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7 
summary and Main Findings
This report analyses labour market and wage developments in the European Union in 2007 from a 
macroeconomic perspective, looking at the main geographical aggregations.1 The macroeconomic 
focus has been adopted in order to shed light on the interaction of employment trends with 
developments of key macroeconomic variables such as productivity and GDP. This report is a 
contribution to the overall efforts to upgrade the monitoring of macroeconomic developments in the 
EU and the euro area within the framework of the revamped Lisbon strategy for “Growth and Jobs” 
and the EMU@10 Communication. 2 To this end, it presents an analytical interpretation of the most 
recent trends and prospects on both the quantity side (participation, unemployment and employment 
rates) and the labour cost side (wage and unit labour cost developments). The report includes a 
statistical annex that provides data on key labour market aggregates for each Member States.
Employment and unemployment developments
2007 was a year of relatively strong growth in the EU economy, notwithstanding the significant 
uncertainties all industrialised countries faced in the second half of the year amid global financial 
turmoil. The dynamism that had characterised the EU labour market from the mid 1990s also 
continued in 2007. EU employment grew at the highest rate since 2000 (1.8%) and almost 4 million 
jobs were created. In 2007, the ratio of employment to working age population rose to a peak of 
65.4%. Net job creation was particularly robust in Poland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Germany. 
Employment developments can usually be expected to weaken with a lag compared to GDP growth. 
In light of the downward revisions to the growth projection and of the uncertainty created by the 
recent financial shakeout, the outlook for the employment situation has turned less favourable. For 
the near term, this view is supported by the recent marked deterioration in the survey data concerning 
employment expectations of businesses and households.
The expansion of the workforce involved all segments of the labour force in 2007. Female and older 
workers’ employment continued to grow at a sustained pace (+2.2% and 4.7%). The large increase 
in the employment of older and female workers has been one of the most remarkable developments 
of the last decade. A salient feature of 2007 was the vigorous acceleration of male employment (1.6% 
against an average of 0.7 over the 2000-2006 period). For the second year in a row, youth employment 
saw a significant increase, shared equally between men and women (about 1.5%). 
The strong gains in employment mainly reflected the creation of more stable payrolls, with permanent 
employment accounting for about 80% of total employment growth. The share of employees in 
temporary contracts reached 14.5% in the EU, 2.3 pp higher than in the year 2000. This proportion 
does not generally reflect a voluntary choice by workers, as about 60% of those in temporary positions 
declared that they would have liked to have a permanent job but were not able to find one. The 
evidence suggests that the proportion of those that find themselves in less stable jobs by force of 
circumstances is correlated with the strictness of the employment protection legislation. The 
1 An exhaustive panorama of recent developments in European labour markets is provided by the annual Employment in 
Europe report published by the European Commission (DG Employment) downloadable at http://ec.europa.eu/
employment_social/employment_analysis/employ_en.htm. More detailed analysis on reforms of labour market institutions 
can be found in reports related to the Lisbon strategy and the Integrated Guidelines, which encompass the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the European Employment Guidelines. The recent assessment of the national reform 
programmes, along with a detailed analysis of the employment aspects of the programmes at national level can be found in 
the Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council, “A year of delivery” The European 
Commission’s 2006 Annual Progress Report on Growth and Jobs” at http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/annual-
report-1206_en.htm. The most recent Joint Employment Report evaluating labour market reforms in 2006/2007 undertaken 
in response to the Employment Guidelines, within the framework of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs 
(2005-2008), can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/employ_en.htm and   
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/annual- report_en.htm.
2 See Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2005-2008).
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proportion of those who declare themselves to involuntarily be in temporary employment is 
characterised by a strong cyclical pattern, fairly closely reflecting different consumers’ and employers’ 
perception of future labour market developments. 
The imbalance between labour demand and supply is reflected in the unemployment rate, which in 
July 2008 reached the historically low rate of 6.8 percent (7.3% for the euro area). This improvement 
was fairly uniform across different age groups. The decline in the unemployment rate has been 
associated with a reduction in the rate of long-term unemployment and a shortening in the average 
duration of unemployment spells. Yet the long-term unemployment and the average unemployment 
duration picked up in the recently acceded Member States (RAMS), a development which calls for 
a careful monitoring over the medium-term. In 2007, about 55% of all job seekers in the RAMS were 
unemployed for 12 months or more, much higher than the average long-term unemployment of the 
remaining member states (about 40%). 
The strong growth of employment has been associated with an increase in labour supply, which, in 
turns, reflects an increase in the participation rate - to 70.5% – as well as in the working age 
population, the latter mainly driven by the remarkable expansion of non-nationals. The inactive 
proportion of the total population aged 15-64 decreased almost everywhere. Although it is too early 
to consider the development in these two countries as a new trend, it should be monitored carefully, 
as it could signal potential inflationary pressures owing to a binding labour supply. There is a labour 
supply potential that needs to be activated in view also of the ageing of the population, to mitigate 
possible pressures on wages arising from buoyant demand for labour. 
Although the good macroeconomic fundamentals may have played a role, the labour market 
improvements observed so far are also a sign that structural reforms have started to pay-off. In 
addition to an, although imperfect, liberalisation of the labour market, the reduction of disincentives 
to work and to hire, especially for the low-skilled, embedded in tax and benefit systems, a greater 
link with activation policies and a stronger reliance on preventive and targeted ALMPs, and a 
widespread wage moderation are all factors that have contributed to the structural improvement in 
the functioning of labour markets. The Commission has stressed the importance of labour market 
reforms that shift the focus from protection on the job to insurance in the market.3 These reforms 
would enable workers to move smoothly from declining to expanding activities, thus easing tensions 
in the adjustment process, while ensuring adequate income support and responding to anxiety of 
European citizens. 
Recent trends in wages and labour cost
Wage continued moderation in the euro area during 2007. 
Wage growth has surprised on the downside in recent years, especially in the light of the buoyancy 
of the euro-area labour market. Overall, aggregate wage increases in the euro area over the past years 
have been moderate, thus contributing to job creation. Nominal unit labour costs have also been 
supportive of the goal of price stability. However, there are important differences between Member 
States. Much of the overall benign wage developments in recent years can be attributed to significant 
wage moderation in Germany where nominal unit labour costs stagnated over the period 2002 to 
2007, thereby helping to correct the accumulated loss in competitiveness in the aftermath of 
reunification. In other countries, however, developments of nominal unit labour costs have not always 
contributed to moderate inflation. Should wage behaviour in Germany return to more standard growth 
patterns, while remaining unchanged in other countries, price pressures as a whole would rise.
Signs of wage acceleration emerged in 2007q4 and continued over the first half of 2008. The risk is 
that the last hikes in  energy prices, although partially reverted in recent weeks, will trigger a wage-
3 European Commission Communication “Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity”, COM(2007) 359 final. Flexicurity 
involves the combination of flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, 
effective active labour market policies, and modern, adequate and sustainable social protection systems.
9 
price spiral, which could potentially be fed by imitation effects between different national jurisdictions 
or sectors. 
While evidence of second-round effects is scant, there is concern that they could materialise and 
become entrenched in wage bargaining behaviour. The greatest upside risks stem from concerns about 
workers’ declining purchasing power after a prolonged period of wage compression and, despite the 
recent decrease, of still high consumer inflation perceptions and expectations. Wage growth can be 
fuelled by past inflation and have an effect on future inflation if employers can pass additional costs 
to their costumers via higher prices. If such increases are entrenched in private inflation expectations, 
the risk of a price-wage spiral via second-round effects will be higher. Short-term inflation expectations 
based on the EU’s consumer survey have been increasing in the euro area until June 2008, softening 
in July and decreasing significantly in August and September. High profit margins and increased 
competition in some countries and sectors, together with a lower projected demand, should put a lid 
on further price increases.
However, wage claims are likely to be dampened by the sharper-than-expected weakening in 
economic activity. Although unemployment has remained at low levels and employment growth has 
been buoyant so far, the economic slowdown is set  to affect the labour market, albeit with some lags. 
DG ECFIN business surveys for 2008 suggest weaker employment growth and higher unemployment 
compared to the recent past. Looking forward, the Commission’s Spring September Interim forecasts 
expect labour market pressures to ease over 2008-09. The unemployment gap (i.e. the gap between 
the observed and the equilibrium unemployment rate given by the NAWRU) should widen somewhat, 
dampening wage pressures.
When a supply shock occur, it is difficult to predict whether higher inflation expectations would 
persist or even increase further. On the one hand, if the increases in wage and price inflation persist, 
the ECB will be forced to tighten its monetary policy beyond what the effective inflation figures and 
real economic developments would imply, just to curb inflation expectations. This might increase the 
cost of inflation in terms of potential output losses, though the increased flexibility of the labour 
market might partially offset the medium-term consequences of a restrictive monetary policy causing 
a larger but faster adjustment of the unemployment rate. On the other hand, if moderation in wage 
claims were to continue this might soften the adjustment burden, which would otherwise fall mainly 
on monetary policy and on real economic activity. 
Price stability is put under strain by substantial changes in relative prices due to more limited supply 
of natural resources and changes in the composition of consumption patterns at the global level. 
Social partners can play an active role in ensuring a smooth adjustment to the deterioration in the 
terms of trade. At the aggregate euro-area level, this smooth adjustment may require nominal wages 
developments not to exceed the sum of trend productivity4 plus the price stability target of the ECB 
of close to but below 2%. This would suggest an increase of wages not higher than about 3% on 
average, though a country’s competitive position must be taken at the national level. Similarly, 
national authorities may take into account the inflationary consequences of excessive increases in 
indirect taxes and public wages.
In the short term, if the impact of reforms is limited, wage earners will likely have to help absorb the 
supply shock by further moderation in their nominal wages. Labour cost moderation will be 
particularly needed in those countries that have seen competitiveness losses in the past. The impact 
of wage indexation should be strictly monitored, to avoid fuelling a wage-price spiral.
The burden of adjustment cannot fall wholly on wages. In the medium term, policy measures should 
also aim to increase competition. Enhanced competition and continued increases in productivity will 
be key to accommodate the deterioration in the terms of trade. High energy prices are likely to prevail 
4 The average trend productivity growth, measured in terms of real GDP per hour worked, has been 1.2% in the euro area 
(EA12) over the period 1996-2007, with marked differences cross member states, ranging from 0.4% in Italy and Spain to 
5.3% in Ireland.  
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in the medium and long term in the face of continued strong demand from emerging economies and 
supply constraints. Actions should also be undertaken to improve substitution between the various 
energy resources and facilitate the structural shift to more sustainable patterns of production, transport 
and consumption, as proposed by the Commission in its Climate and Energy policy. In this regard, 
it is important to ensure consistency between short term and long term measures as well as between 
policies at both national and EU level. Finally, the significant changes in relative prices in the 
economy and the ensuing reallocation of resources strongly point to the need to ensure flexible 
product and labour markets.
Fiscal instruments (e.g. reduction of taxation on labour) could be used to support the poorer segments 
of the population and preserve their purchasing power, although how any tax reductions might be 
financed would need to be considered very carefully. These policies would contribute to offset the 
effects of the downward adjustment of real wages which would be required in the case of a permanent 
supply shock. 
The EMU@10 Communication5 stress deeper fiscal policy coordination and surveillance, the 
broadening of macroeconomic surveillance beyond fiscal policy and the better integration of structural 
reform in overall policy-coordination within EMU. Increased policy coordination and adequate policy 
surveillance need to comprise a wider set of economic and fiscal policies, structural policies, policies 
that may help to address the impact of idiosyncratic shocks faced by individual countries within the 
monetary union, as well as all policies that are particularly likely to generate spill-over effects to 
other euro-area countries.
While structural reforms are no short-term panacea, ambitious agendas could make macroeconomic 
policies more credible and could bolster investor and consumer confidence, enhancing the economy’s 
resilience in face of sectoral or country specific shocks. A smooth adjustment to these shocks may 
require restructuring of the euro-area economy, which means the necessity of moving factors from 
one type of output to another. Where factor mobility is low, the misallocation and loss in output and 
welfare, respectively, are likely to be significant. Reforms that reduce rigidities and provide support 
to those undergoing transitions across different occupations and sectors may therefore be crucial also 
in the short-term.
The economic impact of migration in receiving countries
Few issues seem to be as controversial as international migration. For many countries immigration 
has been an important component of economic development, yet in recent years there has been a 
backlash against it. It has been argued that further inflows of immigrants will have a negative impact 
on labour market opportunities for native workers.  Many consider that more job seekers from abroad 
means fewer jobs, or lower wages, for native workers, especially for those at the bottom end of the 
wage distribution.  The costs of integration and the higher claims by immigrants of welfare benefits 
are often considered to put a strain on the financing of the welfare state. 
Unsurprisingly, it is not easy to reach a consensus view. Different people weigh differently the well-
being of natives, of new and old migrants as well as that of different groups of natives. Who gains 
and who loses from immigration has become a hotly debated issue.  
Few economists would however dispute the positive contribution that immigration can make to total 
output. Immigration brings in more workers and yields more output. It creates opportunities for 
growth and jobs and, in an economy rapidly adapting to change, should not raise unemployment. 
More foreign workers does not imply fewer natives in employment or lower wages, for the same 
reason that more natives in the labour market does not imply a higher unemployment rate. An increase 
in the foreign labour supply will trigger an adjustment process that ultimately “shifts the labour 
5 European Commission (2008) “EMU@10 Successes and challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary Union”, 
European Economy, 2, 2008.
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demand out”. When more people enter the labour market, the amount of capital each worker is 
endowed with falls, making it profitable for firms to invest in physical capital. Foreign workers also 
produce and consume new goods and services. By virtue of their links with the country of origin, 
migrants promote trade between the home and the host countries. Being more mobile than natives, 
foreign workers tend to cluster in areas where they are most needed, i.e. where wages are the highest 
for the type of skills they offer.
Where regional differences persist (i.e. labour shortages are geographically concentrated), immigration 
flows into high wage regions speed up the process of matching of people with jobs, thereby helping 
to equalise the value of the marginal product across different geographical areas. Spatial arbitrage by 
foreign workers thus “greases the wheels” of the labour market.
The adjustment mechanisms caused by immigration may take time to have an effect on the rest of 
the economy. In the short-term, an increase in foreign labour may reduce the wages of those native-
born workers that are more in competition with immigrants. Thus, immigrants hurt the labour market 
outcomes of the workers they compete with. Conversely, an increase in foreign labour raises the 
wages of those natives who complement immigrant labour in production. This implies that a rise in 
employment of foreigners also increases employment of complementary native workers. When wages 
cannot be adjusted in response to a change in the labour supply, an increase in foreign workers leads 
to higher unemployment and/or inactivity of the affected groups. Conversely, policies that make real 
wages more flexible may reduce the effects on unemployment. 
As the European population becomes more educated and older, less educated immigrants supply a 
skill level which is much in demand. Low-skilled immigrants work in domestic services and nursing, 
providing childcare or elderly care. This has a particularly positive impact in labour terms if it allows 
another adult (often skilled) in the household to work, especially in countries where the public 
provision of care is less developed. But the complementarity of skills also plays a role in the case of 
better-educated immigrants. The native workers who gain most are those whose skills differ most 
from that of the immigrants. 
Immigration of skilled workers not only can help alleviate labour shortages, but the increased return 
of capital resulting from the immigration of talented people tends to create investment opportunities, 
especially in knowledge intensive sectors. Skilled immigrants may also have a favourable effect on 
income distribution. More skilled immigrant implies more competition for highly educated natives. 
Skilled immigrants also earn more, pay higher taxes, and require fewer social services than the less-
skilled. A balanced inflow of high- and low-skilled immigrants would lead to a better match between 
jobs and qualifications and would improve productivity.
The main uncertainty is about who are the gainers and losers from the distributive effects of migration. 
It is clear that immigrants gain in one way, since in the host country they are likely to be paid much 
more than what they could get in similar occupations in their home countries. A large majority of 
Europeans also benefit from immigration, especially if their skills and educational background are 
different from the immigrants’. The empirical evidence reviewed suggests that the effect of 
immigration on the labour market, if there is one, is very small, with the possible exception of the 
least skilled domestic workers.
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PARt I — Employment and wage developments
1.1. EmploymEnt and EmploymEnt ratEs
overall employment performance: robust 
growth in 2007 
In 2007 the economic activity of the EU 
expanded at a healthy pace (2.9%), although 
signs of moderation occurred in the fourth 
quarter. Aided by resilient economic growth, 
employment (based on National Accounts) 
continued to expand at about the same rate as in 
2006, 1.8% on a yearly basis for both the EU and 
the euro area, the largest increase since 2000. 
However, employment growth decelerated in 
12 Member States, among these Spain, Ireland, 
Italy, and Romania (Graph 1 and Statistical 
Annex). The strong pick up in employment 
recorded in 2006 continued in 2007, especially 
in Germany (1.7%), where employment was for 
the first time above the 2001 level, France (1.3%) 
and Poland (4.5%) - Graph 2. 
According to Labour Force Statistics, the number 
of persons employed in the EU increased in 2007 
by about 3.9 millions (1.8%), of which 
2.8 millions in the euro area (2.7%) - Table 2.6 
The population aged between 55 and 64 (the 
older workers) increased by 1.2 million, those 
aged between 25 and 54 (the prime age workers) 
and between 15 and 24 (the young workers) 
contributed  respectively 2.4 millions and 323000 
to the overall increase in employment. For older 
workers, employment expanded at the same rate 
experienced during 2001-2006, while young 
workers saw the strongest gains since 2001. Both 
male and female employment witnessed high 
growth compared to the 2001-2006 average. 
Employment was particularly dynamic for the 
6 These figures are based on labour force surveys (LFS) and 
refer to the age group 15-64. In some countries (notably 
Spain, Italy and the UK, but also Germany and Sweden), 
some labour market data have been revised over the most 
recent years, following revisions in the structure of the 
labour force survey and updating in the official estimates of 
population. This may have created some breaks in the 
series, making the comparison with past years more 
difficult. The differences between the National Accounts 
(henceforth NA) and LFS concept are discussed in the box 
“The Measure of employment in National Accounts and in 
the Labour Force Survey”. Data on employment by gender 
and age group exist only from the LFS.
high-skilled, while growth was negative for less 
educated persons.
At the national level, significant positive 
contributions were recorded in those countries 
which exepreinced a relatively modest 
employment performance in 2000-2006, i.e. 
Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland 
(Graph 2). The increase in employment growth 
was largely the result of the increase in the 
number of women in France, of men in Austria. 
Consistently with the NA figures, employment 
growth based on Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
decelerated in Italy (by 0.8pp from the 1.8% in 
2006), Spain (down from 4.1% to 3.1% in 2006), 
Ireland (down by 1pp to 3.4%) and the UK 
(down by 0.1pp. to 0.3%). Employment losses 
were registered for both men and women in 
Denmark and, only for women, in Hungary.  
The breakdown of employment growth by age 
groups reveals a more dynamic employment 
compared to the 2000-2006 average for young 
workers, especially in Germany (+3.8% 
compared to 2% of one year earlier), the 
Netherlands (up to 4.2% from 2.1%), Finland 
(6.7%), and Sweden (8%). Conversely, in 2007 
employment of young people fell in Portugal 
(-5.1%), Greece (-4.3%), Hungary (-3.7%), Italy 
(-3.2%), Spain (-1.9%) and the UK (-0.6%). The 
number of prime-age male workers increased 
everywhere but Denmark, where it dropped by 
0.2% year over year, owing to the decline in the 
male component (-0.6%).
Foreign population is the main contributor 
to overall population growth in the EU
In 2007, the working age population increased at 
the same rate as 2006, namely 0.4% or about 
1.2 millions, below the peak achieved in 2005 
(2.2 millions). This increase was mainly due to 
the expansion of the resident foreign population 
(+1.5 million). From the EU perspective, it is 
appropriate to distinguish nationals from other 
EU Member States, for whom free movement 
within the EU generally applies, from third 
country nationals, which are subject to the 
immigration and asylum legislation of each 
country. In 2007, both components grew, with 
the citizens from countries outside EU27 
accounting for more than 75% (80%) of the 
1. GENERAl DEvElOPMENts IN 2007
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increase in the EU (euro area) population aged 
between 15 and 647. Thus, both the intra-EU 
mobility and migration from the non-EU 
countries increased.
stronger increase in the overall and the youth 
employment rates in 2007
In 2007, the employment rate rose in the EU and 
in the Euro area by almost 1 pp. (respectively up 
to 65.4 and to 65.7%), more than the 1996-2005 
average (0.6 pp). Yet the employment rate 
remains about 4 pp below the Lisbon target of 
70%. The increase of the employment rate was 
sizeable in Bulgaria (3.1 pp), Poland (2.6 pp), 
Germany (1.8 pp), the Netherlands (1.6 pp) and 
the Baltic countries (by about 1.5pp on average). 
Conversely, the employment rate declined in 
Denmark (-0.2 pp), the UK (-0.2 pp) and Portugal 
(by 0.1 pp to 67.8%). 
7 In the LFS employed are all residents in a country, either 
nationals or foreigners, A further distinction is made  
between non-nationals but citizens of other EU27 countries 
and citizens of countries outside the EU27. Thus, an 
increase in the number of foreigners with nationality from 
one EU country employed in another country of the Union 
implies higher intra-EU mobility. Conversely, an increase 
in the number of those with nationality from non-EU 
country implies higher international migration.
The employment rate of foreigners, both from 
the EU and from non-EU countries, increased by 
about 0.8 pp to respectively 69.5 and 78% of the 
relevant population. The decline in the working 
age population of the young observed in 2006 
continued in 2007 at the about the same pace 
(-0.6%). Owing to this fall and dynamic job 
creation, the employment rate of the young rose 
by 0.8 pp., to stand 37.2%. 
The labour market recovery of 2007 strengthened 
the gains in the employment rate registered in 
recent years. After the modest improvements 
observed during the period 2001-2004, the 
overall employment rate increased significantly 
between 2005 and 2007 both in the EU (by 2.6 pp 
up to 65.4%) and the Euro area (by 2.9 p.p. from 
62.8% up to 65.7%). All countries except Greece 
and Italy performed better in the second period 
compared to the first. For the EU as a whole, the 
pick up was stronger for countries with relatively 
low rates, implying cross-countries convergence 
in employment rates. Even so, convergence was 
driven by the EU Member States that do not 
participate in the EMU.
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table 1 – key labour market indicators in the EU27 - 2007
Structure of employment - EU27 – 2007
Thousand of persons 
or % 
Percentage change 
2006-2007
Percentage change 
2001-2007
Total employment 214673 1.80% 7.10%
Men 118665 1.60% 5.00%
Women 96009 2.20% 9.80%
Employees 180196 2.10% 8.60%
Self-employed 21387 1.00% 12.50%
Employers 9547 1.20% -4.30%
Family workers 3477 -4.60% -35.00%
Permanent Employment 188670 1.70% 4.90%
Fixed-term and temporary employment 26003 2.70% 26.50%
Full-time employment 176261 2.50% 4.80%
Part-time employment 37616 2.80% 19.70%
High-skilled 55993 3.70% 27.20%
Medium-skilled 106417 2.00% 11.10%
Low-skilled 51804 -0.60% -8.90%
Unemployed 16694 -12.10% -12.50%
women 8449 -12.70% -12.30%
men 8246 -11.50% -12.70%
Labour force 231368 0.70% 5.40%
women 127113 0.50% 3.70%
men 104254 0.90% 7.60%
Participation rate (ages 15-64) 70.5 0.2 2
women 63.3 0.3 3.2
men 77.6 0.1 0.8
Employment rate (ages 15-64) 65.4 0.9 2.9
women 58.3 1 4
men 72.5 0.9 1.7
older workers (55-64) 44.7 1.2 7.2
Unemployment rate 7.1 -1 -1.4
women 7.8 -1.1 -1.6
men 6.6 -1 -1.1
Long-term unemployment rate 42.8 -2.8 -4
women 42.5 -2.8 -5.4
men 43.1 -2.8 -2.7
Youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24) 15.5 -1.8 -1.8
women 15.8 -1.9 -2.1
men 15.2 -1.8 -1.7
Source: Eurostat (lFs);1 Data do not add up to total employment due to non responses.
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Graph 1 – Employment growth in the European Union 
Source: Commission services.
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table 2 – Employment growth - Contribution by gender and age groups (in %) 
2006 - 2007 2000 - 2006
EU27 Euro area EU15 EU27 Euro area EU15
Growth 
rate
Contri-
bution 
Growth 
rate
Contri-
bution 
Growth 
rate
Contri-
bution 
Growth 
rate
Contri-
bution 
Growth 
rate
Contri-
bution 
Growth 
rate
Contri-
bution 
Employment 
growth:
1.8 (100%) 2.7 (100%) 1.7 (100%) 1.0 (100%) 1.9 (100%) 1.2 (100%)
Young (15-24) 1.5 8% 2.2 8% 1.2 8% -0.4 -4% 0.6 3% 0.3 3%
Prime  age (25-54) 1.4 61% 2.2 66% 1.3 60% 0.8 64% 1.8 72% 1.0 61%
Older (55-64) 4.7 30% 6.2 26% 4.5 32% 4.2 41% 5.0 24% 4.4 36%
MALE: 1.6 48% 2.2 46% 1.3 44% 0.7 37% 1.4 42% 0.8 35%
Young (15-24) 1.4 5% 1.8 4% 0.9 3% -0.2 -1% 0.7 2% 0.3 1%
Prime  age (25-54) 1.1 27% 1.8 29% 1.0 24% 0.4 19% 1.2 28% 0.4 16%
Older (55-64) 4.4 17% 5.3 13% 3.9 16% 3.4 20% 3.8 12% 3.4 17%
FEMALE: 2.2 52% 2.2 54% 2.1 56% 1.5 62% 1.7 57% 1.9 64%
Young (15-24) 1.5 4% 2.7 5% 1.5 4% -0.5 -3% 0.5 1% 0.3 1%
Prime  age (25-54) 4.4 35% 2.8 37% 1.7 36% 3.4 44% 2.5 44% 1.6 44%
Older (55-64) 5.2 14% 7.4 13% 5.3 16% 5.5 20% 6.9 12% 6.1 19%
Source: Commission services based on lFs, Eurostat.
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Graph 2 – Average employment growth by age groups
 
Source: Commission services.
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Box 1: The measuremenT of employmenT in naTional accounTs and in The laBour force survey
LFS and National Accounts (NA) are the two main sources of employment statistics.1 The National 
Accounts estimate of employment identifies the input of labour that has contributed to the production 
of domestic output. LFS registers the employment status and labour market participation of the resident 
population in the reference week of the survey. In some countries, NA employment estimates draw on 
the LFS and a combination of other sources (e.g. depending on the country: social security records, 
household surveys, business surveys, tax records, population census etc.). Adjustments are done to 
ensure comprehensiveness and to avoid double counting and to ensure consistency with other NA 
estimates (e.g. output and wage and salaries). Thus, national accounts and LFS employment levels and 
growth rates may differ substantially (Table 3). This difference is also not stable over time. The growth 
of employment based on NA is higher than the growth rate based on LFS in some years but not in 
others. 
table 3 – Comparison of employment level and growth in 2007 according to the data source 
2000 2007
Employment (Total) 
National accounts
Employment (15-max) 
LFS
Employment (Total) 
National accounts
Employment (15-max) 
LFS
Country Level growth level growth level growth level growth
BE 4142 2 4093 2.1 4408 1.7 4380 2.7
DK 2760 0.4 2713 0.5 2831 1.4 2804 -0.1
DE 39038 1.8 36324 0.7 39687 1.7 38210 2.2
GR 4255 -0.2 4088 1.4 4705 1.2 4510 1.3
ES 16399 5 15506 5.6 20580 3.1 20356 3.1
FR 24332 2.7 23123 2.7 25696 1.3 25642 1.9
IE 1696 4.6 1692 3.6 2116 3.6 2112 3.6
IT 22498 1.9 21080 1.9 24929 0.9 23222 1
LU 185 2.8 181 2.7 207 1.9 203 3.9
NL 8108 2.2 7870 3.5 8566 2.4 8464 2.5
AT 3766 1.1 3713 0.6 3988 1.9 4028 2.5
PT 5030 2.1 5021 2.3 5121 0 5170 0.2
FI 2302 2.2 2335 1.7 2492 1.9 2492 2
SE 4291 2.5 4125 1.8 4516 2.2 4541 2.5
UK 27477 1.2 27185 0.9 29219 0.7 28441 0.4
CY 315 1.7 294 5.2 385 3.2 378 5.8
CZ 4825 -0.1 4681 -0.7 4987 1.8 4922 1.9
EE 575 -1.3 572 -1.3 657 1.4 655 1.4
HU 3844 1.3 3829 1 3899 -0.1 3926 -0.1
LT 1399 -4 1398 -4 1515 1.9 1534 2.3
LV 944 -2.9 941 -2.8 1111 3.5 1118 2.8
MT 146 2.3 143 : 158 2.7 156 2.1
PL 14526 -1.6 14526 -2.8 15240 4.5 15240 4.4
SK 2102 -1.4 2102 -1.4 2357 2.4 2358 2.4
SI 905 1.3 901 2 960 2.7 985 2.5
BG 3239 4.9 2795 : 3714 2.8 3253 4.6
RO 9919 2.5 10653 0 9645 1.3 9353 0.7
Source: Commission services.
The main differences between National Accounts and LFS concern the geographical coverage, age 
boundary, population covered, definition of employment/self-employment. 
Geographical coverage
National Accounts recognise two employment concepts: resident persons employed (i.e. the national 
concept) and employment in resident production units irrespective of the place of residence of the 
employed (i.e. domestic concept). LFS is a survey based on resident households. As such it gives 
1 For the pros and cons of LFS as source for the National Accounts estimates see de la Fuente, A. and Lequiller, F. 
(2006) “Measuring employment in National Accounts” Eighth Meeting of the Group of experts on National 
Accounts http://www.unece.org/stats/documents/2006.04.sna.htm .  
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information on the major part of the national concept, but national households abroad are not covered 
(e.g. staff of national embassies working abroad and/or crews in national fishing boats). The National 
Accounts employment measure is based on the domestic concept which is a more appropriate measure 
of the labour input for gross domestic product. This means that LFS data must be adjusted, mainly for 
cross-border workers, to be consistent with the NA concept of employment. LFS gives information on 
the national concept (i.e. resident workers). To change over from the resident concept to the domestic 
concept, non-residents working in the country are added and residents working abroad are subtracted.
Age boundary
LFS usually excludes from the definition of employment those persons of age below 15 (in some 
countries below 16) and above 75, while National Accounts register all persons engaged in some 
productive activity irrespective of age. 
Employment	definition
There are two ways of looking at employment: the number of people with jobs, or the number of jobs. 
The two concepts are not the same because some employed may hold more than one job. The NA 
concept of employment is based on persons engaged in economic activity, which includes all persons 
engaged in some production activity, hence more than one job is registered. This means that persons 
performing several jobs at the same time are covered many times in National Accounts but only once 
in the LFS, namely according to their main job. Thus, the average annual number of jobs exceeds the 
annual number of person employed by the average annual number of second, third etc. jobs. There is 
one minor difference between a job as defined in NA and the category of persons “with a job but not at 
work” who are considered as employed according to the LFS (ILO definition), which usually is adopted 
by the LFS.  In the ILO definition, the employed may include persons who are not being paid but have 
a “formal attachment to their job” in the form of “an assurance of return to work ... or an agreement as 
to the date of return”.  Such an understanding between an employer and a person on layoff or away on 
training is not counted as a job in the NA. This difference seems to be relevant in some countries such 
as Denmark.
The number of people with jobs is measured by the LFS and includes people aged 15 or over who do 
paid work (as an employee or self-employed), those who have a job but are temporarily away from, 
those on government-supported training and employment programmes, and those doing unpaid family 
work. To be counted as employed in the LFS one person should 
• have worked at least one hour in exchange of some monetary or in kind compensation;
• have worked at least one hour with no compensation for one member of the family; 
• be absent from work for holidays or sickness (for not more than three months) or receive, while not 
working, at least 50% of the salary;
• self-employed persons absent from work are regarded as in employment only if they can be said to 
have a business, farm or professional practice. 
In many countries, the LFS does not inquire persons living in institutional collective households (e.g. 
members of the armed forces living in military quarters, detainees in prisons, religious in monasteries 
etc.). In LFS, conscripts, unpaid apprentices and trainees, and persons in extended parental leave are 
not included in employment, while they are in National Accounts. The difference between the level of 
employment based on NA and that based on the LFS accounted by conscripts and people living in 
institutional households is of second order. Contrary to the NA, no adjustment is done in LFS for the 
underground economy. Finally, there are other differences that affect the borderline between employees 
and self-employed, while not influencing the total employment levels. For instance, sometimes owners 
of quasi-corporations are re-allocated from self-employed (in LFS) to employees (in National 
Accounts). 
22
European Economy No 5/2008
labour market and wage developments in 2007
As expected when the economic recovery is at 
an advanced stage of the economic cycle, the 
bulk of employment growth in 2007 was 
accounted for by full-time positions (about 80% 
of total growth in employment), especially of 
males (Graph 3). Part-time work, accounting for 
18.2% of total employment in the EU27 (19.6% 
in the euro area), is largely dominated by women 
(accounting for more than 30% of total female 
employment in the EU and about 35% in the 
euro area ) and people with upper secondary 
education (about 55% of employees with part-
time contracts). 
The share of temporary contracts went further 
up, reaching 14.5% of overall employment in the 
EU27 and almost 17% in the euro area. People 
of age below 39 are overrepresented in the group 
of those employed with a temporary contract 
(3 out of 4 employed with a temporary contract 
are aged below 39). But the strong momentum in 
the labour market gave also impulse to the 
creation of more stable jobs. Permanent 
employment picked up sharply in 2005 and 2006 
and continued at about that brisk pace also in 
2007. Yet, the number of persons that declared 
themselves involuntarily employed with a 
temporary contract increased significantly. 
Among those working with temporary contracts, 
there is a rising number of persons who would 
like a permanent position but could not find one 
(about 60% in  both the EU and the Euro area in 
2007, against an average of 52.5% in 2005). 
A cross-country comparison showhs that this 
percentage tends to be higher in the countries 
with more regulated labour markets (Graph 4). 
Almost one quarter of the cross-country 
variability in the share of people with involuntary 
temporary contracts is accounted for by 
differences in the tightness of employment 
protection regulation.8 Thus, the dual character 
of the labour market appears more prevalent with 
more regulated labour markets.
However, involuntarily temporary employment 
is not only the result of a dual labour market with 
an inner core of permanent workers and an 
external group of peripheral work. Indeed, there 
is a distinctive pro-cyclical pattern in the 
proportion of those declaring themselves 
involuntarily in temporary payrolls (Graph 4), 
which appears to be inversely related to the 
deviations of consumers’ from employers’ 
expectations on the short-term labour market 
developments. 
At the member state level, the highest share of 
temporary positions is observed in Spain (32%), 
below the decade-peak of 34% reached in 2006 
(Graph 5). While largely below the EU average, 
the share of temporary jobs more than doubled 
in Ireland to reach 7.3%, reversing the falling 
trend of the previous years. Conversely, it 
increased further in Portugal (to 22.4%, the 
highest share since 1986), Slovenia and Poland, 
8 For the sample of euro-area countries, differences in the 
tightness of the employment protection legislation account 
for about 2/5th of the differences in the share of 
involuntary temporary contracts. 
Business surveys as source of employment data 
Finally, employment figures produced by business surveys and used sometime in NA may differ from 
the LFS for a series of reasons. Business surveys (BS) gather information on production units operating 
in the territory whereas LFS gathers information on people living in the country. Cross-border workers, 
or seasonal workers, are correspondingly recorded in different countries. LFS does not cover people 
living in collective households. BS typically do not gather information on certain economic activities, 
like agriculture or some services. Business surveys estimate the number of jobs whereas LFS counts 
jobholders. BS are based on business registers that may not include small enterprises below a certain 
threshold. As business surveys inquire employment simultaneously to other variables like turnover or 
profits, they are more exposed to underreporting of employment than household surveys. In addition, 
employment not included in the payroll or in the accounting books, like trainees or family aids, could 
be left out. 
All in all, National Accounts are judged more suitable to measure employment levels, employment 
growth and industry breakdowns. LFS is more adequate to measure participation in the labour market 
(i.e. employment rates, activity rates, flows between employment and unemployment, etc.), demographic 
or social breakdowns (e.g. by age, gender or educational level). 
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were about 30% of the payroll employment in 
2007 was made of temporary contracts.
perceived labour market developments 
and involuntary temporary employment 
In adjusting their workforce, employers must 
decide how many workers to hire relative to 
changes in production. When uncertainties about 
the strength and duration of the expansion 
prevail, the use of less stable employment to 
save on hiring and firing costs would prevail on 
the demand side. Thus, temporary employment 
would pick up at the early stages of the 
recovery
Following this hiring strategy, firms would save 
the hiring and firing costs that they would incur 
if a permanent job had been instead offered. On 
the supply side, in an environment of expanding 
economic activity, workers may expect a 
permanent rather than a temporary job offer. 
Thus, a cyclical pattern in those declaring to be 
involuntarily in a temporary job may reflect a 
mismatch between job seekers’ and employers’ 
perceptions about the state of the economy, 
which arise as the expansion reaches its mature 
expansion stage. 
To test the role played by the consumers’ and 
employers’ perceptions, the proportion of those 
involuntarily in temporary employment is 
regressed on a variable measuring the divergence 
between consumers and employers’ expectations 
on labour market developments (Mismatch). An 
increase in Mismatch means that consumers 
expect a deterioration of the labour market 
conditions relative to the employers’. The result 
in Table 4 suggests that, indeed, households’ 
assessment of their position in temporary 
payrolls as involuntary is partly explained by the 
mismatch between employers and households’ 
expectations about the labour market 
conditions. 
table 4 – Determinants of involuntary temporary 
employment: the role of consumers’ and employers 
expectations 
Mismatch between consumers’ and employers’ 
expectations about labour market status 
-0,07**
(-2.29)
Involuntary temporary employment (-1)
-0.46
(-2.44)
MA(1) 
0.91
-26.6
R2
0.15
2.8
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
The Mismatch variable is the difference between the consumers’ 
unemployment expectations over the next 12 months and the 
employment expectations on the months ahead in industry. 
Variables are standardised to have zero mean and variance 1
Source: Commission services.
Graph 3 – Contribution of full-time and permanent employment to total employment growth – EU27
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Graph 4 – Involuntary temporary contracts
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Graph 5 – temporary employment
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Graph 6 – Convergence between the employment rates: 2004-2007 
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Still significant increases in the female and 
older workers employment rate in 2007
The large increase in the employment of older and 
female workers has been one of the most 
remarkable developments of the last decade. The 
job creation for older workers (both men and 
women) accounted for more than three fifth of the 
EU27 total employment growth during the period 
2000-2007. The female component accounted for 
about the same proportion (73%) of total 
employment growth. With rates hovering around 
45 and 58% for the EU as a whole, the female and 
the older workers employment remained the most 
dynamic components also in 2007. 
A closer look at the developments at national 
level reveals sizeable differences in the 
employment rates in some countries in 2007 both 
with respect to 2006 and the 2000-2006 average 
(Graph 7). The overall employment rate has 
dropped in Denmark and the UK by 0.2pp and in 
Portugal by 0.1pp. In Denmark, this fall was 
driven by a drop in the employment rate of those 
aged between 49 and 64 (down in 2007 by about 
1.9 pp, to 95 percent),9 due to both an increase in 
the population and a decline in employment. This 
decline might be a symptom of a “Nordic 
disease”, a referring to the weak incentives for 
9 For those at the higher end of the age distribution, namely 
between 60 and 64 one should go back to 1991 to find a 
drop in employment rate of the same size (-2.7pp).
workers to remain in the labour market because 
of the generosity of the  welfare system, e.g. 
sickness and disability benefits being an 
alternative pathway to early retirement.10 In 
contrast, the decline of employment in the UK 
reflects both a fall in the employment of the 
young - that may have decided to pursue further 
education in a period of cyclical uncertainties - 
and an increase below that of population of 
employment of individuals aged between 45 and 
49. Finally, the decline in the Portuguese 
employment rate derives from a fall in 
employment higher than that in population for 
the young and from an increase in employment 
insufficient to offset the increase in population 
for all other age classes except the 40-44 group. 
A significant drop in the older workers’ 
employment rate was also observed in Hungary, 
where the female employment rate fell by 0.9 pp 
to 26.2%, and Spain, where the male employment 
rate fell by -0.4 pp to 60% whereas the female 
rate went up by 1.4 pp to 30%. In countries such 
as Finland, France, and the Czech Republic the 
increase in the older workers’ employment rate 
remained below the 2000-2006 average. Both the 
10 For Denmark, Larsen and Pedersen (2005) show that the 
availability and/or generosity of retirement programs 
explain the access to early retirement through employment 
and unemployment insurance benefits, while individual 
characteristics are of minor importance. This result applies 
in particular to women. Conversely, the probability of early 
retirement achieved through social welfare a benefit (i.e. 
not work-related benefits) is explained by both individual 
characteristics and the access to retirement programs.
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female and the older workers’ employment rates 
accelerated remarkably in Poland, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Rumania. In other 
countries the pick up in employment rate was 
limited either to women (e.g. Bulgaria and 
Sweden) or to the older workers (e.g. Austria, 
Belgium, Lithuania and Italy). 
As far as the employment rate by nationality is 
concerned, no clear pattern can be identified 
(Graph 8). For the recently acceded Member 
States, the employment rate of nationals rises 
with that of the foreign population. In the 
Southern countries the proportion of foreigners 
in employment is higher than that in the national 
population. The opposite is observed in the 
Nordic countries while less clear is the pattern for 
the other continental European countries. This 
difference across countries in the employment 
rates of non-natives might be related to the 
qualifications of foreign workers, to different 
legal settings and requirements for the asylum 
seekers11 and to the generosity of the welfare 
state. For example, in countries where there is a 
large flux of refugees, labour market participation 
may be initially limited by their status.
11 Asylum seekers are usually not allowed to work while 
their application is processed. 
Graph 7 – Changes in the employment rate relative to the average changes in 2000-2006 (in p.p.) 
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Graph 8 – Employment rates of nationals and foreigners 
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the impact of population and participationrate 
effects on the dynamic of employment 
rates 
The contribution of different gender and age 
groups to the changes in the employment rates 
and the participation rates is shown in Table 5, 
along with the contribution provided by the 
demographic component (for detailed country 
figures see Annex 1). Between 2000 and 2006, 
the older and the prime age female workers were 
the main sources of increases in the employment 
and the participation rates. After being negative 
for the all period, the contribution of the young 
and the prime aged male population turned out 
positive in 2007, mirroring a period of very 
strong labour demand. The contribution of female 
employment rate to the overall employment 
growth increased by 0.2pp, while that of the 
older workers remained the same as the 2000-
2006 period. The impact of the demographic 
effect (that is the shift in the relative share of 
different age and gender groups) on the overall 
employment can be relevant and will be discussed 
in a next section. Between 2000 and 2006 more 
than half of the improvement in the EU 
employment and participation rates were due to 
older workers. In 2007 this contribution was 
relatively muted. 
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table 5 – Employment rate and participation rate contribution to changes by gender and age groups
Employment rate
EU27 Euro area
Rate in: 2007 2006 2007 2006
65.4 64.5 65.7 64.8
 p.p. change in  p.p. change in 
2006-2007 2000-2006 2006-2007 2000-2006
0.5 0.9 100% 0.4 100% 1.0 100% 0.6 1.0
due to shifts in employment rates  of:
Young 0.1 15.0% 0.0 -5% 0.1 13.7% 0.0 0.0
Prime  age 0.6 66.0% 0.2 61% 0.6 61.2% 0.3 0.5
Older 0.2 21.5% 0.2 47% 0.3 26.4% 0.2 0.4
MALE: 0.4 46.5% 0.1 22% 0.4 38.2% 0.1 0.2
Young 0.1 7.9% 0.0 -3% 0.1 5.4% 0.0 0.0
Prime  age 0.3 27.2% 0.0 6% 0.2 20.5% 0.0 0.0
Older 0.1 11.3% 0.1 20% 0.1 12.3% 0.1 0.2
FEMALE: 0.5 56.0% 0.3 80% 0.1 0.6 63.0% 0.4 0.8
Young 0.1 7.0% 0.0 -2% 0.1 8.2% 0.0 0.0
Prime  age 0.4 38.8% 0.2 55% 0.4 40.6% 0.3 0.5
Older 0.1 10.3% 0.1 27% 0.1 14.1% 0.1 0.2
due to demographic effect:
TOTAL: 0.0 -2.6% 0.0 -6% 0.0 -1.4% 0.0 0.0
Young -0.1 -7.0% 0.0 -9% -0.1 -6.9% 0.0 -0.1
Prime  age -0.1 -8.9% 0.0 -11% 0.0 -4.8% 0.0 0.1
Older 0.1 13.3% 0.1 14% 0.1 10.3% 0.0 0.0
due to interaction effect:
0.0 0.1% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1% 0.0 0.0
Participation  rate
EU27 Euro area
Rate in: 2007 2006 2007 2006
70.5 70.3 71.1 70.7
 p.p. change in  p.p. change in 
2006-2007 2000 -    2006 2006-2007 2000 -    2006
0.2 100% 0.3 100% 0.1 0.4 100% 0.5 100%
due to shifts in participation  rates  of:
Young 0.0 -5% 0.0 -13% 0.0 0.0 6% 0.0 0%
Prime  age 0.1 47% 0.2 57% 0.0 0.2 47% 0.3 53%
Older 0.2 74% 0.2 63% 0.0 0.2 52% 0.2 44%
MALE: 0.1 25% 0.1 18% 0.01 0.1 15% 0.1 19%
Young 0.0 -4% 0.0 -7% 0.0 0.0 -2% 0.0 0%
Prime  age 0.0 -7% 0.0 0% 0.0 0.0 -4% 0.0 2%
Older 0.1 36% 0.1 26% 0.0 0.1 21% 0.1 18%
FEMALE: 0.2 91% 0.3 88% 0.1 0.3 90% 0.4 76%
Young 0.00 -2% 0.0 -7% 0.00 0.0 8% 0.0 -1%
Prime  age 0.11 54% 0.2 57% 0.04 0.2 51% 0.3 51%
Older 0.08 38% 0.1 37% 0.03 0.1 31% 0.1 26%
due to demographic effect:
TOTAL: 0.0 -17% 0.0 -10% 0.0 0.0 -6% 0.0 3%
Young -0.1 -37% 0.0 -15% 0.0 -0.1 -20% 0.0 -9%
Prime  age -0.1 -42% 0.0 -16% 0.0 -0.1 -14% 0.0 8%
Older 0.1 63% 0.1 21% 0.0 0.1 28% 0.0 4%
due to interaction effect:
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Commission services.
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1.2. UnEmploymEnt and laboUr sUpply
Should one lose his or her job, (s)he may either 
actively seek work, and be ready to accept one if 
it is offered, or give up search and leave the 
labour force. Thus, the unemployment rate falls 
if either joblessness falls or if the labour supply 
gets smaller. During the 80s and 90s reductions 
in the labour supply were advocated by many as 
a way to solve the unemployment problem. This 
was based on the assumption that the number of 
jobs is fixed - the so-called lump-of-labour 
fallacy - so that a reduction in the competition 
among job seekers, e.g. through early retirement 
of aged workers, would have been sufficient to 
improve the functioning of the labour market.12 
Yet, the empirical evidence does not support the 
view that unemployment can be reduced through 
early retirement or that natives perform better in 
countries that allow fewer immigrants. In 
addition, countries that attempted to reduce 
unemployment via early labour market exit 
experienced the highest natural rate of 
unemployment. For these reasons, developments 
in the unemployment rate should be analysed 
jointly with the changes in the labour supply, an 
approach followed in this section.
In the EU, the labour force expanded by almost 
1.8 millions or 0.8% compared to 2006 
(+1.6 millions of additional persons or 1.1% in 
the euro area), of which almost 1/4 were non-
nationals but citizen of other EU countries and 
40% citizen of countries outside the EU (for the 
euro area the figures are respectively 14% and 
40%). For both the EU and the euro area, the 
increase in the labour supply was mainly due to 
the increase in the resident population 
(respectively by 1.2 millions and 950 thousands) 
and in the overall participation rate, by 0.2 pp to 
70.5% (for the euro area by 0.4 pp to 71.1). The 
female participation rate continued to be the 
most dynamic component, especially for women 
aged between 55 and 64 (+0.9 pp and +1.3 for 
the EU and Euro area). On the contrary, the male 
12 The lump-of-labour thesis is a false assumption that takes 
no account of the dynamics of the labour market. For 
example, an influx of immigrants may force down the level 
of wages employers are willing to pay which in turn may 
make many employers demand more labour or workers at 
that price. The lump-of-labour theory also overlooks the facts 
that some people wish to work longer hours, that older 
workers may be more productive and that migrants are also 
consumers, supporting the creation of new jobs. For its 
endogeneity, the unemployment rate per se is not an adequate 
stand alone indicator of the state of the labour market.
participation rate remained mainly flat, owing to 
the declining rate of the young and to the 
unchanged rate of prime-age workers. 
Taking advantage of the positive growth 
momentum in 2007, the number of people 
economically inactive aged between 15 and 64 
(i.e. those not in employment and unemployed 
according to the ILO definition) continued to fall 
(-0.3pp) but less than in 2006 (-0.5%). In 2007, 
about 30% of the working age population was 
inactive, almost all nationals (95%). Individuals 
with less than secondary education and with 
secondary education account for respectively 50% 
and about 38% of all inactive. Noticeable is the 
difference between the two sexes. The number of 
inactive women dropped for all age groups other 
than the women aged between 55 and 64, for 
which the number of inactive increased by about 
0.6%. In contrast, the number of men out of the 
labour force remained unchanged, owing to a 
decline of inactivity for the young and older 
individuals and to an increase for those aged 
between 25 and 54. According to the LFS, about 
50% of the inactive declare to be in education, 
training or retirement, while 18% is out of the 
labour force, either because looking after children, 
because of incapacitated adults or because 
involved in other family responsibilities.
table 6 – Main reasons for not seeking employment 
Inactive population - Main reasons for not seeking  
employment (as % of total inactive)
EU Euro area
Other reasons 12.2 13.4
Awaiting recall to work (on 
lay-off) 0.3 0.4
Own illness or disability 12.3 10.2
Other family or personal responsibili-
ties 9.7 11.6
Looking after children or 
incapacitated adults 8.1 8.8
In education or training 32.5 30.2
Retired 20.6 21.2
Think no work is available 4.3 4.2
100 100
* Source:	Eurostat	(LFS);	preliminary	figures	2006
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Unemployment edged downward in 2007, 
continuing the pattern of improvement exhibited 
in the previous years. The number of job-seekers 
fell respectively by 2.3 millions in the EU, or 
12%, to 16.7 millions. The unemployment rate 
dropped by 1.1 pp to the historically low level of 
7.2% - down by about 1 pp in the euro area to 
7.5% - with no difference by gender or 
nationality. Most age groups reflected the overall 
pattern, although the largest drop was that of the 
young (-1.8 pp to 15.5%). 
In 2007, the decline in the unemployment rate 
involved all Member States except Ireland (+0.2 
to 4.6%) and Portugal (+0.3 to 8%) - Graph 9. 
The largest reduction was observed in the RAMS, 
especially Poland (down by 4.3 pp to 9.7%), 
Slovakia (down by 2.2 pp to 11.2), Bulgaria 
(down by 2.1 pp 6.9%) and Germany (down by 
1.6 pp to 8.7%, the third largest rate after Slovakia 
and Poland). As a consequence of these patterns, 
the cross-country dispersion of the unemployment 
rates continued to narrow, especially for the non-
EMU countries (Graph 10). The dispersion went 
up slightly in the first three months of 2008, 
owing to the increase in the unemployment rate at 
the higher end of the cross-country distribution - 
namely in Spain. Even so, there is a remarkable 
convergence of the EU Member States 
unemployment rates to a lower average. 
 The length of time persons remain unemployed 
and the reasons for their unemployment are 
important variables in assessing the functioning 
of the job market. The proportion of unemployed 
persons who remained jobless for more than 
12 months (the long term unemployed) edged 
down both in the EU and the Euro area, 
respectively to 42.8 and 43.5% from more than 
45% in 2006 (Graph 9 right panel). In line with 
this decline, the mean duration of unemployment 
- at 11.6 months both for the EU and the euro 
area - was slightly below the figure for 2006. The 
recent decline in the mean duration follows a 
much larger decrease since the late 1990s and 
early 2000s – from 12.8 months for the EU in 
1998 (13.2 for the euro-area) to 11 month, both 
for the EU and the euro area.13 In contrast, in the 
RAMS the long-term unemployment picked up 
until 2005. Afterwards, it started to decline, to 
reach in 2007 a rate that is still well above the 
one prevailing in 2000, an indication of the 
difficulties faced by the job seekers in these 
countries. 
13 The mean unemployment duration is calculated as the 
weighted average of the central values of the intervals of 
unemployment spells (i.e. the classes “less than 1 month”; 
“between 1 and 2”;”between 3 and 5”;”between 6 and 
11;”between 12 and 17;”between 18 and 23”; “between 24 
and 47”; “48 months or more”) with weights the number of 
unemployed in each class.  For the central value of the last 
open class it is assumed that the class is closed and of the 
same width as the previous one (i.e. “between 24 and 47”). 
Excluding unemployed with a duration of more than 48 
months shifts mean duration downward, but does not 
change its time evolution. 
Graph 9 – Unemployment rates
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1.2.1. why unemployment has trended 
downwards? 
Three explanations have been given for the fall 
in the unemployment rate in the EU. Firstly, the 
drop reflects a decline of the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment (see box 2 Structural rate, 
equilibrium rate of unemployment and NAIRU). 
This has made the fall in the actual unemployment 
rate possible without significant inflationary 
pressures. A second reason for the declining 
unemployment rate is the increase in the “grey 
area” consisting of jobless people not classified 
as active in the LFS (and therefore not 
unemployed), while actually searching for a job 
in a way not dissimilar from that of the 
unemployed. Finally, a third explanation relates 
the fall in the unemployment rate due to changes 
in the composition of the labour force. This 
section reviews these three explanations of the 
recent decline in the unemployment rate.
reforms have started to pay off
The labour market has been improving 
significantly since the mid-1990s. After having 
reached a peak in 1994, the unemployment rate 
started to decline gradually. In all countries the 
decline in the overall unemployment rate was 
achieved through a joint increase in employment 
and participation rates. In cross-countries 
comparisons, the positive and high correlation 
between employment and participation rates 
(both levels and changes), implying that countries 
with low inactivity rates also have high 
employment rates, challenges the view that 
labour market problems can be solved through 
early labour market exit (the so-called lump-of-
labour fallacy). 
The perception that labour market problems 
could be cured through early exits led to a loose 
access to early retirement and other welfare 
benefits in the 1980s. The transfers from those at 
work to those out of the labour force distorted 
the balance between social assistance (i.e. the 
assistance toward those at high risks of poverty 
and social exclusion) and social security 
(unemployment and welfare related benefits), 
blurring their relative different roles. In some 
countries, government intervention played an 
important role in the regulation of economic 
interactions. The trade-off between the generosity 
(levels and coverage) of unemployment insurance 
and the stringency of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) is a well-known example (e.g. 
Boeri et al, Buti et al.).14
14 Some countries relied on work sharing and reduction of 
effective labour supply as a way to deal with adverse 
shocks (Kramarz et al.). This strategy was accompanied by 
exogenous hourly wage increases, which ultimately 
worsened the effect of the shocks.
Graph 10 – Dispersion of unemployment rates in the EU27 and in the Euro area 
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As governments became progressively more 
aware of the weaknesses of the lump of labour 
fallacy, they increasingly made efforts to develop 
activation policies explicitly designed to 
influence job-search and strengthen the incentive 
structure of the tax and benefit systems. The 
experience of Nordic countries drew attention as 
it entailed flexible hiring and firing rules that 
improve the adjustments to sector or country 
specific shocks, and generous welfare institutions 
that lessen the opposition to this adjustment by 
reducing individual labour market risks through 
forms of collective risk sharing (Andersen, 
2007). If agents are risk adverse, both risk-
pooling and risk- taking improve welfare and 
incentives enhancing efficiency. Thus, one would 
expect more flexibility in countries with more 
efficient redistributive welfare state policies. 
This is shown in  Graph 11 (left panel), which 
displays on the horizontal axis the reduction in 
the Gini index for market income due to 
redistribution through tax and benefits and on the 
vertical axis the EPL index. The graph suggests 
that tight employment legislation is associated 
with low reduction in income inequality through 
the tax and benefit system. As suggested by 
Graph 11 (right panel), EPL is also not a very 
effective way to improve perceived job security. 
The role of incentives - particularly in delaying 
early retirement decisions and welfare benefits 
dependency - and individualised active labour 
market policies, preventing that short-term 
unemployment spells are transformed in long-
term non-employment status, have been 
highlighted in countries where reforms appear to 
have led to improved labour market performance 
(OECD 2006).15
15 Yet, the experience of the wage formation in Scandinavian 
countries has been less stresed in the debate about the reform 
of the welfare state. Contrary to the experience of some 
continental countries, a coordinated wage restraint turned out 
to be a successful response with little attempt to reduce the 
labour supply (Faggio and Nickell, 2007).
Graph 11 – Job protection, job security and redistribution
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The introduction of more flexible working 
arrangements, mainly achieved by easing access 
to part-time and/or temporary work, has been 
the main feature of partial labour market 
reforms, especially in the euro-area. Table 7 
reports for EMU and non EMU countries the 
contribution of temporary and permanent 
contracts to total employment growth. The table 
suggests that the introduction of the common 
currency may have changed significantly the 
pattern of job-creation in participating countries 
compared to non-participating countries. Before 
EMU, the contribution of temporary employment 
to total employment growth was higher in 
countries that would have shared the common 
currencies than in the rest of the EU15. After 
1998, the difference between the contribution of 
EMU and non-EMU countries became three 
times as much. Reforms of EPL have rarely 
addressed the whole set of provisions and mainly 
aimed at activating groups with low labour 
market attachment. Partial labour market 
reforms have been paying out in terms of faster 
employment growth and better employability of 
these groups, according to a recent DG ECFIN 
research16. Even so, piecemeal reforms have 
increased the duality of the labour market. 
Because of the rigid wages of the insiders, the 
burden of the non-adjustment of government-
mandated employment protection has been 
transferred onto the outsiders, which ended up 
16 For econometric evidence see “Recent Labour Market 
Reforms in the Euro-area: characteristics and estimated 
impact” in “Quarterly Report of the euro area Vol 7 N°1 
(2008)” Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs; http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
publication12331_en.pdf. For the euro area as a whole, the 
reform process in the early years of the euro was 
characterised by a sequence of gradual reforms rather than 
by a few radical changes. However, data also shows an 
encouraging shift in the pattern of reforms in the Member 
State in the early years of the euro with more reforms being 
introduced by those countries that need them most. For a 
discussion of the effects of euro-area participation on the 
reform path see “Labour Market Reforms in the euro-area” 
in “Quarterly Report of the euro area Vol 6 N°4 (2007)” 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
publication10549_en.pdf. The effect of reforms improving 
the employability of groups with low labour market 
attachment on the employment and productivity trade-off is 
discussed and assessed in “The EU Economy 2007 
Review” Moving Europe’s productivity frontier  http://ec.
europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
publication10130_en.pdf .
to be less protected and with lower entry 
wages.17
In addition to an admittedly imperfect 
liberalisation of the labour market, other factors 
have contributed to the structural improvement 
in the functioning of the labour market: the 
reduction of disincentives to work and to hire 
(especially for the low-skilled) embedded in tax 
and benefit systems, a greater link with activation 
policies, the stronger reliance on preventive and 
targeted active labour market policies (ALMPs) 
as well as widespread wage moderation. 
The last decade also witnessed important changes 
in the pension system. Up to 1995 only few 
countries implemented pension reforms. By 
2006 almost every European country reformed 
the pension system. Reforms in pension systems 
that have postponed the statutory retirement age 
and cut incentives for early retirement have 
reversed the structural decrease in participation 
and employment rates of older workers in many 
17 In the case of Italy, Rosolia and Torrini (2006) found 
that the wage gap between old and young workers went up 
from 20 percent in the late 80s to 35 percent in the early 
2000s… this decay is not accounted for by developments in 
relative supplies of skill-age groups overtime and reflects 
almost entirely falling entry wages.” Rosolia, A. and R. 
Torrini (2006), The generation gap: an analysis of the 
decline in the relative earnings of young male workers in 
Italy, mimeo, Bank of Italy.
table 7 – Contribution of temporary and permanent 
employment to total employment growth 
1991-
1998
1999-
2006
(1) (2)
Temporary employment
EMU 4.07 3.27
Non-EMU 2.93 -0.37
z-test : same mean changes 5.72*** 26.19***
Permanent employment
EMU 4.72 7.21
Non-EMU 10.8 5.44
z-test : same mean changes -12.2*** 6.42***
Source : Author’s calculation on LFS; non-EMU includes 
Denmark Sweden and the UK. Columns (1) and (1) reports 
for the EMU and non-EMU countries the contribution of 
temporary and permanent contracts tot total employment 
growth. The z-test is the statistics for the comparing to 
average changes. The sum of the contributions of temporary 
and permanent employment for respectively EMU and 
non-EMU group gives the cumulated average employment 
growth over each sub-period based on LFS. This can differ 
from the growth rate based on National Accounts.
Source: Commission services based on lFs, Eurostat.
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Member States. The measures adopted involved 
stronger actuarial links between contributions 
and pension benefits, the possibility for workers 
to retire later while incentives to early-retire 
were discontinued and the eligibility conditions 
tightened. The retirement age was increased in 
Germany, Austria, and Finland. Some countries 
increased the statutory retirement age for female 
or both male and females. Others have changed 
only some provisions of social security 
programmes (and sometimes of other transfer 
programmes used as alternative early retirement 
paths) that provided strong incentives to leave 
the labour force at an early age. Recent analysis 
by DG ECFIN concluded that the participation 
behaviour of those that are approaching the 
retirement age changes after the reforms are 
enacted18. As shown by the analysis of the labour 
market flows (see Box 3 on Labour market flows 
and transitions rates), the labour market 
improvements of the late 1990s were mainly due 
18 European Economy 2/2008 “EMU@10 Successes and 
Challenges after 10 years of Economic and Monetary 
Union”, European Commission.
to increases in the flows from inactivity to 
employment, especially for women, and to strong 
increases in the flows from unemployment to 
employment for prime age workers. 
All things considered, the labour market 
improvements cannot be considered as just an 
aspect of the movement of the economy from 
recession to boom. The remarkable thing is that 
the fall in unemployment was not accompanied 
by any notable acceleration in inflation, implying 
that the level of unemployment at which labour 
shortages start to emerge along with rising 
inflation has declined. According to estimates, 
the NAIRU declined from 8.8% in 1997 to 
below 8% in 2007 (for the euro area from 9.2 to 
7.7). However, these structural rates are still 
high, and without further reduction they 
represent a serious limitation to the speed of 
recovery. Indeed, for several countries most of 
the remaining unemployment appears to be 
structural in nature already at this juncture 
(Graph 13). For 2007, the comparison between 
the equilibrium and the actual unemployment 
(7.1% for the EU and 7.4 for the euro-area) 
implies a tight labour market.
Box 2 : sTrucTural raTe, equiliBrium raTe of unemploymenT and nairu
In the economic literature, structural unemployment is usually analysed in terms of equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. As such, it is a concept which is not tied to short-term economic fluctuations and, 
therefore, does not disappear in cyclical booms. Rather, it results from the institutional set up of the 
economy, the structure of markets, demography, laws and regulations. These elements shape the 
relationships between wage and price setters, affect the interplay of demand and supply of labour and 
involve the efficiency of the search and matching process in the labour market. When unemployment 
is determined by mechanisms that lead to persistency, the distinction between cyclical and structural 
unemployment become more complex1. 
In any case the identification of structural unemployment with the concept of equilibrium is not clear 
cut. Indeed, it may refer either to a situation where for some reason the economy does not clear existing 
excess of labour supply, or to a state of excess supply which tends to perpetuate over time regardless of 
the market clearing properties. Two different, but not independent, concepts of equilibrium are identified 
in economic literature: a stock and a flow equilibrium. Stock approaches focus on the difference at a 
given point in time between the workforce desired by firms (aggregate stock demand for labour) and 
the number of workers willing to work (aggregate stock supply of labour). Flow approaches deal with 
the difference between the flows in and out of the unemployment pool during a certain period. 
The NAIRU is a stock equilibrium concept defined as the level of unemployment rate compatible with 
a stable inflation rate in the absence of shocks, (i.e. when current and expected inflation coincide). It is 
based on an expectations-augmented Phillips curve which can be derived from models of wage and price 
setting in monopolistic product and labour markets (Layard et al. (1991)). It is a structural concept in 
the sense that economic agents have no incentives to change prices and wages when the economy is 
1 A. Lindbeck (2001), Unemployment Structural, in N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes eds.,  International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Oxford: Pergamon.
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Further evidence of these improvements is 
provided by the Beveridge curve (Graph 12). 
Shifts along the curve represent cyclical changes 
in the excess demand for labour, whereas shifts 
of the curve are indicative of long-run changes. 
Graph 6 reports the Beveridge curve19 for the 
period 1993q1 2008q2. Over time the curve has 
shifted inwards, suggesting an improvement in 
the process of job reallocation, i.e. a lower 
unemployment rate associated to a given rate of 
vacancies. Although it is too early to dub a 
further shift of the curve as structural, data for 
2008 point towards a gradual improvement in 
the matching of unemployed workers and job 
vacancies.  
Evidence of structural improvements in the 
labour market is also provided by the relation 
between the employers’ perceptions of the limits 
to production due to insufficient demand and the 
unemployment rate. Over the cycle one should 
expect a positive relationship between these two 
19 Data on job vacancies and occupied posts area available 
only for some countries and starting form 2000. The graph 
is based on the information from DG ECFIN Business and 
Consumers’ Survey which asks about various factors 
including labour shortages that limit production. Data used 
are balances of respondents giving positive and negative 
answers. 
variables. As the economy improves, both the 
unemployment rate and the perceived constraints 
to production from insufficient demand should 
decline. Since the mid-1990s, the curve has 
shifted downward suggesting a structural 
improvement in the labour market as any given 
perceptions of constraints on the demand side 
occurs at a lower unemployment rate.  
 The continuous improvements in the older 
workers’ employment rates, and, if confirmed the 
pick up in young employment are an indication 
of an improved functioning of the labour market. 
Even so, they warrant further analysis, especially 
as regards the sustainability of high employment 
rates for the older workers, without changes in 
early retirement or disability and sickness 
schemes, in the pension systems or in the deep-
rooted attitudes of enterprises towards older 
workers. Indeed, the low increase, in some 
countries even declines, of female older workers’ 
participation rates should warn against the risks 
of falling female labour force.
stuck at its level (i.e. the level of unemployment required to hold inflation in check).  The NAIRU is an 
equilibrium concept based on supply-side considerations and on the assumptions that expectations are 
fulfilled and wages rise in line with prices after taking account for productivity changes.
Theoretical models of flow unemployment focus on the flow of workers in and out of unemployment 
(Phelps et al. 1970, Hall 1979, Diamond 1982). These models emphasise the heterogeneity of jobs and 
workers and, as a consequence, explain structural unemployment in connection with job search and 
matching. The equilibrium rate of unemployment emerges when the number of individuals finding a job 
equals the number of individuals who are separated from a job, and it is related to the efficiency of the 
search and matching process. The Beveridge curve depicts the combinations of vacancies and 
unemployment coherent with equilibrium in the labour market. Along the curve unemployment is stable 
as inflows into unemployment equal outflows out of it. Therefore, movements along the Beveridge curve 
reflect transitory shocks while shifts in the curve mirror structural demand shifts or reduction in the 
efficiency of job matching activities. The stock and the flow concepts of structural unemployment are 
related. Indeed, when the match between vacancies and unemployed is far from being perfect, firms 
may offer higher wages than otherwise to hire workers. By contrast, improvements in the efficiency of 
matching and increases in the search effort may induce an inward shift of the Beveridge curve (the 
relationship between vacancies and unemployment) and reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate. 
The NAIRU may not be constant over time. Indeed, there are good reasons for the estimates of the 
NAIRU to follow actual unemployment. This occurs, for example, when there is hysteresis in 
unemployment, i.e. when the path of unemployment influences the position of the equilibrium 
unemployment rate, and so unemployment has persistent effects. This may happen for example when 
the duration of unemployment reduces the probability of a worker of finding a new job via its effects 
on job search; workers’ skill; motivation and morale; job screening and employer perceptions.
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Graph 12 – Beveridge curve and aggregate demand constraints in the euro area 
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Graph 13 – Estimates of structural and cyclical unemployment rates in 2007 
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* Structural unemployment is referred to the NAwRU estimated by DG ECFIN (Source: Ameco database).
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the borderline between inactivity and 
unemployment
According to the LFS, the vast majority of 
persons out of the labour force (about 80% of the 
inactive) declare that they do not want to work. 
However, while some of them want a job, they 
do not actually seek for it due to a number of 
reasons, including health problems, family 
responsibilities, and school enrolment. Thus, the 
decline in unemployment may partly refl ect an 
increase in the population registered as inactive 
that, in practice behaves like unemployed, and 
thus are “potentially” in the labour force.20 If the 
potential labour force and the unemployment are 
behaviourally two indistinct labour market states, 
20 Brandolini et al (2004) have shown that the transition 
rates for the potential labour force are different from those 
observed for other inactive and to some extent similar to 
those of the unemployed. This implies that the labour 
market would be better described by four distinct states 
(employed, unemployed, potential labour force and other 
inactive population) rather than by the ILO categories of 
employed, unemployed and inactive. Thus, the distinction 
between those “really” wanting a job and those who would 
like a job but are searching less intensively or not at all 
does not characterise the observed dynamics. Brandolini, P. 
Cipollone and A. E. Viviano (2006), “Does the ILO 
defi nition captures all unemployment?” Journal of the 
European Economic Association , 4,1, pp.153-179.
then the level and the dynamics of the 
unemployment rate should be modified to 
account for patterns in the potential labour 
force. 
Another group of inactive persons are those 
ready to work but do not look for a job because 
they think they cannot fi nd one. Such persons are 
typically referred to as “discouraged workers” 
and have been continuously rising since 2000, to 
reach 15% of the total inactive population in 
2007. While not included among the unemployed 
because they are not actively seeking work, these 
persons provide an indication of labour market 
difficulty. Graph 14 (left panel) shows the 
inactivity rate for selected countries. There is a 
clear downward trend in all of them but Italy, the 
country with the highest inactivity rate in 2007 
(37.5% of working age population or about 8 pp 
above the EU average). The right panel focuses 
only on that part of the inactive population at the 
boundary between inactivity and unemployment 
(the potential labour supply). In this case, the 
potential labour force, and in particular the 
female component, is rising in all countries but 
the UK. The two panels suggest that among a 
falling number of inactive, there is a rising 
proportion of the population which could 
potentially be in the labour supply. 
Graph 14 – Inactivity rate and the borderline between inactivity and unemployed
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the impact of demographic changes on 
employment, unemployment and 
participation rates
Demographic changes can play an important role 
in explaining labour market developments. 
Changes in the composition of the labour force 
and working age population combined with slow 
changing rates for specifi c groups may have 
influenced the overall aggregate patterns, in 
particular driving the observed fall in the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment. As different 
age groups have different age-specific 
unemployment rates, demographic shifts towards 
an older and more experienced workforce affect 
both their overall level and the time evolution of 
the overall unemployment rate. Ageing may, 
therefore, be an “automatic” but transitory source 
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of labour markets improvements even when the 
age specific rates are changing slowly, the only 
conditions being that more numerous groups 
have also the highest employment, participation 
or unemployment rates and their distribution by 
age does not change overtime.21 Thus, these 
improvements would be only temporary and the 
evaluation of the sustainability of the recent good 
performance potentially distorted by such 
exogenous shifts. Thus, the shift of the age 
distribution in the population may change the 
expectation of what constitutes a low 
unemployment rate.
The effect of demographic changes is more than 
a theoretical possibility as it is suggested by 
Graph 15, showing for the last 20 years the 
evolution over time of relevant labour market 
variables by age groups with their age profile. 
Three features of this graph are important. First, 
the employment and the participation rates went 
up for prime age workers while they declined for 
young people and started to go up, but only 
recently, for the older workers. Second, despite 
the recent increase of young workers’ employment 
rate, it never went back to the level prevailing 
before the 1993 recession, while their participation 
rate declined steadily over time. Third, this pattern 
of participation implied a fall in the unemployment 
rate of young individuals greater than that 
observed for other age groups. The aggregate 
evidence hides important gender specific 
heterogeneities (Graph 15). For both men and 
women the employment and participation rates 
decline with age. Yet, during the last two decades 
the age profile for women changes dramatically, 
especially for the oldest. In 2007, the age profile 
of the employment and participation rates is 
higher at any age and start to decline at age 
between 50 and 54. Twenty years earlier the age 
profile of the female rates implied that the 
likelihood of labour market participation declined 
already age within the 45-49 age bracket.  
21 In the case of the US, R. Murphy (1999) finds that in 
1998 the unemployment rate was 0.6 percentage points 
lower than it would have been if the age structure had 
remained unchanged. However, most of this 
demographically induced decline already occurred in 1989; 
about only 0.2 percentage points of the decline occurred in 
the 1990s. Katz and Krueger show that change in the age 
composition of the labour force explains about 0.4 
percentage points of the decline in the unemployment rate 
since 1980s. Finally, Shimer (1998) finds that changes in 
the US age structure account for a substantial part of lower 
unemployment in the 1990s more than in the 1980s. 
Together with the changes occurred in the 
composition of the workforce, the significant 
changes in the distribution of employment, 
participation and unemployment rates by age 
groups rises the question of the contribution of 
demographic shifts to the resurgence of the labour 
market of the late 1990s-early 2000s. The 
potential relevance of the demographic effect is 
illustrated by the movements in the age 
composition of both the labour force and the 
working age population. Due to a declining birth 
rate, the share of young people (15-24) in the 
working age population (15-64) fell from about 
23% in 1987 to about 18% in 2007 in the EU15. 
The share of those aged 25-54 went up from 60% 
to slightly above 65%, while the population in the 
age bracket 55-64 rose from 17% to 18%.22 
Similar developments can be observed for the 
labour force, which is also influenced by the 
increased participation of young people in 
education and of women in the labour market. 
To identify the role of changes in the structure of 
the population, the employment rate is calculated 
assuming that the composition of the working age 
population by age groups is invariant over time. 
The comparison between the actual and the 
simulated rates provides indirect evidence of the 
role played by exogenous demographic shifts.23 
Graph 16 shows the path of the age constant 
employment, participation and unemployment 
rates. They track all the actual rates quite closely 
until the early 1990s. Thereafter, however, the 
actual rates deviate from the age constant rates, 
making larger the fall in employment and 
participation (and the increase in unemployment) 
22 Due to data limitation, the 2007 figures cover only the 
15 countries of the European Union; 1987 data excludes 
Austria, Finland and Sweden.
23 The calculations are based on Shimer (1998) “Why is the 
U.S. Unemployment Rate So Much Lower”, which makes 
the counterfactual exercise of simulating the unemployment 
rate assuming that the unemployment rate for each age 
group is unaffected by demographics. This assumption is 
theoretically sounded if the age-specific unemployment rates 
do not depend on the age distribution, which requires that 
changes in the labour supply are accommodated by changes 
in the labour demand. The employment rate is a weighted 
average of the employment rates for each age group. Then it 
can be corrected for changes in the age structure of the 
working population by keeping constant the weights. In 
symbols et=Σωt(i)*et(i) where ωt(i) is the fraction of the 
working age population in group i and et(i) the employment 
rate of the i-th age group. The demographic adjusted 
employment rate is calculated under the assumption that 
ωt(i) is kept constant at 1987 value. The 15-64 working age 
population is divided in 10 age groups of 5 years each. The 
group specific employment rates are computed before the 
aggregation with unchanged population structure.
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that followed the slump of the early 1990s and 
smaller the improvements observed ever since. 
Without changes in the composition of the 
workforce, the employment and participation 
rates would have been in 2007 about 2 percentage 
points below the actual rates, while the 
unemployment rate about 1 pp larger. Thus, the 
ageing of the population contributed for about 
10% to the increase of the employment rate 
between 1994 and 2007. A similar conclusion 
holds for the participation rate. 
The role played by ageing in the increase of EU 
employment and participation rates varies across 
countries. Graph 17 shows for selected countries 
the age adjusted employment and participation 
rates. Clearly, ageing has positively contributed 
to the increase in the employment and participation 
rates in Italy, France and Spain while more muted 
is the role of demographics in Germany, the 
Netherlands or the UK.
Nevertheless, the evidence provided so far 
suggests that the improvements in labour market 
indicators of the 1995-2004 period do not 
disappear when data are depurated from pure 
demographic factors. The ageing of the population 
contributed to the increase in the employment and 
participation rates and to the decline in the 
unemployment rate. Without further improvements 
in the long-term growth prospects, ageing will 
become the main drivers of employment and 
participation rate trends. With unchanged age-
specific employment and participation rates, the 
positive drifts deriving from ageing will soon turn 
into a negative trend.  The improvements of the 
2nd half of the 1990s would be partly a statistical 
artefact and not entirely the outcome of a change 
in the labour market functioning. Indeed, unless 
the employment rates for the older worker keep 
rising, the ageing of the population will depress 
the overall employment rate. Increasing the 
employment rates for the older workers remains 
therefore a significant challenge.
Graph	15	–	Age	specifics	employment,	participation	and	unemployment	rates	in	the	EU
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Source: Commission services. Data refer to an EU aggregate that covers the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, spain, France, Ireland, Italy, luxembourg, Netherlands, United kingdom.
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Graph 16 – the effect of demographic changes on labour market outcomes 
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Graph 17 – the effect of demographic changes on labour market outcomes: selected countries
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1.2.2. Driving forces of unemployment 
developments 
In Table 8, changes in the unemployment rates 
are disaggregated into changes in the working-
age population, participation rate and employment 
growth24. This decomposition shows that the 
reduction of the EU27 unemployment rate to 
7.1%25 in 2007 was due to the increase in 
employment (1.8%), more than offsetting the 
increase in labour supply, that is the combined 
increase in both the size of the working-age 
24 The following calculation has been used: U=(Popwa * 
Pr) – E, where U: unemployed persons, Popwa: working 
age population (15-64); Pr: participation rate; UR: 
unemployment rate; E: employment. This can be 
re-arranged as U/ (Popwa * Pr)=1-E/(Popwa * Pr) and 
(1-UR) = E /(Popwa * Pr). Thus, by taking the logarithm of 
the expression and differentiating, it gives a decomposition 
that approximates the changes in the unemployment rate 
(in percentage point ) as : dUR= dPopwa/Popwa + dPr/Pr 
- dE/E, that is as the sum of the % change in the working 
age population and the participation rate minus the % 
change in employment.
25 Calculations are based on LFS. The aggregate 
unemployment from LFS differs from the harmonised 
unemployment rate in table 1 due to the different nature of 
the two data sets, but some of the differences occur just 
because the transition period that uses the most recent 
quarterly data is not yet completed. For a summary of the 
methodology http://europa.eu.int/estatref/info/sdds/en/une/
une_sm.htm  
population (+0.4%) and the participation rate 
(+0.3%). 
The overall positive trend observed at the 
aggregate EU level masks quite diverging 
developments across Member States. The decline 
in the unemployment reflects generally an 
increase in employment growth, especially in 
Poland, Germany and Lithuania. However, for 
some countries it is also explained by a fall in 
labour supply (Denmark, UK, Italy, and Poland), 
or by the decline in the working age population 
(e.g. as in Germany, Bulgaria, Latvia, and 
Estonia). In Ireland and Portugal the increase in 
employment did not keep pace with the 
increasing number of people respectively in the 
labour force and in the working age population.
The contrasting trends as regards developments 
in employment and unemployment rates in the 
euro area between 2000 and 2007 are shown in 
Graph 18. As a consequence of the 2001-2003 
economic downturn, the number of unemployed 
increased until 2004 (about 20 millions). The 
parallel increase in employment and 
unemployment occurred because the of the 
structural increase in the female labour supply 
was faster than the creation of additional jobs. 
Since 2004 the fall in unemployment was 
associated with an increase in the number of 
employed.
table 8 – Decomposing changes in the EU unemployment rate in 2007
    Unemployment rate (age 15-64)  
Change since is~ equal to
(age 15-64) 
Level in 2007 2006 =
% Change in working 
age population +
% Change  in 
participation rate -
% Change in 
employment 
BE 7.5 -0.8 1 0.9 2.7
DK 3.8 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.2
DE 8.7 -1.6 -0.6 0.9 2.1
GR 8.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.1 1.3
ES 8.3 -0.2 1.8 1 3.1
FR 8 -0.9 0.6 0.2 1.8
IE 4.6 0.2 2.7 0.9 3.4
IT 6.2 -0.7 0.6 -0.3 1
LU 4.1 -0.7 2.9 0.3 3.9
NL 3.2 -0.7 0.2 1.4 2.4
AT 4.5 -0.3 0.3 1.4 2.1
PT 8.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
FI 6.9 -0.9 0.4 0.5 1.8
SE 6.2 -0.9 0.9 0.5 2.3
UK 5.3 -0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.3
EA 7.5 -0.9 1.1 0.5 2.7
EU15 7.1 -0.7 0.5 0.4 1.7
CY 4 -0.6 3.6 1.3 5.6
CZ 5.4 -1.8 0.5 -0.7 1.8
EE 4.8 -1.2 -0.4 0.6 1.6
HU 7.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
LT 4.4 -1.3 -0.1 0.7 2
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LV 6.1 -0.8 -0.4 2.2 2.7
MT 6.5 -0.8 0.6 0.6 2.1
PL 9.7 -4.3 -0.1 -0.3 4.6
SK 11.2 -2.2 0.3 -0.5 2.4
SI 5 -1.1 0.4 0.6 2.2
EU25 7.2 -1 0.4 0.3 1.9
BG 6.9 -2.1 -0.8 2.9 4.5
RO 6.8 -0.9 0.1 -0.9 0.1
EU27 7.1 -1.1 0.4 0.3 1.8
Source: Commission services, based on Eurostat lFs data.
Graph 18 – Employed and unemployed persons (age 15-64), Euro area
200 000
202 000
204 000
206 000
208 000
210 000
212 000
214 000
216 000
218 000
220 000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
15 000
16 000
17 000
18 000
19 000
20 000
21 000
22 000
Employment Unemployment
Source: Commission services.
Box 3 : laBour markeT flows and TransiTion raTes
Flows between different labour market states provide valuable information about labour market 
dynamics therefore enriching the standard analysis of stock variables such as employment and 
unemployment. The analysis of flows in Europe indicates that they have considerably changed the 
composition of working age population over the past 25 years. The changing role of women in society, 
ageing populations, pension reforms and labour market reforms, including targeting of marginally-
attached groups, have shaped overall unemployment rate and participation rates. The following analysis 
based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) focuses on structural features of the labour market, by gender 
and age; however it also comments some basic business cycle properties of labour market variables.1 
In order to disentangle structural trends from cyclical movements, this analysis uses annual data (as they 
are available for a longer time span) for a sample of 9 EU countries.2 The annual series suffer from the 
1 The LFS was launched in 12 countries in 1983 and provides data on an annual (since 1983) and quarterly basis 
(for most countries since 1998). For several countries and until 2005, annual series are based on the spring sample, 
in particular on data collected in the second quarter, due to the limited availability of the quarterly data. From 
2005, data are constructed as annual averages of quarterly data. This transition from the spring sample to an 
annual sample introduces a break in 2006.  http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/employment/info/data/eu_lfs/index.htm). 
2 The following country are excluded due to missing observations: Italy (from 1984-1991), Ireland (1998-2006) 
and the Netherlands (2000-2006). 
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so called “time-aggregation error” since they capture only year-to-year persons’ flows and they do not 
account for flows that occurred within a year between two subsequent surveys.3 Therefore, annual series 
underestimate the flows between different labour market states (and derived transition rates). For this 
reason, the following analysis does not attempt to interpret the absolute size of flows and transition rates; 
it rather tries to inspect some trends and basic business cycle features, as well as to provide some broad 
comparisons across gender and age. The section analyses firstly the flows between different labour 
market states and secondly the transition rates between different labour market states. 
Labour	Market	flows	
Labour market is described by stocks (employment - E, unemployment - U and inactive population - I) 
and flows between different labour market states that could be denoted by EU (from employment to 
unemployment), UE (from unemployment to employment), EI (from employment to inactivity), IE 
(from inactivity to employment), UI (from unemployment to inactivity) and IU (from inactivity to 
unemployment). Graph 19 to Graph 23 provide the basic description of stocks and flows between 
different labour market states in the last 24 years divided into four six-year periods (1983-88, 1989-94, 
1995-2000 and 2001-2006). Furthermore, Graph 24 to Graph 27 display yearly flows between different 
labour market states by each age group, Graph 28 to Graph 31 display the 6-year averages of these 
labour market flows while Graph 32 to Graph 35 present their net contributions to stocks (unemployment, 
employment and inactivity). 
The flows between employment and inactivity are the largest followed by the flows between 
employment and unemployment and between unemployment and inactivity. The size of labour 
market flows, however, depends also on gender. For males, the flows between employment and inactivity 
are of similar size to flows between employment and unemployment, with a considerably lower importance 
of flows between unemployment and inactivity. On the contrary, for females, the flows between 
employment and inactivity are by far the most important flows, which may reflect their more irregular 
work pattern and their increasing labour market participation. Furthermore, females’ flows between 
employment and unemployment and between unemployment and inactivity were of similar size before 
90s, with a somewhat greater importance of flows between employment and unemployment since then.
The importance of labour market flows was different across different periods, in line with business 
cycle conditions and structural shifts. The largest changes in yearly average labour market flows 
occurred in the periods 1989-1994 and 1995-2000 (Graph 19 to Graph 23). The period 1989-1994 
around the recession saw a large increase in average yearly EU flows coupled with the increased average 
yearly EI and UI flows, thus indicating an increased withdrawal from the labour market. The subsequent 
period 1995-2000, however, conveys an improved labour market performance, in particular a large 
increase into employment from both unemployment and inactivity. Besides cyclical fluctuations, labour 
market flows suggest also some structural changes, in particular the IE flows (indicating a higher 
participation on the labour market), UE flows (suggesting a beneficial impact of structural reforms) and 
UI flows (of relative importance in particular for older persons that were withdrawing from the labour 
market using early retirement schemes).
A strong increase in flows from inactivity to employment is in line with a higher participation and 
provides the largest positive contribution to employment. For total working age population the IE 
flows tended to increase over the whole period (Graph 24 to Graph 27). A structural component in these 
flows reflects a higher participation, in particular of females. Over the business cycle, however, these 
flows tend to move pro-cyclically, declining in a recession (indicating lower job opportunities faced by 
new entrants – in particular of young persons – and potential re-entrants) and rebounding in an expansion 
(indicating greater job opportunities for new entrants as well as potential re-entrants enabling them to 
join the labour market directly from inactivity to employment). On the other hand, EI flows do not 
display any clear trend but they rather appear to be dominated by counter-cyclical movements, regardless 
of the age group and gender. A large increase in EI flows occurred in the recession at the beginning of 
the 90s and was driven by both prime-age and older persons. This increase has been exceptional and 
very persistent in particular for older persons that used early retirement on a large scale to avoid 
unemployment. Overall, for total working age population flows between inactivity and employment 
provided the largest positive boost to employment (Graph 32 to Graph 35).
3 See Fujita, Ramey, 2006 to correct for the “time aggregation error”. 
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Average	1983-2006	yearly	gross	flows	and	stocks	in	the	Labour	Force	Survey,	EU9,	age	group:	15+,	in	Millions
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Flows between unemployment and employment were the main source of the decline in 
unemployment since the mid-90s, thus contributing positively also to higher employment. 
Following the recession of the early 1990s, the EU flows increased substantially and prevailed over the 
UE flows until the mid-1990s Graph 24 to Graph 27).4 However, the EU flows declined substantially 
after the mid 1990s, while the UE flows remained relatively high (mainly owing to the prima age group 
and female component), which contributed to a large extent to the large decline in unemployment, in 
particular in the second half of the 90s. For young persons, EU and UE flows decreased over the period, 
though UE flows kept above EU flow implying a decline in the youth unemployment, with an exception 
in the period of recession in the beginning of the 90s Graph 33). On the contrary, older persons had EU 
flows always above UE flows, though the later have been increasing (Graph 34).  
Since 2000 a decline in unemployment was supported also by flows between unemployment and 
inactivity. A steady increase in UI flows was driven by both older and prime-age persons, though they 
were of greater relative importance for older persons (Graph 24 to Graph 27). On the contrary, IU flows 
displayed counter-cyclical movements increasing in recession (indicating lower job opportunities faced 
by new entrants and re-entrants in the labour force that are unsuccessful at their job search) and 
decreasing in expansion (indicating the bypassing of IU flows by IE flows since new entrants and 
re-entrants can find a job immediately). However, counter-cyclical features of IU flows were possibly 
dampened to the extent that a larger fraction of inactive persons may decide to search for a job in an 
expansion but may not find a job immediately (thereby boosting IU flows) while in a recession a smaller 
fraction of people may decide to search actively for a job (e.g. due to belief of scarce job opportunities). 
For older persons, UI flows were always above IU flows (Graph 34). For them a decline in their 
unemployment was driven in particular by withdrawing from the labour market using retirement 
schemes. 
transition rates
Besides observing data on flows, it is of policy interest to look at average individual probabilities of 
moving from one labour market state (pool) to another. These probabilities can be described by transition 
(or hazard) rates5 that provide additional information to the data on flows. Namely, besides considering 
data on flows they take into account also changes in the stock variables which are shaped (directly) by 
different (four) labour market flows. Therefore, labour market properties of flows and transition rates may 
differ. Furthermore, transition rates enable a comparison of cyclical and structural labour market properties 
across different groups, e.g. by gender, age, country etc. The following analysis focuses on transition rates 
from and to unemployment, from and to employment (or separation rate and hiring rate, respectively) as 
well as from and to inactive population, that are calculated in the following way:
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4 The counter-cyclical feature of the Unemployment-Employment flows that appears to be counter-intuitive has 
been discussed in the literature. See e.g. Fujita and Ramey, 2006; Burda and Wyplosz, 1994.  
5 Transition rate is a probability that a person is in a certain labour market state (unemployed, employed or 
inactive) at the end of a period t given that he/she was in other than initial labour market state at the beginning of a 
period t. It is calculated as a ratio of a flow(s) in a period t over the relevant population in period t-1. 
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The analysis of transition rates from and to unemployment is pivotal for the analysis of the unemployment 
rate Graph 36 to Graph 39). Their comparison across age groups presents also structural differences in the 
behaviour of labour market participants (Graph 40 to Graph 45). Furthermore, the analysis of hiring rate 
and separation rate provides an insightful view into different (though converging) labour market behaviour 
by gender over time Graph 46 to Graph 50) that is complemented by the analysis of transition rates to and 
out of inactivity Graph 51 to Graph 55).
transition rates to and out of unemployment, by gender
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Transition rates to unemployment display a cyclical pattern over the period (Graph 36 to Graph 
39). They tend to behave counter-cyclically, picking up strongly in the period of economic contraction 
at the beginning of the 90s, afterwards steadily decreasing for almost a decade of economic expansion 
before moderately increasing again during a period of economic weakness at the beginning of 2000. A 
more detailed look at transition rates to unemployment from employment (EU) and from inactivity (IU) 
reveals that both series tend to display counter-cyclical movements with no visible structural trend. 
Older persons face the lowest transition rates to unemployment, both from employment and from 
inactivity; therefore a demographic effect (via ageing populations) has possibly exerted a downward 
pressure on transition rates to unemployment. 
Transition rates out of unemployment display a strong, possibly structural increase in particular 
since 1997 (Graph 36 to Graph 39). The transition rates out of unemployment are characterized by two 
distinct periods. Before 1997 they tended to fluctuate within a narrow band for almost 15 years. After 
1997 they increased sharply until 2002 with a slight reverse afterwards in line with a weaker economic 
activity. This pattern was driven by both transition rates UE and UI indicating a greater employability 
of unemployed persons, however, also a lower participation of unemployed older persons, including 
unemployed prime-age persons since 2000. 
Both, transition rates to unemployment and out of unemployment shape the unemployment rate 
over time6 However, transition rates out of unemployment seemed to be a driving force behind a 
decline in the structural unemployment rate over time. The unemployment rate in EU127 strongly 
decreased in the period since the mid-90s until 2001. It reversed somewhat from 2001 to 2004 before 
declining again since then. A decrease in the unemployment rate in the second half of the 90s was driven 
by both, a decline in transition rates to unemployment and an increase in transition rates out of 
unemployment (see Graph 36). However, while cyclical properties of transition rates to and out of 
unemployment were driving cyclical movements in the unemployment rate, a sharp increase in transition 
rates out of unemployment since the mid-90s and its persistence at a relatively high level in the first half 
of 2000 suggests a structural decline in the unemployment rate. Indeed, estimates of the NAIRU for the 
euro area suggest a decline in the NAIRU from a peak of 9.2% in 1997 to 7.7% in 2007. Furthermore, 
an inward shift of the Beveridge curve occurred largely over the period from 1997 to beginning of 2000 
suggesting that a decline in unemployment rate may to some extent be structural (Graph 13). Finally, 
this timing coincides with an introduction of reforms in several countries targeting labour demand (e.g. 
via reducing employment protection and easing the access to part-time and temporary contracts, 
decreasing the tax burden on labour, in particular of low-skilled labour) and labour supply (e.g. via 
increasing financial and non-financial incentives to work to combat the unemployment (and inactivity 
trap), therefore raising the employability of unemployed (and inactive) persons and the incentives to 
take up work.
6 The contemporaneous correlation between the transition rate to unemployment and the unemployment rate is 
80% while between the transition rate out of unemployment and the unemployment rate is -76%.   
7 EU12 captures Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and EU9 countries that are subject of this analysis.  
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Unemployed older persons face considerably higher probabilities to withdraw from the labour 
market than to get employed (Graph 40 to Graph 45). Older persons display the lowest transition rates 
EU. Moreover, those older workers that in fact get unemployed encounter difficulties to get employed 
again and, therefore, tend to withdraw from the labour market. This follows from the observation that 
older persons face the lowest transition rates UE and the highest transition rates UI as compared to 
young and prime-age persons. A low employability of unemployed older persons may hint on their 
problem of structural unemployment that has been often tackled with early retirement. 
Young persons face the highest transition rates from employment to unemployment which is in line 
with their search for a preferable job and with firms’ adjustments of labour, in particular of young 
persons, to negative shocks. Firms tend to adjust labour input of young persons to smoothen their 
production to negative shocks due to several reasons. Young persons tend to be the least experienced and 
with fixed-term contracts (the proportion of young persons in overall temporary contracts was about 35% 
in 2007). Therefore, they are the first to be dismissed or their contracts are not extended. Furthermore, 
young persons tend to be less costly to dismiss, in particular if severance pay increases with tenure. Finally, 
young persons may themselves quit since they tend to change many jobs before finding the preferable one. 
All these factors contribute to their relatively high transition rates EU, which account for a large proportion 
of the gap between the unemployment rates of the young and prime-age individuals. Nevertheless, young 
persons have considerably reduced their unemployment rate, in particular over the period since the mid-
90s to 2001 when they also greatly reduced their gap with respect to the overall unemployment rate. 
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The gap between hiring rate and separation rate tended to increase since 1983. An increase in hiring 
rate (driven by females) has more than offset a downward pressure on hiring rate due to ageing 
populations (as older persons face the lowest hiring rates) and a greater labour market attachment of 
females. On the contrary, a demographic effect due to ageing populations has possibly exerted an upward 
pressure on the separation rate, however decreasingly so since the separation rate of older workers has 
steadily declined since the beginning of the 90s.8
8 Note that the separation rate of older persons is the highest due to their retirement. 
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Males perform better on the labour market: they face a higher hiring rate and a lower separation 
rate. This applies for all age groups. A breakdown of separation rate shows that for both genders, older 
persons have the highest separation rate followed by young and prime-age persons. However, a 
breakdown of hiring rate reveals that while prime-age men face the highest hiring rate, prime-age 
women face a lower hiring rate than young women. 
However, females improved their labour market performance considerably over the period, in 
particular prime-age females. Their hiring and separation rate almost completely converged to 
the levels observed by males. Females’ hiring rate almost doubled (it almost tripled for prime-age 
females) while males’ hiring rate displayed only cyclical movements around a constant value. Females 
also reduced their separation rate to the level slightly above the level observed by males. Overall, the 
widening gap between the hiring and separation rate indicates better labour market performance for 
females, in particular an increase in their participation and employment rate.
Recent reforms in pensions reduced the separation rate from employment to inactivity of older 
persons. Older persons have the highest separation rate from employment to inactivity (due to 
retirement) that peaked in the recession period at the beginning of the 90s and declined afterwards, in 
particular in the first half of 2000. This timing is consistent with the introduction of pension reforms in 
several EU countries that have postponed the statutory retirement age and cut incentives for early 
retirement. 
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Source: Commission services.
A driving force behind an increased hiring rate of females is a steady increase in their transition 
rates from inactivity to employment. Increased participation rate of females, in particular of 
prime-age females, contributed to females’ widening gap between the transition rates to and out 
of inactivity. At the beginning of the period females faced considerably lower transition rates out of 
inactivity than males. However, over time females have steadily increased their transition rates out of 
inactivity and at the end of the period have almost entirely converged to the males’ transition rates out 
of inactivity. On the contrary, females’ transition rates to inactivity remained fairly unchanged and 
considerably above males’ transition rates to inactivity.
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1.3. monitoring thE gap with thE lisbon 
EmploymEnt targEts 
Because of the weakness in employment growth 
over the first half of this decade, reaching the 
Lisbon employment targets for the EU27 would 
require an acceleration of employment in the few 
remaining years up to 2010. Progress towards 
the Lisbon employment rate targets since 2001 
is shown in Table 9. 
The overall EU employment rate has risen since 
2001 by about 3 percentage points to reach 
65.4% in 2007. Reaching the 70% employment 
rate target by 2010 would require almost 
doubling the increase in the rate observed 
between 2006 and 2007 over the next 3 years. 
This, in turn, implies that about 20 millions 
additional jobs would need to be created – 
equivalent to an employment growth between 
2008-2010 of 3% per year, far above the growth 
of both the most recent period and the historical 
average. 
The contribution provided by each Member State 
to the fulfilment of the Lisbon targets (which are 
targets set for the overall EU economy) varies 
substantially (Graph 9 and Graph 10). There are 
only three countries (Denmark, Sweden and 
United Kingdom) which already exceed all three 
targets (for the overall, female and older workers 
employment rate of respectively 70%, 60% and 
50%), while five countries stand out as being 
particularly far from the three targets (Hungary, 
Italy, Greece, Poland and Malta). 
table 9 – lisbon employment targets: required job performance
LISBON PROJECTIONS 2001 2007 2010 Required Pro memoria
2008-2010 Annual Employment  growth 
Total (15-64) New Jobs
Employment  
growth 1998-2000 2001-2007
Employees (15-64)            (000) 200385 214673 234491 19818 3.0% 1.4% 1.2%
Employment rate                  (%) 62.5 65.4 70
Population  (15-64)              (000) 320435 328307 334987
Older workers   (55-64 ) 2001 2007 2010 New Jobs
Employment 
growth
Employees (55-64)               (000) 19597 25795 30375 4580 5.6% 1.8% 5.3%
Employment rate                  (%) 37.5 44.7 50
Population  (55-64)            (000) 52312 57721 60750
Female 2001 2007 2010 New Jobs
Employment 
growth
Employees (15-64)            (000) 87407 96009 100294 4285 1.5% 2.2% 1.6%
Employment rate                 (%) 54.3 58.3 60
Population  (15-64)           (000) 160935 164596 167157
Source:	Commission	services,	DG	ECFIN	calculation	using	Eurostat	figures	(Europop2004	demographic	projections).
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Looking at the employment target for specific 
groups, the most feasible seems to be the one set 
for females (60%). Women from younger 
generations show higher participation than 
women from older generations. This cohort 
effect, fostered by changes in cultural attitudes 
and the increasing average level of female 
education, is bringing female employment closer 
to the Lisbon target. Since 2001, the employment 
rate of women has increased by 4 percentage 
points in the EU27 (and almost 6 percentage 
points in the euro area) to reach 58.3% in 2006. 
In order to fulfil the target, an average annual 
growth of 1.5% in 2007-2010 compared with an 
average rate of 2.2% over the period 1998-2000 
and about the same order of that recorded 
between 2001 and 2007 is required. The female 
target is already achieved by fourteen Member 
States (Denmark, Germany Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Slovenia). Among the countries with 
low female employment rates, Italy and Poland 
strongly impinges upon the achievement of the 
target. 
Despite considerable recent improvements, the 
older workers’ employment rate (44.7% in 2007) 
is far from the 50% target established by the 
Stockholm European Council in 2001. To achieve 
this target by 2010, almost 4.6 million additional 
jobs should be created. This would require an 
annual growth rate of employment of about 5.6% 
per year, slightly higher than the exceptional 
average registered the period 2001-2006. The 
older workers’ target is already exceeded by 
12 Member States (Denmark, Germany Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Latvia).
the road ahead to reach national 
employment rate targets for 2010
In order to identify what could be feasible national 
targets for the year 2010 under different 
employment performances, and to see whether 
and how these national targets would lead to the 
fulfilment of the overall EU27 targets, a set of 
simulations is run taking into account the most 
recent Eurostat demographic projections for the 
year 2010. For each Member State, Table 11 
reports the national employment rates under the 
hypothesis of job creation rates over the remaining 
3 years (2008-2010) as those observed under four 
different scenarios (Table 10):
1) the employment growth scored in 2007.
2) the years since the 2001 slowdown; 
3) the period of buoyant economic growth  
(1997-2000);
4) the overall period 1997-2007;
In the best possible scenario, the EU employment 
rate would still stay below the 70% target. Thus, 
if the overall target is to be achieved, some of the 
laggard countries should contribute substantially 
more than what has been done so far. For the 
female target, the situation is less challenging, as 
the 60% target could be hit with an employment 
growth close to that recorded for 2007. The result 
for the older workers deserves attention. If the 
strong acceleration in the employment growth of 
older workers over the most recent period were 
maintained over the remaining 3 years, the older 
workers’ employment rate would be just below the 
50% target. To sum up, the Lisbon employment 
targets remain very ambitious, especially in view 
of the fact that achieving the Lisbon strategy 
involves efforts both to improve labour market 
performance and to raise growth. This implies a 
need for a substantial acceleration in the medium-
term labour productivity growth.26 
26 For a detailed analysis of the linkages between 
employment and productivity growth see European 
Commission (2007) “Moving Europe’s productivity 
frontier” The EU economy: 2007 review; “Is there a 
trade-off between productivity and employment. 
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Graph 56 – Progress towards the lisbon targets: total and female employment rate, 2007
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Graph 57 – Progress towards the lisbon targets: total and older workers employment rate, 2007
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table 11 – Employment rates in 2010, alternative simulation
 
EMPLOYMENT RATE in 2010
Alternative country-targets
Target: Overall Employment rate in 2010
Rates in 2010 using employment growth rate in: Employment rate targets set by Member States 
Country 2007 2006 - 2007 2001 - 2007 1997 - 2000 1997 - 2007 (from NRPs)
BE 63.0 66.2 63.4 65.1 63.5 70
DK 76.8 75.9 77.1 77.6 77.2 50000/60000 extra jobs
DE 63.8 68.8 65.9 66.5 66.1
GR 59.2 60.9 61.6 62.8 61.7 64.1 (projections)
ES 67.1 69.5 71.2 73.7 72.0 66
FR 62.1 66.2 65.4 66.3 65.8
IE 71.8 72.9 72.4 81.5 75.0
IT 58.8 59.8 60.2 60.4 60.4
LU 58.8 62.4 58.1 59.5 58.8
NL 75.7 80.8 76.9 82.6 78.9
AT 70.9 74.4 72.3 71.9 72.0
PT 68.0 67.7 67.7 75.0 70.1 70
FI 70.1 73.1 71.0 76.5 72.7 75 "(2011)
SE 75.2 78.5 75.0 76.9 76.5 80 (age 20-64)
UK 69.5 68.3 68.7 68.7 68.8 80 (national 
definition)
EU15 65.3 67.8 67.0 68.4 67.5
CY 69.0 75.1 70.5 71.3* 71
CZ 66.6 69.9 67.9 63.4 66.3 66.4
EE 68.8 72.9 73.9 65.5 71.1 67.2 (projections)
HU 56.2 56.3 57.0 60.6 58.3 63
LT 64.9 69.2 69.5 66.5* 68.8
LV 68.0 75.0 74.3 73* 67
MT 55.3 57.3 55.3 55.7* 57
PL 55.8 63.0 57.3 53.3 55.5
SK 60.9 64.4 63.2 62.2* yearly increase 1-2 pp
SI 68.0 72.1 70.0 68.3 69.6 67 "(2008)
EU25 64.3 67.2 66.0 66.1*
BG 60.1 70.0 67.3 65.4*
RO 58.7 59.3 57.1 55.8 56.8
EU27 64.7 67.7 66.3 66.3*
Target: Employment rate of female in 2010
Rates in 2010 using employment growth rate in: Employment rate targets set by Member States 
Country 2007 2006 - 2007 2001 - 2007 1997 - 2000 1997 - 2007 (from NRPs)
BE 56.1 60.4 57.9 60.1 58.1 60 asap
DK 73.0 72.3 73.4 75.2 74.0
DE 58.3 63.3 61.2 62.1 61.5
GR 46.7 48.1 49.8 49.9 49.5 51
ES 55.9 60.5 62.5 64.3 63.0 57
FR 58.0 63.4 62.4 62.3 62.4
IE 63.0 66.6 65.1 74.7 67.8
IT 46.8 47.9 49.3 49.7 49.6
LU 48.7 54.4 50.4 51.6 50.9
NL 69.6 75.9 72.2 78.4 74.5 65 >12 hours week
AT 64.3 66.9 66.5 65.5 66.2
PT 62.0 61.9 62.5 68.3 64.4 63 (2008)
FI 68.7 72.2 70.0 74.8 71.6
SE 72.8 76.0 72.3 74.5 73.8
UK 64.7 63.4 64.3 65.6 64.7
EU15 58.2 61.3 61.0 62.4 61.5
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CY 61.8 70.7 64.2 66.2* 63
CZ 57.6 59.7 58.3 55.0 57.2 57.6 (2008)
EE 65.4 67.2 70.8 62.5 67.9 65
HU 50.2 49.8 51.2 55.5 52.7 57
LT 62.1 65.6 65.7 63.4* 61
LV 64.0 70.5 69.5 69.2* 62
MT 36.9 43.2 38.9 38.5* 41
PL 49.8 57.1 50.9 48.1 49.6
SK 53.2 56.3 53.9 53.8*
SI 62.6 65.3 64.9 63.3 64.4 2pp >EU15 (2008)
EU25 57.3 60.6 59.9 60*
BG 56.1 65.2 62.4 61.2*
RO 52.7 52.3 50.5 50.1 50.6
EU27 58.0 61.2 60.2 60.2*
Target: Employment rate of older workers in 2010
Rates in 2010 using employment growth rate in: Employment rate targets set by Member States 
Country 2007 2006 - 2007 2001 - 2007 1997 - 2000 1997 - 2007 (from NRPs)
BE 29.6 27.4 26.2 26.9 26.2 50 asap
DK 60.6 55.3 63.3 72.4 67.0
DE 43.5 53.8 48.3 43.3 46.0
GR 43.5 43.4 43.0 33.6 39.4
ES 49.0 46.8 48.8 45.7 48.2
FR 42.9 39.9 45.0 35.6 41.6
IE 60.4 56.9 59.7 63.0 60.9
IT 34.2 37.5 36.5 31.9 34.7
LU 30.0 22.0 30.3 29.5 28.7
NL 55.4 63.3 61.6 64.0 61.8 40 >12 hours week
AT 36.7 47.1 44.1 40.6 42.3
PT 54.5 56.2 52.2 48.5 50.8 50
FI 61.4 57.4 63.8 63.6 65.1
SE 74.0 73.1 78.3 83.8 81.5
UK 60.8 59.2 63.9 62.9 63.8
EU15 46.9 49.1 49.6 45.2 47.8
CY 64.1 72.6 56.5 56.5 61.2* 53
CZ 51.1 50.9 55.9 46.2 52.6 47.5 (2008)
EE 59.4 58.7 60.4 47.7 56.5 54.8 (2008)
HU 33.9 29.5 37.5 37.2 37.7 37
LT 53.5 65.3 58.6 59.5 56.7* 50
LV 55.5 69.1 66.0 64.1 63.8* 50
MT 24.7 16.9 24.5 21.2 20.8* 35
PL 35.2 36.1 30.5 19.6 26.0
SK 39.4 41.6 34.7 33.8 39.9*
SI 37.4 39.5 38.4 32.4 36.9 35 (2008)
EU25 45.9 47.6 47.8 42.8 46.8*
BG 43.0 50.0 53.0 55.4*
RO 44.7 40.2 36.1 31.4 34.2
EU27 47.3 48.8 48.7 48.2*
*1997-2007
Source: Commission services, DG ECFIN.
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1.4. thE contribUtion oF EmploymEnt 
and laboUr prodUctivity to gdp 
growth
The relative contribution to GDP growth of labour 
productivity and labour utilisation, can be assessed 
using the standard accounting decomposition
Table 12 and Table 13 reproduce this 
decomposition for 2007 and the decade 1997-
2007. In 2007 the labour input made an average 
contribution of 1.8% against a contribution of 
hourly productivity growth of about 1.1% (Table 
12), with this larger contribution of the labour 
input suggesting that the expansion cycle achieved 
in 2007 a mature stage. A similar pattern was 
observed in the US, where the strong productivity 
growth in 2003 and 2004 (3.0%) was followed in 
2005 and 2006 by a decline in hourly productivity 
growth (1.8%) and an increase in the rate of 
labour utilisation (at about 1.5%).
When looked over a longer period (Table 13), 
hourly productivity provides the highest 
contribution (1.4% against 0.8%).27 This 
difference is partly due to the increase in the 
employment rate and to the more moderate 
27 In 2007 the total factor productivity and the hourly labour 
productivity in the EU aggregate for which TFP data are 
available, increased by 1.0% and 1.6%, compared with an 
average change of 1.0% and 1.5% between 2001 and 2006.
decline in total hours worked. In addition, the 
productive population continued to fall at the 
same rate as that of the 1997-2007 average, 
implying that its contribution did not change 
between the two periods. Demographic trends 
have been an important factor in the differing 
relative performance of the EU versus the US 
over the last decade, and are projected to be even 
more relevant in the coming decades given the 
faster pace of ageing in Europe. In 2007, the 
positive contribution of the demographic effect 
was in the US twice as much as in the EU.
With few relevant exceptions, labour productivity 
was the major contribution to GDP growth in the 
RAMS but also in countries such as Denmark 
Portugal and Finland. The increase in the labour 
input is mainly driven by the new jobs created 
(the so-called extensive margin), while the 
contribution of the intensive margin is negative 
in Malta, Denmark, Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, 
Finland and the UK. For Denmark and Cyprus 
the decline in the total hours worked per 
employee gave a positive impulse to growth of 
productivity. The combined effect of changes at 
the intensive and extensive margins is a positive 
contribution to the increase in the labour input in 
all countries but Cyprus, Malta and Hungary. For 
the first two, the input of labour grows only 
because of demographic components.
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table 12 – GDP growth and its sources in 2007
 
GDP 
growth in 
2007
Due to growth in: GDP per 
capita 
growth in 
2007
Productivity 
(GDP/hour)
Labour
utilisation Hours worked
per employee
Employment
rate
Share of 
Working 
age population
Population
of which
1 = 2+3 2 3 = 4+5+6+7 4 5 6 7 8 = 1-7
BE 2.8 1.0 1.7 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.2 2.6
CZ 6.5 4.7 1.7 -0.1 1.2 0.1 0.5 6.0
DK 1.8 1.4 0.4 -1.4 1.5 -0.1 0.4 1.4
DE 2.5 0.8 1.7 0.0 2.3 -0.5 -0.1 2.6
EE 7.1 6.4 0.6 -0.1 1.1 -0.2 -0.2 7.3
EL 4.0 1.6 2.3 1.1 1.3 -0.2 0.1 3.9
ES 3.8 1.1 2.7 -0.4 1.3 0.0 1.8 2.0
FR 2.2 1.0 1.2 -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.6
IE 5.3 1.9 3.2 -0.3 1.0 0.5 2.1 3.2
IT 1.5 -0.2 1.7 0.5 1.0 -0.2 0.4 1.0
CY 4.4 2.4 1.9 -1.3 1.2 0.1 1.9 2.4
LV 10.3 6.4 3.7 0.2 4.0 0.0 -0.5 10.8
LT 8.8 5.6 3.0 1.1 2.0 0.5 -0.5 9.3
LU 4.5 -0.5 5.0 0.8 3.2 0.0 1.0 3.5
HU 1.3 1.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 1.5
MT 3.8 2.9 0.9 -1.7 0.7 1.3 0.6 3.1
NL 3.5 1.1 2.4 0.0 2.3 -0.2 0.2 3.3
AT 3.4 1.6 1.8 -0.2 1.6 -0.1 0.4 3.0
PL 6.5 2.0 4.4 -0.1 4.1 0.4 -0.1 6.6
PT 1.9 1.4 0.5 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.3 1.6
SI 6.1 3.3 2.7 0.0 2.1 0.2 0.4 5.7
SK 10.4 6.4 3.7 1.6 1.6 0.5 0.1 10.3
FI 4.4 3.1 1.3 -0.9 1.9 -0.1 0.4 4.0
SE 2.6 -0.6 3.1 0.9 0.9 0.2 1.2 1.4
UK 3.0 3.0 0.1 -0.6 0.0 0.3 0.4 2.6
US 2.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2
JP 2.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 2.1
Euroarea 2.6 0.8 1.8 0.0 1.4 -0.1 0.5 2.1
EU-25  2.9 1.1 1.8 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.4 2.4
EUR-15 2.7 1.1 1.5 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 0.5 2.2
EU10 6.1 3.0 3.0 0.1 2.6 0.3 0.0 6.1
Source: Commission services.
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1.5. EmploymEnt prospEcts in coming 
yEars
Looking forward, business and consumer 
expectations and DG ECFIN Spring forecasts 
(Table 14) point to job creation slowing down. 
After the trough in 2003, survey measures of 
employment intentions and household 
perceptions of labour market conditions 
improved significantly. According to the Business 
and Consumer Survey, in May 2007, the overall 
“economic sentiment” index reached the highest 
level since early 2001, while both employers and 
consumers were optimistic about the future 
labour market prospects (Graph 15). One year 
later, the economic sentiment, indicator has 
plummeted to the level of July 200528. While it 
is difficult to infer from this pattern a clear 
response of the labour market, the reforms 
enacted so far should have made the European 
labour markets more prepared to cope with 
cyclical shocks. At the same time, the increase in 
the inactivity rate in some countries and the 
rising size of the inactive which would potentially 
28 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/
business_consumer_surveys/2008/bcs_2008_05_en.pdf   
For a detailed analysis of future growth developments see 
DG ECFIN-Economic Forecasts-Spring 2008.
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
european_economy/2007/ee207en.pdf
table 13 – GDP growth and its sources 1997-2007
 
GDP 
growth 
in 2007
Due to growth in: GDP per 
capita 
growth 
in 
1999-
2007
Productivity 
(GDP/hour)
Labour
utilisation Hours worked
per employee
Employment
rate
Share of 
Working 
age population
Population
of which
1 = 2+3 2 3 = 4+5+6+7 4 5 6 7 8 = 1-7
BE 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.4 1.9
CZ 4.1 4.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.0 4.0
DK 2.0 1.4 0.6 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.3 1.7
DE 1.5 1.5 0.0 -0.5 0.9 -0.3 0.0 1.5
EE 7.7 0.0 0.7 0.3 -0.4 8.0
EL 4.2 2.7 1.5 0.4 0.9 -0.1 0.3 3.9
ES 3.8 0.6 3.1 -0.5 2.2 0.1 1.4 2.4
FR 2.2 1.8 0.4 -0.7 0.5 0.0 0.6 1.6
IE 6.5 3.1 3.2 -0.5 1.5 0.4 1.8 4.7
IT 1.4 0.4 1.0 -0.3 1.3 -0.3 0.4 1.0
CY 3.8 1.5 2.3 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.7 2.2
LV 8.2 7.1 1.1 -0.2 1.5 0.4 -0.6 8.8
LT 6.5 5.7 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.6 7.0
LU 5.1 1.7 3.4 -0.4 2.4 0.1 1.3 3.8
HU 4.0 3.7 0.3 -0.4 0.8 0.2 -0.2 4.2
MT 2.4 0.0 -0.3 0.5 0.9 1.5
NL 2.4 1.6 0.8 -0.4 0.8 -0.1 0.5 1.9
AT 2.3 1.5 0.7 -0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 1.8
PL 4.1 0.0 -0.4 0.6 -0.2 4.3
PT 1.7 1.3 0.5 -0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.5 1.2
SI 4.4 3.4 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 4.2
SK 5.0 4.9 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.7 0.0 5.0
FI 3.4 2.4 1.0 -0.4 1.2 0.0 0.3 3.1
SE 3.2 2.4 0.8 -0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.7
UK 2.8 2.3 0.5 -0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 2.3
US 2.8 0.0 -0.1 0.2 1.0 1.7
JP 1.5 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.1 1.4
Euro area 2.2 1.2 0.9 -0.4 1.0 -0.1 0.5 1.7
EU 25 2.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.4 2.0
EU15 2.3 1.4 0.8 -0.4 0.8 -0.1 0.5 1.8
Source: Commission services.
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be in the labour force should warn against the 
risks of a falling labour supply. 
Looking forward, the Spring 2008 Commission’s 
forecasts (Table 11) suggest a deceleration of job 
creation in 2008 and 2009 in response to the 
foreseen economic slowdown29. However, the 
European economy has been so far relatively 
29 According to the fl ash estimate for the fi rst quarter of 
2007 (see Eurostat Press release, 15 May 2007), compared 
to the fi rst quarter of 2007, GDP grew by as much as the 
average of the previous three quarters, respectively 3.1% 
for the euro area and by 3.2 for the EU27 (+0.6 over the 
previous quarter for both the aggregates).
resilient to the economic contraction in the US 
and major industrialised economies. In the fi rst 
quarter of 2008 GDP growth was unexpectedly 
revised upward (0.8% q-o-q or 2.2 y-o-y). Even 
so, business and consumers’ surveys suggest a 
more moderate economic activity in 2008.
According to DG ECFIN Spring forecasts, the EU 
as a whole is expected to create about 3 millions 
of jobs over the period 2007-2009 (of which 
2 millions in the euro area). Total employment will 
grow at 0.8% in 2008 and at 0.5% in 2009 (in the 
Euro area at 0.8% and 0.5%). In 2008-2009 the 
unemployment rate is projected to hover around 
6.8% in the EU and at 7.2% in the Euro area. 
Graph 58 – Employment and unemployment expectations: business and consumers survey
Unemployment expectations over the next 12 months
Evolution of employment expected in the months ahead: Services
Employment expectations for the months ahead: industry
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Source: Commission services.
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table 14 – Commission’s forecasts (Autumn 2007 and spring 2008)
 
Total employment (percentage change on 
preceding year)
Number of unemployed (as a percentage of 
civilian labour force) ¹
Year 2008 2009 2008 2009
(Forecast in:) X-2007 IV-2008 X-2007 IV-2008 X-2007 IV-2008 X-2007 IV-2008
 Belgium 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.4 7.2 7.3 6.9 7.5
 Germany 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.3 7.7 7.3 7.6 7.1
 Ireland 1.3 0.7 1.5 1.6 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.8
 Greece 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 7.9 8.3 7.5 8
 Spain 2.1 1.3 1.7 0.7 8.5 9.3 9.1 10.6
 France 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.3 8.2 8 8.1 8.1
 Italy 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 5.7 6 5.5 5.9
 Cyprus 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.1 3.7 3.9 3.5
 Luxembourg 3.6 4.0 3.2 3.3 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.4
 Malta 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.2
 Netherlands 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.7 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.8
 Austria 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3
 Portugal 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.5 8 7.9 7.7 7.9
 Slovenia 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.7
 Finland 0.8 1.2 0.3 0.6 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.1
 Euro area 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.5 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.3
 Bulgaria 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.2 6.8 6 6 5.4
 Czech 
Republic 1.5 1.1 1.6 0.5 5.4 4.5 5 4.4
 Denmark 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 2.7 3.1 2.7 3.2
 Estonia 0.2 -1.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 6 4.9 6
 Latvia 0.8 -0.4 0.4 -1.2 5.5 6.4 5.6 6.9
 Lithuania 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 4.2 4.5 4.4 4.8
 Hungary 0.1 -1.1 0.2 0.6 7 8.3 6.9 7.8
 Poland 1.7 2.6 1.3 1.3 7.3 7.1 6.4 6.1
 Romania 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 7 6.1 6.9 5.9
 Slovakia 1.5 1.5 1.0 0.9 9.7 9.8 9 9.3
 Sweden 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.2 5.8 6.2 5.7 6.5
 United 
Kingdom 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.0 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.7
 EU27 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.5 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.8
 USA 0.0 -0.2 0.7 -0.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 6.2
 Japan 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 4 4 4 4.2
Source: Commission´s forecast. 
1 Unemployment	rate:	series	following	Eurostat	definition,	based	on	the	labour	force	survey
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Focusing on EMU members the analysis shows 
that contained labour cost developments have 
supported moderate inflation in the euro area in 
recent years. Notwithstanding this overall 
assessment of subdued labour cost pressures, 
some signs of strong acceleration in wages are 
emerging since the last quarter of 2007. 
Moreover, the pick-up in wage growth is 
expected to continue in 2008, with wage demands 
being fuelled against a background of public 
concern about workers’ declining purchasing 
power and increasing consumer inflation 
perceptions. Over the medium term, price 
stability will therefore require wage agreements 
at the national level that take into account 
underlying trend productivity developments, the 
cyclical situation of labour markets and the 
underlying position in relative price 
competitiveness within the euro area. 
The current round of energy price rises, if it 
persists, may require either a renewed downward 
adjustment of real wages relative to productivity 
or a reduction in profit margins in order to avoid 
a negative impact on inflation and, ultimately, 
on growth and employment. However, after 
years of wage moderation, employees may 
resist further downward adjustment of real 
wages in several countries (e.g. in Germany 
where real wages have been almost flat for a 
number of years). There are indeed clear signs 
of increasing wage demands in euro-area 
economies, often linked to the observation that 
labour shares have generally been declining in 
recent times. Nevertheless, it is shown that, 
beyond wage moderation, the decline in labour 
shares stems also form compositional effects. 
Thus, wage-setting policies alone will not be 
sufficient to reverse the current trend in labour 
shares. More emphasis should be put on whether 
technological and structural conditions in the 
economy favour significant and widespread 
productivity gains, necessary for real production 
wages to increase with no detriment for cost 
competitiveness.
Overall moderate wage developments in the euro 
area conceal marked differences across countries 
regarding the contribution of nominal unit labour 
costs to the GDP and the final demand deflators. 
The historical low levels in nominal and real unit 
labour costs registered in recent years are mostly 
attributable to Germany. Among the three sources 
of movements in post-tax real consumption 
wages (i.e., wages received by workers relative 
to the price of goods and services they purchase), 
increases in real production wages are the most 
dominant, while the contribution of the domestic 
terms of trade to the purchasing power of workers 
has remained limited. In most euro-area 
countries, growth in post-tax real consumption 
wages has outpaced that of gross real 
consumption wages, this implying a favourable 
contribution of changes in social security 
contributions and personal income taxes to the 
purchasing power of workers.
Developments in public wages could, directly 
and indirectly, be an important source of inflation 
and competitiveness dynamics of individual 
countries. Recent trends show that growth in 
nominal compensation per employee in the 
government sector has outpaced that of 
compensation per employee in the private sector 
in several euro area countries. The available data 
hints at a relatively high share of skilled workers 
as well as at a relatively low level of compensation 
per employee in the government sector. Even so, 
excessive growth of wages in the government 
sector could worsen underlying budgetary 
conditions while exacerbating inflationary 
pressures both directly and indirectly through 
their signalling role to private sector 
negotiations.
Developments in nominal compensation per 
employee in several countries relative to the 
remaining euro-area economies are not 
necessarily in line with what one would expect 
in view of their relative cyclical positions, 
thereby raising concerns about the adjustment 
capacity of labour markets (measured by 
movements in relative nominal unit labour costs) 
to asymmetric cyclical patters. More precisely, 
the weak responsiveness of nominal 
compensation per employee to asymmetric 
cyclical shocks across euro-area members seems 
to have precluded a smooth adjustment of the 
ULC-based Real Effective Exchange Rates 
(REERs) in EMU. 
Regarding non euro-area countries the analysis 
suggests that in 2007, wage growth stabilised in 
Denmark, strongly accelerated in Sweden but 
2. wAGE AND lABOUR COst DEvElOPMENts
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abated in the UK, in spite of the labour market 
tightening in the latter country. Coupled with a 
sharp slowdown in productivity, nominal unit 
labour costs have picked up in Denmark and 
Sweden whereas more dynamic productivity 
behaviour has contributed to the moderation of 
nominal unit labour costs in the United Kingdom. 
The study of labour cost developments in the 
Recently-Acceded Member States (RAMS) 
requires a separate section on account of their 
condition of catching-up countries, with the 
ongoing convergence process triggering higher-
than-EU average wage growth while in turn 
benefiting from higher-than-EU average 
productivity growth. Recent data on nominal 
labour costs point to mounting inflationary 
pressures, in line with tightened labour market 
conditions and relatively stable productivity 
gains. After the culmination of overheating in the 
labour market in 2007, nominal unit labour costs 
are expected to decelerate significantly over the 
period 2008-2009. The deterioration in the 
international economic outlook is expected to 
lead to some slowdown in the economic activity. 
From a supply-side perspective, signs of 
deteriorating competitiveness in labour-intensive 
sectors suggest that the sustainability of the 
catching-up process depends on labour costs 
remaining in line with productivity, particularly 
in a context characterised by increasing 
inflationary expectations. The removal of any 
shortages of skilled workers will be crucial in 
this regard, insofar it can facilitate enhanced 
external competitiveness and a higher 
contribution of net exports to GDP growth in a 
less favourable euro-area environment.
2.1. wagE and laboUr cost 
dEvElopmEnts and macroEconomic 
stability in thE EUro arEa
This section assesses to what extent the 
functioning of euro-area labour markets have 
facilitated and can be expected to facilitate sound 
internal and external macroeconomic conditions, 
namely aggregate price stability and sustainable 
competitive positions at individual country 
level.
2.1.1. Recent past developments in wage 
and labour costs in the euro area
This section presents recent evidence on the 
indicators that provide a measure of the growth in 
nominal labour costs in the euro area, i.e., 
negotiated wages, the Labour Cost Index, and 
compensation per employee30. The assessment of 
inflationary pressures stemming from the labour 
market focuses on nominal unit labour costs, 
which reflect the developments of compensation 
per employee and labour productivity. This is 
done by quantifying the contribution of nominal 
unit labour costs to the increase in the final 
demand deflator. Inflationary pressures as 
measured by the final demand deflator have two 
sources: i) factors arising from abroad, whose 
influence on prices is channelled through the 
import deflator, and ii) domestic factors, whose 
influence on prices is channelled through the GDP 
deflator and its income (i.e., cost) components: 
nominal unit labour costs, gross operating surplus 
and net indirect taxes per unit of output. 
The inspection of nominal unit labour costs 
growth relative to that of the GDP deflator is a 
starting point of the assessment of inflationary 
pressures arising from the labour market.  The 
requirement for wage developments to contribute 
to price stability translates into the condition that 
nominal increases in compensation per employee 
should not exceed the sum of productivity and 
the inflation target of the ECB of close but below 
2%. However, when applying this simple “rule 
of thumb” due attention should be given to the 
distinction between actual and long-term 
productivity and the influence on wage growth 
of the cyclical situation of the labour market. A 
benchmark against which to gauge labour cost 
developments should rather compare cyclical 
unemployment with a measure of real 
compensation per employee adjusted for 
productivity trend. 
contained labour cost developments have 
supported moderate inflation in the euro 
area in recent years, although signs of 
strong acceleration in wages are emerging 
since the last quarter of 2007
30 Compensation per employee includes gross wages and 
salaries (i.e., wages plus employees’ social security 
contributions) and employers’ social security contributions. 
This indicator covers the total economy, which gives an 
indication of whether labour cost developments are broadly 
based across sectors or whether labour cost pressures 
significantly comes from a particular sector (public/private 
sectors, industry/services, etc.). The Labour Cost Index 
captures the evolution of hourly labour costs, correcting for 
distorting compositional effects of hours worked (namely, 
the changes in overtime hours and the developments of 
part-time employment). The Labour Cost Index does not 
cover non-market activities.
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Information on nominal labour costs available 
up to the fourth quarter of 2007 point to a 
continuation of subdued wage developments 
(Graph 59 and Table 15). The annual growth 
rates of negotiated wages and compensation per 
employee in 2007 was around the corresponding 
average growth rates over 1999-2006, while the 
annual increase in the Labour Cost Index 
(measuring hourly labour costs) stayed well 
below the average level registered since the 
creation of EMU. The overall picture of moderate 
labour costs is partly clouded by some noticeable 
acceleration in the last quarter of 2007 and the 
fi rst quarter of 2008, as indicated by the upward 
movement in the annual rate of change of all 
indicators of labour cost growth. In the fi rst 
quarter of 2008, the annual growth rate of 
negotiated wages rose to 2.8%, compared with 
an average of 2.2% in 2007. The Labour Cost 
Index has also recorded further acceleration from 
2.9% in the last quarter of 2007 to 3.1% in the 
fi rst quarter of 2008. Compensation per employee 
grew at 3% in the fi rst quarter of 2008, compared 
with an average of 2.4% in 2007.
As illustrated by Graph 60, wages have been 
driving the increases in the Labour Cost Index in 
the recent past, while the contribution of non-
wage costs (mainly represented by employers 
social contributions and, to a lesser extent, 
vocational training costs, as well as taxes and 
subsidies) has remained relatively smaller, 
particularly as of 2006, following the dampening 
effects of cuts in social security contributions 
implemented in some euro-area economies. 
Graph 59 – Nominal wage and labour cost indicators, EA13
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Graph 60 – Contribution of wage and non-wage costs to overall growth in lCI, EA13
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Graph 61 presents an estimate of the euro-area 
wage drift31. As wage increases are bargained for 
a given period of time, the wage drift is likely to 
capture the effect of unexpected changes in 
economic conditions in the short term, through 
flexible pay elements, such as performance-
based bonuses or compensation for overtime, 
that companies use to respond to fluctuations in 
activity and labour market conditions. The wage 
drift, therefore, provides some information about 
the cyclical profile of compensation per 
employee, following cyclical developments in 
the economy. In recent years, the wage drift has 
generally been negative and thus should have 
contributed to moderate nominal wage 
developments in a period of relatively weak 
economic activity.
on the basis of the information available32, 
the latest rounds of wage negotiation in 
euro area member states have resulted in 
somewhat higher increases than in previous 
years, albeit with much differentiation 
across member states 
Agreed pay settlements foresee substantial 
compensation growth in countries such as 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and 
Italy. In Belgium, the sharp price increase will 
have a lagged impact on nominal wages as these 
are automatically adapted to a measure of past 
inflation. Although the indexation excludes a 
number of goods, such as motor fuels, for which 
inflation has been particularly high in recent 
months, wages are projected to increase more 
than in the neighbouring countries in 2008. Wage 
developments in 2009 will depend on the 
outcome of the upcoming bargaining rounds, but 
are forecast to be largely in line with those in 
France, Germany and the Netherlands. In the 
case of Germany, a number of years of almost 
flat real wages (and improving competitiveness) 
appear to be the main justification for recently 
higher wage demands, rather than the recent rise 
in inflation. In the Netherlands, wage demands 
are expected to rise in response to both the still 
31 An estimate of the annual growth in the euro-area wage 
drift is constructed as a residual component of annual 
growth in compensation per employee, after subtracting the 
increase in negotiated wages and the increase in 
employees’ and employers’ social security contributions 
weighted by their share in overall compensation per 
employee. For a detailed description of the methodology 
see Box 2 entitled “Recent developments in euro-area wage 
drift” in the October 2006 issue of the Monthly Bulletin.
32 See “Spring economic forecasts 2008 – 2009”. 
European Economy, No. 3, 2008. 
tight labour market and increasing inflation. In 
Finland, the current multi-annual wage 
agreements provide for 5½ % wage growth in 
2008 and slightly less in 2009. This is 1½ 
percentage points higher than the average over 
the recent years. In Italy, the wage agreements 
signed in late 2007 and those scheduled for 2008 
in many sectors of the economy, both private and 
public, are likely to bring about an appreciable 
acceleration in compensation per employee. In 
Austria, Luxemburg and Spain, wage 
negotiations resulted in relatively moderate wage 
settlements. In Austria, the increase in wages is 
projected to be slightly lower than the euro-area 
average. In Luxembourg wages should 
decelerate in 2008 and 2009 but not dramatically, 
as the rise in employment is projected to remain 
rather robust and inflation to be quite strong. 
Finally, wage moderation is expected to continue 
over the forecast horizon in France owing to a 
still high unemployment rate (around 1 pp above 
the euro-area average) and the projected 
slowdown in employment growth. Whereas the 
risk of second-round effects on wages from the 
flare-up in prices cannot be excluded, it 
nevertheless seems relatively limited.
In order to assess inflationary pressures 
coming from the labour market, 
developments in labour cost growth should 
be viewed in conjunction with 
developments in productivity and the 
contribution of nominal unit labour cost to 
the growth in GDP deflator should be 
closely monitored
From a medium-term standpoint (Graph 62), the 
assessment of mild inflationary pressures 
stemming from the labour market is largely 
explained by a slowdown in compensation per 
employee, while productivity gains have 
generally been weak. Notwithstanding this 
positive medium-term assessment, nominal unit 
labour costs increased by 2.3% and 2.4% 
respectively in the fourth quarter of 2007 and the 
first quarter of 2008, almost one percentage point 
above the average rate of change over the period 
1999-2006. This is due to a marked slowdown in 
productivity coupled with a strong acceleration 
in nominal wages. Taking a longer-term 
perspective, there is evidence33 that trend 
productivity growth in the euro area registered a 
fairly sustained decline since the mid-1990s. 
33 See, for instance, “Moving Europe’s productive frontier. 
The EU 2007 Review”. European Economy, No 8/2007.
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This is a common feature across sectors and 
Member States, although developments in 
manufacturing and trade services, from a sector 
perspective, and in Germany and Italy, from a 
country perspective, seem to have dominated the 
overall picture. Nevertheless, actual data suggests 
a significant pick-up in labour productivity 
growth since mid-2005, although further data is 
needed to assess whether this pick-up refl ects a 
change in the underlying trend.
The GDP defl ator can be broken down into three 
income components, namely, nominal unit labour 
costs, gross operating surplus per unit of output 
and net indirect taxes (i.e., taxes on production 
and imports less subsidies) per unit of output. 
Graph 63 illustrates the dampening effect of 
nominal unit labour costs on euro area infl ation 
in recent years. The domestic price pressures, 
refl ected in the annual rate of change of the GDP 
defl ator, have been contained, standing at around 
1.9% since 2004, after having been as high as 
2.6% in 2002. The contribution of nominal unit 
labour cost decreased signifi cantly in 2004 and 
remained at moderate levels thereof. The 
contribution of net indirect taxes per unit of 
output has generally increased over time, while 
that of the gross operating surplus per unit of 
output has remained broadly stable. 
The resilience of profi ts is particularly evident 
considering developments in the industrial sector 
(excluding construction). Graph 64 illustrates 
developments in industrial producer prices and in 
the industrial value added deflator and its 
breakdown into nominal unit labour costs and 
nominal unit profi t margins34. Producer prices 
measure gross output prices, whereas the value 
added defl ator measures the price of value added 
(i.e., the difference between gross output and 
intermediate inputs). Barring 2001 and 2002, the 
significant gap between producer price 
developments and the value added defl ator is due 
to marked increases in intermediate input costs. 
Whenever the increase in producer prices were 
not accompanied by a commensurate increase in 
the value added defl ator, labour costs have been 
declining, thus enabling fi rms to maintain profi t 
rates and to offset the upward pressures on prices 
from intermediate inputs. 
34 Owing to the lack of information at the sectoral level on 
taxes less subsidies on production, nominal unit profi t 
margins are calculated as the gap between the rates of 
change in the gross value added defl ator at basic prices and 
nominal unit labour costs.
Graph 61 – Compensation per employee and the wage 
drift, EA13
Year-on-year % change, 2000-2007
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Data source: Own calculations on the basis of Eurostat 
and AMECO data.
Note: the annual growth in the wage drift is estimated 
as a residual component of the annual growth in 
compensation per employee, after subtracting the 
increase in negotiated wages and the increase in 
employees’ and employers’ social security contributions, 
weighted by their share in compensation per employee.
Graph 62 – Compensation per employee, labour 
productivity and nominal unit labour costs, EA13
Year-on-year % change, 1999-2007
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Data source: Eurostat.
Note: Compensation per employee, labour productivity 
and nominal unit labour costs are based on 
headcounts. 
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overall moderate labour cost growth in the 
euro area conceals different patterns 
across sectors. it is still early to say whether 
recent labour cost pressures in market 
services and the construction sector will 
persist and thus spill over across the 
remaining economic sectors
In recent quarters, the annual growth rate of 
compensation per employee has been highest in 
the construction sector (Graph 65). The growth 
rate in compensation per employee has been 
higher in the industry than in the market services. 
In terms of the Labour Cost Index (Graph 66), 
there was a clear moderation of the annual 
growth rate of hourly labour costs in industry 
throughout 2007 and a marked acceleration in 
construction. Hourly labour costs growth in 
market services increased somewhat in 2007 
compared with the previous year. 
Graph	63	–	Income	decomposition	of	GDP	defl	ator,	EA133
P.p. contributions to year-on-year GDP defl ator % growth, 
2000-2007
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Data source: Own calculations on the basis of Eurostat 
data.
Graph 64 – Industrial production prices and the 
breakdown	of	industrial	value	added	defl	ator,	EA13
Year-on-year % change, 1999-2007
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of 
Eurostat data.
table 15 – Nominal wage and labour cost indicators, labour productivity and nominal unit labour costs, EA13
Year-on-year %change
 
2005 2006 2007 Av. 99-06 2007Q1 2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1
Negociated wages 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.8
Labour Cost 
Index 2.7 2.5 2.6 3.0 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.1
Compensation per 
employee 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.7 3.0
Labour 
productivity
0.7 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.6
Nominal unit 
labour costs 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.3 2.4
Data source:  Negotiated wages: ECB. lCI, Compensation per employee, labour productivity and nominal unit 
labour costs: Eurostat.
Note: Compensation per employee, labour productivity and nominal unit labour costs are based on headcounts.
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Graph 65 – sectoral compensation per employee, EA13
Year-on-year % change, 2000Q1-2007Q3
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Data source: ECB. statistical Data warehouse.
Note: Compensation per employee is based on headcounts. NACE G-I corresponds to the following groupings: trade 
and	repairs,	hotels	and	restaurants	and	transport	and	communication.	NACE	J-K	covers	fi	nancial	intermediation,	and	
real estate, renting and business activities.  
Graph 66 – sectoral labour Cost Index, EA13
Year-on-year % change, 2000Q1-2007Q4
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Data source: ECB. statistical Data warehouse. 
Note: NACE G-I corresponds to the following groupings: trade and repairs, hotels and restaurants and transport and 
communication.	NACE	J-K	covers	fi	nancial	intermediation,	and	real	estate,	renting	and	business	activities.	
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Sectoral nominal unit labour costs are examined 
in Graph 67, where compensation per employee 
is seen in conjunction with sectoral productivity 
developments. The pattern across sectors appears 
to differ substantially not only in terms of growth 
in compensation per employee, but also in terms 
of productivity, and, therefore, of nominal unit 
labour costs. Nominal unit labour costs have 
edged up in the construction sector in the last 
quarters of 2007, due to a combination of labour 
cost pressures and a slowdown in labour 
productivity. Growth in nominal unit labour 
costs remained negative in the industry, owing to 
sustained increases in productivity. While the 
weakening of household spending on residential 
construction should contribute to moderating 
wage pressures in the construction sector, careful 
surveillance in the months to come may be 
warranted in order to detect whether mounting 
labour cost pressures in this sector persist and 
eventually spill-over across the remaining 
economic sectors. 
Graph 68 shows the sectoral gross value added 
deflator (at basic prices) as the sum of nominal 
unit labour costs and a mark-up of profits over 
labour costs. The industrial sector is characterised 
by a decline in nominal unit labour costs over the 
period 1999-2007. Judging by the resilience of 
profit margins (see Graph 64), this sector seems to 
have withstood the pressures from rises in non-
labour input costs and international competition. 
In market services, the increases in value added 
inflation has been driven by the rise in labour costs 
(together with profit margins, especially in 
financial intermediation, real estate, renting and 
business activities). Finally, the construction sector 
differs somewhat as it has exhibited higher 
mark-up growth than industry, while sharing a 
pattern of high labour costs growth with services.
Graph 67 – sectoral nominal unit labour costs, EA13
Year-on-year % change, 2000Q1-2007Q3
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Note:  NACE G-I corresponds to the following groupings: trade and repairs, hotels and restaurants and transport and 
communication.	NACE	J-K	covers	financial	intermediation,	and	real	estate,	renting	and	business	activities.	
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Judging by the negative growth rate 
registered in real unit labour costs, euro-
area labour cost dynamics were quite 
moderate in recent years…
When assessing infl ationary pressures coming 
from the labour market, it is standard practice to 
focus on real unit labour costs, i.e., compare 
GDP-defl ated compensation per employee with 
labour productivity. On this basis, euro-area 
labour cost dynamics have been quite benign in 
recent years (Graph 69), as GDP-deflated 
compensation per employee did not increase 
suffi ciently to compensate for the increase in 
productivity gains, implying falling real unit 
labour costs or declining labour shares (for a 
detailed description of the underlying drivers of 
declining labour shares, see Box 5). 
…though not for all countries consistent with 
cyclical labour market conditions since the 
creation of EmU 
However, such a positive assessment of labour 
cost pressures needs to be qualified in two 
regards. First, it must be acknowledged that this 
overall positive assessment changes its character 
when broken down to the individual country 
level (see Section 3.2.2). Second, the practice of 
focusing on yearly real unit labour costs to assess 
infl ationary pressures ignores the distinction 
between actual and long-term productivity and 
the infl uence of labour market cyclical conditions 
on wage growth. A better benchmark against 
which to assess actual labour cost developments 
can be obtained by comparing the cyclical 
unemployment (i.e. the gap between the observed 
rate of unemployment and its long-term 
component) with a measure of the cyclical 
component of real compensation per employee. 
The latter can be obtained by subtracting from 
the actual growth rate in real wages its long-term 
component. Such long-term component of real 
wages is, in turn, consistent with a stable labour 
share and long-run labour productivity 
developments (Box 4 “A benchmark measure for 
real wage growth in the long run”  discusses the 
long-term component of real wages that would 
be consistent with a technology of the Cobb-
Douglas type). 
Graph 68 – Income decomposition of the sectoral gross 
value	added	defl	ator,	EA13
P.p. contribution to y-on-y GVA defl ator % growth, 1999-2007
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Graph	69	–	GDP-defl	ated	compensation	per	employee,	
labour productivity and real unit labour costs, EA13
Annual average % change over selected periods 
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The cyclical real wages and cyclical 
unemployment are plotted together in Graph 70 
for euro-area members (excluding Slovenia) 
over the period 1981-2007, as well as the forecast 
period 2008-2009. Over the cycle, one would 
expect a negative relationship between the 
growth of the cyclical component of real wages 
and the change in the unemployment gap. Put 
differently, when the increase in unemployment 
is higher than the increase in the NAIRU, the 
actual growth of real wages should fall below the 
growth of its long-term component. However, 
Graph 70 illustrates that this negative relationship 
is not detected for all euro-area economies over 
the EMU years. In countries such as Austria, 
Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands there 
seems to be a positive relationship between the 
cyclical components of unemployment and real 
wages, usually with a lagged response of real 
wages to cyclical unemployment. On the basis of 
these indicators, movements in real wages in the 
short run have not adequately reflected the 
cyclical situation in the labour market in many 
euro-area members. 
Taking a look at the expected developments over 
2008-200935, the distance between the observed 
unemployment rate and the NAIRU is likely to 
remain the same in Belgium and Austria (after 
two years the overall change in the unemployment 
gap is estimated respectively at 0.08 and 0.07). 
35 See “Spring economic forecasts 2008 – 2009”. 
European Economy, No. 3, 2008.
Significant reductions in the unemployment gap 
are expected to occur in Germany (-0.91), 
Portugal (-0.72) and, to a lesser extent, 
Luxembourg (-0.57). The gap between the 
observed unemployment rate and its long-term 
component is assumed to increase substantially 
in Spain (1.84), followed by Ireland (0.58) and 
Italy (0.49). The remaining countries occupy 
intermediate positions (Greece and France with 
positive variations of respectively 0.25 and 0.21, 
and the Netherlands and Finland with negative 
variations of respectively -0.20 and -0.18). In 
many euro-area countries, the cyclical component 
of real wages is expected to decrease during the 
forecast period, reinforcing their contribution to 
subdued inflation and employment growth. This 
is particularly the case in Belgium, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Finland, where 
the unemployment gap is expected either to 
stabilise (Belgium) or even narrow (the 
remaining countries), yet cyclical real wages 
should further decrease. Cyclical real wages are 
estimated to accelerate slightly in Germany, in 
line with tightening labour market conditions. 
By contrast, the situation in the labour market is 
projected to deteriorate in Spain and Greece, 
which casts some doubts on the adjustment 
capacity of real wages, which are expected to 
accelerate over the forecast period. Finally, in 
Ireland and Italy some moderation is foreseen in 
cyclical real wages in line with easing labour 
market conditions.
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Box 4 : a Benchmark measure for real wage growTh in The long run 
Let us define the long-run as a situation where the real unit labour costs (the labour share in national 
income) remain roughly constant. In the long-run, with product and labour markets operating under 
perfect competition, the rate of unemployment will be given by the natural rate of unemployment, i.e., 
there is no involuntary unemployment and the economy will experience no inflationary pressures. The 
internal macroeconomic equilibrium can be defined in terms of the steady-state solution provided by 
the neoclassical growth model. Let us define the labour share as: 
(1)  
Y
wLLSRULC *==  
where RULC, w, L and Y respectively denote real unit labour costs, real wages (GDP deflated 
compensation per employee), total employment and GDP at constant market prices. Consider the Cobb-
Douglas specification for the production function:
(2) αα −= 1LAKY  
where A and K respectively stand for TFP and the capital input. As is well-known, the labour share in 
value added consistent with the production function defined in (2) is equal to , both along the balanced-
growth path and the transitional dynamics. With this in mind, (1) becomes:
(3)  ( )α−== 1** LSRULC
where the symbol * denotes the value of the variable under balanced-growth conditions. Expression (3) 
then implies that:
(4)  
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Yw  
where the symbol ^ denotes the growth rate of the variable. Expression (4) tells us that, in the long run, 
the growth rate of real wages must be equal to the growth rate of the average productivity of labour. In 
turn, the average productivity of labour consistent with the production function defined in (2) is:
(5)   ( )
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One feature that characterizes the balanced-growth path in the neoclassical growth model is the 
constancy of the capital-output ratio, which implies that:
(6)  *
*
* ˆ
1
1ˆˆ A
L
Yw
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⎛
=  
Expression (6) implies that, for wages to contribute to the internal macroeconomic balance in the long 
run, their growth rate should equate the growth of the long-run component of TFP divided by the labour 
share. The long-run rate of productivity growth determines how rapidly real wages can rise without 
undermining employment performance 1.
Expression (6) is a steady-state condition and, as such, it does not allow for increases in real wages 
arising from increases in the capital-output ratio, which is stable in the long run. In turn, it can be shown 
that, in the context of the neoclassical growth model, changes in the capital-output ratio reflect changes 
in the capital-labour ratio, with labour measured in efficiency units. Expression (6) therefore implies 
that, from a long-term perspective, an increase in the capital-labour ratio measured in efficiency units 
does not generate margin for higher real wages.  This is one fundamental difference between the 
benchmark given by (6) and the most commonly used yardstick which identifies wage pressures with 
the excess of real wage growth compared to the growth of observed labour productivity. This criterion 
1 For empirical applications, the labour share entering expression (6) can be downloaded from the AMECO 
databank. The level of potential TFP growth is consistent with potential GDP growth, as estimated by DG ECFIN 
services within the Working Group on Output Gaps attached to the EPC.
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is vulnerable to the critique that changes in real wages affect (given the price of capital) the capital 
intensity and hence the labour productivity. Intuitively, an increase in the relative price of labour that 
generates a higher capital-labour ratio will result in higher labour productivity (see expression (5)). Yet, 
this increase in measured labour productivity should not generate margins for higher real wages if seen 
from a long-term angle, as real wage growth in excess of TFP productivity will induce capital-labour 
substitution, thereby creating a vicious circle of “higher relative price of labour – substitution of capital 
for labour – higher capital-labour ratio– increase in labour productivity – increase in real wages…”. 
This mechanism is considered to have been at work in the period since the 1970s and may have 
contributed to high wage growth and a subsequent increase in unemployment in some European 
countries ( Blanchard 1997).
Graph 70 - Cyclical unemployment and annual growth in cyclical real wages, EA12 Ms
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²Note:  Cyclical unemployment is given by the gap 
between the actual rate of unemployment and its 
equilibrium value as measured by the NAwRU (both series 
downloaded from AMECO). Annual growth in cyclical 
real wages is calculated by subtracting from the actual 
growth	rate	in	real	wages	(GDP	deflated	compensation	
per employee) its long-term component. such long-term 
component of real wages is, in turn, calculated by dividing 
the long-term component of tFP growth of each year by 
the labour share. the long-term component of tFP growth 
is consistent with potential GDP growth, as estimated by 
DG ECFIN services within the working Group on Output 
Gaps attached to the EPC. the labour share can be 
downloaded from the AMECO database. the two 
variables are normalised, i.e. they are transformed to 
have zero mean and unit standard deviation. For Italy the 
1998 data are not corrected for the introduction of the 
IRAP, which replaced some social security contributions 
with a tax on value added. 
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2.1.2. Prospects in wage and labour cost 
developments in the euro area 
Two different shocks pushing in different 
directions add to the uncertainty surrounding the 
outlook for inflation over the medium term.
As regards the medium-term inflation outlook, 
there is an unusual combination of significant 
downside and upside risks. The upside risks stem 
from the rise in commodity prices. The question 
is whether inflationary pressures will remain just 
temporary, or whether they will feed into 
medium-term expectations of inflation, and so 
become reflected in wages and prices going 
forward and, thus, in domestically-generated 
inflation. These upside inflationary risks from oil 
and other commodity prices need to be weighed 
in the balance against the risks to inflation from 
the recent financial turmoil. On the one hand, 
financial distress may keep inflationary pressured 
down because of economic slack. On the other 
hand, policy response to difficulties in the global 
financial markets may turn out to be inflationary. 
In any event, sustained appreciation of the euro 
exchange rate has helped to mitigate external 
inflationary impulses and aggregate demand is 
expected to slow. There is, in consequence, a 
downwards threat to inflation over the medium 
term as well.
Regarding the situation in the labour market, the 
Commission’s Spring economic forecasts 2008-
2009 expects labour market tensions to ease. The 
unemployment gap (i.e., the gap between the 
observed unemployment rate and the equilibrium 
unemployment rate given by the NAWRU) 
should widen somewhat, pointing to a certain 
easing in the labour market situation. This would 
contribute to attenuate the risk from wage 
pressures associated with positive cyclical labour 
market conditions (Graph 71). 
With the HIPC inflation well above 2%, an 
important concern at this juncture is whether 
households expect higher inflation to persist, and 
the extent to which those expectations are built 
into wages. It is essential for the effectiveness of 
the monetary policy that inflation expectations 
remain well-anchored. Recent survey data 
indicate that inflation expectations have picked 
up a little over the past few months, influenced 
by the rises in fuel and food prices affecting the 
more frequently-purchased consumer goods. 
Short-term inflation expectations based on the 
EU’s consumer survey have been increasing in 
the euro area until June 2008, softening in July 
and decreasing significantly in August.
looking further ahead, the pick-up in wage 
growth is expected to continue in 2008.
Most recent wage negotiations points towards 
somewhat increasing pressure for higher wages 
in some countries in 2008, against a background 
of public concern about high consumer price 
inflation, increasing consumer inflation 
perceptions and the link between workers’ 
purchasing power and declining labour shares 
(although this appears to be driven to some 
extent by sizeable compositional effects (see 
Box 5)). 
The already agreed wage increases in 2008 in 
several countries are indeed somewhat larger 
than in previous years. In particular, recent 
German wage negotiations in the public sector, 
with an agreed pay increase of 8% stretched over 
two years (5.1% this year, the rest in 2009), came 
after a prolonged period of wage stagnation in 
the public sector, thus should not be used as a 
benchmark for other rounds of industrial 
bargaining. However, if similar public wage 
claims should emerge in other countries that 
have recorded much less virtuous wage behaviour 
in the past, this could generate serious upward 
inflationary pressure in the euro area. Indeed, 
several other large countries will conduct major 
Graph 71 – Unemployment gap (inverted) and nominal 
unit labour costs (year-on-year growth rates) in EA13
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public sector wage negotiations in the course of 
the year. If high wage growth in the public sector 
were to materialise, it may have some signalling 
role on wage claims in the private sector (see 
Section 3.2.3 for a detailed discussion on wage 
increases in the public sector vis-à-vis wage 
increases in the private sector from a medium-
run perspective).
Looking further ahead, subdued wage growth so 
far should not lead to complacency. Price 
stability will require wage agreements at the 
national level that take into account underlying 
trend productivity developments, the cyclical 
situation of labour markets and the underlying 
position in relative price competitiveness within 
the euro area. Strict vigilance on possible second 
round effects is warranted. One factor likely to 
mitigate the risk of higher pay settlements is the 
outlook for demand. The background of greater 
economic uncertainty may limit pay pressures as 
wage bargainers become more concerned about 
employment prospects and businesses may 
reduce profitability. The combination of those 
factors could lead to more subdued pay 
settlements.
Box 5 : long-Term Trends in The laBour share 
An analysis performed at the aggregate level may overlook important disaggregated sectoral patterns 
that may explain the observed change in the aggregate real unit labour costs (or “adjusted” labour 
shares). Beyond the impact of wage moderation, part of the observed decline in the aggregate labour 
shares might be due to changes in the sectoral composition and the employment structure of the economy, 
with an increasing weight of those sectors with structurally lower labour shares, together with widespread 
reductions in the proportion of self-employment in total employment, which, for any given value of the 
ratio of compensation of employees to value added, result in a lower level of wages being imputed to 
the self-employed.  Let the adjusted labour share given by:
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Expression (2) shows that the its change can be split into 3 components: i) the “sectoral 
composition effect”, ii) the “employment structure effect”, and iii) the “industrial labour share effect”, 
which measure changes in the adjusted labour share of the economy coming respectively from changes 
in: i) the sectoral composition of the economy, ii) the employment structure of the economy, and iii) the 
ratio of compensation of employees to value added at the industry level. According to the first effect, a 
shift from high-labour-share sectors to low-labour-share sectors will translate into an aggregate decline 
in the labour share, all other things being equal. According to the second effect, widespread reductions 
in the ratio of total employment to the number of employees across the various economic sectors will 
translate, all other things being equal, into a lower aggregate labour share, because of a lower level of 
compensation per employee being imputed to a higher level of self-employed. According to the third 
effect, generalised reductions in the ratio of compensation of employees to value added across the 
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various economic sectors will translate into a lower labour share for the economy as a whole, all other 
things being equal. 
The shift-share analysis reveals the importance of structural forces in driving aggregate labour share 
movements. To illustrate this more clearly, we proceed to disentangle the industrial labour share 
component from the other two structural sources of labour share movements. This is illustrated in 
Graph 72, which compares two series over the period 1970-2004, i.e., the observed adjusted labour 
share and an alternative measure of the adjusted labour share calculated by keeping constant the sectoral 
and employment composition observed in 1970. The main conclusion is that changes in the sectoral and 
the employment composition of the economy explain about half (3.5 p.p.) of the overall observed decline 
(6 percentage points). Put differently, if there had been no change in the sectoral and employment 
structure of the economy since 1970, the decline would have been 2.5 percentage points instead of the 
observed 6 percentage points. 
Because the sources of observed declining labour shares are partly structural in nature, i.e. arising from 
changes in the sectoral and employment composition of the economy, wage-setting policies alone will 
not be sufficient to reverse the current trend in labour shares. To avoid the whole burden of adjustment 
falling on wages, reforms improving the functioning of product and services market and boosting 
productivity are essential. Enhanced competition and integration of services markets can contribute to 
containing profit margins and price pressures. Productivity gains should also play a major role in 
sustaining wage increases. Technical progress, higher investment and more flexibility in the workplace, 
are all factors that can contribute to enhancing productivity. In this context, the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy can provide a key contribution. In addition, a reduction of the tax burden on labour 
could also contribute to reduce labour cost pressures. This is easier to be implemented in countries that 
have already achieved a sound budgetary position, and could be facilitated by a re-composition and 
better quality of spending and revenues. 
Graph 72 – Adjusted labour share (dashed line) versus an alternative adjusted labour share measure, 
keeping constant sectoral and employment composition at 1970 levels (solid line), EA12
.50
.55
.60
.65
.70
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Data source: Commission services on the basis of EU klEMs data.
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2.1.3.	Country-specific	trends	in	labour	costs
overall moderate wage developments in 
the euro area conceal marked differences 
across countries regarding the contribution 
of nominal unit labour costs to the gdp and 
the final demand deflators.
The historical low levels in nominal (1.5%) 
(Graph 73) and real (-0.6%) (Graph 75) unit 
labour costs growth registered in the euro area 
over the period 2002-2007 are mostly attributable 
to wage moderation in Germany. Excluding 
Germany from the euro area average yields a 
growth rate in nominal and real unit labour costs 
of, respectively, 2.1% and -0.4%. A number of 
Member States, namely Greece, Ireland, 
Slovenia, Italy and Spain (Graph 73) registered 
sizable increases in nominal unit labour costs. 
Graph 74 quantifies the contribution of nominal 
unit labour costs to the increase in the final 
demand deflator. Inflationary pressures as 
measured by the final demand deflator have two 
sources: i) factors arising from abroad, whose 
influence on prices is channelled through the 
import deflator, and ii) domestic factors, whose 
influence on prices is channelled through the 
GDP deflator and its income (i.e., cost) 
components: nominal unit labour costs, gross 
operating surplus and net indirect taxes per unit 
of output. The contribution of nominal unit labour 
costs to cost pressures is almost nil in Germany 
and very modest in Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Finland. Looking at the contribution 
of gross operating surplus per unit of output to 
the increase in GDP deflator, Spain, Greece, 
Slovenia, Austria and Luxembourg stand out as 
the countries in which this is relatively high, 
which may suggest low competition in various 
economic sectors. The impact of import prices on 
the final demand deflator is dramatically high in 
Luxembourg, and, to a lesser extent, Slovenia, 
Belgium, and Finland, all economies of a 
relatively small size in the euro area. Finally, net 
indirect taxes remain the lowest contributor to the 
increase in the GDP deflator in most Member 
States, though its size is relatively large in 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy.
Graph 73 – Compensation per employee, labour productivity and nominal unit labour costs, EA13 Ms and EA with and 
without Germany
Year-on-year % change, average 2002-2007
Compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted) Nominal unit labour costs
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Data source: Eurostat. 
Note: For DE, Es, FR, It, Nl and At, compensation per employee, labour productivity and nominal unit labour costs are 
based on full-time equivalents.
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in most countries, increases in real (gdp 
defl ated) compensation per employee 
were below the increase in labour 
productivity and thus real unit labour costs 
(the adjusted36 labour share) have 
declined over the period 2002-2007.
Graph 75 shows that, over the period 2002-2007, 
real unit labour costs decreased or remained 
broadly stable in all euro-area economies except 
Greece and Ireland, where acceleration in GDP 
defl ated compensation per employee more than 
absorbed productivity gains. Luxembourg, 
Germany, Austria, and Belgium registered 
increases in productivity above the euro-area 
average, which, coupled with very modest (or 
even reductions) in real wages, allowed for 
signifi cant reductions in real unit labour in these 
countries. Pronounced increases in real wages 
went in parallel with substantial gains in 
productivity in Slovenia, Finland, and the 
Netherlands, thus real unit labour costs fell in 
these countries. Spain stands out as the only 
country were real wages sharply dropped over 
the period 2002-2007, which combined with 
very unfavourable productivity developments 
(partly as a result of brisk employment growth 
36 The term “adjusted” labour share is used to illustrate 
that the share of compensation of employees in value added 
is adjusted upwards by incorporating the imputed wage 
component of the self-employed income.
related to immigration) resulted in a marked 
reduction in real unit labour costs. Declining real 
unit labour costs also prevailed during the period 
1996-2001 in the euro area as a whole (Graph 
76). From a country perspective though, in 
contrast with developments during the subsequent 
fi ve-year period described above, real unit labour 
costs increased in Portugal and Luxembourg, 
decreased in Ireland, Greece and Italy and 
remained stable in Germany and Belgium.
Graph	74	–	Contribution	of	import	prices	and	GDP	defl	ator	components	to	fi	nal	demand	defl	ator	growth,	EA13	MS	
P.p. contributions to year-on-year % change in fi nal demand defl ator growth, average 2002-2007
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Data source: Eurostat.
Note: For DE, Es, FR, It, Nl and At, nominal unit labour costs are based on full-time equivalents.
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Graph	75	–	GDP	defl	ated	compensation	per	employee,	labour	productivity	and	real	unit	labour	costs,	EA13	MS	and	
EA with and without Germany 
Year-on-year % change, average 2002-2007
GDP deflated compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted) Real unit labour costs
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Data source: Eurostat.
Note: For DE, Es, FR, It, Nl and At, nominal unit labour costs are based on full-time equivalents.
Graph	76	–	GDP	defl	ated	compensation	per	employee,	labour	productivity	and	real	unit	labour	costs,	EA13	MS	and	
EA with and without Germany 
Year-on-year % change, average 1996-2001
GDP deflated compensation per employee Labour productivity (inverted) Real unit labour cost
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increases in real consumption wages 
across euro-area economies stem from 
increases in real production wages, while 
the contribution of the domestic terms of 
trade to the purchasing power of workers 
has been limited.
Whereas fi rms care about the “real production 
wage”, the price of labour relative to the value 
added defl ator, households care about the “real 
consumption wage”, their take-home pay relative 
to the price of the goods and services that they 
purchase. In the long run, both measures should 
grow in line with productivity. But in the short 
run, for example, during the adjustment to a 
change in non-wage costs, these growth rates 
may diverge, which influences households’ 
purchasing power and, ultimately, together with 
the growth in employment, their consumption 
pattern. 
A rough approximation to the gross purchasing 
power of workers can be obtained by comparing 
nominal compensation per employee with the 
price of goods and services they purchase. 
Following a simple accounting rule, real 
consumption wages can be decomposed into the 
product of real production wages and the ratio of 
the GDP deflator to the deflator of private 
consumption – i.e., the domestic terms of trade –. 
This is to say:
(1) ,  
where W, PC and PY respectively denote nominal 
compensation per employee, the deflator of 
private consumption and the GDP defl ator. By 
relating real consumption wages to real 
production wages and the domestic terms of 
trade, this accounting rule allows to identify the 
sources of movements in real consumption 
wages. 
Graph 77 reveals that the deterioration in the 
purchasing power of workers has been mostly 
driven by the deterioration in real production 
wages, accentuated by the drop in the domestic 
terms of trade. The latter was particularly painful 
in 2000, as a result of the sharp depreciation of 
the euro. More recently (2004-2006), adverse 
movements in the domestic terms of trade led to 
the stagnation in real consumption wages, due to 
soaring commodity prices. A detailed analysis by 
countries (Graph 78) generally confirms the 
aggregate pattern. Movements in real consumption 
wages tend to mirror improvements in real 
production wages (which in turn refl ect labour 
productivity gains over the period 2002-2007), 
whereas international trade does not change the 
picture for most euro-area countries, although 
some unusual developments seem to have taken 
place in Germany, Spain and Luxembourg. 
Graph 77 – Real consumption wages, real production 
wages and domestic terms of trade, EA13 
Annual average % change over selected periods 
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Data source: Eurostat.
Note: GDP-defl	ated	compensation	per	employee	and	
consumer-price-defl	ated	compensation	per	employee	
are based on headcounts.
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the sources of changes in the domestic 
terms of trade are specifi c to each euro-
area economy
The sources of changes in the domestic terms of 
trade  can be gauged in Graph 79.37 The 
cumulated changes in the domestic terms of trade 
between the reference year (2000) and any given 
year t are related to the gap between the defl ator 
of expenditure components other than private 
consumption and the deflator of private 
consumption. More precisely, the gap between 
the defl ator of GDP at basic prices and the private 
consumption defl ator is positively related to the 
difference between the public consumption, the 
investment, and the export defl ators with the 
private consumption deflator, as all these 
components are part of the GDP but are not 
37 Starting with the breakdown of the GDP into its 
expenditure components, the gap between the GDP and the 
private consumption defl ators can be broken down as 
follows:
(2) ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tCtTtTtCtMtMtCtXtXtCtItItCtGtGtCtY PPwPPwPPwPPwPPwPP ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,  −−−−−+−+−=−
where 
,  
tTtMtXtItGtCtY PPPPPPP ,,,,,,, ,,,,,,   respectively denote the 
defl ators (index numbers) at any given year t of GDP at 
basic prices, private consumption, public consumption, 
gross capital formation, exports, imports and net indirect 
taxes (i.e., taxes on production and imports less subsidies), 
whereas  correspond to the weight of each expenditure 
component in GDP at basic prices. The weights are 
calculated with variables expressed in volumes.
consumed by private households. Conversely, 
the gap between the defl ator of GDP at basic 
prices and the private consumption defl ator is 
negatively related to the difference between the 
import and the net indirect taxes defl ators with 
the private consumption defl ator, as imports and 
net indirect taxes are clearly part of private 
consumption but they are not part of domestic 
production at basic prices. 
This decomposition is performed in Graph 79. 
The accumulated gap over the period 2000-2006 
between the GDP (at basic prices) and the private 
consumption defl ators is shown to be highest in 
Ireland, followed at a considerable distance by 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Spain. Barring 
Luxembourg, all these countries have in common 
a sizable positive contribution of the gap between 
the import and the private consumption defl ators. 
The strong growth in investment is also an 
important part of the signifi cant gap between 
GDP and private consumption deflators in 
Ireland and Spain, with the booming in housing 
investment playing a prominent role in the latter 
country. The gap is lowest in Italy and Austria, 
while the remaining euro-area countries occupy 
an intermediate position, with varying patterns 
in terms of composition. Finland stands out as 
the country where the contribution of the gap 
between the public consumption and the private 
consumption defl ators is highest. In Greece, the 
accumulated gap between the net indirect taxes 
Graph 78 – Real consumption wages, real production wages and domestic terms of trade, EA13 Ms and EA with and 
without DE
Year-on-year % change, average 2002-2007
Real production wages Domestic terms of trade Real consumption wages
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Data source: Eurostat.
Note: For	DE,	ES,	FR,	IT,	NL	and	AT,	GDP-defl	ated	compensation	per	employee	and	consumer-price-defl	ated	
compensation per are based on full-time equivalents.
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and the private consumption deflators is shown 
to be negative and sizeable, which has contributed 
to widen the gap between the GDP (at basic 
prices) and the private consumption deflators, 
whereas Portugal has undergone the opposite 
development. It is finally worth noting that the 
gap between the export price and the private 
consumption deflator is negative in all countries 
except Luxembourg and Greece, thereby 
contributing to easing pressures in the GDP 
deflator relative to the consumption price 
deflator. This does not come as a surprise, in 
view of the disciplinary effect of international 
competition on the set of domestically-produced 
goods that are the object of foreign trade.
in most euro-area countries the growth in 
real take-home pay has been above the 
growth in real (consumption price deflated) 
compensation per employee, this implying 
a favourable contribution of changes in 
social security contributions and personal 
income taxes to the purchasing power of 
workers
When using the decomposition of real 
consumption wages presented in equation (1), 
one should be cautious to gauge the terms in the 
right hand side as the sole sources of changes in 
the purchasing power of workers. Importantly, 
the breakdown in equation (1) neglects one 
important aspect of the difference between real 
production wages and the purchasing power of 
workers, i.e., the tax wedge. As it stands, real 
consumption wages are not an accurate measure 
of the real take-home pay, as compensation per 
employee encompasses social security 
contributions, labour income taxes and net wages 
and salaries. The tax wedge includes the tax and 
social security components that create a gap 
between the cost of labour for employers and the 
net earnings received by the workers. 
Actual data on the net wages and salaries 
component of compensation per employee are 
not available and therefore need to be estimated. 
Graph 80 displays a positive growth differential 
between consumption price deflated post-tax 
wages (i.e., compensation per employee 
excluding social security contributions and 
labour income taxes received by workers) and 
consumption price deflated gross wages (i.e., 
compensation per employee paid by employers) 
over the period 2000-2006. The latter are 
calculated as specified in (1), while the former 
rely on the estimates of the tax wedge on labour 
for an average-wage worker38 provided by the 
OECD (see Box 6). Only in four euro-area 
Member States, namely Greece, France, Austria 
and Spain real post-tax consumption wages 
increased by less than real gross consumption 
wages over the period 2001-2006. Note that, of 
the group of countries that registered weak 
increases (or even decreases) in real gross wages, 
i.e., Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Austria and 
Portugal (see Graph 78), in two of them, namely 
Spain and Austria, the purchasing power of 
workers is even worsened when changes in 
social security contributions and labour income 
taxes are taken into account.
38 The reference is a single person without children.
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Box 6 : The evoluTion of The Tax wedge on laBour
The high tax burden on labour is frequently regarded as an important reason for the negative labour 
market outcomes and the high levels of undeclared work that can be observed in many European 
countries. The tax burden on labour is typically measured by the tax wedge on labour which measures 
the difference between the gross labour costs an employer has to pay and what the worker receives after 
taxes and social security contributions. This wedge can be calculated either on an average basis or with 
respect to the additional euro earned.
The tax wedge is composed of several elements. First, employers have to pay payroll taxes and/or 
employers’ social security contributions. Second, employees have to pay social security contributions 
on their wage income received 1. Finally, labour income is subject to the personal income tax. These 
different taxes and social security contributions constitute the different components of labour taxation, 
and they can be summed up to give the aggregate tax wedge due to labour taxes.
Such measured tax wedges on labour remain high in most EU countries. This situation contrasts with 
that of non-EU OECD countries, where the total tax wedge is substantially lower on average. However, 
European governments have been able to reduce the tax wedge over recent years. This has been the case 
for average and low income workers alike (see Table 16).
Given the importance of labour taxation for government revenues, reductions and increases in the tax 
wedge typically take place gradually over time. This is evident from Table 16, which shows little change 
on a year-over-year basis for individual countries. An exception to this observation can be the changes 
in the tax wedge as a consequence of major tax reforms. In line with this observation, Table 16 shows 
that some Member States have been able to subsequently reduce the tax wedge on labour over recent 
years. This is particularly the case for Ireland and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland). 
On the other hand, Slovakia’s reduction in the tax wedge, which is the biggest in the EU over the period 
2001-2007 can be mostly attributed to the change from 2004 to 2005. A similar picture holds for those 
countries that have substantially increased their tax wedge over the same period, such as the UK and 
Austria, where the tax wedge has gradually built up.
The trend to flat tax systems continues in the EU, with Bulgaria and the Czech Republic now moving 
to such systems in 2008. While flat tax systems can differ substantially with respect to their basic 
allowances, the definition of income that is subject to the tax, and the rate that is being applied, they 
typically make the tax system less progressive. This will typically reduce the tax wedge more strongly 
for high income workers. Nevertheless, if the rate is set relatively low, this may also imply falling tax 
wedges for low income workers. This will also depend on how the reform is financed and whether other 
taxes or social security contributions are being increased to compensate revenue losses.
Several specific tax changes have occurred in 2007 and 2008 that affect the tax wedge on labour. The 
personal income tax was reduced in Lithuania at the beginning of 2008. In Denmark, the average local 
income tax was reduced in 2007 as a consequence of a reform of local government. Estonia continued 
with its policy of subsequently lowering its personal income tax rate by one percentage point per year 
until 2011. Hungary adjusted its personal income tax system that made the system more progressive in 
2007. Sweden has introduced waivers of social security contributions for long term unemployed, and 
reduced contribution rates for younger workers.
Finally, while the tax wedge on labour itself gives useful information on the tax burden on labour, it 
should be noted that it nevertheless underestimates the full tax burden on labour. Consumption taxes 
reduce the value of wages for the worker and should therefore also be regarded as part of the tax wedge 
on labour. Moreover, other taxes can also be implicit forms of labour taxation to the extent the incidence 
falls on labour, no matter how such taxes are classified. The classic example is that of capital income 
taxation in a small open economy. If capital is fully mobile across borders, the tax will be fully shifted 
onto labour.
1 One should mention that social security contributions (whether paid by the employer or employee) often give 
rights to individual benefits. Therefore, only to the extent to which the link between contributions and benefits in 
such social insurance schemes is not actuarially fair, the contributions actually constitute a tax. An insurance 
scheme is called actuarially fair, if the insurance premium is equivalent to the expected costs of the insured 
contingency. 
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table 16 – total tax wedge on labour (including employers’ social security contributions)
Total tax wedge (average rate, including employers’ SSC), 
single person without children, 100% of AE
Total tax wedge (average rate incl. employers’ SSC), single 
person without children, 67% of AE 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Change 
2001-
07
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Change 
2001-
07
Austria 46.9 47.1 47.4 48.1 47.9 48.1 48.5 1.6 42.9 43.1 43.5 43.9 43.1 43.5 44.1 1.2
Belgium 56.7 56.3 55.7 55.4 55.4 55.4 55.5 -1.2 50.7 50.5 49.6 48.9 49.2 49.1 49.6 -1.1
Bulgaria 40.4 39.6 39.0 38.9 38.9 35.4 n.a. n.a. 35.9 35.2 35.0 34.9 35.3 31.1 n.a. n.a.
Cyprus 20.9 17.3 18.5 18.6 13.6 14.1 n.a. n.a. 17.0 17.2 18.5 18.6 11.9 11.9 n.a. n.a.
Czech 
Republic 42.6 42.9 43.2 43.5 43.8 42.6 42.9 0.2 41.3 41.5 41.7 41.9 42.1 40.1 40.5 -0.8
Denmark 43.6 42.6 42.6 41.3 41.4 41.3 41.3 -2.3 40.5 39.8 39.8 39.3 39.3 39.3 39.3 -1.2
Estonia 39.7 42.2 42.5 41.4 41.6 40.2 n.a. n.a. 37.4 40.2 40.7 38.9 39.8 38.4 n.a. n.a.
Finland 46.4 45.9 45.0 44.5 44.6 44.1 43.7 -2.7 41.4 40.9 40.0 39.4 39.5 38.9 38.2 -3.2
France 49.8 49.8 49.8 49.9 50.1 50.2 49.2 -0.7 47.6 47.4 45.0 42.4 41.8 44.5 44.4 -3.2
Germany 53.0 53.5 54.2 53.2 52.4 52.5 52.2 -0.8 47.7 48.1 48.8 47.8 47.3 47.4 47.4 -0.3
Greece 38.1 37.7 37.7 39.5 40.4 41.2 42.3 4.2 35.1 34.3 34.4 34.9 34.8 35.4 36.7 1.6
Hungary 54.0 53.7 50.8 51.8 50.5 51.0 54.4 0.4 48.1 48.2 44.5 44.8 42.9 42.9 45.9 -2.2
Ireland 25.8 24.5 24.2 25.0 23.5 23.1 22.3 -3.5 17.3 16.7 16.2 20.0 16.8 16.3 15.0 -2.3
Italy 46.0 46.0 45.0 45.4 45.4 45.2 45.9 -0.1 42.7 42.7 41.1 41.4 41.7 41.5 42.0 -0.7
Latvia 42.7 42.9 42.2 42.5 42.2 42.9 n.a. n.a. 41.2 41.4 40.8 41.2 40.9 41.8 n.a. n.a.
Lithuania 45.2 44.6 43.4 43.7 44.4 46.3 n.a. n.a. 42.2 41.2 39.5 40.0 41.0 43.9 n.a. n.a.
Luxembourg 37.0 34.2 34.7 35.1 35.9 36.5 37.5 0.5 31.2 29.0 29.3 29.6 30.2 30.6 31.4 0.2
Malta 23.4 24.1 23.3 23.6 23.9 24.5 n.a. n.a. 17.0 17.7 17.4 17.6 17.8 18.4 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 37.2 37.4 37.1 38.8 38.9 44.4 44.0 6.8 38.9 39.1 40.0 40.8 41.6 40.6 40.2 1.3
Poland 42.9 42.9 43.1 43.3 43.6 43.7 42.8 -0.1 41.8 41.7 41.9 42.2 42.4 42.5 41.6 -0.1
Portugal 36.4 36.6 36.8 36.8 36.3 36.3 37.4 1.0 32.2 32.3 32.4 32.4 31.8 31.7 32.6 0.4
Romania 47.9 47.3 46.2 45.8 44.0 43.7 n.a. n.a. 45.2 44.6 43.4 42.9 42.4 42.2 n.a. n.a.
Slovak 
Republic 42.8 42.5 42.9 42.5 38.3 38.5 38.5 -4.3 41.3 40.8 40.9 39.6 35.3 35.6 35.6 -5.8
Slovenia 42.3 42.5 42.5 42.6 42.4 44.0 n.a. n.a. 41.0 41.1 41.1 41.1 39.4 39.8 n.a. n.a.
Spain 38.8 39.1 38.5 38.7 38.9 39.1 38.9 0.0 35.3 35.7 34.7 35.2 35.5 35.9 35.6 0.3
Sweden 49.1 47.8 48.2 48.4 47.9 47.9 45.4 -3.7 47.8 46.8 47.0 47.1 46.5 46.0 43.3 -4.5
United 
Kingdom 31.8 31.9 33.3 33.4 33.5 33.9 34.1 2.3 28.0 28.1 29.6 29.7 29.9 30.4 30.8 2.8
EU-27 44.9 45.0 45.4 45.2 44.9 45.1 n.a. n.a. 41.3 41.4 41.3 40.7 40.4 40.7 n.a. n.a.
Source: OECD and Eurostat, Change 2000-07 in percentage points, AE: Average earnings.
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 2.1.4. labour cost developments in the 
government sector 
With the government sector wage bill around 
20% of total compensation of employees over 
the period 1999-2006, public wages may directly 
influence aggregate wage growth. Through 
spillover and imitation effects, wage settlements 
in the public sector provide a signal to private-
sector wage setters when agreements on increases 
in government wages take place before similar 
settlements have taken place in the private 
sector. 
Public wages can be not only an important costs 
factor but, through their effect on public 
consumption, a source of policy-induced demand 
shocks. As such, developments in public wages 
could, directly and indirectly, be an important 
source of infl ation and competitiveness dynamics. 
Excessive growth in public wages may worsen 
overall competitiveness when the interaction 
between public and private make the latter to 
respond asymmetrically to positive and negative 
shocks and reinforce the pressure on private 
wages during upturns. Thus, monitoring the 
relative developments of private and public 
wages could help to detect inadequate adjustment 
of wages in face of accumulated competitiveness 
losses. Given that the public sector is not exposed 
to market pressure, it is important to signal when 
public wages have a trend which may turned out 
to be unsustainable for the economy and the 
private sector. Furthermore, inappropriate wage 
developments in the public sector may distort 
labour supply decisions, namely reduce the 
incentives to take up a job in the private sector. 
Similarly, wage compression in the public sector 
relative to the private sector may create 
substantial public wage premia in certain 
geographical areas which can make a ‘job for 
life” in the public sector the preferred option, 
creating long waiting lists, high unemployment 
and low participation (Alesina et al. 2001). 
Graph 79 – Accumulated gap between GDP and 
consumption	price	defl	ators	in	2006,	EA13	MS
Defl ators are index numbers, 2000 = 100
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of 
AMECO data.
Graph 80 – Growth gap between real post-tax and gross 
consumption wages, EA13 Ms
Year-on-year % change, average 2001-2006 
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Data source: Compensation per employee and private 
consumption	defl	ator:	Eurostat.	Tax	wedges	on	labour:	OECD	
taxing wages report.
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The government sector is one sub-sector of the 
non-market services, and its scope very much 
depends on the institutional features of the country 
under consideration. In particular, the delimitation 
of the government depends on differences in the 
organisation of the provision of education and 
healthcare services.39 As a consequence, 
differences in the provision of services may result 
in different assessments of government wage and 
employment developments.40 
recent trends show that the growth in public 
wages has outpaced that of private wages in 
most EmU members 
There are only four countries, namely Germany, 
France, Portugal and Luxembourg, where 
compensation per employee in the public sector 
has grown in line or below compensation per 
employee in the private sector over the period 
2004-2007 (Graph 81). Taking a longer 
perspective, Graph 82 displays a positive growth 
differential between government and private 
sectors’ compensation per employee in practically 
all euro-area members over the past decade. The 
average annual growth gap between public and 
private wages has been the highest in Portugal, 
Ireland, and Italy, followed at a considerable 
distance by Greece, Spain, Germany, Belgium, 
39 For instance, in countries where hospitals (or schools) 
are owned and managed directly by the government, the 
related human resources costs and the number of workers 
appear in the government accounts as, respectively, 
government nominal compensation of employees and 
government employment. By contrast, in countries where 
healthcare services (or education) are mainly managed by 
the private sector or a public corporation classified as being 
outside the government, the costs borne by the government 
are classified in public expenditure items different from 
government compensation of employees. Similarly, the 
number of workers involved is not considered as part of the 
government employment.
40 To add to such difficulties, the availability of data is 
anything but straightforward. A good compromise between 
tractability and strict comparability across euro-area 
countries can be reached by relying on national accounts 
(ESA95) figures for government compensation of 
employees while taking government employment data from 
the OECD Economic Outlook database. Although the latter 
are not ESA95 aggregates, the OECD data are based on a 
uniform approach across countries which hinges on the 
identification of public sector employment at different 
levels of government. On the basis of this data, private 
sector compensation of employees is calculated as total 
economy compensation of employees minus government 
sector compensation of employees. Then, private sector 
compensation per employee is calculated as private sector 
compensation of employees divided by the number of 
private employees, which is in turn derived as total 
economy employees minus government employees minus 
the self-employment.
France and Austria. Only in the Netherlands, 
government compensation per employee has 
grown in line with private compensation per 
employee over the past decade, whereas Finland 
and Luxembourg have registered a negative 
growth differential of government wages vis-à-vis 
private wages. 
Thus, public wages is experiencing a trend in 
recent years higher than that of private’s, which, 
in turn, could be contributing to the loss of 
competitiveness in these countries, provided 
imitation effects are at work. This is not to say that 
there should be no differentiation between wages 
in the private and public sectors, but that wages do 
not seem to be aligned with sectoral productivity 
in several countries. Indeed, leaving aside all the 
manifold problems that affect the measurement of 
productivity in the public sector, it is difficult to 
believe that underlying productivity developments 
in the two sectors justify such divergent growth 
patterns. Thus, a prudent wage policy in the public 
sector could weigh heavily on the wage 
determination process and provide an appropriate 
signal to wage settlements in the private sector.
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it is not straightforward to identify the main 
drivers of the positive growth differential 
between public and private compensation 
per employee
A question arises as to the main drivers of this 
growth differential. Two candidates for accounting 
for such general phenomenon are diverging 
patterns in the skill composition and long-term 
dynamics governed by convergence phenomena 
across euro-area countries.41 
Graph 83 and Graph 84 show for selected euro-
area members the p.p. contribution by skills to the 
annual growth in compensation per employee over 
the period 1996-2004 in industry, construction and 
market services versus non-market services42. In 
general, the data suggest that the p.p. contribution 
of the high skilled is relatively higher in the public 
sector, which could contribute to explain a 
relatively faster increase in wages in this sector. 
41 A third posssibility concerns the differernt part-time jobs 
created in the public relative to the private sector.  Thus,  if 
more part-time jobs are created in the private than in the 
public, the gap between the growth compensation per 
employee on head count basis in the public and the private 
sector would be biased upward. 
42 Data come from the EU KLEMS database where 
employment by skills is computed in terms of hours 
worked. Due to the lack of data on government 
compensation per employee, we present data on NACE L-P 
as the best proxy one may think of the government sector. 
Though imperfect, this approximation has the virtue of 
being fully comparable across the euro-area countries for 
which the data are available.
Graph 85 to Graph 88 investigate whether there 
is a negative relationship between the relative 
growth of compensation per employee in the two 
sectors across euro-area countries and the ratio 
of government to private compensation per 
employee in a given initial year (either 1986 or 
1996). A negative correlation would imply 
convergence across countries in the public-
private wage gap. As shown by Graph 85, there 
is no evidence of this convergence over the past 
decade, and even divergence, when Austria and 
Graph 81 – Nominal compensation per employee in the private and government sectors in EA12 Ms
Average annual % change, 2004-2007
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Data source: OECD Economic Outlook database.
Note: For DE, El, At and EA12 averages over 2004-2006.
Graph 82 – Growth gap between government and 
private sectors’ nominal compensation per employee in 
EA12 Ms
Average annual % change, 1996-2006
IE FI LUBEDEITPT
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
NLEA ES ATFREL
Data source: OECD Economic Outlook database.
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Graph 85 – Ratio of government to private’s compensation per employee and relative growth in wages in the two 
sectors 
EA12 MS, 1996-2006
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of OECD Economic Outlook database.
Graph 83 – Contribution by skills to annual growth in 
compensation per employee, NACE l-P, selected EA Ms
P.p. contributions to year-on-year % growth in nominal 
compensation per employee, 1996-2004
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Data source:  Commission services on the basis of EU 
klEMs data.
Note: NACE l-P includes non-market services, i.e., public 
administration and defence, education, health and 
other community social and personal services.
Graph 84 – Contribution by skills to annual growth in 
compensation per employee, NACE C-k, selected EA Ms
P.p. contributions to year-on-year % growth in nominal 
compensation per employee, 1996-2004
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Data source:  Commission services on the basis of EU 
klEMs data.
Note: NACE C-k includes industry, construction and 
market services. Market services include trade and 
repairs, hotels and restaurants and transport and 
communication,	fi	nancial	intermediation,	and	real	
estate, renting and business activities.
the Netherlands are excluded from the sample. 
Extending the period backwards to include the 
decade 1986-1996 does not change the results 
(Graph 87) unless Belgium, France and Finland 
are removed, in which case a convergence in the 
public-private wage gap is detected. This 
preliminary evidence suggests that a convergence 
in the public-private wage gap may explain the 
widening gap between public and private wage 
growth in countries where the wage gap is 
relatively lower than the average. Even so this 
convergence is detected only when the countries 
with the lower ratio of government to private 
compensation per employee in 1986 are removed 
from the sample. Thus, the divergence observed 
over a shorter period hints at an excessive growth 
of public relative to private wages. 
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Graph 86 – Ratio of government to private’s compensation per employee and relative growth in wages in the two 
sectors 
EA12 MS (excl. AT , NL), 1996-2006
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of OECD Economic Outlook database
Graph 87 – Ratio of government to private’s compensation per employee and relative growth in wages in the two 
sectors 
EA12 MS (excl. LU), 1986-2006
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of OECD Economic Outlook database.
Graph 88 – Ratio of government to private’s compensation per employee and relative growth in wages in the two 
sectors 
EA12 MS (excl. LU, BE, FR, FI), 1986-2006
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of OECD Economic Outlook database.
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in view of the relatively high volatility of 
public wages and their lagged response to 
gdp growth, prudence in government 
wages settlements should be warranted at 
the current juncture
The analysis of the cyclical pattern of public 
wages43 over the period 1980-2006 (Graph 89 
and Table 17) suggests that, in most euro-area 
countries, public wages react with some lag to 
cyclical swings. Table 18 illustrates that, 
compared to GDP, government wages tend to be 
more volatile than private wages in most euro-
area countries.44 This is consistent with the recent 
literature which shows that government 
consumption in many countries is pro-cyclical, 
owing to the dynamic behaviour of public wages 
(Lane, 2003),45 which, to some extent, reflects 
policy-induced fluctuations rather than systematic 
correlation with the economic cycle brought 
about by market forces.
Due to the lagged response of government wages 
to economic activity and assuming that the cycle 
reached its peak in (the first half of) 2007, an 
acceleration in government wages will become 
visible in 2008-2009. This calls for prudence on 
the part of governments in the current cyclical 
conditions, as excessive growth of government 
wages could worsen underlying budgetary 
conditions, while exacerbating inflation pressures 
both directly and indirectly through their signalling 
role to private wage sector negotiations. 
For the euro-area countries, Graph 81 suggests 
that there is a strong positive correlation between 
nominal compensation in the government and in 
43 The data used in the analysis come from OECD 
Economic Outlook database compiled by the ECB. 
44 The volatility of nominal compensation per government 
and private employee is measured as the standard deviation 
of the cyclical component of nominal compensation per 
government and private employee relative to real GDP’s. 
This gives an indication of the amplitude of each series 
relative to real GDP’s.
45 Few empirical studies address the topic of cyclical 
heterogeneity of government wages across countries. Lane 
(2003) shows that cyclical heterogeneity of government 
wages across countries is related to country characteristics 
such as GDP per capita, GDP volatility, trade openness, 
size of the public sector and the degree of power dispersion 
within the political system. More specifically, the volatility 
of government wages is positively related to the volatility 
of GDP, dispersion of power in the political system, the 
size of the public sector and the degree of openness and 
negatively related to GDP per capita.
the private sector in recent years46. Since 
correlation does not imply causality, Table 19 
checks for the direction of causality between 
public and private wages on the basis of the 
so-called Granger causality test47. Table 19 
suggests that there is causality from private wages 
to government wages in Austria, France, Greece, 
and Italy. By contrast, in Spain and Portugal the 
hypothesis that public wages do not Granger-
cause private wages is rejected. In Finland and 
Ireland there is statistical causality in both 
directions, while no statistically-significant causal 
relationship between government and private 
wages is found in the remaining countries. 
interactions between private and public 
wages 
Because of the interactions between private and 
public wages and their effects on the growth and 
inflation cycles, directly through the budget 
balance and indirectly through their effects on 
private wages, the cyclical response of private 
and public wages should be analysed taking into 
account the feedbacks between private and 
public wages. 
The analysis in box 7 shows that the interactions 
between private and public wages may be an 
important source of inflation persistence and 
cycles in economic activity. Shocks to the public 
sector wages appear more inflationary than 
shocks to the private sectors’ and, consistently 
with the public finance literature, they have an 
expansionary bias in economic activity.48 In the 
short-term, fluctuations in public wages are 
mainly exogenous (i.e., policy-induced). This is 
suggested by the forecast error variance 
decomposition of public wages (not reported for 
brevity), which suggests that the volatility of 
public wages is mainly determined in the short-
46 Lamo et al. (2008) report a strong positive annual 
contemporaneous correlation of public and private sector 
wages over the business cycle; this finding is robust across 
methods and measures of wages and quite general across 
countries.
47 The Granger causality measures the significance of past 
values of variable X (say public wages) in explaining 
variable Y (say private wages), taking into account the 
effect of past values of variable Y itself. Since the Granger-
causality test is sensitive to the number of lags included in 
the regression, both the Likelihood Ratio (LR) criterion and 
Schwarz Information criterion (SC) have been used in 
order to find an appropriate number of lags.
48 Blanchard-Perotti (1999), “An Empirical characterisation 
of the dynamic effects of changes in government spending 
and taxes on output” NBER WP7269. 
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term by changes in public wages (i.e. a public 
wage shock) and not by any other shock to the 
endogenous variable. However, in the medium 
term, relevant interactions with private wages 
and demand shocks emerge. Indeed, fluctuations 
in public wages are determined not only by 
public wage shocks, but also by shocks to 
demand and to private wages,  with each 
accounting for about 1/3 of the total variability 
of public wages. 
Although statistical methods do not generally 
confirm the hypothesis of direct causality from 
public to private wages49, the (limited) empirical 
evidence provided by the academic literature in 
this regard suggests a number of ways in which 
incomes policy in the public sector could affect 
economy-wide wage settlements50. Wage 
agreements in the government could provide a 
signal (demonstration effect) to private-sector 
wages, on account of their timing, when 
agreements on increases in government wages 
take place before similar settlements take place 
for the private sector. Second, in countries where 
the government employs a large and growing 
49 Lamo et al. (2008) show that while influences from the 
private sector appear on the whole to be stronger, there are 
direct and indirect feedbacks from public wage setting in a 
number of countries as well.
50 See, for instance, Christou et al. (2007), Demekas and 
Kontolemis (1999), Friberg, K. (2007), and Mizala and 
Romaguera (1995).
number of staff, growth of public wages largely 
above the private wages may increase wage 
pressures, especially when the labour market is 
tight51. The arguments above suggest that, in 
evaluating the impact of government action on 
the labour market, the effect of wages and 
employment must be considered together. In the 
current cyclical upturn, a prudent wage policy in 
the broad public sector could weigh heavily on 
the wage determination process and provide an 
appropriate signal to wage settlements in the 
private sector, particularly in those euro-area 
countries where public-sector employment has 
been rising under tight labour market 
conditions.
51 Demekas and Kontolemis (1999) develop a two-sector 
labour market model and, by applying it to Greece—a 
country with a relatively large public sector—, they show 
that increases in government wages lead to increases in 
private-sector wages and, therefore, directly to higher 
unemployment. Specifically, it appears that the expansion 
of the public sector in Greece during the late 1970s and 
1980s, not only failed to improve overall labour market 
performance, but has probably contributed directly to its 
sharp deterioration during that period. Increases in 
government wages have had a strong positive impact on 
private sector wages and led to higher unemployment. At 
the same time, because of its positive impact on private 
sector wages, the expansion of government employment 
has been much less effective in relieving the burden on 
unemployment than policy-makers thought at the time. 
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Graph 89 – Cyclical components of real GDP and nominal compensation per employee in the government sector, 
EA12 Ms 
Cyclical components of real GDP and nominal compensation in the government sector a.t. HP filter, 1980-2006
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table 17 – synchronization of public compensation per 
employee with GDP across the cycle
Cross-correlation of (contemporaneous) GDP with nominal 
compensation per government employee  
(at different leads and lags), EA12 MS. Cyclical components of 
real GDP and nominal compensation  
per government employee a.t HP filter, annual data 1980-2006
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 0 t+1 t+2 t+3
AT -0.41 -0.58 -0.34 -0.15 0.15 0.34 0.52
BE -0.46 -0.58 -0.43 -0.08 0.22 0.47 0.64
DE -0.36 -0.15 0.20 0.66 0.81 0.69 0.52
EA -0.48 -0.52 -0.48 -0.25 0.23 0.53 0.64
EL -0.17 -0.25 -0.08 0.00 0.09 -0.03 0.02
ES -0.56 -0.65 -0.55 -0.23 0.24 0.55 0.80
FI -0.43 -0.55 -0.44 -0.09 0.36 0.58 0.54
FR 0.00 -0.28 -0.36 -0.35 -0.16 0.01 0.09
IE -0.38 -0.56 -0.49 -0.23 0.13 0.31 0.30
IT 0.02 -0.20 -0.26 -0.24 0.17 0.33 0.22
LU -0.01 -0.28 -0.63 -0.74 -0.40 0.20 0.51
NL -0.07 -0.30 -0.36 -0.17 0.01 0.25 0.37
PT -0.12 0.18 0.52 0.59 0.39 0.19 -0.12
Data source: Commission services.
table 19 – spillovers between government and private wages, EA12Ms
Annual data 1980-2006
 
Null hypothesis Null hypothesis
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests   WPU does not Granger Cause WPR   WPR does not Granger Cause WPU
Country
Optimal number of 
lags (Schwarz 
criterion)
F-Statistic Probability F-Statistic Probability
AT 1 0,29 0,59 28,01 0,00
BE 2 0,89 0,42 2,22 0,13
DE 2 0,53 0,59 1,45 0,25
EA12 1 0,42 0,51 1,54 0,22
EL 1 0,37 0,54 9,40 0,00
ES 6 13,60 0,00 1,47 0,31
FI 2 2,93 0,07 8,93 0,00
FR 6 2,36 0,14 3,78 0,05
IE 0 3,48 0,05 2,61 0,09
IT 1 0,43 0,51 7,13 0,01
LU 2 0,42 0,66 1,83 0,22
NL 1 0,05 0,82 0,01 0,90
PT 5 30,50 0,00 1,22 0,36
Data source: Commission services. second column shows the optimal number of lags according to the schwarz 
criterion. the optimal number of lags following the likelihood Ratio criterion only differs from the schwarz criterion in the 
case of Germany, Finland, Greece and spain.  however, the results of Granger causality test run with the alternative lag 
structure	remains	the	same.	Columns	third	and	fifth	show	in	bold	those	cases	in	which	we	reject	the	null	hypothesis	(i.e.,	
non-causality). Columns fourth and sixth show the probability value corresponding to the reject threshold.
table 18 – volatility of public and private wages in EA12 
Ms, 1980-2006
Stand. deviation of cyclical components of compensation per 
public and private 
Public wages Private wages
EA 0.09 0.10
BE 0.22 0.14
DE 0.13 0.11
IE 0.07 0.08
EL 0.22 0.19
ES 0.14 0.13
FR 0.18 0.18
IT 0.27 0.21
LU 0.06 0.07
NL 0.10 0.08
AT 0.11 0.07
PT 0.20 0.14
FI 0.16 0.14
Data source: Commission services. Note:	by	definition,	
volatility of the euro-area  aggregate takes account 
of cross correlations among euro-area countries, as, 
generally, if c stands for the aggregate made of 
individual components a and b, then 
abbabac ρσσαασασασ )1(2)1( 2222 −+−+=
105
PARt I — Employment and wage developments
Box 7 : puBlic-privaTe wage inTeracTions in a sTrucTural var (svar) framework
Private and public wages are not exogenous as they may be influenced by the cyclical economic 
conditions, by long-term productivity trends and by demand of specific skills. There are also interactions 
between private and public wages. For these reasons, it is not possible to examine the behaviour of one 
type of wage independently from the other. Vector Autoregression is a standard economists’ tool used 
to capture the capture the evolution and the interdependencies between multiple time series. All the 
variables in a VAR are treated symmetrically by including for each variable an equation explaining its 
evolution based on its own lags and the lags of all the other variables in the model. Thus all variable are 
endogenous. The VAR is a-theoretical as it mainly describes the correlation between the variables. 
Economic relationship are imposed with a Structural VAR 
In the analysis of the relationships between private and public wages and their relative cyclical behaviour, 
one has to take into account that public wages are a source of exogenous shocks across the economic 
cycle. Moreover, shocks to public wages may feed inflation directly through their effect on public 
consumption or indirectly, with lags, through imitation effects from the private sectors. Most likely, an 
inflationary public consumption shock would lead to a response of the monetary authorities to curb 
inflation expectations. Thus, a proper identification of the cyclical behaviour of public and private wages 
should incorporate possible monetary authorities’ reactions functions. To this end, a five variable SVAR 
is estimated for the euro-area on annual data for the period 1979-2006  1 
Graph 90 reports the impulse-response function for each variable and structural shock. An increase in 
private wage inflation is associated to an interest rate hike which gradually leads to an adjustment 
process via reduction of GDP below potential. Through imitation effects, the increase in private wage 
inflation pushes up public wages inflation. It takes about 3 years for the initial shock to the private wages 
to be reabsorbed. Conversely, the increase in public wages leads to a temporary cyclical expansion, 
accompanied by an increase in private wages and, compared to the increase in public wages, is relatively 
more persistent. This longer interest rate cycle is due to the more persistent effect on inflation of the 
public wage shock.  The impulse-response functions do not give any information of the empirical 
relevance of the structural shocks, which is provided by the forecast error variance decomposition 
(FEVD) of each single variable. The analyses of the FEVDs suggest that: 
1) Temporary demand and inflation shocks are the main determinants of the short-run variability of CPI 
inflation. However, after 3 years shocks to public wages explain up to 20% of the volatility of consumer 
price inflation. 
2) In the short term, the volatility of public wages is mainly due to shocks to public wages and, to a 
minor extent to shocks to private sector wages. This implies that public wages are mainly an exogenous 
variable. However, in the medium term wages fluctuations in the public sector wages are determined 
by fluctuations in private wages. In the medium term, private wages explain up to 30% of the fluctuations 
in public wages. 
3) Demand shocks and private wage inflation shocks are most important in explaining the volatility of 
nominal interest rate in the short run.
4) Contrary to what found for public wages, a private wage inflation shock depresses temporarily output. 
1 The SVAR is done in two steps. Firstly, a congruent representation of the data with a canonical VAR in 5 variables 
(nominal interest rates, output gap, public wage inflation, private wage inflation, CPI inflation) is obtained. It turns 
out that a VAR with one lag is well specified as it is not affected by autocorrelation and non-normal and 
heteroschedastic residuals. The residuals from an unrestricted VAR cannot be given any economic interpretation, as 
they are a linear combination of (unobserved) structural shocks. Thus, in a second step, a link is established between 
the reduced-form residuals and structural innovations, usually mutually uncorrelated. One way to link reduced-form 
and economically meaningful shocks is via the contemporaneous correlation of the reduced-form residuals (e.g. 
Amisano and Giannini, 1997). These links are suggested by plausible restrictions among the economic variables of 
the original VAR. With 5 variables, the reduced-form variance-covariance matrix has 15 elements that can be used to 
estimate the links between reduced-form and the structural innovations. Starting from a Choleski decomposition, it is 
possible to delete non-significant parameters and identify an over-identified structure, whose validity is tested via a 
LR ratio. The final structure of the instantaneous equations implies that public wages respond positively to private 
wages, the output gap is positively affected by public wages inflation raises during expansions and the short-term 
interest rate rises when inflation goes up and GDP grows above potential. Finally private wages are predetermined. 
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Graph 90 – Impulse responses svAR 
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2.1.5. the impact of labour cost 
developments on cost-competitiveness in 
euro-area Member states
Wage developments are crucial elements for 
price and cost competitiveness. With the euro 
area uniform monetary conditions, various 
factors may prompt diverging nominal unit 
labour costs across its members. Benign factors 
include equilibrium wage adjustments reflecting 
long-term catching-up processes or wage 
responses to asymmetric cyclical positions of 
national economies. Non-benign factors reflect 
widening divergence in nominal unit labour costs 
due to structural rigidities and inertial 
components in wage settlements. 
This section investigates the impact of labour 
cost on the external position of euro-area 
countries on the back of various measures of 
price and cost competitiveness. The emphasis of 
the section is twofold. First, an effort is made to 
explain the interplay between developments in 
nominal unit labour costs in individual Member 
States and various competitiveness indicators. 
Second, the section examines the adjustment 
capacity of nominal unit labour costs to 
asymmetric cyclical positions within euro-area 
countries.
the Ulc-based real Effective Exchange 
Rate (REER) provides a reliable picture of 
general trends in competitiveness
The developments in the external position of 
euro-area economies over time can be accounted 
for by non-price/cost competitiveness factors, 
such as geographical location, trade specialisation, 
product differentiation, and FDI strategies as well 
as price/cost competitiveness factors. The latter 
can be measured by different versions of the Real 
Effective Exchange Rate (REER), depending on 
the number of countries and the cost/price 
indicators involved in its definition. There is little 
consensus on the ideal indicator of international 
cost and price competitiveness as each of the 
standard measures typically employed has its 
own merits and drawbacks. From an empirical 
angle, one would prefer the indicator that best 
explains and helps forecast export developments. 
Ca’ Zorzi and Schnatz (2007) compare the 
properties of the alternative cost and price 
competitiveness measures of the euro area. They 
find little evidence that there is one indicator 
consistently outperforming the others in terms of 
explaining and forecasting euro area exports. 
Graph 91 compares two versions of cost-
competitiveness indicators (or REERs based on 
unit labour costs in total economy), the intra-
euro-area REER, calculated against the remaining 
euro-area members, and the broad REER, 
calculated against 36 countries (including EU15 
initial Member States, the twelve recently-
acceded Member States, Norway, Switzerland, 
Australia, the United States, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, New Zealand, and Turkey). The two 
measures give similar rankings of Member 
States’ relative competitive performance over the 
medium run, and show a clear deterioration in 
the competitive position of Italy and Portugal 
over the period 1999 to 2007.
Graph 92 compares three well-known versions 
of intra-euro-area REERs, based on 1) unit 
labour costs in manufacturing, 2) unit labour 
costs in total economy, and 3) the GDP deflator. 
On the basis of these indicators, countries are 
classified into three main groups with regard to 
price and cost competitiveness developments 
since the launch of the euro. A first group of 
countries, represented by Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, and the Netherlands, has registered a 
significant deterioration in their competitiveness 
position against the rest of the euro area. A 
second group, including Belgium and France, 
has seen their competitiveness position broadly 
unaltered since the launch of the euro. The third 
group has achieved gains in competitiveness, 
which is pronounced for Germany and less 
clearly so in the case of Austria and Finland 
depending on the indicator examined. The 
verdict on the competitiveness position of Ireland 
depends on the indicator considered. The 
competitiveness position of the manufacturing 
sector in this country has strengthened since 
1999, whereas the remaining two competitiveness 
indicators reflect appreciation movements, an 
indication of rising domestic inflationary 
pressures. 
As most international trade is in manufactured 
goods, the most widely-used measure of cost 
competitiveness focuses on REERs based on unit 
labour costs in manufacturing (the first of the three 
REERs described above). However, labour costs 
account for only a limited share of total costs in 
this industry, which purchases a certain amount of 
inputs from tradable and non tradable services. 
Therefore, the REERs based on the unit labour 
costs in total economy should provide a more 
general picture of one country’s competitiveness 
position. Even so, Graph 92 suggests that 
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competitiveness losses in manufacturing are more 
marked than in the total economy in some 
countries, namely Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal. Conversely, in the Netherlands and 
Ireland, labour cost pressures in other sectors 
magnify respectively the competitiveness losses 
or offset the competitiveness gains registered in 
manufacturing. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the prices of 
manufacturing goods are set by international 
markets, pressures arising from unit labour costs 
may not necessarily lead to deterioration in the 
external position when labour cost pressures 
result in squeezed profi t margins. Therefore, 
comparing the REER based on unit labour costs 
in manufacturing with the REER based on the 
GDP defl ator may be of value to see whether 
mounting labour cost pressures translate into 
infl ationary pressures in the GDP defl ator or 
rather lead to a redistribution of income between 
workers and firms. Among countries with 
unfavourable labour cost developments, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece have avoided passing 
through the increase in nominal unit labour costs 
on prices, thus mitigating the loss of 
competitiveness as measured in terms of the 
GDP defl ator at the expense of a drop in profi t 
margins. By contrast, in Spain and the 
Netherlands fi rms have been passing through the 
increase in nominal unit labour costs on fi nal 
prices, thus adding to the deterioration in 
competitiveness arising from mounting labour 
cost pressures. The reversal of sign in 
competitiveness movements between these two 
indicators in Ireland and Slovenia is also an 
indication of growing profi t margins in these 
countries. 
Graph 91 – Intra-euro-area (Y-axis) and broad (X-axis) REERs based on UlC total economy, EA12 Ms 
Cumulative change, 1999Q1-2007Q4
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Data source: Price and cost competitiveness indicators. Commission services. 
Note:  the intra-euro-area REER is calculated against the remaining euro-area members. the broad REER is 
calculated against the EU15 initial Ms, the twelve RAMs, Norway, switzerland, Australia, the Us, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, New Zealand, and turkey.
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the weak responsiveness of nominal 
compensation per employee to 
asymmetric cyclical shocks across euro-
area countries precludes a smooth 
adjustment of the rEErs 
In presence of country-specifi c cyclical shocks, 
changes in cost competitiveness are the key 
channel of adjustment under a monetary union. 
A relevant question, therefore, is whether and to 
what extent nominal unit labour costs respond to 
fl uctuations in output gaps, ensuring smooth 
adjustment of the REER. This, in turn, entails 
examining how both nominal compensation per 
employee and labour productivity respond to 
cyclical conditions.
To assess the adjustment capacity of national 
labour markets to asymmetric cyclical conditions 
during EMU, Graph 93 compares the relative 
output gap of each euro-area economy with the 
annual growth rate of relative nominal unit 
labour costs, and its two components, i.e., 
nominal compensation per employee and labour 
productivity. A positive transitory asymmetric 
shock is identified whenever a country 
experiences an increase in the output gap larger 
than the average. A smooth adjustment to 
asymmetric shocks would require a marked 
response of relative nominal unit labour costs, 
thus reducing the sensitivity of a country’s output 
to the shock. Graph 93 shows that there are two 
countries (Germany and Greece) subject to a 
negative asymmetric shock during the period 
1999-2007, while another three  (Ireland, France, 
and Spain) have experienced a positive 
asymmetric shock. In line with what might be 
expected in terms of adjustment mechanisms of 
labour markets, relative nominal unit labour 
costs decreased in line with comparatively 
negative output gap in Germany, whereas the 
three countries with comparatively positive 
output gap experienced an increase in their 
relative nominal unit labour costs. In Germany, 
the drop in relative nominal unit labour costs 
was largely driven by a reduction in relative 
compensation per employee. France and Spain 
witnessed unfavourable relative labour 
productivity developments, which translated into 
increases in relative nominal unit labour costs in 
spite of contained wage pressures. By contrast, 
in Ireland and Greece, marked increases in 
relative labour productivity were not suffi cient 
to offset excessive growth in compensation per 
employee, which explains the increase in relative 
nominal unit labour costs in these two 
countries. 
Of the fi ve countries with fairly neutral cyclical 
pressures, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal were 
not able to contain labour cost pressures, and 
experienced a positive differential in nominal unit 
labour costs. Within this group, Italy witnessed 
comparatively unfavourable productivity growth, 
while the Netherlands and Portugal experienced 
excessive nominal compensation per employee 
growth. 
Graph 92 – Cumulative changes in various measures of  intra-euro-area REERs, EA13 Ms
Cumulative change, 1999-2007
Intra-EA REER, based on ULC total economy
Intra-EA REER, based on GDP deflator
Intra-EA REER, based on ULC Manufacturing
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Data source:  Price and cost competitiveness indicators. Commission services.
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Graph 94 focuses on recent developments. 
Positive asymmetric shocks are registered in 
2007 in Germany, Finland, Greece and Austria. 
The relatively stronger cyclical position did not 
preclude relative nominal unit labour costs to 
decrease in the former two countries, mainly 
owing to wage moderation –Germany– or 
productivity gains –Austria–. Relative nominal 
unit labour costs grew excessively in Greece, 
owing to a marked acceleration in nominal 
compensation per employee. In the three 
countries with comparatively weak cyclical 
position, there appear to be problems in terms of 
adjustment in Ireland and Italy, as relative 
nominal unit labour costs have increased 
markedly, particularly in Ireland. By contrast, 
the reduction in relative nominal unit labour 
costs registered in Portugal is consistent with its 
relatively weak cyclical position.
All in all, the loose connection between nominal 
compensation per employee and labour 
productivity across the cycle translates into non-
benign losses of competitiveness in some euro-
area members (Greece, Spain, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal). Further measures to 
foster a higher degree of competition in product 
markets and service sectors would contribute to 
improve the competitiveness adjustment 
mechanisms across the cycle.
Graph 93 – Cyclical divergence and relative nominal unit labour costs, relative compensation per employee and 
relative labour productivity, EA12 Ms
Annual average % change, 1999-2007. EA12 MS are ranked in terms of the size of their relative output gap
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Data source: AMECO.
Note: All variables are expressed in relative terms, i.e., they are normalised with respect to the weighted average of 
the remaining euro-area countries.
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the Ulc-based rEEr is an important 
explanatory factor of external performance
Graph 95 to Graph 97 report on the relationship 
between various measures of external 
performance and indicators of cost-
competitiveness (total and intra-euro-area ULC-
based REERs). The charts show a negative 
relationship between cost-competitiveness and 
measures of export performance, such as export 
growth or changes in export shares, as well as 
the net balance of goods and services. Yet, 
caution is needed when interpreting the 
relationship between REER movements and the 
net balance of goods and services as the two 
variables may be driven by a common factor. For 
instance, a country-specifi c positive shock to 
domestic demand can lead both to cost tensions, 
a rise in REERs and deterioration in the net 
balance of goods and services due to the increase 
in imported goods related to higher initial 
demand. The available econometric evidence 
points to considerable heterogeneity in the 
response of the external performance to changes 
in the REER52, which may be interpreted as an 
indication of the importance of non-price 
competitiveness, and relative demand, as in 
empirical estimates of determinants of trade 
balance, income elasticity tends to be much 
higher than the price elasticity.
52 The elasticity of exports to the REER varies 
signifi cantly depending on the Member States considered. 
ECB (2005), “Competitiveness and the export performance 
of the euro area”, Occasional Paper No. 30, June , and 
Allard et al. (2005), “Explaining differences in external 
sector performance among large euro-area countries”, IMF 
country Report No. 05/401), report signifi cant differences 
in the price elasticity of exports. In both studies, estimated 
exports tend to show large residuals since the early 2000 in 
some Member States, which may be interpreted as an 
indication of the importance of non-price competitiveness 
and relative domestic demand.
Graph 94 – Cyclical divergence and relative nominal unit labour costs, relative compensation per employee and 
relative labour productivity, EA12 Ms  
Annual % change, 2007. EA12 MS are ranked in terms of the size of their relative output gap
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Data source: AMECO.
Note: All variables are expressed in relative terms, i.e., they are normalised with respect to the weighted average of 
the remaining euro-area countries.
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Graph 95 – Cumulative change in broad REER (based on UlC in total economy) and average annual % change in 
overall exports, EA12 Ms  
1999-2007
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Data sources:  Commission services on the basis of AMECO and Price and Competitiveness indicators data.
Note:  the broad REER is calculated against the EU15 initial Ms, the twelve RAMs, Norway, switzerland, Australia, the 
Us, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and turkey. Overall exports are exports to the rest of the world.
Graph 96 – Cumulative change in intra-EA REER (based on UlC in total economy) and av. annual % change in 
exports of goods and services, performance relative to the rest of the EA, EA12 Ms   
1999-2007
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Data sources: Commission services on the basis of AMECO and Price and Competitiveness indicators data.
Note:  the intra-euro-area REER is calculated against the remaining euro-area members. the performance relative to 
the rest of the former euro area is calculated using double export weights.
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Graph 97 – Cumulative change in broad REER (based on UlC in total economy) and average annual % change in 
overall net exports of goods and services, EA12Ms
1999-2007
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Graph 98 – Cumulative change in broad REER (based on UlC in total economy) and average annual %   
1999-2007
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO and Price and Competitiveness indicators data. 
Note:  the broad REER is calculated against the EU15 initial Ms, the twelve RAMs, Norway, switzerland, Australia, the 
Us, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and turkey. Market shares are performance of exports of goods and 
services on export-weighted imports of goods and services in the 36 industrial markets mentioned above.
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2.2. laboUr cost dEvElopmEnts in 
dEnmark, swEdEn and thE UnitEd 
kingdom
Denmark, Sweden and the UK share the position 
of being outside the euro area and being endowed 
with a GDP per capita level well above the EU27 
average. In 2007, nominal compensation per 
employee as depicted in Graph 99 grew at 4.2% 
in Sweden, 3.9 % in the UK and 3.7 % in 
Denmark, compared to 2.3% in the euro area. 
Compared to 2006, this implies a stabilisation of 
wage increases in Denmark, strong nominal 
gains in Sweden following last year’s wage 
agreements, and a significant slowdown in the 
United Kingdom, in spite of the labour market 
tightening throughout 2007. Coupled with a 
sharp slowdown in productivity, nominal unit 
labour costs have picked up in Denmark and 
Sweden (in the latter country as a consequence 
of strong employment gains and decelerating 
output growth), whereas more dynamic 
productivity behaviour has contributed to the 
moderation of nominal unit labour costs in the 
United Kingdom (Graph 100 and Graph 101). 
One remarkable feature shown in Graph 40 is the 
relatively stronger volatility of real unit labour 
cost in these three countries as compared to the 
euro area. Beyond the fact that an aggregate 
indicator tends to exhibit less volatility than 
individual-country indicators, real unit labour 
costs result more volatile in these three countries 
than in any of the four biggest economies in the 
euro area (i.e., Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain). The fact that Denmark, the UK and, to a 
lesser extent, Sweden, stand out in terms of 
successful labour market performance in a 
context characterised by flexible labour and 
product markets may explain this higher 
volatility in the real unit labour costs.
Looking further ahead, in Denmark the labour 
market is expected to remain tight and wage 
growth to remain higher than in previous years, 
while productivity is foreseen to improve after a 
very weak growth in 2007. In Sweden, nominal 
wages are assumed to decelerate somewhat as 
employment is expected to rise in 2008 and 2009 
at a significantly slower pace, thus leading to a 
slight rise in unemployment. As employment 
gains decelerate, productivity is likely to recover. 
In the United Kingdom prospects for employment 
growth point to a slowdown to near-zero 
increases as a result of moderation in activity. As 
a result of slowing activity and the still (though 
reduced)  dynamic immigrat ion,  the 
unemployment rate is set to increase slightly, 
implying that future wage growth will moderate 
due to labour market easing. 
Graph 99 – Compensation per employee in Denmark, sweden and the Uk compared to the EA13 
Year-on-year % changes, 1999-2007
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
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Graph 100 – labour productivity in Denmark, sweden and the Uk compared to the EA13
Year-on-year % changes, 1999-2007
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
Graph 101 – Real unit labour costs in Denmark, sweden and the Uk compared to the EA13 
Year-on-year % changes, 1999-2007
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Graph 102 – Nominal unit labour costs in Denmark, sweden and the Uk compared to the EA13 
Year-on-year % changes, 1999-2007
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2.3.wagE and laboUr cost 
dEvElopmEnts in thE rEcEntly-accEdEd 
MEMbER StatES (RaMS) 
recently-acceded member states still 
undergoing a convergence process 
towards EU15
The growth rate of GDP in the Recently-Acceded 
Member States (RAMS) situated significantly 
above that of the euro-area average over the 
period 1995-2007 (Graph 103). Outstanding 
growth rates have been registered in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania (Baltic3), followed by the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia (Central and Eastern 
Europe countries or CEE5) and Cyprus and 
Malta (CY&MT). Although benefiting from 
bright economic conditions as of 2000, over a 
ten-year period Romania and Bulgaria (South 
and Eastern Europe countries or SEE2) still 
appear lagging behind the remaining RAMS in 
terms of average GDP growth. The strong 
expansion of the RAMS continued in 2007, with 
growth accelerating to 6.1%. Growth was robust 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, whereas some 
signs of deceleration were registered in the three 
Baltic countries. In Hungary, economic activity 
continued to be weak. In general, growth in 
RAMS economies was underpinned by dynamic 
domestic demand while the sign of the 
contribution of net exports to GDP growth is 
negative in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Slovenia and positive in the 
remaining ones.
As a result of relative rapid GDP growth, per 
capita income levels have become closer to the 
EU average (Graph 104). Convergence has been 
particularly impressive in Baltic3, helped not 
just by their low starting positions and more 
dynamic trading partners, but also their strong 
commitment to an attractive business 
environment and sound macroeconomic policies 
(including lower tax burdens and early 
commitment to fixing exchange rates against the 
euro). All RAMS have benefited from high rates 
of inward FDI, averaging 5% of GDP, as 
companies have taken advantage of relatively 
low-cost, but highly skilled labour forces in a 
relatively secure and familiar neighbourhood. In 
spite of this substantial convergence process, 
RAMS still exhibit a substantially lower GDP 
per capita than the EU average. 
118
European Economy No 5/2008
labour market and wage developments in 2007
in 2007, sharp acceleration in nominal 
wage growth in line with tightened labour 
market conditions was not mitigated by 
strong productivity performance, thus 
leading to substantial inflationary pressures 
stemming from the labour market
Overall labour market conditions have remained 
dynamic in 2007, with foreign companies taking 
advantage of reasonably skilled labour forces at 
relatively low-cost in a relatively secure business 
environment. However, increasing skill shortages 
are driving up nominal unit labour costs in many 
RAMS. 
Nominal compensation per employee grew 
stronger in RAMS than in EU15 countries in the 
last years and continued to do so in 2007 (Graph 
109 and Table 20). The highest rates of growth of 
compensation per employee in 2007 were 
registered in Latvia (33.2%), Estonia (26.5%), 
Romania (20.2%), and Bulgaria (17.9%). With as 
many as two million Romanians working abroad 
and fast economic growth, the country’s labour 
market is growing increasingly tight. Overheating 
in the labour market explains the sharp wage 
pressures in Latvia in 2007. In Estonia the labour 
market remains tight, in particular for skilled 
workers. At the lower end of the spectrum, wage 
growth in Malta was even below the EU15 
patterns. Half of the RAMS are placed in between 
the EU15 and the RAMS average values, namely, 
Cyprus, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Hungary. 
Labour productivity in RAMS as a whole grew 
at 3.5% in 2007 (Graph 109 and Table 20), well 
above the EU15 aggregate (1.2%). Labour 
productivity increased markedly in Slovakia, 
followed by the three Baltic countries, the Czech 
Republic and Romania, with more intermediate 
positions represented by Slovenia and Bulgaria 
and fairly poor productivity performance in 
Cyprus, Malta, Hungary and Poland. 
In order to assess the inflationary pressures, 
developments in wage growth should be viewed 
in conjunction with developments in productivity, 
i.e. in terms of the development of nominal unit 
labour costs (ULC). Marked productivity 
improvements in 2007 did not suffice to 
compensate for high nominal wage growth. 
RAMS as a whole saw an increase in nominal 
unit labour costs of 10.7% (Graph 109 and Table 
20), well above the average registered for EU15 
countries. Nominal ULC increased most in Baltic 
3 and SEE2, followed by CEE5. Modest 
increases were registered and CY&MT. 
Real ULC increased by a remarkable 5.7% in 
2007 for RAMS as a whole, thus around 6.5 p.p. 
above the EU15 average (Graph 110 and 
Table 20). Pronounced real unit labour costs 
Graph 103 – Convergence of RAMs with EU15. 
Real GDP growth         
Average year-on-year % change 1995-07 
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Graph 104 – Convergence of RAMs with EU15. 
Per capita GDP relative to EU15
Percent, 1995 and 2007
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increases were recorded in Baltic3 and SEE2 
while ULC remained broadly constant in CEE5 
and exhibited negative growth rates in CY&MT, 
in the latter case somewhat below the decline of 
real ULC registered in EU15. 
Graph 105 to Graph 108 put labour cost 
indicators in RAMS into a longer perspective. 
Not surprisingly, they clearly show that RAMS 
dynamics is governed by developments in CEE5, 
as they constitute the biggest economies among 
RAMS. Indicators in SEE2 are extremely volatile 
and also the least aligned with EU15 standards. 
Acceleration in nominal wages is the main 
explanation to the problem of relatively high 
nominal ULC growth in SEE2. In spite of 
declining growth rates in nominal compensation 
per employee, Romania and Bulgaria still appear 
as the two RAMS with unavoidably high 
increases in nominal ULC. Baltic3 benefited 
from shrinking nominal ULC between 1999 and 
2002 owing to relatively moderate nominal wage 
increases and strong productivity performance. 
This trend was inverted as of 2002, mostly 
associated with mounting wage pressures. 
CY&MT and CEE5 comprise the group of 
countries which has exhibited most convergence 
with EU15 in terms of nominal ULC. Although 
both nominal wages and productivity growth in 
CEE5 are situated well above the EU15 values, 
nominal wages are fairly aligned with 
productivity developments. 
Graph 105 – Convergence of RAMs with EU15. Compensation per employee
Year-on-year % changes 1999-2007
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Graph 107 – Convergence of RAMs with the EU15. Nominal unit labour costs
Year-on-year % changes 1999-2007
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Graph 106 – Convergence of RAMs with EU15. labour productivity
Year-on-year % changes 1999-2007
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Graph 109 – Breakdown of nominal unit labour costs into compensation per employee and labour productivity, RAMs
Year-on-year % changes 2007
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Graph 108 – Convergence of RAMs with EU15. Real unit labour costs
Year-on-year % changes 1999-2007
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table 20 – Breakdown of real unit labour costs, RAMs compared to EU15 and EU27
Year-on-year % changes, 2004-2007
 
BG CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL RO SI SK EU27 EU15 RAMS
Compensation per 
employee
2004 4.9 5.7 11.2 1.9 14.3 10.9 11.2 1.3 1.8 13.9 7.8 8.4 3.0 3.3 3.9
2005 5.9 4.6 11.0 1.8 25.3 11.5 7.1 2.0 1.6 22.1 5.3 9.7 2.8 2.3 14.2
2006 7.4 6.2 14.0 2.7 23.6 15.1 4.5 3.3 1.9 17.8 5.5 7.9 2.9 3.0 7.7
2007 17.9 7.0 26.5 3.5 33.2 14.1 8.4 1.5 8.1 20.2 6.2 8.3 3.1 2.7 14.1
Average 2004-2007 9.1 5.9 15.7 2.5 24.1 12.9 7.8 2.0 3.3 18.5 6.2 8.6 2.9 2.8 10.0
Labour productivity
2004 3.9 4.3 8.2 0.4 7.5 7.3 5.4 0.8 4.0 10.3 4.1 5.5 2.1 1.9 5.3
2005 3.5 5.2 8.3 0.3 8.7 5.3 3.7 2.0 1.3 5.8 4.0 5.1 1.1 1.0 3.7
2006 2.9 4.5 5.3 2.3 7.2 5.9 3.0 2.2 2.9 4.9 4.5 6.1 1.5 1.5 3.7
2007 3.3 4.6 6.6 1.1 6.6 6.7 1.5 1.1 1.9 4.7 3.3 8.1 1.1 1.2 3.5
Average 2004-2007 3.4 4.7 7.1 1.0 7.5 6.3 3.4 1.5 2.5 6.4 4.0 6.2 1.4 1.4 4.0
Nominal unit labour 
costs
2004 1.0 1.4 3.0 1.5 6.9 3.6 5.8 0.5 -2.2 3.7 3.7 3.0 0.9 1.4 -1.4
2005 2.5 -0.6 2.8 1.4 16.5 6.2 3.4 -0.1 0.3 16.3 1.4 4.5 1.7 1.3 10.6
2006 4.5 1.6 8.8 0.5 16.4 9.3 1.5 1.1 -1.0 12.9 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.5 4.0
2007 14.7 2.4 19.8 2.4 26.6 7.4 6.9 0.5 6.2 15.5 2.9 0.2 1.9 1.6 10.7
Average 2004-2007 5.7 1.2 8.6 1.5 16.6 6.6 4.4 0.5 0.8 12.1 2.2 2.4 1.5 1.4 6.0
GDP deflator
2004 5.1 4.5 1.8 3.3 7.0 2.7 4.4 1.7 4.1 15.0 3.3 5.9 2.2 2.0 5.4
2005 3.8 -0.2 6.2 2.3 10.2 5.7 2.2 3.0 2.6 12.2 1.7 2.4 2.1 2.0 3.4
2006 8.5 1.7 6.2 2.8 9.9 6.6 3.9 2.9 1.5 10.8 2.0 2.9 2.2 2.1 3.7
2007 7.9 3.4 9.7 3.1 13.3 8.6 5.2 2.3 3.0 10.8 3.9 1.1 2.5 2.4 4.9
Average 2004-2007 6.3 2.4 6.0 2.9 10.1 5.9 3.9 2.5 2.8 12.2 2.7 3.1 2.2 2.1 4.4
Real unit labour 
costs
2004 -4.1 -3.2 1.2 -1.7 -0.1 0.9 1.5 -1.2 -6.3 -11.4 0.3 -2.9 -1.3 -0.6 -6.8
2005 -1.3 -0.4 -3.4 -0.9 6.4 0.5 1.2 -3.0 -2.4 4.1 -0.3 2.2 -0.4 -0.7 7.1
2006 -3.9 -0.1 2.6 -2.3 6.5 2.7 -2.4 -1.8 -2.5 2.0 -1.0 -1.1 -0.7 -0.6 0.3
2007 6.8 -1.0 10.1 -0.7 13.3 -1.2 1.7 -1.8 3.2 4.7 -0.9 -0.9 -0.6 -0.8 5.7
Average 2004-2007 -0.6 -1.2 2.6 -1.4 6.5 0.7 0.5 -2.0 -2.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 1.6
Data source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
Graph	110	–	Breakdown	of	real	unit	labour	costs	into	nominal	unit	labour	costs	and	the	GDP	deflator,	RAMS
Year-on-year % changes 2007
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the contribution of nominal unit labour costs 
to the fi nal demand defl ator widely varies 
across rams
Overall, fi nal demand prices pressures have been 
highest in Romania and Latvia, followed at a 
considerable distance by Bulgaria and Estonia 
(Graph 111). Nominal unit labour costs have 
been a major contribution to such infl ationary 
pressures in the fi rst two countries, together with 
sizable profi t margins and the effect of import 
prices in, respectively, Romania and Latvia. The 
contribution of import prices has also been 
sizable in Bulgaria. In the remaining RAMS, 
fi nal demand price pressures have been more 
contained. Hungary and Poland are two cases 
worth mentioning, as they exhibit unbalanced 
patterns in terms of cost pressures, respectively 
biased towards unit labour costs and profi ts. 
Graph 112 decomposes the contribution of 
import prices to the fi nal demand defl ator growth 
into the contributions of import prices 
denominated in foreign currency and the effect 
of nominal effective exchange rates. Barring the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, in all RAMS 
import prices have contributed to intensify 
infl ationary pressures. In all cases this is due to 
increases in import prices denominated in foreign 
currency. Depreciation movements in nominal 
effective exchange rates have added to external 
infl ationary pressures in Latvia and Romania. 
However, in most RAMS appreciation in nominal 
effective exchange rates has dampened the effect 
of higher import prices on overall fi nal demand 
pressures. 
Graph	111	–	Contribution	of	import	prices	and	GDP	defl	ator	components	to	fi	nal	demand	defl	ator	growth,	RAMS	
Year-on-year % changes 1999-2007
P.p. contributions to year-on-year % change in fi nal demand defl ator growth, average 2002-2007
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Graph	112	–	Contribution	of	import	prices	denominated		in	foreign	currency	and	nominal	EER	to	final	demand	
deflator	growth,	RAMS
P.p. contribution to year-on-year % change in final demand deflator growth, average 2002-2007 
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sectoral developments
Catch-up growth processes are usually driven by 
strong productivity improvements in the tradable 
sector. In the RAMS53, average productivity 
growth over the period 1999-2006 was around 
4 p.p. higher in manufacturing than in services. 
Conversely, data on compensation per employee 
reveal that services wages in RAMS have grown 
almost 3 p.p. faster than manufacturing wages 
during the same period. As a result, nominal unit 
labour costs fell by -2% in manufacturing against 
a +5% growth rate in services (Graph 113 to 
Graph 115).
The divergent pattern in nominal unit labour costs 
across manufacturing and services suggests that 
these countries are facing a typical Balassa-
Samuelson effect, i.e., real appreciation movements 
driven by high price increases in the non-tradable 
sector. Although the empirical literature is not 
conclusive, it is recognized that Balassa-Samuelson 
effects could add 1½–2½ percentage points to 
53 Due to lack of data availability, the aggregate excludes 
Bulgaria, Malta and Romania.
inflation in an accession country as its productivity 
catches up to EU15 levels. This is one reason why 
sectoral wage developments warrant strict 
monitoring. 
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Graph 113 – Compensation per employee in manufacturing and services, RAMS
Average year-on-year % change 1999-06
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Data source: Commission services on the basis of AMECO data.
Note: Averages for Romania are calculated over the period 1999-2005.
Graph 115 – NULCs differential between manufacturing 
and services, RAMS
Average year-on-year % change 1999-06
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AMECO data.
Note: Averages for Romania are calculated over the 
period 1999-2005.
Graph 114 – labour productivity in manufacturing and 
services, RAMs
Average year-on-year % change 1999-067
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Note: Averages for Romania are calculated over the 
period 1999-2005.
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Sustained consumption growth benefited 
from continued employment, real wage 
gains and expanding credit
In 2007, growth in RAMS was fed by sustained 
consumption, which increased by around 6.1%, 
slightly below the growth rate registered in the 
previous year (6.4%). In most RAMS, 
consumption was boosted by increasing 
employment, rises in real consumption wages, 
and sustained credit expansion. Strong job 
creation was in turn boosted by a reduction in 
pension contributions, and an increase in 
participation rates that led to higher-than 
expected employment growth of around 2.6% in 
2007. Private consumption was also stimulated 
by an increase in households’ disposable income, 
following the cut in the personal income tax rate 
in Malta and an increase in social benefits in the 
Czech Republic. Historically low interest rates 
contributed very positively to the acceleration in 
consumption growth in Cyprus. 
From a longer time perspective, Graph 116 
illustrates the evolution of real (consumption 
price deflated) compensation per employee and 
employment in RAMS as compared with EU15 
between 1999 and 2007. Whereas in the EU15 
real compensation per employee and employment 
grew in parallel, the same cannot be said of 
RAMS where the increase in real wages has 
largely outpaced that of employment, which has 
actually recorded a meagre increase in the period 
of analysis. Real wage expansion has been 
impressive in Baltic3 and SEE2, whereas CEE5 
and CY&MT have recorded more modest 
increases in real compensation per employee.
Graph 117 displays sizeable increases in real 
consumption wages in the majority of RAMS 
over the period 2002-2007, generally rooted in 
marked productivity improvements as well as a 
pronounced augmentation of the domestic terms 
of trade in Romania and Baltic3. The sources of 
changes in the domestic terms of trade over the 
period 2000-2006 can be gauged in Graph 118, 
which confirms the picture of marked increases 
in the domestic terms of trade in the four 
countries listed above. Whereas in Lithuania and 
Latvia there does not seem to be any single 
predominant factor, the increase in the domestic 
terms of trade in Estonia is mainly explained by 
the accumulated gap between the deflators of 
public and private consumption. The remarkable 
increase in the domestic terms of trade in 
Romania is mostly attributable to the positive 
contribution of the gap between the import and 
the private consumption deflators –i.e., import 
prices growing by less than overall consumption 
prices– as well as the fast growth in the public 
consumption and the investment deflators 
relative to the private consumption deflator.
Real consumption wages presented in Graph 117 
do not represent an accurate measure of the 
purchasing power of workers or real take-home 
pay, as (consumption price deflated) 
compensation per employee includes both social 
security contributions and labour income taxes. 
Graph 119 plots the growth differential between 
consumption price deflated post-tax wages (i.e., 
compensation per employee excluding social 
security contributions and labour income taxes 
received by workers) and consumption price 
deflated gross wages (i.e., compensation per 
employee paid by employers). Only in four 
RAMS, namely Malta, Estonia, the Czech 
Republic and Poland, consumption price deflated 
post-tax wages increased less than consumption 
price deflated gross wages over the period 2001-
2006. Note that, of the group of countries that 
registered weak increases in consumption price 
deflated compensation per employee (Graph 
117), namely Cyprus, Malta and Poland, in the 
latter two the purchasing power of workers 
worsened when changes in social security 
contributions and labour income taxes are taken 
into account (Graph 119). As for prospects in 
2008-2009, it seems that announced cuts in the 
tax wedge are expected to boost disposable 
incomes in these two countries.
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Graph 116 – Employment and real consumption wages 
in RAMs and EU15
Average year-on-year % change 1996-07
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Graph 117 – Real consumption wages, real production 
wages and domestic terms of trade, RAMs 
Year-on-year % change, average 2002-2007
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Graph 118 – Accumulated gap between GDP and 
consumption	price	deflators	in	2006,	RAMS
Deflators are index numbers, 2000 = 100 
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Graph 119 – Growth gap between real post-tax and 
gross consumption wages, RAMs 
Year-on-year % change, average 2001-2006  
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nominal unit labour costs are expected to 
decelerate significantly over the next two 
years on the back of moderate nominal 
wage growth and steady increases in 
labour productivity 
Following the culmination of overheating in the 
labour market in 2007, employment growth is 
forecast to decelerate slightly over the period 
2008-2009, thus narrowing the gap between the 
observed unemployment rate and the NAWRU. 
As a result, growth in nominal compensation per 
employee is expected to fall from 14.8% in 2008 
to 12.3% and 8.8% respectively in 2008 and 
2009. On account of an overall continuing 
investment activity and the ongoing economic 
restructuring, labour productivity is projected to 
accelerate steadily from around 3.4% in 2007 to 
3.6% and 3.8% respectively in 2008 and 2009. 
As a result, both nominal and real unit labour 
costs are expected to moderate significantly over 
the forecast period.
overall assessment of future developments 
in labour costs 54
Although growth in RAMS is foreseen to remain 
robust, the deterioration in the international 
economic outlook may lead to some slowdown 
in the economic activity. Rising interest rate 
spreads and lower returns are expected to bring 
a decrease in FDI and investment growth. High 
food and commodity prices will imply higher 
inflation, thereby dampening consumption 
growth, which could also be adversely affected 
by lower bank credit growth and tax measures in 
some countries (most notably the Czech 
Republic, where the increase in the lower band 
of VAT will weigh on consumption). To limit the 
cooling down in consumption, it is of the utmost 
importance that employment growth and real 
wage gains keep its robust pace. 
From a supply-side perspective, signs of 
deteriorating competitiveness in labour-intensive 
sectors suggest that the sustainability of the 
catching-up process depends on labour costs 
remaining in line with productivity, particularly 
in a context characterised by increasing 
inflationary expectations. The removal of any 
shortages of skilled workers and the restructuring 
of manufacturing towards more capital-intensive 
segments will also be crucial, insofar it leads to 
54 See Spring economic forecasts 2008 – 2009. European 
Economy, No. 3, 2008. 
enhanced external competitiveness and a higher 
contribution of net exports to GDP growth in a 
less favourable euro-area environment. 
2.4. assEssing rEal wagE FlExibility in EU 
mEmbEr statEs
Box 4 assesses the degree of real wage flexibility 
in EA12 Member States and the RAMS during 
the pre-EU enlargement (1996:Q1-2004:Q2) and 
the euro phase (1999:Q1-2007:Q3). The EA12 
group is characterised by declines in real wage 
flexibility, particularly noticeable for Finland, 
Germany, Italy and Spain. On the other hand, the 
RAMS experienced an increase in real wage 
flexibility. Positive changes to wage flexibility in 
e.g. the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Malta and 
Poland are more pronounced than real wage 
flexibility declines in the cases of Cyprus, 
Romania and Slovenia. 
One possible explanation for this decrease in 
wage flexibility could be a limited pace in labour 
market reforms, as compared to a progress in 
product markets deregulation (OECD, 2004). 
Evidence of limited ability of real wages to 
adjust to real shocks and high heterogeneity of 
wage adjustment patters across the EU is reported 
by studies employing alternative measures of 
wage flexibility, based upon reaction of real 
wages to macroeconomic variables. For example, 
Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) estimate a 
Phillips-curve type wage equation across the 
euro area countries and find insufficient degree 
of real wage flexibility in the euro area. In 
addition their results support our findings of a 
significant degree of cross-country heterogeneity 
across euro-area countries. Another factor 
contributing to a decline in wage flexibility could 
be related to recently rising heterogeneity in 
inflation rates across the EU, documented in 
Bulíř and Hurník (2008).  Inflation acceleration, 
which occurs in a number of EU economies, 
creates cost-push pressures and leads to monetary 
transmission inefficiencies. Heterogeneity in 
inflation rates, in turn, transmits into stronger 
demand shocks, in particular for the euro area 
countries which share common monetary and 
exchange rate policies. In presence of nominal 
inertia (price/wage sicknesses), nominal shocks 
could have effects on real variables including 
real wages, which corresponds to the observed 
decease in real wage flexibility.  
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Box 8 : how flexiBle are real wages in The enlarged eu? 1
This box assesses the degree of real wage flexibility in EA12 Member States and the RAMS. Following 
the Structural VAR approach elaborated in Moore and Pentecost (2006),2 real wages are defined flexible if 
the variance of real wages is mainly due to real (permanent) shocks, represented by changes in factors 
endowments and/or factors productivity. On the contrary, whenever nominal (transitory) shocks explain 
most of the variance in real wages, this is suggestive of rigidities in nominal wages (e.g. not adapting to 
changes in prices). Nominal shocks are represented by changes in money supply and/or nominal exchange 
rates. Thus, the degree of real wage flexibility is given by the percentage of the variance in real wages that 
can be attributed to real shocks.
In order to measure real wage flexibility, a variable characterising the development of labour costs both in 
nominal and real terms is needed. For this purpose, the LCI provided by the Eurostat at quarterly frequency 
(covering 1996:Q1 to 2007:Q3) is used. The LCI is available in both nominal and real terms, and the data 
have the advantage of being harmonised for a cross-country comparison. Nominal and real indices are 
seasonally and working day adjusted, and normalised to 100 in 2000. For brevity, we refer to the real and 
nominal labour cost indices as to real and nominal wages. 
A bivariate structural VAR decomposition makes it possible to identify real (permanent) and nominal 
(transitory) shocks from the observable movements of real and nominal wages.3 By definition, one type of 
shock (labelled as “nominal”) has only a transitory impact on the level of real wages, while another type 
of shock (labelled as “real”) might have a long-term impact on the level of real wages.
Using the estimated parameters of the VAR equations for each of the 24 countries in our sample we first 
assess the expected reaction of real wages in each country to one standard deviation innovations in real 
(permanent) and nominal (transitory) shocks over the forecast horizon from 1 to 16 quarters. The stability 
of the estimated VARs is confirmed by the fact that all impulse-response functions (IRFs) converge to some 
constant level. Yet the speed of convergence to the constant level varies from country to country, as well 
as the magnitude of those constants. 
The long-term IRFs of real wages to real shocks range from 1 to 6%. In general, the effects of shocks on 
real wages are more substantial in the RAMS, largely because one standard deviation innovation shock is 
larger in these countries, which is consistent with higher real wage growth in the rams compared to the 
EA12. In the short-run, the IRFs of real wages to nominal shocks range between -1.5 to 4.0%. There are 
6 countries of the RAMS group (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia) and 5 of the 
EU12 (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain) in which real wages drop down after a nominal shock. 
In these countries nominal wages seem to be stickier compared to prices.4
In 3 RAMS (the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Romania) and in Luxembourg, real wages tend to rise in 
reaction to a nominal shock. For these countries, wages seem to be more flexible than prices. In the 
remaining 3 RAMS (Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia) and 6 euro-area members (Austria, Finland, France, 
Greece, Netherlands and Portugal) real wages do not react to nominal shocks or the evidence on the 
response of real wages to nominal shock is inconclusive. Thus, the reaction of real wages to a nominal 
shock appears to be rather heterogeneous. Differences in the results could be driven by specific labour 
market conditions and institutions. 
1 For further details on the information content of this box, see Babecky J. and Dybczak K. (2008), ‘Real wage 
flexibility in the enlarged EU: Evidence from a Structural VAR’, National Institute Economic Review, volume 
204, number 1, pages 126-a-138.
2 Moore, T. and Pentecost, E. J. (2006), ‘An investigation into the sources of fluctuation in real and nominal wage 
rates in eight EU countries: A structural VAR approach’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 34, 2, pp. 357–76.
3 The identification strategy is based upon the standard structural decomposition proposed by Blanchard and Quah 
(1989), in the way Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) apply this decomposition to extract real (supply) and nominal 
(demand) shocks from the series of real output and prices. Bayoumi, T. and Eichengreen, B. (1996), 
“Operationalizing the theory of optimum currency areas”, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 1484. Blanchard, O. J. and 
Quah, D. (1989), ‘The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances’, American Economic 
Review, 79(4), pp. 655–673. 
4 For Poland and Italy, Moore and Pentecost (2006) find a positive reaction of real wages to nominal shocks. Our 
finding of a negative response of real wages to nominal shocks is largely due to a difference between total labour 
cost and wage measures
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Graph	120	–	Change	in	real	wage	flexibility				
Pre-EU enlargement period (1999-2007) compared to euro phase (1996-2004), (difference in percentage points)
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Data source: Babecky J. and Dybczak k. (2008).
Note: vertical axis shows the p.p. difference between the later and earlier periods (i.e., 1999-2007 versus 1996-2004) in the 
variance decomposition of real wages to real shocks. As the contribution of shocks to the variance of real wages may 
depend on the forecast horizon, the percentage difference is reported for two alternative horizons (1 and 16 quarters 
after the shock).
The overall transitory dynamics of real wages in the EA12 seems to be smoother compared to the RAMS. 
But while for some EA12 countries (e.g. Germany, France and Belgium) the impulse-response functions 
are smooth, the adjustment in other euro-area countries (e.g. Greece, Spain and Finland) is longer and/or 
more volatile. Even so, there are some countries within the group of RAMS (particularly the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Estonia) whose responses to shocks are smoother and faster compared to the 
peripheral EA12 countries. 
While impulse-responses allow illustrating the dynamic effects of shocks on real wages, variance 
decomposition measures the relative contribution of real and nominal shocks to fluctuations in real wages. 
Real wages are said to be flexible if their variation is mainly due to real shocks.  We found that both groups 
– the RAMS and the EA12 – are characterised by a variety of outcomes. For example for Lithuania and 
Romania, the proportion of total variance accounted by real shocks goes from 40%-50% of Lithuania and 
Romania to more than 90% of countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia. In the countries of 
the Euro area, real wage flexibility is higher in the ‘core’ countries such as Germany and France (over 90%) 
and somewhat lower for other countries such as Greece and Spain (65%-70% after 4 years). 
On average, in terms of variance decomposition at the horizons up to 4 years, the RAMS are positioned 
between the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. Excluding Romania and Lithuania, the majority of the RAMS are 
characterised by higher real wage flexibility than e.g. Greece and Spain, but lower than Germany and 
France. 
Finally, in order to assess the stability of the results over time we compare the estimates for the full sample 
(1996:Q1–2007:Q3) and two periods, which correspond to the pre-EU enlargement (1996:Q1-2004:Q2) 
and the euro phase (1999:Q1-2007:Q3) (Graph 120). For each of the two shorter periods we find stable 
VARs, similar impulse-response functions and calculate the variance decomposition. The EA12 group is 
characterised by declines in real wage flexibility, particularly noticeable for Finland, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. On the other hand, the RAMS experienced an increase in real wage flexibility. Positive changes to 
wage flexibility in e.g. the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Malta and Poland are more pronounced than real 
wage flexibility declines in the cases of Cyprus, Romania and Slovenia.  
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1.1. introdUction
In recent years the world has experienced a 
substantial increase in international migration. 
The United Nations estimate that in 2005 around 
191 million persons, representing 3% of world’s 
population, resided in a country other than the 
country where they were born.55 The figure for 
1960 was 75 millions or 2.5% of worlds’ 
population. International migrants tend to reside 
in the more developed countries. Almost one of 
every 10 persons living in the more developed 
regions is an immigrant. In contrast, nearly one 
of every 70 persons in developing countries is a 
migrant. Sixty per cent of the world’s migrants 
currently reside in the more developed regions. 
Most of the world’s migrants live in Europe 
(64 million), Asia (53 million) and Northern 
America (45 million). 
Mass migration is not a new phenomenon. 
Significant migration flows between the old and 
the new world occurred from the middle of the 
19th century until the 1920s (a period often 
identified with the first wave of globalisation), 
when flows dropped as a consequence of the 
national-origin quota system.56 Following the 
introduction of “guest worker” programmes, 
some continental European countries such as 
Germany experienced sizeable immigration 
flows between mid-1950s and early 1970s. 
Waves of mass immigration also came from 
former colonies to France, the Netherlands and 
the UK. Between early 1970s and mid 1985, in 
conjunction with the oil shocks and the related 
economic uncertainties, economic migration 
slowed down considerably, and the main sources 
of migration became asylum seekers and 
refugees. Important flows of migrants were 
admitted in the Nordic countries on the ground 
55 United Nations (2006), International Migration 2006, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/2006Migration_Chart/Migration2006.pdf . 
56 In the 1920s, the US Congress introduced the national-
origin quota system allocating visas according to ethnic 
composition. As a consequence of this system, the inflows 
rate dropped dramatically; in the 1930s, 60 percent of all 
visas were awarded to applicants from Germany and the 
UK. Inflows rate in the US started to pick up again after the 
amendments to the National Immigration act in 1965, 
which lifted the national-origin quota system. Borjas, G. 
(1994), “The Economics of Immigration”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, pp. 1667-1717.
of humanitarian reasons in the 1970s; more 
recently, ethnic conflicts at the European borders 
resulted in large movements of refugees and 
asylum seekers. The fall of the iron curtain 
spurred east-west migration from Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
As a consequence of these geopolitical changes, 
international migration flows has been rapidly 
increasing since the 1980s. Yet, the greatest 
increase in the stock of migrants was observed 
between the mid-1980s and the mid 1995 
(Lowell, 2007).57 In this period, the stock of 
migrant grew by 62% worldwide and more than 
doubled in the developed countries. Europe was 
the main destination area, while traditional 
emigration countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece 
and Portugal gradually turned out to be new 
immigration countries. The fraction of the EU 
population that is foreign-born reached 5% in 
2006. From an European perspective, it is 
appropriate to further distinguish nationals from 
other Member States, for whom free movement 
within the EU is, generally, in place, from third 
country nationals, subject to the immigration and 
asylum legislations of each Member State. The 
stock of third-country nationals hovered around 
3% in the EU, with sizeable differences across 
Member States. 
The large number of immigrants and the rapid 
increase in the foreign population in some 
countries has prompted concerns about the 
possible negative effects on labour market 
opportunities of nationals. The perception that a 
large number of immigrants were low-skilled 
also made these concerns widespread especially 
among the less educated. Are migrants taking the 
jobs from natives? How migrants integrate in the 
hosting country? Is migration an economic 
burden for the host country, or it can provide a 
valuable contribution to raising economic growth 
in the long term? 
A simple answer to these questions cannot be 
given. The economic impact of migration 
57 Lowell, B.L. (2007), “Trends in International Migration 
Flows and Stocks, 1975-2005”, OECD Social Employment 
and Migration Working Papers no. 58. For a review of 
recent trends in migration to the EU and a discussion of 
policy options see Diez. Guardia, N. and K. Pichelmann 
(2006) “Labour Migration Patterns in Europe: Recent 
Trends, Future Challenges”.
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depends on how fungible are migrants’ skills, on 
how their skills combine with those of the natives 
and on the response of the latter to the increase 
in the supply of foreign labour. In a medium- to 
long-term perspective, the final impact of 
immigration on labour market opportunities of 
nationals depends also on the mobility of capital 
and workers across sectors and geographical 
areas. Moreover, since many immigrants return 
back to their native countries,58 the effects of 
migration on the labour market and on the 
welfare state of the hosting country depend on 
whether those who return are the most successful 
or people who have failed to do well. Nonetheless, 
there is wide agreement in the literature that the 
impact of migration on the labour market 
perspective of the native population is fairly 
small. For example, the International 
Organisation for Migration (2006) concludes 
that in a wide variety of jobs in Western Europe 
there is hardly any direct competition between 
immigrants and local workers... … The economic 
gains from immigration are small, but positive, 
with the benefits, invariably, distributed 
unequally. Most gains accrue to the migrants and 
owners of capital, and can have positive 
knock-on effects on global GDP levels. The 
losers are often local workers with similar skills 
to the migrants, but again the overall loss seems 
minimal”.59 
The increased international mobility of people is 
an important aspect of globalization. There 
cannot be easy answers to the issue of the costs 
and benefits of migration, but what is certain is 
that migration will remain an important issue for 
the European Union over the coming years. 
Immigration and asylum of third-country 
nationals was inserted in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The European Council, at its 
meeting in Tampere in October 1999, set out the 
elements for a common EU immigration.60 
The 2000 Communication of the Commission on 
58 For example, out of five migrants (“ethnic Germans” 
excluded) only one was still living in Germany after 10 
years from his/ her arrival and less than 35 per cent after 25 
years. In Sweden, over a quarter of immigrants are 
estimated to leave within 5 years of their arrival (Edin, 
LaLonde and Aslund, 2000).
59 International Organisation for Migration (2006), “World 
Migration: Costs and benefits of international migration”
60 In 1994, a European Council Resolution prescribed that 
“Member States will refuse entry to their territories of 
third-country nationals for the purpose of employment”, 
see Council Resolution of 20 June 1994 on the limitation of 
admission of third-country nationals to the territory of the 
Member States for Employment. 
a Community Immigration Policy 61 recognised 
that immigration has an important role to play in 
releasing Europe’s potential .  In i ts 
Communication of June 2003 on Immigration, 
Integration and Employment 62, the Commission 
explored the role of immigration in the context 
of demographic ageing and outlined policy 
orientations and priorities to promote the 
integration of immigrants. The Thessaloniki 
European Council of June 2003 welcomed this 
Communication and stressed «the need to 
explore legal means for third country nationals 
to migrate to the Union, taking into account the 
reception capacities of the Member States». As 
a follow-up, the Commission adopted its first 
Annual Report on Migration and Integration in 
June 2004, where it announced its intention to 
work towards the definition of common basic 
principles for integration at EU level. In the 2005 
Communication on a Common Agenda for 
Integration 63, the Commission encouraged 
Member States to strengthen their efforts to 
develop comprehensive national integration 
strategies, while enhancing consistency between 
actions taken at EU and at the national level. The 
nexus between migration and development was 
tackled in a 2005 Communication, while the 
policy priorities in the fight against illegal 
migration of third country nationals were 
discussed in a 2006 Communication 64. The 
recent Commission Communication on a 
Common immigration policy for Europe sets out 
a number of initiatives designed to ensure that 
economic immigration is well managed in 
partnership with the Member States. 65 The recent 
Commission’s Strategic Report on the Lisbon 
strategy underlined the issue of migration as an 
emerging policy priority within the next three-
year cycle of the Integrated Guidelines 2008-
2010. The European Council conclusions of 
December 2007 also point in this direction. 
Questions related to migration play a major role 
in the context of the integrated guidelines. 
Dealing with increased international migration is 
a global challenge, requiring closer cooperation 
between sending and receiving countries. 
Solutions should take into account the interests 
of all the countries involved as well as those of 
the migrants themselves. 
61 COM(2000) 757.
62 COM (2003) 336 final.
63 COM(2005) 0389.
64 COM(2008) 359, 17.6-2008.
65 COM(2005) 0389.
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Against this background, this focus will first 
present the main facts about immigration and 
labour market. While difficult to predict, 
economic analysis may provide a simple 
framework to assess the economic consequences 
of immigration. The mechanisms through which 
immigration influences labour market 
performance of the hosting country will be 
analysed in the second section. The third section 
reviews the findings of a vast and sometimes 
inconclusive empirical literature.66 The fourth 
session concludes.
1.2. sEtting thE scEnE: immigration and 
thE laboUr markEt
More than 20 millions of foreigners resided in 
the EU in 2007, mainly third country nationals 
(Table 21, columns 1 and 2). The largest 
proportion of foreigners is found in Germany, 
where the nationals from other EU countries and 
nationals from third countries account both for 
27% of the respective stocks of migrants in the 
EU. The proportion of foreigners in the total 
population shows significant cross-country 
differences (Table 21 columns 9 and 10). Apart 
from Luxembourg, a very small and open 
economy, the largest proportion of foreigners in 
total population is observed in Spain, Austria and 
Germany. With the exception of Belgium and 
Luxembourg, the foreigners from third countries 
are usually disproportionally represented in the 
total foreign population. Spain, Austria and 
Germany are the countries that attract more third 
country nationals. 
Non-nationals, especially from third countries, 
are also more likely to be unemployed than 
employed (Table 21 columns 3 to 6); foreigners 
respectively non-EU and EU-countries represent 
about 8% and 3% of total unemployed. The share 
of foreign unemployment is particularly high in 
Austria, Germany and Spain, where migrants 
from other EU countries and non-EU countries 
account respectively for more than 4 and 12% of 
total unemployment. 
Consistently with the increase in the intra-EU 
mobility, the proportion of EU-nationals is higher 
66 For an exhaustive description of the recent trends in 
international migration and of immigrants’ labour market 
performance see “International Migration output 2007”, 
OECD. A discussion of more recent migration trends and 
of migration policies can be found in Employment in 
Europe 2008.
than the proportion of third country nationals. 
Thus, the latter tend to cluster in few countries 
compared to EU-nationals.  For example, in 
France nationals from other EU countries 
account for 13 per cent of the total stock of EU 
migrants while third country nationals in the 
country represent  11 per cent of all migrants 
from the rest of the world. Similarly, 17% of EU 
migrants reside in the UK, while the proportion 
of third country nationals in the UK is at about 
13%. Exceptions to this pattern are Germany, 
Spain and, especially, Italy, where compared to 
the relevant stock there are as many foreigners 
from another EU country as foreigners from 
third countries. For these two recent immigration 
countries, migrants form the rest of the world 
represents a disproportionally high share of all 
the third countries’ immigrants in the EU 
respectively 20 per cent and 12 per cent of all 
migrants from non EU countries. 
Yet, with the exception of the Nordic countries, 
geographical mobility is lower in Europe, about 
a third of that in the US (Rupert and Wasmer, 
2007). Indeed, 15.5% of American residents 
move yearly for one reason or another against 
only 4.5% of the Europeans.67 
The highest share of Europeans living in another 
EU country, aside Luxembourg, is found in 
Belgium and in the relatively small and open 
Cyprus. Excluding Luxembourg, on average 
about 2% of residents in an EU country has a 
nationality from another Member States. This 
percentage is extremely low if compared with 
the 30% of US residents born in a state and living 
in another in 2000 (Peri, 2005)68. In addition, the 
geographical mobility of individuals peaks in the 
US between 20 and 24 years, while it 
monotonically declines in Europe from age 16. 
Being mainly made of young people, immigration 
may contribute to enhance geographical mobility 
in Europe. Even so, the housing markets and 
wage-compressing labour market institutions 
remain the main obstacles to mobility. 
67 Rupert, P. and E. Wasmer. (2007). “Labour markets with 
imperfect housing markets”, mimeo, Sciences-Po Paris and 
Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank. About two-thirds of 
moves in the US are within a county; the remainder to a 
different county. In other words, the inter-county mobility 
rate is approximately 5% a year, or around 14% over three 
years. 
68 Peri, G. (2005), International migration: some 
comparisons and lessons for the EU, preliminary draft.
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sizeable cross-country differences in the 
employment rates of nationals and non-
nationals
The immigrant employment rate is generally 
lower than the employment rate of nationals. This 
gap is to a large extent due to the difference 
between the immigrant employment rate of 
respectively nationals form EU and third country 
nationals. This gap is appreciable in the Nordic 
countries, Netherlands, Belgium, and France, not 
less than 20 pp, but also in Germany, Luxembourg, 
Austria and the UK where the unemployment 
rate of third countries nationals is between 10pp 
and 20 pp lower than that of the EU-nationals. In 
contrast, the employment rate of third countries’ 
immigrants in the Southern European countries 
is not lower than that of EU, and even higher in 
the case of Greece (Table 21). 
The age structure of the immigrants differs from 
that of nationals. This distorts the comparisons 
between the nationals and foreign employment 
rates. Usually, immigrants are younger than 
natives, implying that cohorts with relatively low 
employment rates weight more in the foreign 
population. For example, in Italy and France the 
highest employment rate is observed for the 
40-44 age group which account respectively for 
less than one fifth and 16% of the 25-54 
population. The effect of demographics is 
highlighted in the last two columns of Table 21 
showing respectively for the EU and the third 
country nationals, the employment rates adjusted 
assuming the same age structure as that of the 
natives. This adjustment shows that the gap 
between nationals and immigrants employment 
rate is even larger in countries where the 
immigrants population is relatively young.
Net migration inflows in traditional 
emigration countries account for a large 
part of the net inflows in the EU 
There has been a rapid change in the composition 
of migration flows (Table 22). Traditionally, the 
largest number of arrivals was found in Germany, 
France and the UK. Due to recent inflows, the 
share of foreign population has sharply increased 
in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland. 
During the period 1990 to 1996, Germany 
concentrated over two thirds of the net migration 
flows into the EU. Over the period 1997 to 2007, 
the share of Germany as a recipient was less than 
10%, with Spain receiving close to 36% of net 
inflows, Italy close to 21% and the UK 11%. Net 
inflows prevail in most EU10 new Member 
States, except in the Baltics, Poland and Romania 
where the reverse pattern took place. In 2007, 
the migratory balance was positive in all Member 
States except Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Bulgaria and the Netherlands. 
It is the swift increase in the net inflows in 
countries of Southern Europe that explains the 
recent inflows of immigrants to the EU. Graph 
121 shows inflows to the EU since mid 1970s 
both as proportion of total population and of the 
change of total population. After the temporary 
decline in the late 1970s, immigration started to 
increase in the 1980s and peaked in the early 
1990s in conjunction to the geopolitical changes 
which spurred massive flows of immigrants from 
Eastern Europe. It is appreciable that, although 
immigrants’ flows hovered in this period around 
0.1 to 0.2 per cent of total population, their 
contribution to the change of total population 
increases up to close 100% in 2000s. As a 
consequence of the jump in the new immigration 
countries in 2000s, the inflow rates more than 
doubled (Graph 122) while they were relatively 
small in the rest of the EU. Finally, the 
contribution of migration to total growth in 
population stabilised with inflows being about 
80% of the change in the EU total population. 
In parallel with the increase in net inflows, also 
the immigrants’ employment has gone up with 
an appreciable contribution to total employment 
growth in some countries Table 23. During the 
last decade, the employment of foreign people is 
the most dynamic components in all OECD 
countries but France. In Austria, Denmark, 
Sweden and the Southern European Countries 
the growth of foreign employment has been 
spectacular; in Germany where the total growth 
of employment is negative in the period 
considered, the increase in immigrants’ 
employment is relatively limited. 
a more U-shaped distribution of immigrants 
by level of education, but not in the 
southern European countries
The educational attainment determines the 
degree of substitution or complementarity 
between foreign and natives workers. Overall, 
the EU tends to attract immigrants in largest 
proportion among the less educated: the 
distribution of foreign-born by education 
attainment tends to concentrate in the lower 
levels, whereas for nationals the proportion of 
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the adult population with upper secondary 
attainment tends to be the highest (Table 24). 
This partly reflects labour demand for low skilled 
occupations in manufacturing in Italy, in 
agriculture (in Greece) and in construction (in 
Spain, Portugal and Greece). Compared to 
native-born with tertiary level of education, high 
skilled foreigners represent a relatively higher 
share in employment. 
Immigrants tend to occupy both extremes of the 
education distribution. Of the foreign-born living 
in the EU, the percentage of people having low 
and medium educational attainment levels 
combined is above 70 per cent in most Member 
States, close to 90 per cent in Italy and between 
55 and 65 per cent in Ireland, Denmark and the 
UK. For natives, the percentages are similar. The 
percentage of foreign-born highly skilled is 
rather high in Ireland, the Nordic countries, the 
UK, Spain, and Hungary. In Italy and Austria, it 
is the lowest. The proportion of foreign-born 
with tertiary level of education is about the same 
as among the native-born in many Member 
States, with the exception of Denmark Poland, 
and,  especially, the UK, Ireland, Hungary and 
Portugal where it is relatively high and of 
Finland, and to a less extent, Belgium and Austria 
where it is relatively low. 
Compared to native-born with tertiary level of 
education, foreign-born people are usually less 
likely to be employed. This is not valid for 
countries such as Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Sweden, where the employment rate of high 
skilled natives is lower than the employment rate 
of foreign-born with the same level of 
education. 
Overall, most international migrants are medium 
and low skilled people. Yet, recent waves of 
immigration have been characterised by higher 
skill levels especially in Belgium, Denmark and 
Sweden, (OECD, 2007) 69. Even so, the U-shaped 
distribution of migrants by level of education of 
some continental European countries and the UK 
is not representative of the distribution of 
immigrants in Southern European countries, 
which lag behind in attracting skilled immigrants. 
Overall, the EU net migration flows by level of 
education suggests that Europe as a whole attract 
people with primary and secondary level of 
education, while it experiences a substantial loss 
of highly educated individuals. In contrast, high 
skilled prefer to move to the US, where 65% of 
total high skilled migrants are located.70 Thus, 
with the exception of the UK, Europe attracts 
immigrants in a large proportion among the low 
skilled, highly substitutes for the less educated 
native workers. Conversely immigrant population 
in the US, Canada, Australia and Switzerland has 
an educational distribution that is complementary 
to that of the native born (Peri, 2005).
Over half of the highly-skilled from non-OECD 
countries go to the US. The US, the UK, France, 
Portugal and Spain seem best able to attract 
highly skilled workers from non-OECD 
countries, which can be explained by a colonial 
69 In these countries, the proportion of immigrants with 
tertiary education employed and settled for less than 10 
years was in 2005 at about 40%. Source: International 
Migration Outlook, Annual Report, 2007 edition.
70 Lowel, L., (2007) “Trends in international migration 
flows and stocks, 1975-2005”, OECD Social, Employment 
and Migration Working Papers N 58.
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Graph	121	–	Immigration	infl	ows	in	EU-27				
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past and/or a linguistic advantage. In the EU as 
a whole, mobility of the highly skilled primarily 
takes place within the EU, although traditional 
flows from North Africa and Central and Eastern 
Europe are significant. 
In 2001, the US hosted 79,000 foreign doctoral 
students, the largest number in the OECD 
(OECD, 2007). The second major host is the UK 
(35,000 students in 2004). The share of foreign 
doctoral students in total enrolment differs 
widely across countries. Foreign doctoral 
students represent 40% of the doctoral population 
in the UK, but less than 5% in Italy. Belgium, 
with 30% is the second EU country with the 
largest doctoral population from a foreign 
country. In Austria, Denmark and Sweden, 
international students represent 15 per cent of 
doctoral students, but they hardly exceed 5 per 
cent in Eastern Europe, Finland and Portugal. In 
the past 5 years, the number of international 
students has increased in most EU Member 
States, in particular in Spain. This increase is 
likely to continue in the near future, in particular 
in view of international study providing a 
potential gateway for entry into the labour 
market, notably in fields where there are labour 
shortages. 
1.3. thE Economic impact oF migration
Many different approaches have been used to try 
to find out whether immigration hampers the 
labour market opportunities of natives. 
table 23 – Employment change, total and foreign born, 1995-2005 
 
Employment (thousands) Increase in employment (thousands)
Relative change over the 
period (%)
Foreign-born Total
1995 2005 1995 2005 Foreign-born Total Foreign-born employment
Total 
employment
Australia 1.876 2.483 7.879 9.981 606 2.102 32,3 26,7
Austria 424 544 3.620 3.726 120 106 28,3 2,9
Belgium 306 466 3.769 4.187 159 418 52 11,1
Canada 2.007 2.343 12.636 14.352 336 1.716 16,8 13,6
Czech Republic .. 88 .. 4.698 .. .. .. ..
Denmark 80 156 2.569 2.686 75 118 93,6 4,6
Finland - 57 1.926 2.379 .. 453 .. 23,5
France 2.336 2.552 21.927 24.205 216 2.278 9,3 10,4
Germany 4.199 4.892 36.208 35.705 693 -502 16,5 -1,4
Greece 148 377 3.693 4.301 229 608 154,2 16,5
Hungary .. 77 .. 3.869 .. .. .. ..
Iceland 3 9 133 156 6 23 170,5 17,7
Ireland 64 219 1.229 1.891 154 662 239,8 53,9
Italy 83 1.768 19.644 22.293 1.686 2.649 2.038,40 13,5
Luxembourg 62 85 161 193 23 32 37,3 20,1
Netherlands 499 864 6.727 7.953 366 1.227 73,3 18,2
Norway 88 151 2.007 2.240 64 233 72,6 11,6
Poland .. 49 .. 13.683 .. .. .. ..
Portugal 162 370 4.210 4.806 208 596 128,2 14,2
Slovak Republic .. 17 .. 2.189 .. .. .. ..
Spain 227 2.448 11.895 18.760 2.221 6.865 979,3 57,7
Sweden 230 525 4.064 4.280 296 216 128,7 5,3
Switzerland .. 942 .. 3.883 .. .. .. ..
United 
Kingdom 1.783 2.706 25.489 27.495 923 2.005 51,8 7,9
United States 12.410 21.276 122.764 138.943 8.866 16.179 71,4 13,2
Source: OECD 2007.  
Notes: 1994-1995 average and 2003 for Canada; 1994 for Australia; 1992 for Germany.
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table 24 – Employment by level of education: foreign-born and native born population, 2007  
(as % of total employment) 
 
Less than upper secondary Upper secondary Tertiary level
Foreign-born Native-born Foreign-born Native-born Foreign-born Native-born
AT 44,0% 18,4% 42,3% 66,2% 13,7% 15,4%
BE 37,0% 29,5% 30,1% 37,1% 32,9% 33,4%
CZ 18,8% 8,0% 60,4% 78,1% 20,8% 13,9%
DK 29,4% 27,7% 41,9% 47,8% 28,6% 24,4%
ES 54,8% 56,3% 22,4% 17,9% 22,9% 25,8%
FI 41,9% 22,8% 33,3% 43,3% 24,8% 33,9%
UK 30,0% 42,7% 25,9% 32,4% 44,1% 24,9%
GR 38,0% 38,1% 43,4% 38,8% 18,6% 23,1%
HU 17,5% 20,5% 50,9% 61,6% 31,6% 17,9%
IE 21,8% 34,0% 29,1% 33,5% 49,1% 32,5%
IT 46,1% 46,6% 38,5% 40,0% 15,4% 13,4%
LU 30,7% 13,2% 42,2% 66,6% 27,1% 20,2%
NL 37,9% 29,4% 37,3% 46,5% 24,8% 24,1%
PL 20,2% 13,1% 47,7% 69,0% 32,0% 17,9%
PT 50,5% 73,2% 25,7% 14,7% 23,8% 12,0%
SE 20,1% 15,5% 51,0% 57,5% 28,9% 27,1%
OECD EU 37,2% 36,2% 33,8% 42,1% 28,9% 21,7%
US 20,1% 3,0% 46,9% 62,2% 33,0% 34,8%
table 25 – Employment rate by level of education: foreign-born and native born population, 2007  
(as % of total working age population in each relevant group)
Less than upper secondary Upper secondary Tertiary level
Foreign-born Native-born Foreign-born Native-born Foreign-born Native-born
AT 49.81% 30.73% 60.25% 66.42% 67.36% 79.04%
BE 29.83% 31.21% 52.15% 61.23% 67.96% 76.13%
CZ 21.22% 20.01% 53.96% 66.41% 70.76% 77.92%
DK 43.92% 50.04% 59.04% 76.09% 65.94% 83.39%
ES 51.95% 36.21% 53.00% 49.06% 57.89% 61.23%
FI 34.04% 29.90% 50.27% 62.99% 55.96% 76.26%
UK 40.96% 52.73% 58.72% 71.37% 70.26% 78.32%
GR 50.22% 32.15% 59.06% 51.22% 65.97% 73.17%
HU 16.73% 19.76& 51.17% 60.68% 62.93% 72.94%
IE 43.83% 38.01% 59.00% 60.76% 71.12% 76.41%
IT 47.03% 31.47% 57.19% 59.62% 62.76% 69.83%
LU 53.23% 23.17% 64.75% 57.16% 79.72% 79.52%
NL 41.45% 45.48% 63.39% 71.52% 69.52% 80.06%
PL 6.54% 18.34% 18.31% 51.79% 41.74% 75.47%
PT 62.34% 47.99% 67.09% 63.10% 82.94% 81.66%
SE 34.57% 40.91% 56.32% 72.92% 60.97% 78.11%
US 44.75% 34.90% 59.12% 62.42% 71.54% 77.14%
Source: OECD Figures in bold indicate a higher percentage of the foreign-born than the native-born at that level 
of education. 
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Graph 123 – share of  non-national population by origin 
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Graph 124 – level of education of immigrants 2006 
(as % of total population in each group)
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Immigration, in so far as it constitutes additions 
to the labour force, increases the amount of 
available labour inputs, thereby raises potential 
output and allows for faster sustainable growth. 
Within the context of a growth accounting 
framework, i.e. a very mechanical approach 
which does not consider the effects of the 
increase in labour input on wages and 
productivity, it it is calculated that migration in 
the period 2000-2005 is estimated to have 
contributed up to 21% of the GDP growth on 
average in EU-15 (14% on average in the period 
1995-2005) and contributed adversely by -2% on 
average in EU-10 (-1% on average in the period 
1995-2005).
Economic theory suggests that free international 
mobility of labour is beneficial because of 
allocative reasons, at least for the economy as a 
whole, as the migrant goes from a place where 
he/she is less productive to a place where he/she 
is more productive. Even so, the economic 
impact of migration is uncertain as it depends on 
how fast resources can be shifted across 
occupations, sectors, and geographical areas as 
well as on the degree of substitution (or 
complementarity) between native and foreign 
workers and on the flexibility of natives’ wages 
to changes in the supply of foreign labour. Over 
and above factor price elasticities, the economic 
impact of migration depends also on the change 
in the output- and input-mix triggered by an 
inflow of foreign workers. And the failure to 
account for these effects will produce 
overestimates of the wage and unemployment 
effect of any immigration “shock”. Results also 
depend on the degree of openness assumed for 
the economy. The presence of non traded goods 
in a multi-sector economy can result in both 
skilled and unskilled labour of native population 
losing from immigration (Kuhn and Wooton, 
1991). Finally, immigration and welfare policies, 
fertility rates of immigrant women and return 
migration would all influence how the host 
economy would respond to a change in the type 
and the quantity of foreign labour.  
In general, immigrants lower the price of factors 
with which they are perfect substitutes and raise 
the price of factors with which they are 
complements. When wages are rigid downwards 
and thus cannot be adjusted in response to a 
change in the labour supply, an increase in 
foreign work has large dis-employment effects. 
Conversely, policies that enhance the flexibility 
of real wages may imply lower effects on 
unemployment. 
The theoretical uncertainty created a need for 
quantitative results and stimulated empirical 
research. The limited space of this focus does 
not allow describing all the macro and micro 
issues related to the economics of immigration 
or reviewing the vast empirical literature, to a 
large extent developed to study the US 
experience. More modestly, this focus tries to 
identify the main channels through which an 
increase in the foreign labour can influence the 
domestic labour market focussing on the macro 
aspects. 
a) Homogeneous labour
The simplest way of thinking about the 
economic effects of immigration is in terms of 
partial equilibrium, with fixed capital and 
homogenous labour (i.e. one type of labour). 
Immigrants induce an outward shift of labour 
supply. There are no external effects and all 
output is distributed to workers and owners of 
capital.71 Given the stock of capital (i.e. the 
supply of capital is inelastic), the value of the 
total output produced is provided by the area 
below the labour demand (the marginal product 
of labour); in Graph 125 this corresponds to the 
area ABNO. 
The increase in foreign labour exerts a 
downward pressures on wages (as with 
diminishing returns, the more intensive use of 
output reduces it marginal product), but the 
gains to firms from greater availability of labour 
more than offset native workers’ wage losses. 
For an inflow of M foreign workers, output 
increases by the area NBCL. Part of the increase 
in national income is distributed to the 
immigrants, the wage bill w1M corresponding 
to the area NDCL. The additional output not 
distributed to foreign workers gives the 
immigration surplus for the natives. This surplus 
is distributed to the natives in the form of higher 
remuneration of capital. In fact, the increase in 
employment reduces the capital-labour ratio 
and increases its remuneration. The surplus is 
defined by the area of the triangle defined by the 
71 The production function describing the economy is a 
constant return to scale. The labour supply is assumed to be 
perfectly inelastic, i.e. the labour supply does not change 
with the wage offered. All the capital is owned by the 
natives.
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downward sloping labour demand and the 
change in the labour supply due to immigration, 
namely the area of the triangle BCD.
The size of this surplus depends on the fraction 
of foreign workers, the labour share in national 
income, the sensitivity of wages to the increase 
in the labour supply (i.e. on the elasticity of the 
labour demand).72 Clearly, if the foreign labour 
is only a small fraction of total workforce the 
immigration surplus is small. Similarly, if the 
wage share is small, any additional increase in 
the labour supply would be accompanied, 
because of the diminishing returns to labour, by 
a small fall in the wage and a small immigration 
surplus. Finally, with an elastic labour demand, 
the fall in wage is relatively small and the 
immigration surplus close to zero (compare the 
immigration surplus for the AC with that of the 
more elastic labour demand AC’). Thus, when 
capital and labour are substitutes (i.e. the labour 
demand is elastic) no benefits from immigration 
accrue to the native population. Conversely, 
complementarity between capital and labour 
makes sizeable the immigration surplus. For 
reasonable values of the key parameters and 
assuming homogenous labour and perfect 
competition, the immigration surplus for Europe 
would be around 0.1 percentage of GDP, of 
about the same order found by other authors for 
the US (e.g. Borjas, 1995). 
While the overall immigration surplus turns out 
to be fairly small, the distributional effects tend 
to be more significant. There can be winner and 
losers within the native population. In the above 
model, the native wage bill falls by the area 
w0BDw1, which accrues to the owners of 
capital together with the immigration surplus. 
Assuming an immigration inflow of 10% of the 
labour force, a typical calculation would suggest 
an income redistribution of about 1.7% of GDP 
from native workers to capital-owners. 
72 Following Borjas (1995), the surplus equals one-half the 
share in labour income (s) times the elasticity of the labour 
demand (e) - i.e. the wage adjustment due to the supply shift 
times the fraction of the workforce that is foreign born (m): 
-sem2/2. For the EU, the share of foreigners in the labour 
force is 4% and the share of labour in income 60%. With a 
standard value of the elasticity of labour demand found in 
the literature of -0.3 (e.g. Hamermesh 1993), the above 
formula implies a surplus of less than 0.1 percent. The 
change in natives’ wages as percentage of GDP is sem(1-m); 
the change of income of capital owners is – sem(1-m/2).
Yet, redistributive effects can be beneficial at 
the aggregate level when the redistribution from 
native workers to users of migrant services of 
migration open new labour market opportunities 
for individuals out of the labour market owing 
to family responsibilities. In fact, while several 
factors can explain the increase in the 
employment rate of married women from 43.3 
of 1995 to about 49% in 2007, it is certainly the 
case that the availability of foreign workers has 
made the cost of child-care more affordable 
giving women an opportunity to enter into the 
labour market, especially in countries where 
publicly provided childrearing is poor. 73
Clearly, when wages are sticky downwards, no 
surplus from immigration will arise, but 
unemployment will emerge. Thus, a crucial 
factor is how immigration is going to change 
the wage formation mechanism. Immigrant 
labour can lower the natural rate of 
unemployment, either by tempering wage 
demands, as wage bargainers become aware 
that they can be replaced more easily than in the 
past or by filling skill gaps (assuming that 
foreign-born workers are complementary to the 
domestic workforce). The evidence suggests 
that immigration can serve to make the labour 
market as a whole more fluid and wages less 
sensitive to demand fluctuations (OECD 
Economic Outlook (2006)). In addition, being 
relatively of young age and with low tenure, 
immigrants  have l imited access to 
unemployment benefits, which contributes to 
lower their reservation rate and the overall 
equilibrium unemployment rate.
The effects considered so far are partial 
equilibrium and need to be qualified. In practice, 
since immigrants tend to cluster in few 
geographical areas, it is likely that natives 
would respond to the effect of immigration on 
wages by moving to other geographical areas. 
Thus, the initial downward pressure on wages 
triggered by the immigration is reduced by the 
decline in the labour supply of native workers. 
In reality the stock of capital is not fixed. When 
the stock of capital can be immediately adjusted, 
73 Immigration creates also a demand for the goods and 
services produced by natives, and as such induces a 
multiplier effect (Zimmerman, 1995). Zimmerman, K. F. 
(1998), “Tackling the European Migration Problem”.  
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic 
Association, vol. 9(2), pages 45-62, Spring.
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an increase in the available labour via migration 
entails only a temporary fall of wages. In fact, 
when the amount of labour increases, the 
capital-labour ratio falls and firms find 
convenient to increase capital (i.e. its marginal 
product rises), until the capital labour ratio 
returns to the level before the shock. If the 
supply of capital were very responsive to its 
price, an increase in foreign labour would 
induce a rapid inflow of capital in the hosting 
country that would re-establish the capital-
labour ratio prevailing before the immigration 
shock. 
Clearly, though, when market imperfections are 
taken into account, such as less than fully 
mobile factors of production, income 
distribution effects are reintroduced into these 
models. If the adjustment of capital is gradual, 
shocks to the labour supply may reduce 
temporary the capital-labour ratio below its 
long-term trend determined by the total factor 
productivity. The capital-labour ratio may 
remain below trend when the immigration is 
high and the speed of adjustment of capital is 
low. Thus, the effects on productivity and wages 
of an increase in foreign labour depend on the 
investment response to changes in the skill mix 
and on the extent workers with different levels 
of education and experience are complements 
or substitutes (Ottaviano and Peri (2006)).74 The 
aggregate effect on wages and productivity is 
the combined outcome of different adjustments 
74 They show that home wages and productivity change 
positively in response to an increase in labour determined 
by imperfectly substitutable immigrants; negatively in 
response to a supply of immigrants in the educational 
group where native and immigrants are closer substitutes; 
and falls because of imperfect capital adjustment G.I.P. 
Ottaviano and Peri, G. (2006), “Rethinking the effects of 
immigration in wages”, NBER WP 12497. 
occurring between imperfectly substitutable 
national- and foreign- born workers and of the 
imperfect adjustment in the capital-labour ratio. 
The authors find that US- and foreign-born 
workers and are not perfect substitutes within 
the same education-experience and gender 
categories, which implies that immigration 
has lear positive effects on wages and 
productivity. 
It should be noted, though, that the distributional 
impact of immigration may change drastically 
with different types of economic models. Indeed, 
standard trade theory offers the strong presumption 
that immigration may have no significant effects 
on income distribution at all, because of the 
output-composition effect in a multi-sector 
economy (Rivera Batiz, 1983). In a nutshell, the 
increase in labour endowments caused by 
immigration may simply allow for an expansion 
of output and labour demand of the labour-
intensive sectors, eliminating any tendency for the 
wage rate to fall. In an open economy the 
adjustment occur through the labour embodied in 
traded goods: immigration will induce the country 
to export more labour as embodied in goods.75 
75 Friedberg and J. Hunt (1995) “The Impact of 
Immigrants on Host country Wages, Employment and 
Growth”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, American 
Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 23-44, Spring
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b) Heterogeneous labour
Refi nements of the model include the introduction 
of heterogeneous labour, usually distinguishing 
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, 
both among natives and immigrants. With 
immigrants increasing and/or complementing the 
skills of the native population, infl ows of foreign 
workers could contribute to dynamic effi ciency 
gains in the host economy. Indeed, most studies 
fi nd a small overall net gain from immigration 
for the host country, the “immigration surplus”, 
but the benefi ts are not distributed evenly across 
the native population. 
The overall impact of immigration on wages of 
natives is very small. The empirical evidence 
reviewed in Longhi et al (2005) for the US, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Israel, 
and Australia suggest that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of  immigrants in the 
labour force lowers wages by only 0.12%. More 
recently Borjas (2003) 76 has found large negative 
impacts. Yet, where general equilibrium effects 
are accounted for, the effect of immigration on 
average wages of native born is positive 
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2005). For the UK, Dustman 
76 Borjas, G (2003) “The Labour Demand Curve Is 
Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of 
Immigration on the Labor Market”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economic, November, 118(4) pp. 1335-1374.
(2005) et al fi nd little evidence of any adverse 
outcomes for natives on wages, employment and 
unemployment.
Theoretical models of competitive labour 
markets predict that the labour market impact of 
immigration hinges on how the skills of 
immigrants compare to those of natives (Borjas, 
1999)77, namely whether immigrants are 
substitutes or complements to native workers. 
Immigration should lower the wages of 
competing workers and increase the wage of 
complementary workers, i.e. of workers whose 
skills become more valuable because of 
immigration. The higher the substitution between 
immigrants and natives, the more immigration 
fl ows will cause a decline in native workers’ 
wages. On the other hand, infl ows of immigrant 
workers complementary to native workers 
would, other things equal, increase the 
productivity of natives and push their wages 
up. 
Economic analysis establishes a direct link 
between the losses to native substitutes and the 
larger gains to native complements, so little 
adverse effects of immigration on native workers 
go hand in hand with little native gain from 
immigration, except when immigrants do jobs 
77 Borjas, L. (1999) “The Economic analysis of 
immigration”, Handbook of Labour Economics, vol. 3 Part 1.
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A
W0
W1
0
N L=N+M
D
D1
B
C
B1
C1
LS0
LS1
LD
LD1
 Source: Commission services.
147
PARt II — special focus
that no native-born would do at any reasonable 
wage (Freeman, 2006). Thus, an influx of foreign 
low-skilled workers would benefit the high-
skilled natives, who pay less for the services 
provided by the low skilled and can specialise 
more in the production of goods that fit better 
with their own skills (Borjas, 2000). 
When the supply of capital is perfectly elastic, 
the immigration surplus is positive only if 
migrants and natives complement each other, i.e. 
if they have different skills. If there are more 
unskilled among the immigrants than among the 
natives, an increase in their amount will be 
accompanied by a reduction of the wage of the 
low-skilled relative to the wage of the high-
skilled. The decline in the wage of unskilled 
people will induce firms to substitute away from 
capital and skilled labour to unskilled labour. 
The increase in unskilled labour will induce 
firms to demand more capital and more of its 
complementary input skilled labour. Thus, 
natives benefit from immigration only if they are 
complement to foreign workers. Conversely, if 
the skills distribution of immigrants and natives 
is the same, an increase in the labour input will 
increase only the total GDP with no effect on the 
per capita income and income distribution. 
However, when the supply of capital is inelastic, 
immigration alters the distribution of income 
(Borjas, 1999).
An assessment of gains and losses for the 
different factors of production then requires 
information on the respective factor price 
elasticities, on the skill-mix of both native 
workers and immigrants and on how 
complementary or substitutable are the different 
groups of workers. Under the hypothesis of 
capital-skill complementarity (i.e. high elasticity 
wage of skilled workers relative to shift in the 
skilled labour supply), the immigration surplus 
is maximised when immigrants are mainly high 
skilled.78
To get a flavour of the order of magnitude of the 
immigration surplus with heterogeneous labour, 
78 Using the same symbols as in footnote 16, the 
immigration surplus is 
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where sS (sU) is the share of (un)skilled labour income in 
total output; ps (pU) the proportion of skilled in total 
workforce; eSS (eUU and eSU)  the elasticity of factor 
price. See Borjas (1999).
Table 26 shows the simulation of the immigration 
surplus assuming that the immigrants are either 
all high skilled or all low-skilled. In the simulation 
it is assumed that capital is perfectly inelastic and 
that immigrants have the same skill distribution 
as natives.79 To show the sensitivity to the share 
of national income that accrue respectively to the 
different types of labour, the table reports the 
outcome of the simulation for different shares of 
(un)skilled labour income in total labour income. 
A note of caution is required on the definition of 
skilled labour. The distinction adopted is based 
on the formal level of education. In practice, what 
determines a skill goes well beyond formal 
education. For this reason, the simulations has 
been conducted assuming that half or all those 
with secondary education are high skilled. 
Clearly, the size of the immigration surplus is 
very sensitive to the skill composition of the 
native and immigrant population. When 25% of 
the natives are skilled, an inflow of only unskilled 
immigrants of 10% of the workforce implies an 
immigration surplus of about 1% of GDP.80 If 
half of the native population is skilled, the 
immigration surplus drops to 0.3% of GDP. In 
addition, for a given skill composition, the 
increase in the share of income accruing to (un)
skilled implies higher benefits from an increase 
in the amount of foreign labour, as the consequent 
decline in wages of natives generate larger 
benefits to those of them that use foreign labour 
services more intensively. 
79 The calculations assume that the share of labour in 
national income is at about 60%; the factor price elasticity 
for the unskilled and the skilled, taken from Bauer and 
Zimmerman, is set respectively at -0.85, and -0.45. 
The elasticity of the wage of skilled workers with respect 
to a change in the quantity of unskilled is 0.15 and the 
respective elasticity for the unskilled wage is 0.55. 
The share of skilled workers in the labour force is 25%.
80 Note, however, that from an empirical point of view a 
10 per cent addition to the labour force represents a fairly 
large increase; in practice, numbers have been much smaller.
148
European Economy No 5/2008
labour market and wage developments in 2007
Assuming that migrants mainly compete with 
blue-collar domestic labour for unskilled and 
low-paid jobs, it is precisely this group of native 
workers who might see their wage and 
employment opportunities depressed, while the 
wage and income of complementary factors will 
move in the opposite direction.81 However, as 
long as the immigrant flows are not too large, 
negative impacts on native workers are likely to 
remain rather moderate. Furthermore, as the 
flows of immigrants are composed of both skilled 
and unskilled workers, although biased towards 
the unskilled, and insofar as skilled and unskilled 
workers are complementary, the increased supply 
of skilled workers will raise the demand for 
unskilled workers and tend to increase their 
wages.
Immigration may have positive effects on the 
labour market by relieving the labour shortages 
in certain areas. New jobs can be created, for 
example in the construction sector, domestic 
services, health and hotels and restaurants. These 
jobs may be difficult, with strong seasonal 
fluctuations or generally low paid and would not 
be taken up by natives. The highly skilled 
immigrants are more likely to bring the scientific, 
technical and innovative skills that expand the 
production capabilities of the economy (Freeman, 
2006). They may contribute to the creation of 
new industries and the increase in long term 
81 For example De New and Zimmerman show that a 
1 percentage point increase in the share of foreign labour 
results in a 4.1% reduction in the average hourly wages of 
all workers, which reflect a fall of almost 6% of the 
blue-collar workers and an increase by about 3.5% of the 
white collar workers.
growth through human capital accumulation. 
Labour market efficiency may also increase with 
immigration, as suggested by Borjas (2001). 
Indeed, immigrants are very responsive to 
regional differences in economic opportunities 
and more mobile than natives.82 Hence, their 
labour supply is more reactive to regional wage 
differences. For example, new immigrants in the 
US are found more likely to be clustered in the 
states where wages are the highest for the type 
of skills they offer. Thus, spatial arbitrage by 
foreign workers greases the wheels of the labour 
market. When regional differences persist (i.e. 
labour shortages are geographical ly 
concentrated), immigration flows in the high 
wage regions speed up the process of matching 
of people to jobs within a country and improves 
the adjustment to a long-term equilibrium where 
wages across regions are equalised or their gap 
largely reduced.83 
It is typically argued that labour mobility is too 
low in the EU to function as an adequate 
adjustment mechanism to asymmetric shocks, 
especially in the context of monetary union. 
Immigration can have a potential role in 
improving the efficiency of labour markets by 
compensating, at least partially, for the low 
mobility of natives. Moreover immigration may 
82 This is based on the assumption that the intra-regional 
wage differential is lower than the inter-country wage 
differential. 
83 The reduction in the wage differential will also reduce 
the volume of migration costs that natives would have to 
incur with no immigration (Borjas, 2001. “Does 
immigration grease the wheels of the labour market?”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001) . 
table 26 – Estimates of the immigration surplus for the EU  
(as % of GDP)
 
All immigrants are high skilled
Share of labour income 
accruing to HIGH skilled
25%of natives are 
High-skilled
50% of natives are 
High-skilled
74%of natives are 
High-skilled
0,29 1 0,26 0,12
0,18 0,6 0,16 0,07
0,1 0,4 0,09 0,04
0,14 0,5 0,13 0,06
All immigrants are low skilled
Share of labour income 
accruing to LOW skilled
25%of natives are 
Low-skilled
50% of natives are 
Low-skilled
74%of natives are 
Low-skilled
0,03 0,2 0,05 0,02
0,18 1,2 0,31 0,14
0,04 0,3 0,07 0,03
0,09 0,6 0,15 0,07
Source: Own calculations on OECD data.
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even have been beneficial as it acts as a source 
of flexibility (Coppel et al, 2001). During the 
early years of immigration, participation in the 
goods market is relatively stronger while later on 
participation in the labour market dominate 
(Hercowitz and Yashiv, 2002) 84, which 
contributes to the growth of the local economy. 
Finally, when legally employed, migrants 
contribute to broaden the tax base. 
There are also dynamic effects which complicate 
the analysis, such as the assimilation effects, as 
immigrants acquire skills and experience in the 
local labour market, the possible adjustment in 
decisions on human capital investment by the 
native population and the potential mobility of 
native workers to another location after an inflow 
of competing workers.85 
In practice, labour markets are far from complying 
with the tenets of the textbook competitive 
model. Labour market institutions introduce a 
wedge between labour supply and labour demand, 
interfere with labour market relocation, distort 
relative price and reduce the wage and quantity 
adjustment in the face of unexpected shocks.86 In 
this framework, an increase in foreign labour 
may cause unemployment among the native 
population (Boeri and Brücker, 2005). For 
example, the presence of a binding minimum 
wage makes real wage downward inflexible, 
which implies unemployment among low skilled 
when foreign labour raises.  However, if there are 
skilled people among the immigrants and their 
wage is flexible, the initial increase in unskilled 
unemployment can be offset as long as skilled 
and unskilled workers are complement. In this 
case, the demand for unskilled workers would 
chase that of skilled workers. In presence of 
economies of scale, such as in research- or 
technology- intensive activities or spatial 
agglomeration effects at the regional level, the 
gains in GDP would be larger. 
84 Hercowitz Z. and E. Yashiv (2002), “A macroeconomic 
experiment of mass migration”; IZA DP 475
85 However, evidence for the US indicates that the native 
workers who emigrated from regions receiving an influx of 
unskilled immigrants were predominantly high skilled 
(Rivera Batiz, 1997).
86 Labour market institutions can enhance efficiency when 
they improve search and the matching between 
unemployment and vacancies or when make wage setters 
to internalise the cost of their wage claims. For a survey on 
labour market institutions and labour market performance 
see Arpaia, A and G. Mourre (2005), “Labour Market 
Institutions and Labour Market Performance: A Survey of 
the Literature”, Economic Paper 238. 
In open economy models, the increase in labour 
supply is expected to generate other economic 
mechanisms that increase the demand for labour, 
through the expansion of labour-intensive 
industries, so the overall effects on wages and 
unemployment are ambiguous. The wage rate 
effects in standard models are calculated under 
the assumption that wages adjust and labour 
markets clear. Obviously, when wages do not 
adjust, unemployment will emerge. Indeed, 
immigrants, especially in Europe, tend to have 
significantly higher unemployment rates than 
natives, probably reflecting, inter alia, lower 
wage flexibility and slower speed of adjustment 
in EU economies.
impact on employment, participation rate 
and unemployment 
The potential negative effects of immigration on 
wages and unemployment have received a lot of 
attention in the academic debate. A large number 
of empirical studies examine whether immigrants 
“take the job of natives”. The empirical evidence 
remains inconclusive. 
Rough visual inspection of a cross-plot of the 
overall unemployment rate and the share of 
foreign-born labour force shows little, and if any 
negative, correlation between these two variables. 
It is remarkable that the lack of any correlation 
found in cross-country comparison is also 
observed between regions of a recent immigration 
country such as Italy (Graph 126). The available 
empirical evidence suggests that the effect of 
immigration on the unemployment of native 
workers is small. Negative effects of immigration 
are generally found in presence of very high 
inflows. Empirical studies based on static labour 
models find different effects on different groups 
of labour market participants, for example Borjas 
(1987) study on the US leads to the conclusion 
that immigrants’ main competitors on the labour 
market are other immigrants (Dustman et al., 
2005). Some empirical studies find a positive 
relation between migration and wages of 
complementary workers. It has to be noted that 
empirical research is plagued with numerous 
difficulties and that the results depend on many 
factors, such as the timing of inflows or the fact 
that immigrants can choose destination countries 
and regions with relatively low unemployment 
rates. Furthermore it is difficult to disentangle 
the labour market effects of immigration from 
those caused by the different skill levels of 
immigrants and natives.
150
European Economy No 5/2008
labour market and wage developments in 2007
Graph	126	–	Immigration	fl	ows	and	labour	market	performance	
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table 27 – selected studies on immigration, unemployment and wages
Reference Country Main findings
Card, 1990 US The arrival of around 125 000 Cubans, largely unskilled, in Florida in May 
1985 increased the population of Miami by 7%. Cubans alone (ie neither other 
unskilled Hispanics, Blacks nor Whites) were significantly affected by the 
inflow of migrants. But the growth of Miami's population was lower, indicating 
a fall from other sources of immigration.
Altonji and Card, 1991 US Very slightly significant positive effect of the migration variable on 
employment, but negative effect on wages (elasticity 1.2).
Hunt, 1992 F The repatriation of 900,000 "Pieds Noirs" from Algeria in 1962 increased the 
total labour force by some 1.6% per cent. A one percentage point rise in the 
proportion of returnees in the labour force reduced regional wages by 0.8 point 
and increased the native unemployment rate by 0.2 point.
Simon, Moore and Sullivan, 1993 US Immigration has no significant effect on the unemployment rate. A very slightly 
positive effect is obtained when changes in unemployment are considered over 
2 years.
Pischke and Velling, 1994 D Immigration has no adverse wage or unemployment effects.
Muhleisen and Zimmermann, 1994 D The proportion of foreigners in local industry does not have an impact on 
worker mobility or exposure to unemployment.
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller AT No detrimental effect on regional or industry wage.
Carrington and De Lima, 1996 P The return of 600,000 Angolan nationals to Portugal over three years in the 
mid-1970s, largely in 3 cities, increased the local population by some 10%. 
There is no instantaneous effect but a lagged effect equivalent to an additional 
1.5% of unemployment.
Angrist and Kugler, 2003 Europe An increase in the share of foreign population by 10% would reduce the native 
employment rates by 0.2-0.7 pp. This negative effect is larger in countries with 
less flexible labour and product markets and with high replacements rates.
Borjas, 2003 US An inflow of 10% of the labour force lowers natives' wages by 3 to 4%.
Diaz-Emparanza and Espinosa, 
2000
ES Immigration has a negligible short term effect on unemployment but there is no 
long-term relation between immigration and unemployment.
Longhi et al., 2004 US, DE, NL, AT, 
Israel, Australia
A meta-analysis using a sample of 18 papers finds a negative but small effect of 
immigration on wages of natives with similar skills (a 1 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of immigrants in the labour force reduces wages by 
only 0.119 per cent.
Dustman et al, 2005 UK Little evidence of overall adverse effects of immigration on native outcomes. If 
there is evidence of negative effects on employment in any group, then it is for 
those with intermediate education levels, but this is offset in the aggregate by 
positive effects on employment among the better qualified.
Aydemir and Borjas, 2006 US A 10 per cent labour-supply shift is associated with a 3 to 4 per cent reduction 
in wages. Immigration reduced wage inequality in Canada and increased it in 
the US. In Mexico, emigration has increased relative wages of workers in the 
middle of the skill distribution, but reduced the relative wage of workers at the 
bottom of the skill distribution.
Ottaviano and Peri. (2006) US Immigration has a positive effect on wages and productivity once the 
interactions between capital and labour and within the labour market between 
heterogeneous workers are accounted 
Dustman, Glitz and Vogel, 2006 DE and UK Study of the cyclical pattern of employment and wages of immigrants relative 
to natives. Larger cyclical response of unemployment of immigrants in both 
countries. Immigrants are more responsive to shocks than natives within skill 
groups for both Germany and the UK
Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth, 2006
UK A 10% rise in the share of immigrants in the UK male population is associated 
with an increase in the native-migrant wage differential of around 1.9%, which 
is interpreted as indication of imperfect substitution between natives and 
immigrants. The effect on wages of natives has been small. 
Carrasco, Jimeno and Ortega, 2007 UK, ES Growth accounting exercise, no account for capital accumulation. Without the 
increase in migrants activity rates per capita income growth in the 2000-2005 
period would have bee 0.6 pp lower in ES and 0.07pp in UK . In econometric 
estimates, the effect of migration on productivity is positive but small for the 
UK and Negative for Spain. 
Blanchflower, Saleheen and 
Shadforth, 2007 
UK Immigration 
Source: Commission services.
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1.4. mEasUring thE Economic impact oF 
immigration on rEcEiving coUntriEs 
Two methods have been used to analyse the 
economic impact of immigration. These are the 
so-called area studies and the factor-proportion 
approach. Variants of these two methods make 
specific assumptions on the structure of the 
economy, the speed with which migration inflows 
in one area are diffused in the rest of the economy, 
or extend the unit of analysis from the local to 
the national level. In practice, these two 
approaches analyse the change in the labour 
supply induced by immigration and how this 
changes is reflected in labour market outcomes. 
They differ in the level of  the analysis, 
metropolitan areas or larger geographical 
aggregation, to consider such that changes in the 
relative supply of labour do not affect the prices 
of labour of different groups of workers. This 
section briefly reviews these two approaches. 
a) Area studies
Migrant populations concentrate in particular 
geographic areas.87 Area analysis exploits this 
geographical diversity to look for the effect of 
migration on regional labour markets (Card, 
2001).88 This means that employment 
opportunities or wages in a local labour market 
are related to the fraction of migrants in that 
labour market. If areas with more immigrants 
have lower wages or higher employment rates, 
this would be consistent with immigrants having 
a depressing effect on natives’ labour market 
opportunities. Thus, assuming that natives do not 
change their saving and investment behaviour 
and/or their location decisions because of 
immigration, the impact of immigration on wages 
and employment can be assessed comparing the 
change or the level of wages in cities that receive 
major immigration flows to the change or level 
of wages in other areas. Studies based on this 
approach have found that the effect of 
immigration on natives’ wages is small. But the 
87 For, the US, 34.5 percent of the working age immigrant 
population lived in three metropolitan areas (New York, 
Los Angeles and Chicago). In contrast only 10.5 percent of 
the natives are clustered in these areas; Borjas, G. 2004 
“Increasing the Supply of labour through Immigration 
Measuring the impact on native-born workers” Center of 
Immigration Studies. 
88  Card, D. (2001). “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, 
and the Local Market Impacts of Higher Immigration” 
Journal of Labor Eonomics, vol. 19 No1 pp22-64.
estimates are not very robust to the definition of 
a local area. 
Area analysis has to deal with two main problems. 
The first is the possible endogeneity when 
migrants choose their destination area depending 
on the local wage or unemployment level. 
Immigrants may choose to settle in locations 
with thriving economies, in which case the 
causality would run from labour market 
conditions to immigration. Similarly, industries 
using more intensively foreign labour may decide 
to move to areas where immigrants are mainly 
located, which will increase labour demand and 
local wages. When cross-sections are available 
for two or more years, estimations in first-
differenced form avoid this spurious spatial 
correlation. Thus, the change in employment 
opportunities or wages between two points in 
time is compared with the change in the fraction 
of migrants in these regions.89 In addition, general 
equilibrium mechanisms are at work and the 
effect of a geographically concentrated 
immigration shock diffuses itself over all the 
economy. Thus, in a highly integrated economic 
area, the local effects of immigration are offset 
by general equilibrium effects on a larger market. 
The empirical evidence shows that the coefficient 
of the change in the immigrant/native ratio 
becomes less positive or more negative as the 
area widens (Borjas et al 1996).90 
The second problem is that results from cross-
sectional studies can be biased because they fail 
to account for the migratory response of natives 
89 First-differenced estimations prevent possible omitted 
variables biases that arise when there are regional-specific 
fixed effects that correlate with the fraction of migrants or 
the labour market performance of natives. Many factors 
determine the level of wages in a city. Some of these factors 
may also correlate with immigration. Estimating in first 
differences will solve the omitted variables bias if the 
omitted variables do not change over time (Friedberg and 
Hunt, 1999). The problem with this approach is that 
changes in wages across cities can be different for reasons 
unrelated to the inflows of foreign workers. Thus a 
regression of native population growth in an area on the 
contribution of immigrant to population growth in the area 
ignores the growth of the population prior to the 
immigration shock and imposes that all areas have the same 
growth of employment. In contrast, a double difference 
regression using the change in the population before the 
immigration shock as benchmark growth in the absence of 
immigration shock (Borjas et al 1996).
90 G.J. Borjas, R.B.Freeman,L.Katz (1996), “Searching for 
the Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market”, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No.2 pp.246-251. 
This finding is valid only when the estimates control for 
area-specific changes in the demand of workers. 
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to increased immigration. These models 
implicitly assume that immigrants enter and 
compete in closed local economies, while the 
typical response of native-born workers, namely 
migration to other areas or movement out of the 
labour force, is ignored.91 As immigrants begin 
to compete with native workers for jobs, wages 
and employment (for natives) will fall. If this 
makes natives to move to another area, there can 
be little discernible effect of immigration on the 
local wage structure. Similarly, firms may decide 
to locate in areas where low skilled employment 
abound, which will push up labour demand 
partly offsetting the first round effect of an 
increase in immigrant workers. Since these 
models fail to measure shifts in native-born 
labour supply, the coefficients on the immigration 
variable are not necessarily indicative of the 
“true” impact of immigration, in particular they 
are biased downward. Thus, the weak negative 
or zero correlation between immigration and 
wages might be due to the “diluting effect of 
native migration across regions and failure to 
take adequate account of other regional labour-
market conditions (Borjas et al 1997). 
Disregarding, net internal migration in response 
to immigration from abroad would underestimate 
the effect of immigration on wages. Yet, changing 
the unit of the analysis from the local to the 
national level would allow for these general 
equilibrium effects to be taken into account. 
Recent evidence suggests that the offsetting 
effect on wages of internal migration is only 
partial (Friedberg and Hunt (1995) and Borjas et 
al. (1996)). But Borjas (2003) finds sizeable 
91 There seems to be no consensus on how natives 
migration responds to immigration. Filer [1992] finds that 
immigration of natives is lower in areas with higher 
concentrations of immigrants. Similarly, Frey [1995] 
claims that increased immigration into metropolitan areas 
is associated with larger out-migration of natives. Card 
(2000) finds that a relative inflow of unskilled immigrants 
leads to a slight increase in the growth of unskilled 
population. On the other hand, White and Imai [1994] find 
that areas with high concentrations of immigrants exhibit 
both lower rates of native in-migration and out-migration. 
In addition, Butcher and Card [1991] conclude that native 
in-migration to cities during the 1980s was positively 
correlated with immigration, except for New York, Los 
Angeles, and Miami.
effects on wages of immigration inflow in the 
US. 92  
The effect of immigration on wages depends on 
the elasticity of substitution between immigrants 
and natives, i.e. on “who competes with whom?”. 
The key issue to empirically identify this 
elasticity is to assign native and immigrants to 
relatively homogeneous groups, usually of 
comparable skill levels, so that the substitution 
within each group is higher than the substitution 
between immigrants and natives belonging to 
different groups. 
Following this approach, Card (2001) 93 assumes 
that individuals working in the same occupation 
are perfect substitutes independently of their 
national origin. Card finds a small negative effect 
of immigration on wages and the employment 
rate of natives. In a more recent paper, Card 
(2005) 94 assigns immigrants and natives to skill 
groups and assumes that, within skill groups, 
immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes. 
Immigration in the US of less educated people 
increased the local relative labour supply of 
unskilled workers with no effect on the relative 
wage of natives with the same level of education, 
which is consistent with the standard findings of 
the literature (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995). 
These findings seem to suggest that the 
adjustment mechanism predicted by a local 
version of Heckscher-Olin model (i.e. each 
country specialises in the production of the 
goods that use more intensively the abundant 
factor) does not apply, at least for the US 
economy. An increase in the supply of unskilled 
labour is likely to be absorbed within industries, 
namely new opportunities, not necessarily in the 
same occupations, are opened for the existing 
workers through an increase in unskilled foreign 
labour. The lesson that can be drawn is that the 
92 The effect on wages differs across education groups. For 
example, the immigrant that entered the country between 
1980 and 2000 lowered the wage by 7.4 percent for high 
school dropouts, by 3.6 percent for college graduates, and 
by around 2 percent for both high school graduates and 
workers with some college. Borjas, George J. “The Labour 
Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Re-examining the 
Impact of Immigration on the Labour Market,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2003, pp. 
1359-1368.
93 D. Card (2001), “Immigrant Inflows, native outflows, 
and the local labour market impact of higher immigration “ 
Journal of Labor Economics vol 19, pp. 22-64.
94 D. Card (2005), “Is the New Immigration Really so 
Bad?” Economic Journal vol 115.
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capacity of reallocating resources across sectors 
and geographical areas influence the distribution 
of the immigration surplus between native 
workers differentiated by the level of skills. 
A possible explanation of the low or no response 
of wages to the increase in the labour supply is 
that the groups of immigrants and natives 
considered are imperfect substitutes. The 
importance of carefully identifying groups to 
which assign natives and migrants is evident in 
a widely-cited study by Borjas (2003). He argues 
that the effect of immigration-induced change in 
the labour supply can be identified only looking 
at narrowly defined skill groups in the national 
labour markets. He assumes that both experience 
and education determine one’s stock of acquired 
skills.95 Thus, workers with the same level of 
education and experience are perfect substitutes, 
whereas workers with the same level of education 
but different experience are imperfect substitutes. 
Comparing across categories of workers rather 
than across regions of the country, he finds that 
native-born workers in categories that 
experienced larger increases in immigration 
experienced relatively slower wage growth (i.e. 
that the labour demand is downward sloping). 
Next he calculates the wage impact of the 
immigrant inflows that entered the USA between 
1980 and 2000. His estimates imply that an 
immigration-induced 10% increase in the supply 
of low-skilled workers reduces low-skilled 
wages by 3% to 4%. Workers at the bottom and 
top of education distribution are most affected 
with wage decreases of 8.9% and 2.6%, 
respectively. 
These results have been criticised because they 
do not take into account the imperfect substitution 
between home and foreign workers with the 
same level of experience. Also, the capital 
adjustment induced by immigration is ignored. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) show that when capital 
and labour market interactions are properly taken 
into account, the impact of immigration on 
95 Borjas (2003) expands the number of labour aggregates 
using a three-level CES technology. The bottom level 
combines similarly educated workers with levels of work 
experience into labour supply for each education group. 
The second stage aggregates workers across education 
groups into the national workforce. Finally, the upper level 
combines labour with capital. He combines data from 
several decennial censuses and divides workers into 
education-work experience-year “cells” (categories).
wages is positive.96 In addition to the imperfect 
substitution between natives and foreign workers, 
the non-response of wages to increases in the 
labour supply may be due to the change in the 
technology in response to a change in the skill 
mix. The negative effect of an increase in the 
labour supply on wages is compensated by a 
change in the technology toward the techniques 
that use more intensively the more abundant 
skills (Acemoglu, 1988; Lewis, 2005).97 
However, as convincingly shown by Borjas et al 
(2008), the findings by Ottaviano and Peri are 
plagued with a series of measurement and 
definitional issues, which make their estimates 
biased towards finding no effect of immigration 
on wages.98 Once these problems have been 
solved “…immigration appears to lower wages 
of those native workers most likely affected by 
the immigration-induced supply shift” (Borjas et 
al, 2008).
Borjas’s approach is not without problems. In 
essence, the estimated impact appears to largely 
derive from the fact that there was a decline in 
the wages of high school dropouts between 1980 
and 2000, at a time when many high school 
dropout immigrants were coming to the United 
States. He assumes implicitly that the change in 
96 Ottaviano and Peri (2005) expand the CES framework 
to a fourth level which accounts for the imperfect 
substitution between native and migrants who belong to the 
same skill-group. 
97 Lewis (2003) and Card and Lewis (2005) also find little 
evidence that local immigration shocks are transmitted to 
the rest of the country through intercity trade. The theory 
behind the idea is that if immigration pushed down 
low-skilled wages in one market (say, Los Angeles), then 
employers in low-skilled trade industries that make goods 
that can be traded between markets (like apparel) would 
flock to that market and bid up wages for low-skilled 
workers. In fact, changes in industry mix are virtually 
uncorrelated with immigration flows. Both papers found 
that movements of industries across metro areas account 
for less than 10% of immigration-induced skilled mix 
shocks. Lewis, E.G. (2003) “Local, Open Economies 
Within the US: How Do Industries Respond to 
Immigration?” Working Paper No. 04-01 Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia. 
98 For example, results are downward biased because they 
misclassify those 17- and 18- years-olds enrolled in school as 
school dropouts. This artificially inflates the number of 
natives’ dropouts, which in turn reduces the relative 
immigration shock faced by the low-skilled natives. 
Moreover, the use of annual average wages rather than 
hourly wages bias the results toward no effect of immigration 
on natives’ wages, especially when workers with low labour 
market attachment are included in the sample.
Borjas, G. J. Grogger, Hanson, G.H. (2008), “Imperfect 
substitution between immigrants and natives: a 
reappraisal”, NBER, WP 13887.
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the immigrant share of specific skills reflects 
only supply shifts, while these may partly be 
driven by changes in the labour demand Bohn 
and Sanders (2005).99 Failing to account for 
increasing trends in wage inequality due to trends 
unrelated to immigration, such as skilled biased 
technical change and trade liberalisation, would 
incorrectly attribute the effective fall of wages at 
the lower end of the education distribution to 
immigration. Borjas does not control for any of 
these other macroeconomic forces, and his 
estimates imply that most of the decline in the 
wages of high school dropouts was due to 
immigration. In addition, Raphael and Ronconi 
(2005) show that many of the high immigration 
experience-education groups are populated by 
Americans with high incarceration rates (young 
high school dropouts), and adding incarceration 
rates as an explanatory variable reduces the wage 
impact of immigration in national-level 
analysis.
A different problem for Borjas’ finding is that 
there is little evidence of immigration’s impact 
being geographically dispersed in the way he 
describes. Two mechanisms underlie the 
geographic dispersion in Borjas’ argument: the 
movement of people and intercity trade. These 
mechanisms imply that in the long run wages 
should be the same in all markets. Empirically, 
though, neither mechanism appears to be a major 
source of local labour market adjustment to 
immigration. Although a recent study by Borjas 
(2006) shows that native-born Americans 
expected to compete with immigrants avoid high 
immigration areas, an earlier study (Borjas, 
Freeman, & Katz, 1997) found similar estimates 
were sensitive to what was controlled for. Studies 
by Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001) 
find little evidence that intercity migration of 
American workers dissipates local immigration 
shocks. The idea that the impact of immigration 
is geographically spread by native flight is also 
difficult to square with the simple fact that high-
immigration areas tend to have more unskilled 
workforces. 
b) The aggregate factor-proportions approach
Borjas criticizes the area studies as in a highly 
integrated geographically, immigration’s impact 
is not limited to the areas where immigrants 
99 Bohn, S. and S. Sanders (2007), “Refining the 
Estimation of Immigration’s Labor Market Effects”, 
mimeo.
settle, but is rather dispersed throughout the 
country. As a result, the impact of immigration 
cannot be evaluated through cross-market 
comparisons. Instead of comparing across 
geographic markets, Borjas suggested changing 
the unit of analysis to the national level and 
assess at this level the effect of an immigration- 
induced change in the supply of different skills. 
The factor-proportions approach evaluates the 
contribution of a change in the number of 
immigrants with different skills to the wage gap 
between workers with different skills’ levels. If 
workers with different skills are imperfect 
substitutes, their relative wage will be inversely 
related to the relative labour supply. The factor 
proportions approach compares a nation actual 
supplies of workers, in particular skill groups, 
with those that would prevail in the absence of 
immigration. Next, it uses outside information 
on the elasticity of substitution among skill 
groups to compute the consequences for the 
relative wage of the supply shock (Borjas, 
1999). 100
Following this approach, Borjas et al. (1997) 101 
calculates the contribution of immigrants to the 
increasing wage gap between 1980 and 1995. 
The immigration-induced change in the relative 
supply of high school dropouts relative to 
graduates accounted for 44 to 58% of the total 
decline in the relative wage of high school 
dropouts between 1980 and 1995. However, with 
a definition of skills based on the distinction 
between high school versus college graduates, 
the proportion of the decline in the college/high 
school wage differential drops to about 5 to 9% 
of the actual decline in this wage gap. 
In a later paper, Borjas (2003) expands the 
number of labour aggregates using a three-level 
CES technology. The bottom level combines 
similarly educated workers with levels of work 
experience into labour supply for each education 
group. The second stage aggregates workers 
across education groups into the national 
workforce. Finally, the upper level combines 
labour with capital. The level of education and 
experience help to overcome the problem of 
100 However, this approach is based on the assumption 
that natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes. 
101 Borjas, G., Freeman, R.B. and L.F. Katz (1997), How 
much do immigration and trade affect labour market 
outcomes? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 
1-90.
157
PARt II — special focus
endogeneity of immigration and the bias related 
to the endogenous location decisions of native 
workers. With these estimates he calculates the 
wage impact of the immigrant influx that entered 
the USA between 1980 and 2000. Results show 
a wage decrease for the average native worker 
by 3.2%. Workers at the bottom and top of 
education distribution are most affected with 
wage decreases of 8.9% and 4.9%, respectively. 
However, these results do not take into account 
the imperfect substitution between home and 
foreign workers with the same level of experience 
and the capital adjustment induced by 
immigration. The approach followed by 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) account for changes 
in the capital labour substitutions, for a degree of 
substitution between natives and immigrants 
workers belonging to different skills-experience 
classes higher than the substitution within the 
same class. 
The factor proportions approach has been 
criticized for relying too heavily on theoretical 
models (DiNardo, 1997). It does not estimate the 
impact of immigration on the wage structure; 
rather it simulates the impact for given elasticity 
of substitution. If the model of the labour market 
underlying the calculations or the estimate of the 
relative wage elasticity is false, the estimated 
impact of immigration is also false.  
c) General Equilibrium Analyses
Weyerbrock (1995) makes use of a computable 
general equilibrium model to study the effects of 
immigration into EU. In this model, labour 
migration into the EU does not cause the 
dramatic consequences that EU citizens often 
fear. Negative effects, like increasing 
unemployment or decreasing wages and income 
per capita, may occur only in the short term if 
real wages are rigid. In the long-run, real wages 
are flexible and the unemployment rate is 
independent of the size of the labour force. 
However, the negative effects are small even 
with huge migration flows. Adjustment problems 
for the labour market are smaller when 
immigrants also increase the capital stock.  
Boeri and Brücker (2005) reach similar 
conclusions in an analysis on cost and benefits of 
migration in the enlarged EU. Their results 
suggest that under labour market clearing, a 1% 
population increase can increase GDP in the 
EU25 by 0.3%. There can be sizeable 
redistributive effects, with most of the gains 
accruing to the migrants and to the workers in 
the sending countries, while wages of the native 
workers may drop from 0.04% to 0.56% 
depending on the skill composition of migrants. 
When wages are rigid, the GDP gains drop 
depending on whether real wage rigidity are 
extended to all workers or only to manual 
workers.
1.5. thE EFFEcts oF immigration on 
tradE
Immigration induces an increase in the foreign 
labour supply that, at least in the short-run, 
benefits those natives whose skills complement 
those of immigrants, while harms those natives 
that compete with foreigners for jobs. By 
reducing the production costs, immigration can 
contribute to the expansion of output and makes 
consumers better off. This outcome can be 
achieved through trade liberalisation that reduces 
the costs of importing goods and services 
produced in the rest of the world. And in many 
instances, trade liberalisation is considered as a 
way for the source country to “export less 
people”.
Traditional trade theory implies factor price 
equalisation and perfect substitution between 
labour mobility and international trade 
(Mundell,1957).102 In practice, the restrictive 
assumptions needed to achieve worldwide factor 
price equalisation are not observed in real 
economies, owing to technological differences 
across countries - implying costs’ advantage, 
higher wages and higher trade and immigration 
in the country experiencing better technology 
(Markusen, 1983); to the presence of financially 
constrained households in low income countries 
- so that trade liberalisation, by raising wage rate, 
allows more people to pay for the migration 
102 In a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, Mundell (1957) 
showed that an increase in migration barriers reduces 
migration and raises trade and that an increase in trade 
barriers reduces trade but raises immigration. If two 
countries are endowed with different amount of labour and 
capital, the labour-abundant country will export more 
labour-intensive goods. An increase in trade barriers in the 
labour-abundant country (i.e. the country specialised in the 
production of labour-intensive goods), will raise the price 
of capital-intensive goods, according to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, will raise the return of capital (the 
factor used more intensively in the production of the capital 
intensive good) and lower the wage rate. This results in a 
reduction of trade and an increase in migration from the 
labour-abundant country.
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costs;103 or because of increasing returns to scale 
at the firm (Krugman, 1995) or industry 
(Markusen et al., 1995) level, which implies 
increasing reward of the factor intensively used 
in industry and firm and, consequently, migration 
and factor mobility. 
In recent years, the world has experienced a large 
increase in the international migration of people. 
Free movement of labour has been one of the 
fundamental objectives of the European Union. 
Yet, transportation and transaction costs remain 
and may inhibit international trade. Immigrants 
lower transaction costs such as search costs, 
negotiation costs, enforcement costs and/or 
information cost. By virtue of the links with their 
home countries, they may realize lower costs 
associated with foreign trade and thereby be 
more likely to trade than non-immigrants. 
Firstly, the native language of the immigrants 
can become known, or used more widely by the 
host country residents. Consequently, there 
would be a larger group of individuals in the host 
country, immigrants and non-immigrants, who 
are familiar with the languages of the host and 
home countries. This reduces trading costs 
associated with communication barriers. 
Secondly, if products are differentiated across 
countries and immigrants bring information 
about their home-country products and 
preferences, the costs of obtaining foreign market 
information in the host country will decrease. 
Finally, because trade often depends on contacts 
for delivery and payment, the development of 
trust through immigrant links can decrease the 
costs associated with negotiating trade contracts 
and ensuring their enforcement. 
While trade flows between developed countries 
may benefit modestly from these effects, trade 
between developed and developing countries 
may be expected to be influenced relatively more 
because formal trade contracting is often not as 
deeply routed and institutionalised in developing 
countries as it is in developed countries. The 
importance of these information effects, of 
course, will depend on the initial amount of 
foreign market information in the host country 
and the ability of immigrants to relay information 
and to integrate their communities into the host 
103 In Faini and Venturini, (1993) an increase in income 
raises migration of low incomes’ households and reduces it 
for higher-income households, ultimately affecting the skill 
composition of migrants.
country. The initial amount of information and 
the ability to relay information, in turn, may 
depend on the educational level of immigrants, 
the length of their stay in the host country, and 
the size of the immigrant community.
Knowledge of foreign markets is critical to 
export success, when it is costly to obtain this 
knowledge. Ethnic networks reduce contracting 
costs in the absence of legal enforcement 
mechanisms at the international level (Rauch 
and Trindade, 2002). With respect to information 
costs, migrants are in a better position to provide 
information about distribution networks and 
about demand in their home countries to host 
country exporters and about demand in the host 
country to home country exporters (Esptein and 
Gang, 2004 and Jensen and Piermartini, 
2008).104 
One strand of empirical literature has analysed 
whether immigration has a positive effect on 
bilateral imports and exports using the gravity 
approach. Gould (1994), using a panel data set 
of forty-seven U.S. partners, finds that trade is 
positively influenced by immigration, with 
greatest effects on exports. Head and Ries 
(1998), using Canadian trade data with 
136 partners, also finds that immigration has a 
significant positive relation to bilateral trade. 
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) also uncover 
evidence of a pro-trade impact of immigration 
on U.S. imports in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Girma and Yu (2002), using 
an augmented gravity model, study bilateral 
trade between the UK and 48 trading partners. 
They find that immigration from non-
Commonwealth countries has a significant 
export-enhancing effect. By contrast, immigration 
from Commonwealth countries is found to have 
no substantial impact on exports. They propose 
that, since social and political institutions in 
Commonwealth countries are similar to those of 
the UK, immigrants from former colonies do not 
bring information that substantially reduces the 
transaction cost of bilateral trade. Dunlevy and 
Hutchinson (2001) test the hypothesis that 
immigrants generate beneficial externalities in 
their host countries to expand foreign trade. 
Their data examines U.S exports to 17 European 
104 Epstein, G. S. and I. N. Gang (2004), ‘Ethnic Networks 
and International Trade’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1232.; 
Jansen, M and R. Piermartini (2008), “Temporary 
migration and bilateral trade flows” forthcoming World 
Economy.
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countries at 5-year intervals. Migrant stock 
effects were found to be positive and significant 
for trade as a whole, but proportionately greater 
for particular regional groupings of countries 
that reflect the historical pattern of immigration 
to the US. Moreover, the impact of the stock of 
immigrants on exports dissipated earlier than it 
did on imports. Piperakis, Milner and Wright 
(2003) investigate the influence of migration in 
Greece on the volumes of its bilateral trade. An 
augmented gravity model is estimated using a 
panel data set for the period 1981 – 1991. The 
results show that immigration had a positive 
impact on the volume of Greece’s bilateral 
exports, but no effect on its bilateral imports. 
Jansen and Piermartini (2008) find that temporary 
migration has a positive and significant effect on 
trade and that temporary migration tends to have 
a stronger and more significant effect on both 
imports and exports than permanent migration. 
Interestingly, the role of temporary migrants in 
reducing trade costs does not appear to be 
associated with their skills 105. 
All this suggests that immigration may stimulate 
bilateral trade. The impact may be different for 
import and export activities.  Migrants may have 
a home bias in their imports. This section will 
explore the relationship between immigration 
and trade by augmenting a standard gravity 
model with a immigration into the EU.
105 Jansen, M and R. Piermartini (2008), “Temporary 
migration and bilateral trade flows” forthcoming World 
Economy
The graviTy equaTion 
The relationship between immigration and trade has only recently been investigated. The standard analysis 
of the link between immigration and trade is a gravity equation augmented with a migration variable. The 
gravity equation 1 has been long recognised for its consistent empirical success in explaining many different 
types of flows, such as migration, commuting, tourism, and commodity shipping.
The gravity model is a model of the flows of bilateral trade based on analogy with the law of gravity in 
physics. The model assumes that a flow from origin i to destination j can be explained by economic 
forces at the flow’s origin, economic forces at the flow’s destination, and economic forces either aiding 
or resisting the flow’s movement from origin to destination. The specific functional adopted is:
ittititititit DDistGDPCGDPMy εβββγ +++++= 2100       [1]
where, tijy ,   exports of country j to (or imports from) country i; tijM ,   immigrant stock originating from 
country i to country j ; GDPit GDP of country i;  GDPit GDP per capita of country i; Distijt great circle 
distance from capital of country i to country j. All variable are in logs while the subscript t represents 
time. 
GDP represents the economic size of the exporting and importing country, respectively their productive 
capacity and absorptive capacity. Both variables are expected to be positively related to trade. GDP per 
capita accounts for the wealth effect of the trading partner, with wealthier countries being hypothesized 
to be more open to international trade, although high per capita income countries have a more service-
oriented economy, which should lead to lower trade in merchandise for a given level of GDP. Distance 
proxies frictions to trade associated with geographical distance between trading partners, and it is 
expected to exert negative impact on trade.2 Time dummies (Dt ) capture other macroeconomic and trade 
policy factors that impact on trade. Other  variables included in the gravity equations comprise
Population is used as measure of country size, and since larger countries have more diversified production 
and tend to be more self- sufficient, it is normally expected to be negatively related to trade. As pointed 
1 Despite the gravity equation’s empirical success in explaining trade flows, the model has been criticised because 
it first appeared in the empirical literature without a serious of theoretical justification. After Tinbergen (1962) and 
Poyhonen (1963), who conducted the first econometric studies of trade flows that based on the gravity equation, 
Anderson (1979) made a more formal attempt to derive the gravity equation from models that assumed product 
differentiation. Bergstrand (1985), Helpman (1987), Deardorff (1984), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), Helpman 
and Deardorff (1995), derived gravity equations from a variety of trade models.
2 This formula approximates the shape of the earth as a sphere and calculates the minimum distance along the surface.
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the impact of migration on bilateral imports 
and exports 
We analyse the link between immigration and 
trade using a gravity equation, augmented with 
a migration variable. The model explains the 
bilateral trade as a function of trading partenrs’ 
market size, GDP per capita, distance and 
migration. Using the general functional form that 
we described above, we have 106:
 yit = 0Mit + 0GDPit + 1GDPCit + 2Distit + Dt + it  [1]
where,
106 All variables are in real terms and in natural 
logarithms.
yit = EU-15’s exports to (or imports from) 
country i at time t  
Mit = Immigrant stock from country i at time 
t: GDP of country i at time t 
GDPCit = GDP per capita of country i at time t 
Distit = Great Circle distance from capital of 
country   to each European capital.
We run the regressions of the panel data using 
fixed effects. Thus we avoid austere hypothesis 
that the migration variable is random and 
uncorrelated with an unobserved country or time 
effect. We also use time dummies (Dt) to capture 
other macroeconomic and trade policy factors 
that impact on trade. The purpose is to test if 
out by Prewo (1978) and Bergstrand (1986), there is an inconsistency in this argument, as larger 
populations allow for economies of scale which are translated into higher exports; therefore, the sign 
of the coefficient of the exporting country would be indeterminate. 
Remoteness: In practice, most papers implicitly assume that remoteness, Rj is constant across countries 
and therefore becomes the intercept in the regression equation. However, Rj is important because it 
measures each importer’s set of alternatives. Countries with many nearby sources of goods are likely 
to import less from each particular source. 
Adjacency: Adjacent, or contiguous, countries share a border. Many studies include a dummy variable to 
identify such pairs. The estimated coefficients usually suggest that trade is about 65% higher as a result 
of sharing a border. It is not clear why adjacency should matter if one is already controlling for distance. 
Perhaps centre to centre distance overstates the effective distance because neighbouring countries often 
engage in large volumes of border trade. 
Languages and Colonial Links: Transaction costs caused by inability to communicate and cultural 
differences hinder trade. Thus, countries speaking the same language would trade more. The evidence 
strongly confirms this proposition. Two countries that speak the same language will trade two to three 
times as much as pairs that do not share a common language. Part of the reason for this common 
language effect is common history that make the two countries to share a language. Indeed, measures 
of colonial links are also positively correlated with trade; including them as controls reduces the language 
effect somewhat but it remains quite strong. 
Border Effects: McCallum’s (…) examination of the trade patterns of Canadian provinces argued that 
borders must matter greatly as the typical Canadian province trades 20 times more with other provinces 
than with American states of a given size and distance. Since the Canada – US Free Trade Agreement 
was implemented, cross-border trade has grown dramatically (around 60%) and border effects have 
fallen to about 12% on average for Canadian trade. One approach to answer the question why do borders 
matter is to accept the great importance of national institutions (legal, monetary, social) that promote 
trade. Trade depends on networks of connected firms. These networks formed over time when borders 
and distance imposed higher costs because both tariffs and transport costs were higher. Members of 
networks focused on building local relationships and these strong local ties generate trade. 
Free trade and monetary agreements: Regional trade liberalizing agreements like Europe’s common 
market and North America’s free trade agreements are quite recent and one of the primary uses of gravity 
equations has been to evaluate them. Studies of how exchange rate volatility affects trade have obtained 
mixed results. Some studies find that countries sharing a common currency increase triple trade, but 
some other studies find this result an exaggeration.
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immigrants to EU-15, influence positively or 
negatively imports and exports of host counties. 
Data refer to a panel of the 15 EU countries, 
made of the 15 Member States before 
enlargement, for the period 1996-2005. Trade 
data are taken from OECD direction of trade 
statistics, while GDP and GDP per capita data 
are from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. The distance measures are Great 
Circle distance between London and the capital 
city of the partner country. 
results 
The results of the basic gravity equation for 
imports and exports, for the period 1996-2005, 
are given in Table 28. The coefficients on GDP 
and GDP per capita have the expected positive 
signs and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The distance coefficient has negative sign 
as expected.
The coefficient of migration is statistically 
significant for both imports and exports. The 
results show that a 10% increase in the immigrant 
flows in 1995 had an effect of increasing EU-15 
imports by about 1.6% and exports by about 
1.5%. These results are in accord with previous 
studies [Gould (1994), Head, K. and J. Ries 
(1998), Girma, S and Yu, Z (2002), Piperakis, 
Milner and Wright (2003)] as they support the 
hypothesis that the trade–immigration linkage is 
driven by the new information brought by 
immigrants about their home countries’ market. 
This information reduces the transaction or trade 
costs of bilateral trade. The results also support 
the hypothesis that immigrants affect positively 
imports because of strong preferences for their 
home market products. These preliminary results 
are encouraging and worth further investigation. 
table 28 – Effect of immigration with a gravity model   
(panel data)
Imports Exports
GDP 0,874 0,624(64.27)** (71.78)**
GDP-C 0,097 0,224(4.95)** (17.92)**
Distance -0,688 -0,764(-26.90) (-46.70)
Migration 0,156 0,15(13.72)** (20.62)**
Constant 0,782 3,468(5.64)** (39.06)**
Observations 4175 4182
R-squared 0,72 0,8
Time period 1996-2005 1996-2005
Source:	Commission	services;	robust	t-standard	error	in	parentheses;	*	significant	at	5;	**	significant	at	1%.	
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table 29 –  select empirical studies using gravity models to test the link between immigration and trade
Studies Data structure Method Main findings
D. Gould (1994) US and 47 trade partners; 
1970-1986
Non-linear least squares 
regression
Immigrant information can play an important 
role in determining U.S. bilateral trade flows 
with greatest effects in exports. These effects 
tend to increase at a decreasing rate as the size 
of the immigrant community grows.
K. Head & J. Reis (1998) Canadian trade panel data 
with 136 partner 
countries; 1980-1992
Tobit regressions 
estimated by maximum 
likelihood
Immigration has a significant positive 
relationship with Canadian bilateral trade. 
However immigrants increase imports 
substantially more than exports. Also 
independent immigrants have the largest 
influence on trade, refugees the least, with 
family immigrants in between.
Kohli (1999) Switzerland; 1950-1986 Imports and labour migration are complement
Collins et al (1999) Trade and factor 
movements between 
overseas countries and 
Europe; 1870-1940
Complementarity between trade and factors 
movements  
J. Dunlevy &  
K. Hutchinson-2001
US and 17 trade partners; 
1870-1910
OLS Migrant stock effects were found to be 
positive and significant for trade as a whole 
but proportionately greater for particular 
regional groupings of countries that reflect the 
historical pattern of immigration to the US. 
Moreover, the impact of the stock of 
immigrants on exports is found to have 
diminished over the 1870 to 1910 period.
S. Girma & Z. Yu (2002) UK trade panel data with 
48 trading partners; 
1981-1993
OLS Immigration from non-Commonwealth 
countries is shown to have a significant export 
enhancing effect. By contrast, immigration 
from Commonwealth countries is found to 
have no substantial impact on exports. As for 
imports there is a pro-trade effect from non 
Commonwealth countries and a trade 
substitution effect from Common wealth 
countries.
Mundra (2003) Bilateral trade between 
the US and 47 trading 
partner 
Semi-parametric dynamic 
panel model
Immigration promotes imports of finished and 
intermediate goods; the effect is stronger the 
higher the proportion of high-killed
A. Piperakis, C. Milner 
& P. Wright (2003)
Greek trade panel data 
with 72 trading partners, 
for the period 1981 – 
1991
OLS Immigration has a positive impact on the 
volume of Greece’s bilateral exports, but no 
effect on its bilateral imports.
Bowen and Wu (2004) 14 OECD countries; 
1980-2001
Complementarity between immigration and 
trade; but uncertainty for guest worker 
countries
Bruder (2004) Germany 1970-1998 OLS Migration has no effect on trade but trade with 
the host countries reduces significantly 
migration 
Source: Commission services.
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table 30 –  Empirical studies about migration using Gravity models-variables include
Variables used in Gravity Models D. Gould (1994) K. Head &  J. Reis (1998)
J. Dunlevy &  
K. Hutchinson 
-2001
S. Girma &  
Z. Yu (2002)
A. Piperakis,  
C. Milner &  
P. Wright (2003)
Imports or Exports dependent 
variables (lagged one year)
GDP of host country
GDP of home country of 
immigrants
GDP per capita
Host country GDP deflator
Immigrants’country GDP deflator
Population of host country
Population of country of 
immigrants
Number of immigrants
Export - Import unit value indexes 
for host and home country
Ratio of skilled to unskilled 
immigrants
Average length of immigrants’ stay
Dummy variable for the home 
country
Dummies for group of countries
Distance between countries
A dummy variable indicating 
adjacency
Measure of propensity for external 
trade (total trade/GDP)
Price level of one country relative 
to its trade partner (Pj/Pi)
Common language
Index of the economic remoteness 
of alternative markets "third 
country options"
Time Dummies
Relative Income
Terms of Trade (imports/exports)
Source: Commission services.
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welfare state institutions and migration: 
friends or foes
When it comes to the interaction of migration 
and the welfare state, one argument often heard 
in public debate is that immigrants are drawn 
towards the generous welfare systems of the 
receiving countries. When regularly registered, 
working immigrants pay taxes while they and 
their families receive also transfers and benefits 
from public authorities. As migrants are more 
likely than natives to be unemployed or out of 
the labour force, their demand of welfare services 
may outstrip their financing capacity. In addition, 
costs of public education and services for the 
poor might rise if immigrants are joined by their 
dependents (T. Andersen et al., 2007)107. Migrants 
have also higher fertility rates, which potentially 
can put a further strain on family benefits and 
public finances. 108The relatively high mobility 
of migrant workers has created concerns about 
the possibility of generous welfare states would 
become “magnet for immigrants”. These 
concerns have prompted some to call for 
restrictions to be placed on the extent to which 
EU immigrants have access to the welfare state. 
Standard theory relates the decision to migrate to 
the distribution of income in the home and 
hosting countries (Borjas 1999).109 If immigration 
is motivated by differences in income, foreign-
born welfare recipients have an incentive to 
move to the countries with the most generous 
welfare benefits. Indeed, compared to natives, 
the use of welfare benefits by the foreign-born 
population would be more sensitive to cross-
countries differences in the level of benefits. The 
main reason is that natives have higher migration 
costs than foreign-born, which reduce the 
incentives to choose a location on the basis of 
the inter-country benefit differentials only. 
Conversely, immigrants are a self-selected group 
who decided to incur the large fixed costs of 
leaving their own country and are insensitive to 
the marginal cost of deciding to move in the 
most generous country. Borjas for the US and 
107 Andersen, T. M., B. Holmstrom, S Honkapohja, S. 
Korkman, H.T.Soderstrom, J. Vartiainen (2007), “The 
Nordic Model, Embracing globalization and sharing risks”, 
ETLA .
108 However, the evidence on this effect is inconclusive, 
Brucker et al (2001).
109 G. Borjas (1999) “Immigration and Welfare Magnets”, 
Journal of Labor Economics vol. 17 no 4 .
Brucker et al (2001)110 for Denmark and the 
Netherlands find that differences in the generosity 
of the welfare benefits may generate strong 
magnetic effect on immigrant population. 
The fiscal impact of immigration is quite 
complex. It depends on a series of factors that 
influence immigrants’ welfare dependency such 
as the composition by age of the immigrant 
population - younger people are less likely to be 
on pension - and gender - women have a low 
labour market attachment; their skill level, as the 
more educated earns more than low-skilled 
individuals and pay more taxes; the structure of 
their families, i.e. if they come alone or are 
joined later by other dependents; the generosity 
of the welfare state, i.e. how redistributive is the 
tax and benefits system, and its design. 
Graph 127 provides an example of what 
immigration may imply in terms of the shape of 
the social contract. The chart shows for Denmark 
the net contributions to the public sector of 
cohorts of different age for respectively the 
western and non-western-immigrants. Clearly, 
the net contributions to the public sector do not 
differ for Danes and Western immigrants: the 
average person benefits when young and old and 
contributes when active. Moreover, the net 
positive contributions of middle age groups 
compensate for the negative net contributions of 
non-western immigrants of the same age. 
110 H. Brücker, Gil S. Epstein, B. McCormick, G. Saint 
Paul, A. Venturini (2001),  “Managing Migration in the 
European Welfare State”.
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The evidence on the effects of welfare benefits 
on the migrants’ location is rather mixed. Some 
do not find evidence that low-income households 
migrate in search of higher welfare benefits (e.g. 
Walker, 1994), Levine and Zimmerman, 1999). 
However, for specific socio-economic groups 
such as low-educated single women there is 
some evidence that migrants take into account 
the generosity of the welfare benefits when 
choosing a host country (e.g. Meyer, 2000 for a 
comparison between single mothers with 
children and to single women without children; 
Gelbach, 2004, for a comparison of single 
mothers who high school dropouts with single 
mothers high school graduates), previously 
married high school dropouts, and previously 
married high school graduates. 
Few studies have looked at the analysis of 
welfare dependency of migrants in European 
countries. These studies suggest the take up rate 
of welfare benefits have increased relative to the 
native population. Yet, consistently with what 
has been found for the US, Welfare dependency 
of non-humanitarian immigrants is below that of 
humanitarian immigrants 111 (e.g. for Germany 
Bird et al. 1999, Fertig and Schmidt, 2001, Frick 
et al. 1996, Riphahn, 1998, Sinn et al., 2001; for 
Sweden and Denmark Hansen and Lofstrom, 
1999, Pederson, 2000).  Bird et al (1999)112 find 
for Germany that once the socio-economic 
characteristics of the immigrants are taken into 
account, immigrants don’t have a take-up rate 
higher than that of natives. Compared to natives 
with the same characteristics, low-educated 
migrants with a high number of children are 
more likely to be on benefits. Thus, immigrants 
111 See for Sweden Hanson and Lofstrom, (1999), 
“Immigration and Welfare Participation: Do Immigrants 
Assimilate Into or Out-of Welfare?” IZA Discussion Paper 
100. For the US evidence shows that while immigrants use 
welfare slightly more than natives (6.6 percent versus 4.9 
percent), welfare use was disproportionally concentrated 
among refugees and elderly immigrants. Saiz. A (2003) “The 
impact of immigration on American Cities: An Introduction 
to the Issues”, Business Review Q4 Federal Reserve of 
Philadelphia. Outcomes change when both cash and 
non-cash benefits are included in the definition of welfare. 
112 Bird, E.J., H. Kayser, J.R. Frick, 1999, The Immigrant 
Welfare Effect, Take-up or Eligibility? IZA Discussion 
Paper 66, IZA, Bonn
Graph 127 – Net transfers to the Danish public sector per person (3-year average): 2000
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in t. tranæs and k. Zimmermann (ed): Migrants, Work and the Welfare State, The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit.
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are more frequently in a position that would 
make any households to claim benefits for which 
they are eligible. Recent evidence for several 
EU15 Member States shows that the fiscal 
impact of immigration varies considerably across 
the EU15 countries (Halsmayer, Schuh, Srivanek 
2008)113. This impact is positive when immigrants 
are high skilled and young (usually aged between 
20 and 30 years) and their integration process is 
short.
1.5. conclUsions and policy 
sUggEstions
The wide-scale movement of people is a defining 
feature of globalization as it is the movement of 
goods, services, and capital. Countries usually are 
just as reluctant or even more to open their borders 
to people as to those items. As with trade and 
capital, citizens fear that their culture and their 
jobs are susceptible to being eliminated by 
uncontrolled immigration. Nevertheless, migration 
will be a major, unstoppable fact of global life 
until the economic disparities between sending 
and receiving states are eliminated, if ever. 
This chapter has focussed only on one of the 
controversial topic that affects many aspects of 
life in the country of natives: the economic 
effects of immigration. Clearly an increase in the 
labour supply benefits the economy as a whole. 
Yet, the distributive effects of migration are more 
complex, as they manifest over time and different 
generations. In a nutshell, almost everyone gains 
from immigration, with the exception of those 
natives not so different from immigrants in terms 
of experience and education. 
Theoretical models of competitive labour 
markets predict that the labour market impact of 
immigration hinges on how the skills of 
immigrants compare to those of natives. Thus an 
increase of foreign labour will reduce earnings 
of substitute factors and raise the earnings of 
complementary factors, where complements 
include capital.
From the above analysis it is obvious that there 
is a no clear cut answer about the interaction of 
welfare institutions and migration. Special 
characteristics of immigrants like age skills, 
113 Halsmayer, Schuh, Srivanek (2008), “The Impact of 
Migration on Welfare systems and Social Services”, 
Reseach note on Migration and Welfare Systems, Institute 
for Advanced Studies, Vienna
integration into labour markets in interaction 
with the specific economic and cultural condition 
of the host country the specific time period will 
define the final results. The fiscal consequences 
of immigration depend also on the age, family 
and skill structure of immigrants. Migrants are 
younger than natives and often (as in the case of 
Eastern enlargement) more skilled. Initially they 
come without families, thus do not receive family 
allowances. Later on they become net 
beneficiaries, but as their children age they turn 
again in net contributors. Moreover, some time 
they migrate back to the country of origin, 
implying that they pay contribution for a certain 
period but do not claim pension or other type of 
benefits. Skilled immigrants earn more, pay 
higher taxes and have lower usage of welfare 
benefits. The higher welfare dependency of 
foreign households relative to their native 
counterparts is, not surprisingly, closely related 
to the weaker labour market performance of 
adults in the foreign households relative to the 
native households. 
Fears about the economic consequences for 
hosting countries of immigration are overplayed. 
There are other issues related to immigration that 
affect the public opinion. Certainly the lack of 
comparable and timely data on migrant 
characteristics does not help to understand a 
trend often seen with hostility and resistance 
from natives in the hosting country. A coordinated 
approach and a long-term view on immigration 
is the only way to avoid that an opportunity is 
perceived by the European citizens as a threat. 
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Work Status of persons: Belgium
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10356 10396 10477 10546 10614 0,6 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 6791 6818 6876 6941 7008 1,0 %
as % of total population 65,6 65,6 65,6 65,8 66,0 0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 4409 4493 4589 4616 4701 1,8 %
Male 2492 2528 2557 2562 2595 1,3 %
Female 1917 1965 2032 2054 2106 2,5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 64,9 65,9 66,7 66,5 67,1 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35,0 35,3 35,0 34,7 33,9 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82,3 83,4 84,6 84,5 85,3 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 28,9 31,2 33,3 33,6 35,9 2,3 p.p.
Male 72,9 73,4 73,9 73,4 73,6 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38,4 37,7 37,6 37,4 36,1 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90,9 91,8 92,2 91,9 92,5 0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38,9 40,4 43,4 42,7 44,4 1,7 p.p.
Female 56,9 58,2 59,5 59,5 60,4 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,4 32,8 32,3 31,9 31,6 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,6 74,8 76,8 77,0 78,0 1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 19,2 22,1 23,4 24,6 27,5 2,9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 59,6 60,3 61,1 61,0 62,0 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27,4 27,8 27,5 27,6 27,5 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,5 77,3 78,3 78,4 79,7 1,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 28,1 30,0 31,8 32,0 34,4 2,4 p.p.
Male 67,3 67,9 68,3 67,9 68,7 0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,9 30,1 29,7 30,4 29,9 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,0 85,8 86,1 85,9 87,0 1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 37,8 39,1 41,7 40,9 42,9 1,9 p.p.
Female 51,8 52,6 53,8 54,0 55,3 1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24,7 25,4 25,2 24,7 25,0 0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67,8 68,5 70,4 70,7 72,3 1,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 18,7 21,1 22,1 23,2 26,0 2,8 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4047 4114 4199 4233 4348 115 Th.
Male (as % of total) 56,8 56,8 56,2 56,0 55,7 -0,3 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 43,2 43,2 43,8 44,0 44,3 0,3 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,0 0,7 1,2 1,3 1,7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0,0 1,7 2,1 0,8 2,7 p.p.
Male -1,0 1,6 1,1 0,4 2,1 p.p.
Female 1,3 1,7 3,4 1,3 3,5 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 8,6 8,3 8,5 8,6 8,7 0,1 p.p.
Male 10,0 9,9 10,2 10,4 10,4 0,0 p.p.
Female 6,9 6,2 6,4 6,3 6,6 0,3 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 8,4 8,7 8,9 8,7 8,7 0,0 p.p.
Male 6,2 6,4 6,8 6,9 6,8 -0,1 p.p.
Female 11,1 11,7 11,4 10,9 10,8 -0,1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 20,3 21,2 21,7 22,0 21,9 -0,1 p.p.
Male 6,1 6,6 7,1 7,0 7,1 0,1 p.p.
Female 39,0 40,4 40,4 41,0 40,5 -0,5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8,2 8,4 8,4 8,2 7,5 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21,8 21,2 21,5 20,5 18,8 -1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,1 7,4 7,4 7,2 6,6 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,8 3,7 4,4 4,8 4,2 -0,5 p.p.
Male 7,6 7,5 7,6 7,4 6,7 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22,2 20,2 21,0 18,8 17,1 -1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,5 6,6 6,6 6,5 5,9 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,7 3,2 3,9 4,2 3,5 -0,7 p.p.
Female 8,9 9,5 9,5 9,3 8,4 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21,3 22,4 22,1 22,6 20,9 -1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,8 8,4 8,4 8,1 7,4 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,8 4,8 5,5 5,7 5,3 -0,3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 45,4 49,1 51,7 51,2 50,4 -0,9 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 36,7 36,5 36,7 36,8 37,0 0,5 %
Male 40,2 40,1 40,1 40,5 40,5 0,1 %
Female 32,0 31,8 32,1 32,1 32,6 1,6 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -3,4 -1,2 0,0 -2,4 1,2 p.p.
Building and construction -0,8 0,0 1,3 3,3 2,8 p.p.
Services 0,8 1,4 1,7 1,6 134,4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,8 -2,0 -1,1 -1,0 -0,5 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Belgium
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 1,7 1,9 1,9 3,2 3,0  :   :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2,1 3,8 0,9 2,8 2,9  :        :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 1,9 2,3 2,4 2,6 3,7 3,3 4,7 3,7 3,3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0,7 -0,3 1,5 1,6 1,9  :   :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,9 -2,7 -1,0 -0,4 0,3  :        :    :   
Wage and salaries -0,6 1,4 2,1 3,4  :    :   :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1,2 0,1 1,8 2,0 2,3  :   :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 70,3 68,8 67,8 67,6 67,5  :   :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 29,0 31,6 30,8 30,8 :  :   :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 71,0 68,4 69,2 69,2 :  :   :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 54,4 59,9 60,7 60,7 :  :   :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 56,4 55,4 55,5 55,4 :  :        :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 52,2 51,2 51,3 51,2 :  :   :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 28,9 31,1 30,3 30,3 :  :   :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0,1 0,5 0,5 0,5 :  :   :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0,9 2,3 0,4 1,6 1,1  :   :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,2 4,0 -0,6 1,2 1,0  :   :    :    :   
GDP 1,0 3,0 1,7 2,8 2,8 4,0 3,3 2,4 1,7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7,8 7,7 7,8 7,8 7,6  :   :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,7 0,3 -0,3 0,1 0,3  :   :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,5 1,9 2,5 2,3 1,8 1,8 1,5 1,3 2,7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,7 1,4 1,4 1,6 1,9 1,8 1,9 1,8 2,2
GDP deflator 1,6 2,4 2,5 2,0 1,6 1,6 1,3 1,8 1,9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 7,8 -0,8 3,9 12,0 2,8  :   :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 0,2 -1,7 0,5 -0,9 0,7  :   :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 0,5 -2,1 0,1 -0,1 0,2  :   :    :    :   
Construction 0,4 -0,1 -1,8 -1,9 1,9  :   :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -1,4 0,7 3,6 3,6 0,9  :        :    :   
Finance and business services 0,0 0,5 -1,5 1,8 6,1  :   :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,4 1,6 3,3 2,9 3,5  :   :    :    :   
Market-related sectors -0,3 -0,1 0,6 1,1  :    :   :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 1,7 1,9 1,9 3,2 3,8  :   :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 3,0 5,7 -1,7 7,9 6,9  :   :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,8 3,4 1,5 3,5 4,1  :        :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,1 3,4 1,4 3,7 3,0  :   :    :    :   
Construction 2,2 3,5 0,6 3,0 2,6  :        :    :   
Trade, transport and 1,9 1,9 1,0 3,8 4,1  :        :    :   
Finance and business services 1,6 1,1 1,8 2,2 3,9  :   :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,1 1,6 3,1 3,0 3,8  :   :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -4,4 6,5 -5,4 -3,6 4,0 2,5 4,2 6,7 4,8
Industry excluding construction 1,5 5,2 1,0 4,5 3,3 4,6 3,8 3,1 1,8
          of which: manufacturing 1,6 5,7 1,3 3,8 2,8  :   :    :    :   
Construction 1,8 3,5 2,5 5,0 0,7 3,6 1,5 -1,9 -0,1
Trade, transport and 3,4 1,2 -2,5 0,2 3,2 5,2 3,4 1,0 3,1
Finance and business services 1,6 0,6 3,4 0,4 -2,1 0,1 -1,1 -1,6 -5,7
Non-market related services -0,4 0,0 -0,2 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,3
Market-related sectors 1,9 2,3 0,9 1,9 1,1 3,1 1,7 0,4 -0,8
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only.  
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Work Status of persons: Czech Republic
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10179 10196 10229 10265 10320 0,5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 7182 7231 7270 7307 7347 0,5 %
as % of total population 70,6 70,9 71,1 71,2 71,2 0,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 5044 5063 5119 5140 5132 -0,2 %
Male 2792 2815 2857 2873 2888 0,5 %
Female 2252 2248 2262 2267 2244 -1,0 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 70,2 70,0 70,4 70,3 69,9 -0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,8 35,2 34,0 33,5 31,9 -1,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,8 87,8 88,3 88,2 87,8 -0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,2 45,1 46,9 47,7 48,2 0,5 p.p.
Male 78,0 77,9 78,4 78,3 78,1 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,6 38,7 38,9 37,7 36,7 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94,4 94,6 94,8 94,8 95,0 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 59,9 60,2 62,1 62,7 62,5 -0,3 p.p.
Female 62,5 62,2 62,4 62,3 61,5 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,0 31,5 28,9 29,2 26,9 -2,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81,0 80,9 81,6 81,3 80,3 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,0 31,3 32,9 34,0 35,2 1,2 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 64,7 64,2 64,8 65,3 66,1 0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,0 27,8 27,5 27,7 28,5 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81,7 81,4 82,0 82,5 83,5 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,3 42,7 44,5 45,2 46,0 0,8 p.p.
Male 73,1 72,3 73,3 73,7 74,8 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32,3 30,1 31,3 31,4 32,8 1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89,7 89,2 89,8 90,4 91,7 1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 57,5 57,2 59,3 59,5 59,6 0,1 p.p.
Female 56,3 56,0 56,3 56,8 57,3 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27,6 25,4 23,4 23,7 23,9 0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,5 73,4 74,0 74,5 74,9 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 28,4 29,4 30,9 32,1 33,5 1,4 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4647 4639 4710 4769 4856 87 Th.
Male (as % of total) 56,4 56,4 56,7 56,7 56,9 0,2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 43,6 43,6 43,3 43,3 43,1 -0,2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -1,3 0,3 1,0 1,9 1,8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0,6 -0,2 1,5 1,3 1,8 p.p.
Male -0,5 -0,2 2,2 1,2 2,2 p.p.
Female -0,8 -0,2 0,7 1,3 1,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 12,2 12,1 11,4 11,3 11,7 0,4 p.p.
Male 15,5 15,5 14,7 14,3 14,8 0,5 p.p.
Female 8,0 7,7 7,1 7,3 7,5 0,2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 8,4 8,4 7,9 8,0 7,8 -0,1 p.p.
Male 7,1 7,0 6,9 6,8 6,5 -0,3 p.p.
Female 10,0 10,0 9,2 9,4 9,4 0,0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 4,5 4,3 4,4 4,4 4,4 -0,1 p.p.
Male 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,7 1,7 0,0 p.p.
Female 8,0 7,7 8,0 8,0 7,9 -0,2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 7,8 8,3 7,9 7,1 5,3 -1,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,6 21,0 19,2 17,5 10,7 -6,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,0 7,3 7,1 6,4 4,9 -1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,4 5,4 5,2 5,3 4,6 -0,7 p.p.
Male 6,2 7,1 6,5 5,8 4,2 -1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,3 22,2 19,3 16,6 10,6 -6,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,0 5,6 5,3 4,7 3,5 -1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,0 4,9 4,5 5,1 4,5 -0,6 p.p.
Female 9,9 9,9 9,8 8,8 6,7 -2,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,8 19,5 19,1 18,7 11,0 -7,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,3 9,3 9,3 8,3 6,7 -1,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,2 6,1 6,3 5,6 4,8 -0,8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 48,7 51,0 53,0 54,3 52,2 -2,1 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41,8 41,7 41,7 41,4 41,3 -0,4 %
Male 43,9 43,7 43,6 43,3 43,1 -0,5 %
Female 38,9 39,0 39,1 38,9 38,8 -0,3 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -4,7 -3,9 -3,9 -1,7 -2,6 p.p.
Building and construction -0,1 1,9 0,0 2,5 2,2 p.p.
Services -0,3 0,6 1,5 2,5 2,1 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,7 0,3 1,3 1,3 2,0 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
177
stAtIstICAl ANNEX — Country tables
Czech Republic
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 8,8 5,7 4,7 6,2 7,0  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 7,4 5,7 5,1 5,9 7,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5,5 6,7 3,4 5,9 8,0 7,3 8,1 8,9 7,3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3,6 1,5 -0,6 1,7 2,3  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 2,7 -2,9 -0,4 0,0 -1,1  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 5,1 5,7 5,3 6,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 59,2 58,2 57,9 57,5 56,8  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 28,2 28,1 27,5 27,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 71,8 71,9 72,5 72,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 63,0 63,0 63,8 64,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43,2 43,5 43,8 42,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 40,2 40,5 40,5 39,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 26,9 26,9 26,2 26,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 5,0 4,1 5,3 4,4 4,6  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 4,9 3,7 4,7 4,5 4,7  :    :    :    :   
GDP 3,6 4,5 6,4 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,3 6,6
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7,5 7,3 7,0 6,7 6,1  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -3,0 -2,6 -0,8 0,8 2,0  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) -0,1 2,6 1,6 2,1 3,0 1,7 2,6 2,7 4,9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0,4 2,5 0,9 0,9 3,1 1,9 2,8 3,1 4,5
GDP deflator 0,9 4,5 -0,2 1,7 3,4 3,6 3,7 3,2 3,1
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -7,1 -4,2 2,3 14,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,8 -5,4 2,5 -3,1  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 5,6 -4,9 -5,7 -9,8 -2,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,1 0,7 6,3 11,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -2,3 7,6 6,6 10,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -0,1 3,6 7,4 11,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 4,5 5,0 14,4 10,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 3,1 1,3 -2,4 -0,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5,3 5,5 12,3 11,5 9,2  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 1,1 7,5 11,3 11,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 3,9 6,6 11,9 10,4  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 7,5 7,0 4,4 5,8 6,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,0 4,5 12,2 12,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 5,4 6,5 12,3 12,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 5,1 4,5 10,9 11,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 6,8 3,4 12,6 10,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 8,8 12,1 8,8 -2,2  :   -19,1 -17,5 -2,7 -13,2
Industry excluding construction 2,1 12,7 9,2 14,0  :   2,0 4,4 4,8 8,2
          of which: manufacturing 1,8 12,5 10,7 17,3 8,9 9,6 9,5 8,8 7,9
Construction 2,8 3,7 5,6 0,7  :   9,2 -0,2 -1,6 -4,8
Trade, transport and 7,9 -1,0 5,3 1,9  :   10,7 8,9 5,6 6,9
Finance and business services 5,1 0,9 3,3 -0,1  :   4,6 6,9 8,0 2,7
Non-market related services 2,2 -1,5 -1,5 0,2  :   0,9 1,6 1,6 0,9
Market-related sectors 5,0 5,1 6,8 6,1  :   4,7 5,2 4,7 5,4
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Denmark
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 5359 5379 5396 5415 5431 0,3 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 3548 3559 3566 3569 3573 0,1 %
as % of total population 66,2 66,2 66,1 65,9 65,8 -0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 2820 2852 2846 2875 2866 -0,3 %
Male 1503 1511 1504 1516 1513 -0,2 %
Female 1317 1342 1341 1360 1353 -0,5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 79,5 80,1 79,8 80,6 80,2 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 65,6 67,9 68,1 69,9 70,9 0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,8 88,2 88,1 88,9 89,0 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 63,3 63,9 62,8 63,2 60,8 -2,4 p.p.
Male 83,8 84,0 83,6 84,1 83,9 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 67,7 69,7 70,0 70,5 72,3 1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,8 91,5 91,7 92,3 92,5 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 70,4 71,3 68,7 69,6 67,0 -2,6 p.p.
Female 75,1 76,2 75,9 77,0 76,4 -0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 63,5 66,0 66,2 69,3 69,4 0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,7 84,8 84,5 85,4 85,4 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55,9 56,5 56,8 56,7 54,6 -2,1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 75,1 75,7 75,9 77,4 77,1 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 59,6 62,3 62,3 64,6 65,3 0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,5 83,7 84,5 86,1 86,3 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 60,2 60,3 59,5 60,7 58,6 -2,1 p.p.
Male 79,6 79,7 79,8 81,2 81,0 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 61,5 63,4 63,9 65,0 66,3 1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,9 87,6 88,3 90,0 90,2 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 67,3 67,3 65,6 67,1 64,9 -2,2 p.p.
Female 70,5 71,6 71,9 73,4 73,2 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 57,6 61,1 60,5 64,1 64,2 0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,0 79,8 80,6 82,0 82,4 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52,9 53,3 53,5 54,3 52,3 -1,9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2666 2693 2706 2762 2757 -5 Th.
Male (as % of total) 53,6 53,2 53,1 53,0 53,0 -0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 46,4 46,8 46,9 47,0 47,0 0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -1,1 -0,6 0,8 1,6 1,8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0,7 1,0 0,5 2,0 -0,2 p.p.
Male 0,0 0,2 0,3 1,9 -0,3 p.p.
Female -1,5 2,0 0,7 2,2 -0,1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 4,0 4,1 4,0 4,1 4,2 0,1 p.p.
Male 5,4 5,8 5,3 5,2 5,5 0,2 p.p.
Female 2,3 2,3 2,6 2,7 2,7 0,0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 9,2 9,4 9,8 8,9 8,7 -0,2 p.p.
Male 8,1 8,6 8,4 7,9 7,5 -0,4 p.p.
Female 10,4 10,3 11,3 9,9 9,9 0,0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 20,7 21,5 21,5 22,9 23,4 0,5 p.p.
Male 10,8 11,2 11,7 12,3 12,5 0,2 p.p.
Female 32,1 33,3 32,5 34,9 35,8 0,9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 5,4 5,5 4,8 3,9 3,8 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,2 8,2 8,6 7,7 7,9 0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,9 5,1 4,1 3,2 3,0 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,8 5,6 5,2 3,9 3,5 -0,4 p.p.
Male 4,8 5,1 4,4 3,3 3,5 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,2 9,0 8,6 7,9 8,2 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,2 4,3 3,7 2,4 2,6 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,5 5,6 4,6 3,5 3,1 -0,5 p.p.
Female 6,1 6,0 5,3 4,5 4,2 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,2 7,4 8,6 7,5 7,5 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,7 5,8 4,5 4,0 3,5 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,4 5,6 5,8 4,3 4,1 -0,2 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 20,4 21,6 23,5 20,9 16,1 -4,7 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 35,0 34,7 35,1 34,9 34,9 0,1 %
Male 37,8 37,6 37,9 37,7 37,6 -0,3 %
Female 31,7 31,3 31,7 31,4 31,6 0,6 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -3,3 -4,5 -2,4 0,0 1,2 p.p.
Building and construction -0,6 0,0 5,6 5,3 3,9 p.p.
Services -0,3 0,3 1,3 1,8 1,8 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -4,4 -4,3 -2,5 -0,3 0,5 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Denmark
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3,7 3,3 3,5 3,9 3,7  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 4,0 3,4 4,6 3,3 5,0  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,6 3,3 3,0 2,9 3,5 3,0 3,7 3,4 3,6
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,2 0,4 1,9 1,7 3,7  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0,6 -1,9 -1,1 -0,4 2,2  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 2,7 2,1 3,5 5,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3,2 1,2 2,3 2,1 4,2  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 68,1 67,1 66,7 66,5 68,0  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 13,4 13,0 13,3 14,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 86,6 87,0 86,7 85,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 69,8 70,6 70,3 69,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,6 41,3 41,4 41,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 39,2 37,9 38,1 37,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 10,6 10,2 10,9 11,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2,8 2,8 2,4 2,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1,5 2,9 1,6 2,2 0,0  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,7 2,7 2,6 1,6 1,4  :    :    :    :   
GDP 0,4 2,3 2,5 3,9 1,8 3,8 -0,1 1,7 1,9
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4,6 4,4 4,2 3,9 3,7  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,5 -1,0 -0,4 1,2 0,7  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,0 0,9 1,7 1,9 1,7 1,9 1,5 1,0 2,2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,2 0,9 1,0 1,3 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,3 2,0
GDP deflator 1,6 2,3 3,1 2,0 1,5 1,2 1,0 1,0 2,8
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -3,3 0,2 1,4 -3,6 8,0  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,9 -2,1 5,5 0,5 5,8  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 2,6 -2,0 5,7 -1,9 0,7  :    :    :    :   
Construction -0,7 2,9 5,0 0,6 4,7  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 0,4 1,3 0,0 1,4 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 2,6 0,4 4,6 3,4 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 4,2 3,5 1,3 2,1 2,3  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 1,3 0,0 2,8 1,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3,7 3,2 3,4 3,8 3,8  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 0,9 4,2 4,0 3,2 3,8  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 4,3 4,1 4,8 3,7 4,7  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 4,3 4,1 5,1 3,7 4,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,9 3,1 3,3 6,2 4,1  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 3,0 2,2 3,1 3,4 3,6  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,1 3,5 4,2 3,9 4,1  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 4,5 3,3 2,2 3,7 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 4,4 4,0 2,6 7,0 -3,9 -3,2 -15,6 1,0 2,1
Industry excluding construction 2,3 6,4 -0,6 3,2 -1,0 1,6 -3,9 0,8 -1,5
          of which: manufacturing 1,7 6,1 -0,6 5,7 3,7  :    :    :    :   
Construction 3,6 0,1 -1,6 5,6 -0,6 7,2 -1,5 -7,4 0,8
Trade, transport and 2,6 1,0 3,2 1,9 0,5 4,5 -1,2 -1,0 0,2
Finance and business services 0,5 3,0 -0,4 0,5 -0,2 0,7 -1,1 0,2 -0,6
Non-market related services 0,3 -0,1 0,8 1,5 1,0 0,8 1,1 0,7 1,5
Market-related sectors 2,0 3,1 0,7 2,2 -0,4 2,0 -2,4 -0,6 -0,4
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Germany
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 81596 81563 81529 81489 81363 -0,2 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 54695 54501 54765 54533 54226 -0,6 %
as % of total population 67,0 66,8 67,2 66,9 66,6 -0,3 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 39414 39280 40706 41078 41207 0,3 %
Male 21769 21701 22210 22343 22317 -0,1 %
Female 17644 17579 18496 18735 18890 0,8 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 72,1 72,1 74,3 75,3 76,0 0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 49,5 47,5 49,9 50,3 51,4 1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86,1 85,9 87,1 87,6 87,8 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 45,1 47,5 52,1 55,2 57,5 2,2 p.p.
Male 79,0 79,0 80,6 81,3 81,8 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 52,2 50,5 52,5 52,9 53,7 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 93,2 92,9 93,6 93,8 93,8 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 54,5 57,2 61,2 64,0 66,1 2,1 p.p.
Female 65,0 65,1 68,0 69,3 70,1 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 46,7 44,4 47,3 47,6 49,0 1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78,8 78,8 80,6 81,4 81,8 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 35,8 37,9 43,1 46,6 49,1 2,5 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 64,9 64,3 66,0 67,5 69,4 1,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,0 41,3 42,2 43,4 45,3 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78,1 77,2 78,2 79,4 80,9 1,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39,4 41,4 45,4 48,4 51,5 3,1 p.p.
Male 70,9 70,0 71,3 72,8 74,7 1,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 45,0 42,7 43,7 45,1 47,0 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84,4 83,1 83,7 84,9 86,4 1,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47,7 49,8 53,5 56,4 59,7 3,3 p.p.
Female 58,9 58,5 60,6 62,2 64,0 1,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43,0 39,8 40,7 41,6 43,5 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 71,6 71,1 72,5 73,7 75,2 1,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31,2 33,1 37,5 40,6 43,6 3,1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 35523 35023 36138 36833 37611 778 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55,0 54,9 54,4 54,3 54,2 -0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,0 45,1 45,6 45,7 45,8 0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0,9 0,4 -0,1 0,6 1,7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -1,0 -1,4 3,2 1,9 2,1 p.p.
Male -1,6 -1,5 2,1 1,8 1,9 p.p.
Female -0,1 -1,3 4,5 2,0 2,4 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5,2 5,5 6,0 6,0 5,8 -0,1 p.p.
Male 6,2 6,7 7,2 7,0 6,7 -0,3 p.p.
Female 3,9 4,1 4,7 4,7 4,7 0,0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 12,2 12,5 14,2 14,5 14,6 0,1 p.p.
Male 12,2 12,7 14,5 14,8 14,7 -0,1 p.p.
Female 12,3 12,2 13,9 14,2 14,6 0,4 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 21,2 21,9 23,4 25,2 25,4 0,1 p.p.
Male 5,5 5,9 6,9 8,5 8,5 0,0 p.p.
Female 40,4 41,3 43,0 45,1 45,3 0,2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9,3 9,7 10,7 9,8 8,4 -1,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 11,0 13,0 15,5 13,7 11,9 -1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,3 10,2 10,3 9,5 7,9 -1,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12,6 12,8 12,8 12,4 10,3 -2,0 p.p.
Male 9,8 10,3 11,2 10,2 8,4 -1,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13,7 15,4 16,8 14,8 12,6 -2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,4 10,5 10,6 9,5 7,8 -1,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12,4 12,9 12,6 11,9 9,7 -2,2 p.p.
Female 8,6 9,1 10,1 9,4 8,3 -1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8,1 10,2 13,9 12,5 11,1 -1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,1 9,8 10,0 9,4 8,0 -1,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12,9 12,7 13,0 13,0 11,2 -1,8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 50,0 51,8 53,1 56,5 56,6 0,1 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 36,9 36,9 36,9 36,0 36,0 0,0 %
Male 41,4 41,5 41,6 40,8 40,8 0,1 %
Female 31,2 31,2 30,9 30,1 30,2 0,2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2,7 -0,8 -2,6 -1,1 1,1 p.p.
Building and construction -4,8 -2,9 -3,9 -0,3 1,9 p.p.
Services -0,1 1,3 0,8 1,2 1,8 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,6 -1,5 -1,7 -0,9 1,3 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Germany
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 1,6 0,4 -0,1 1,1 0,9 1,6  :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 1,7 -0,2 0,0 1,2 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2,7 1,0 0,8 1,6 1,2 0,6 1,3 0,9 1,9
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0,8 -0,3 -1,0 -1,1 0,2 -0,3  :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,3 -1,4 -1,7 -1,7 -1,6 -1,8  :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 0,0 0,4 -1,1 0,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1,2 -0,5 -0,9 -1,2 0,0  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 65,4 64,5 63,5 62,6 62,0  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 24,0 23,8 23,5 23,7 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 76,0 76,2 76,5 76,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 63,2 64,3 64,5 63,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 54,2 53,2 52,4 52,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 49,6 48,8 48,0 48,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 23,5 23,4 23,1 23,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0,7 0,7 0,9 2,2 0,7 1,9  :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,2 0,5 1,3 2,4 0,8  :    :    :    :   
GDP -0,2 1,1 0,8 2,9 2,5 3,4 2,5 2,4 1,6
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8,8 8,8 8,9 8,7 8,5  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,5 -1,6 -1,8 -0,3 0,7  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,0 1,8 1,9 1,8 2,3 1,9 2,0 2,2 3,1
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0,9 1,6 1,0 0,8 2,1 1,7 2,0 2,2 2,3
GDP deflator 1,2 1,1 0,7 0,6 1,8 1,5 2,0 2,0 1,9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 3,2 -19,7 6,7 4,4 -0,3  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -0,8 -4,0 -2,3 -2,3 -2,2  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -1,2 -3,0 -2,6 -2,8 -3,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,1 1,2 0,2 -4,4 1,8  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 0,5 -1,8 -0,5 -2,6 0,4  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 2,3 3,0 0,1 0,4 2,1  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,7 1,1 -0,7 0,5 0,4  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 0,4 -1,3 -1,1 -1,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 1,6 0,4 -0,1 1,1 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 0,2 -2,3 -2,0 2,2 1,6  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,2 2,0 0,6 3,8 1,8  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,1 2,0 0,5 3,8 1,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,9 0,2 -0,7 1,0 2,2  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 1,5 -1,0 0,4 0,8 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,5 -0,1 1,2 -0,7 1,3  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,3 0,6 -1,5 -0,1 -0,1  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -2,9 21,6 -8,2 -2,1 1,8 2,1 1,3 2,4 1,7
Industry excluding construction 3,1 6,3 2,9 6,3 4,0 4,4 4,4 4,1 3,1
          of which: manufacturing 3,4 5,2 3,1 6,8 4,9 6,5 5,1 4,7 3,2
Construction -0,1 -0,9 -0,8 5,7 0,3 9,9 -2,1 -1,9 -2,8
Trade, transport and 1,0 0,8 1,0 3,4 0,5 1,9 0,9 0,8 -1,2
Finance and business services -0,7 -3,1 1,1 -1,1 -0,8 -1,0 -0,7 -0,6 -0,7
Non-market related services -0,4 -0,4 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,4 -0,4 -0,7 -0,9
Market-related sectors 1,3 1,6 1,7 3,1 1,5 2,2 1,6 1,5 0,7
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Estonia
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 1350 1348 1343 1339 1338 -0,1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 911 910 910 913 909 -0,4 %
as % of total population 67,5 67,5 67,7 68,1 68,0 -0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 639 636 638 661 663 0,2 %
Male 326 322 319 332 338 1,9 %
Female 313 314 319 329 325 -1,4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 70,1 70,0 70,1 72,4 72,9 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,9 34,7 34,6 35,9 38,3 2,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,7 86,5 86,0 89,1 88,5 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56,3 55,7 59,0 61,0 62,2 1,2 p.p.
Male 75,0 74,4 73,6 75,8 77,5 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43,2 41,6 39,7 41,2 44,2 3,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89,6 90,1 89,2 92,8 93,6 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 64,4 60,7 63,0 61,6 63,7 2,0 p.p.
Female 65,7 66,0 66,9 69,3 68,7 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,7 27,8 29,4 30,6 32,3 1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82,1 83,2 83,1 85,8 83,7 -2,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50,3 51,9 56,0 60,5 61,0 0,5 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62,9 63,0 64,4 68,1 69,4 1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,3 27,2 29,2 31,6 34,5 2,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77,8 78,8 79,6 84,2 84,8 0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52,3 52,4 56,1 58,5 60,0 1,5 p.p.
Male 67,2 66,4 67,1 71,0 73,2 2,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35,8 32,8 33,1 37,0 38,8 1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81,0 81,6 81,9 87,5 89,7 2,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 58,9 56,4 59,2 57,5 59,4 1,9 p.p.
Female 59,0 60,0 62,1 65,3 65,9 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22,6 21,6 25,1 26,1 30,0 3,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74,8 76,2 77,5 81,1 80,2 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47,3 49,4 53,7 59,2 60,5 1,3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 573 573 586 621 631 10 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51,0 50,2 49,6 50,0 50,6 0,6 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 49,0 49,8 50,4 50,0 49,4 -0,6 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,5 0,0 2,0 5,4 0,8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1,3 0,1 2,3 5,9 1,6 p.p.
Male 1,1 -1,5 1,1 6,9 2,7 p.p.
Female 1,5 1,7 3,5 5,0 0,4 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5,6 6,0 5,1 5,2 5,5 0,3 p.p.
Male 7,4 7,7 6,9 7,0 7,4 0,4 p.p.
Female 3,8 4,2 3,4 3,4 3,5 0,0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 2,5 2,6 2,7 2,7 2,2 -0,5 p.p.
Male 3,3 3,5 3,9 3,6 3,1 -0,5 p.p.
Female 2,5 2,2 2,5 2,7 : : p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 7,3 6,9 6,6 6,7 7,2 0,5 p.p.
Male 5,1 4,7 4,2 3,7 3,8 0,1 p.p.
Female 9,7 9,1 9,1 9,7 10,6 0,9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 10,0 9,7 7,9 5,9 4,7 -1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20,6 21,7 15,8 12,0 10,0 -2,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,3 8,9 7,5 5,5 4,2 -1,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,1 5,9 5,0 4,1 3,5 -0,7 p.p.
Male 10,2 10,4 8,8 6,2 5,4 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,0 21,3 16,6 10,1 12,1 2,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,6 9,5 8,2 5,6 4,2 -1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 8,5 7,2 5,9 6,7 6,7 0,1 p.p.
Female 9,9 8,9 7,1 5,6 3,9 -1,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26,1 22,4 14,8 14,8 7,2 -7,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8,9 8,3 6,8 5,4 4,3 -1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,9 4,9 4,2 2,2 0,9 -1,3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 46,3 52,5 53,5 48,2 49,1 1,0 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39,7 39,8 39,9 39,9 39,6 -0,7 %
Male 41,3 41,3 41,3 41,2 41,0 -0,5 %
Female 38,0 38,2 38,5 38,5 38,2 -0,7 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -9,7 -5,3 -7,0 -2,5 -3,2 p.p.
Building and construction 10,2 7,8 2,6 25,1 27,6 p.p.
Services 0,8 -3,4 4,6 7,0 -1,4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 4,5 5,0 -1,3 -2,3 -1,8 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Estonia
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 11,6 11,5 10,7 14,1 26,4  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 10,6 9,9 12,0 14,6 25,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 9,4 6,3 10,7 16,9 20,2 19,8 19,4 20,8 19,7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 5,6 3,0 2,5 8,1 18,9  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 1,1 1,1 -3,5 1,8 8,4  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 9,7 14,4 14,0 11,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 55,0 55,3 53,9 55,1 59,8  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 26,9 26,7 26,6 26,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73,1 73,3 73,4 73,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,5 41,3 41,1 40,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38,9 37,0 38,3 37,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 25,4 25,3 25,3 25,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 5,7 8,3 8,0 5,5 6,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 5,6 7,7 7,2 6,0 6,4  :    :    :    :   
GDP 7,2 8,3 10,2 11,2 7,1 10,1 7,6 6,4 4,8
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 10,5 9,7 8,7 7,7 6,4  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,6 -0,3 1,9 4,7 4,0  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,4 3,0 4,1 4,4 6,7 5,1 5,8 6,7 9,2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,8 2,5 2,6 3,5 6,5 5,0 6,0 6,7 8,2
GDP deflator 4,5 1,8 6,2 6,2 9,7 8,7 9,5 9,6 11,0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -1,4 13,2 13,6 3,1 33,3  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 0,1 -0,5 1,2 3,1 13,0  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 0,5 -0,8 1,2 3,4 12,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction 27,1 13,9 7,8 27,8 28,6  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 4,1 1,7 1,1 8,4 21,3  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 15,5 2,1 -3,0 15,7 18,4  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 9,4 8,4 7,0 7,7 18,8  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 7,0 3,9 2,6 6,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 11,6 11,5 10,7 14,2 26,4  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 15,0 11,5 17,2 10,0 35,1  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 6,3 1,2 14,4 18,4 25,5  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 5,7 4,4 14,6 19,5 23,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction 16,1 9,6 30,3 16,5 9,4  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 17,1 18,5 4,1 11,8 31,9  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 23,3 23,3 -2,2 25,8 21,8  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 6,9 12,0 10,9 6,8 27,3  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 16,7 -1,4 3,2 6,7 1,4 20,3 5,3 -14,8 -1,5
Industry excluding construction 6,1 1,7 13,1 14,8 11,1 6,8 12,3 12,9 12,7
          of which: manufacturing 5,2 5,3 13,3 15,5 10,4 6,7 12,0 12,2 11,8
Construction -8,7 -3,7 20,8 -8,8 -14,9 -10,6 -20,1 -21,8 -4,2
Trade, transport and 12,4 16,5 2,9 3,1 8,7 18,5 12,8 2,4 2,8
Finance and business services 6,8 20,7 0,8 8,7 2,9 1,1 6,2 10,2 -7,2
Non-market related services -2,3 3,3 3,7 -0,8 7,2 7,3 4,2 11,9 5,3
Market-related sectors 7,8 8,8 8,4 6,8 5,0 8,2 6,8 2,0 3,0
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Greece
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10578 10616 10657 10710 10754 0,4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 7119 7129 7132 7158 7208 0,7 %
as % of total population 67,3 67,2 66,9 66,8 67,0 0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 4640 4740 4763 4799 4829 0,6 %
Male 2770 2801 2811 2825 2849 0,8 %
Female 1870 1938 1952 1974 1981 0,3 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 65,2 66,5 66,8 67,0 67,0 0,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,6 36,7 33,7 32,4 31,1 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,8 81,1 81,5 82,0 81,9 -0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,7 41,3 43,2 43,9 43,9 0,0 p.p.
Male 78,3 79,0 79,2 79,1 79,1 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38,1 40,0 37,1 36,1 34,7 -1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94,3 94,6 94,6 94,7 94,6 -0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 60,6 58,9 60,8 61,0 60,8 -0,2 p.p.
Female 52,2 54,1 54,5 55,0 54,9 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,2 33,4 30,4 28,7 27,6 -1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 65,2 67,6 68,2 69,1 69,1 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 26,4 25,2 27,1 28,0 28,2 0,1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 58,7 59,4 60,1 61,0 61,4 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25,3 26,8 25,0 24,2 24,0 -0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 72,9 73,5 74,0 75,3 75,6 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41,3 39,4 41,6 42,3 42,4 0,2 p.p.
Male 73,4 73,7 74,2 74,6 74,9 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,9 32,3 30,1 29,7 29,2 -0,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89,3 89,3 89,5 90,0 90,1 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 58,7 56,4 58,8 59,2 59,1 -0,1 p.p.
Female 44,3 45,2 46,1 47,4 47,9 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19,8 21,3 19,8 18,7 18,7 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 56,4 57,6 58,5 60,5 60,8 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 25,5 24,0 25,8 26,6 26,9 0,3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4181 4235 4287 4365 4423 58 Th.
Male (as % of total) 62,1 61,7 61,5 61,0 61,0 0,0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 37,9 38,3 38,5 39,0 39,0 0,0 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,9 0,9 1,5 2,5 1,2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 2,3 1,3 1,2 1,8 1,3 p.p.
Male 1,8 0,7 0,9 1,0 1,3 p.p.
Female 3,2 2,2 1,8 3,1 1,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 23,0 21,7 21,5 21,2 20,7 -0,5 p.p.
Male 26,2 24,9 24,6 24,1 23,7 -0,4 p.p.
Female 17,8 16,6 16,6 16,6 15,9 -0,7 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 11,2 12,0 11,9 10,7 10,9 0,2 p.p.
Male 9,7 10,5 10,1 9,1 9,3 0,2 p.p.
Female 13,3 14,1 14,3 13,0 13,1 0,2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 4,0 4,4 4,8 5,5 5,4 -0,1 p.p.
Male 2,0 2,0 2,1 2,6 2,5 -0,1 p.p.
Female 7,5 8,3 9,0 9,9 9,9 0,0 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9,7 10,5 9,8 8,9 8,3 -0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26,9 26,9 26,0 25,2 22,9 -2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8,7 9,5 9,1 8,1 7,8 -0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,2 4,5 3,8 3,7 3,4 -0,3 p.p.
Male 6,2 6,6 6,1 5,6 5,2 -0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,9 19,1 18,7 17,7 15,7 -1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,4 5,7 5,4 5,0 4,7 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,1 4,2 3,3 3,1 2,9 -0,2 p.p.
Female 15,0 16,2 15,3 13,6 12,8 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,6 36,3 34,8 34,7 32,1 -2,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 13,5 14,8 14,3 12,5 12,0 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,4 5,0 4,7 5,0 4,3 -0,7 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 55,0 53,2 52,1 54,4 50,0 -4,4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41,9 41,9 41,9 41,5 41,2 -0,8 %
Male 43,5 43,6 43,8 43,5 43,1 -0,8 %
Female 39,1 39,0 38,9 38,4 38,1 -0,7 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 0,5 -16,8 -0,2 -1,5 -2,2 p.p.
Building and construction 8,4 1,3 3,2 0,2 9,1 p.p.
Services 2,2 5,1 1,9 3,8 1,2 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,3 -0,6 -0,3 0,8 0,5 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Greece
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 5,6 5,6 6,1 6,3 7,2  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 5,9 10,4 5,9 3,6 6,2  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2,7 8,9 0,6 7,8  :   5,2 2,5 3,0  :   
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,4 1,8 3,7 4,6 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1,0 -1,6 0,5 1,1 1,4  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3,2 3,0 4,7 5,4 5,6  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 61,9 60,6 60,8 61,4 62,6  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 21,2  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 78,8 : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 71,7 : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38,5 40,2 41,0 41,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37,9 39,7 40,6 41,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 21,7 : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) -0,3 : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 3,1 3,7 2,3 1,7 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 3,5 4,8 2,0 -1,3 1,6  :    :    :    :   
GDP 5,0 4,6 3,8 4,2 4,0  :    :    :    :   
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 9,7 9,8 9,5 9,1 8,8  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) 0,7 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,5  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3,4 3,0 3,5 3,3 3,0 2,9 2,6 2,8 3,6
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 3,1 3,4 3,2 2,9 3,2 3,7 3,1 3,2 2,8
GDP deflator 3,5 3,4 3,3 3,4 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 12,0 -18,5 8,6 15,6 19,7  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 0,5 6,7 -0,9 5,7 9,1  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -0,8 9,0 -3,3 4,8 0,3  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,1 6,1 14,3 -14,9 16,5  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 3,4 -0,2 8,0 10,3 1,6  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,2 5,7 3,3 7,7 4,5  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,6 9,6 0,6 7,0 4,1  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5,6 5,5 6,1 6,3 7,2  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 5,7 4,7 6,1 10,8 16,8  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 8,1 4,1 7,5 7,4 7,8  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 7,1 4,7 7,3 8,2 4,9  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,7 7,8 7,1 9,1 10,9  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 7,7 6,1 6,1 8,2 7,2  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 2,1 0,9 6,4 9,1 8,8  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 4,3 4,4 5,9 3,2 5,6  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -5,7 28,4 -2,3 -4,2 -2,4  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 7,6 -2,4 8,5 1,7 -1,2  :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing 7,9 -3,9 11,0 3,2 4,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 3,5 1,6 -6,3 28,2 -4,8  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 4,1 6,3 -1,8 -1,8 5,5  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 0,8 -4,6 3,0 1,3 4,0  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,7 -4,8 5,3 -3,5 1,5  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 3,5 6,2 0,8 2,6 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Spain
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 41753 42440 43141 43835 44630 1,8 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 28729 29227 29755 30255 30808 1,8 %
as % of total population 68,8 68,9 69,0 69,0 69,0 0,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 19428 20073 20743 21435 22043 2,8 %
Male 11558 11834 12155 12432 12702 2,2 %
Female 7870 8239 8587 9003 9341 3,8 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 67,6 68,7 69,7 70,8 71,6 0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,5 45,1 47,7 48,2 47,8 -0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,6 80,6 80,9 82,0 82,8 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 43,8 44,4 45,9 46,8 47,4 0,6 p.p.
Male 80,0 80,4 80,9 81,3 81,4 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 49,5 50,2 52,3 52,2 52,1 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92,5 92,5 92,4 92,5 92,6 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 62,9 62,7 63,2 63,5 63,1 -0,4 p.p.
Female 55,1 56,8 58,3 60,2 61,4 1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,2 39,8 42,9 43,9 43,3 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 66,5 68,3 69,0 71,2 72,7 1,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 25,7 27,2 29,6 31,0 32,5 1,6 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 59,8 61,1 63,3 64,8 65,6 0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,4 35,2 38,3 39,5 39,1 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 71,4 72,7 74,4 75,8 76,8 1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40,7 41,3 43,1 44,1 44,6 0,5 p.p.
Male 73,2 73,8 75,2 76,1 76,2 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,9 40,8 43,5 44,4 44,2 -0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,9 86,1 86,9 87,6 87,6 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 59,2 58,9 59,7 60,4 60,0 -0,4 p.p.
Female 46,3 48,3 51,2 53,2 54,7 1,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28,6 29,3 32,8 34,4 33,8 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 56,6 58,9 61,5 63,7 65,6 2,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 23,3 24,6 27,4 28,7 30,0 1,4 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 17188 17861 18834 19600 20211 611 Th.
Male (as % of total) 61,6 60,8 60,0 59,4 58,8 -0,6 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 38,4 39,2 40,0 40,6 41,2 0,6 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 3,1 3,5 4,1 3,7 3,1 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 4,0 3,9 5,4 4,1 3,1 p.p.
Male 2,8 2,7 4,0 3,1 2,1 p.p.
Female 6,0 5,9 7,8 5,6 4,6 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 11,1 11,0 11,2 10,9 10,9 0,0 p.p.
Male 12,6 12,6 12,8 12,6 12,6 0,0 p.p.
Female 8,7 8,6 8,9 8,4 8,5 0,1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 31,8 32,5 33,4 34,1 31,7 -2,4 p.p.
Male 30,0 30,6 31,7 32,1 30,6 -1,5 p.p.
Female 34,6 35,2 35,7 36,8 33,1 -3,7 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8,1 8,7 12,2 11,8 11,6 -0,2 p.p.
Male 2,5 2,7 4,3 4,1 3,9 -0,2 p.p.
Female 17,0 17,9 24,0 23,0 22,7 -0,3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 11,1 10,6 9,2 8,5 8,3 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22,7 22,0 19,7 17,9 18,2 0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10,3 9,8 8,0 7,5 7,2 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,0 7,1 6,1 5,7 5,9 0,2 p.p.
Male 8,2 8,0 7,0 6,3 6,4 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19,5 18,7 16,7 15,0 15,2 0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,1 6,9 5,9 5,4 5,4 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,9 6,0 5,4 4,8 4,9 0,0 p.p.
Female 15,3 14,3 12,2 11,6 10,9 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27,0 26,4 23,4 21,6 21,9 0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 14,8 13,8 10,9 10,5 9,7 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9,4 9,4 7,5 7,4 7,7 0,3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 33,7 32,0 24,5 21,7 20,4 -1,3 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38,4 38,2 38,6 38,6 38,4 -0,4 %
Male 40,2 40,2 41,3 41,2 41,0 -0,4 %
Female 35,3 35,1 34,6 34,7 34,7 0,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -0,9 -1,4 0,2 -5,7 -2,2 p.p.
Building and construction 4,7 5,8 7,7 5,4 6,0 p.p.
Services 3,9 4,2 4,5 5,1 4,0 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 0,6 0,8 0,9 -0,2 -0,7 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Spain
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,8 2,2 2,1 2,3 3,4 4,2  :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 4,3 3,3 3,7 3,6 4,2  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4,8 4,1 3,7 4,0 4,0 3,7 3,8 4,4 4,4
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,8 2,5 2,5 2,2 2,7 2,8  :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1,3 -1,5 -1,6 -1,7 -0,3 -0,5  :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 2,6 2,6 0,6 2,0  :   4,0  :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 2,9 2,3 2,2 2,3 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 63,2 62,5 61,8 61,0 60,3  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 26,4 26,6 26,6 26,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73,6 73,4 73,4 73,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) : 66,9 : : :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 38,5 38,7 38,9 39,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37,1 37,4 37,6 37,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 25,0 24,9 24,9 24,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1,4 1,7 1,7 1,7 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0,0 -0,3 -0,4 0,1 0,7 1,3  :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 0,9 0,7 0,9 0,8 1,1  :    :    :    :   
GDP 3,1 3,3 3,6 3,9 3,8 4,3 3,9 3,7 3,3
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 10,5 9,9 9,2 8,8 8,5  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) 0,3 -0,2 -0,6 -0,5 -0,4  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,6 2,8 2,5 2,4 2,4 4,0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 3,0 2,8 2,7 3,0 2,7 2,7 2,5 2,5 3,3
GDP deflator 4,1 4,0 4,2 4,0 3,1 3,4 3,3 2,8 2,8
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -1,4 4,4 11,8 -6,5 -2,8 -6,2  :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,0 1,3 2,2 0,6 0,0 -1,3  :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 2,5 1,5 2,3 0,4 -0,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction 4,8 4,7 6,3 5,5 5,9 6,9  :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 2,4 1,9 0,8 1,2 -1,0 -2,1  :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,7 1,8 1,3 2,1 6,4 5,4  :    :    :   
Non-market related services 3,9 3,4 3,6 3,9 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 2,8 2,2 2,2 2,0  :   1,0  :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2,8 2,2 2,1 2,3 3,4 0,0  :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery -1,0 3,5 2,0 1,5 3,1 0,3  :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 3,0 1,2 2,8 3,2 3,6 2,8  :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 3,2 1,4 2,4 3,4 3,6  :    :    :    :   
Construction 4,5 4,0 4,1 5,2 3,8 2,4  :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 0,3 0,4 0,4 -0,6 0,3 0,9  :    :    :   
Finance and business services 4,2 1,2 1,2 1,6 1,5 -0,1  :    :    :   
Non-market related services 3,8 3,9 2,3 2,5 6,0  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 0,4 -0,9 -8,8 8,5 6,1 6,9 6,7 6,4 5,4
Industry excluding construction 1,0 0,0 0,6 2,5 3,6 4,1 4,7 3,2 2,4
          of which: manufacturing 0,7 -0,1 0,1 3,0 3,8 5,7 4,7 3,5 1,4
Construction -0,3 -0,7 -2,1 -0,3 -2,0 -4,2 -2,8 -1,1 0,1
Trade, transport and -2,0 -1,5 -0,3 -1,8 1,3 3,0 1,3 0,5 0,5
Finance and business services 0,4 -0,6 -0,1 -0,5 -4,7 -5,2 -6,5 -4,1 -2,8
Non-market related services -0,1 0,5 -1,2 -1,3 2,0 1,3 2,7 1,7 2,3
Market-related sectors -0,4 -0,7 -0,5 0,6 0,3 0,6 0,0 0,3 0,4
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: France
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 58824 59275 59605 59948 60283 0,6 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 38420 38777 38989 39274 39493 0,6 %
as % of total population 65,3 65,4 65,4 65,5 65,5 0,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 26859 27122 27322 27496 27719 0,8 %
Male 14369 14470 14531 14584 14628 0,3 %
Female 12489 12652 12792 12912 13091 1,4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69,9 69,9 70,1 70,0 70,2 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38,4 38,3 38,5 38,4 38,8 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,0 87,3 87,6 87,8 88,3 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38,9 39,9 40,9 40,5 40,4 -0,1 p.p.
Male 75,6 75,4 75,4 75,1 74,9 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 42,0 42,0 42,3 42,2 42,1 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 93,9 94,0 94,0 94,2 94,2 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,9 43,8 43,9 43,1 42,8 -0,2 p.p.
Female 64,3 64,6 64,9 65,0 65,6 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,6 34,6 34,6 34,6 35,4 0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,3 80,9 81,3 81,7 82,5 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 35,1 36,2 37,9 38,0 38,1 0,1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 64,0 63,7 63,9 63,8 64,6 0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,4 30,8 30,7 30,2 31,5 1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,4 80,5 80,7 81,2 82,1 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 37,0 37,6 38,7 38,1 38,3 0,2 p.p.
Male 69,9 69,4 69,3 69,0 69,3 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,6 34,1 34,2 33,8 34,5 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,7 87,6 87,6 87,9 88,3 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40,8 41,4 41,6 40,5 40,5 0,0 p.p.
Female 58,2 58,2 58,5 58,8 60,0 1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28,1 27,4 27,1 26,6 28,5 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,2 73,6 74,0 74,7 76,2 1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,3 34,0 36,0 35,9 36,2 0,3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 24580 24716 24897 25068 25510 442 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,0 53,9 53,7 53,5 53,1 -0,4 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 46,0 46,1 46,3 46,5 46,9 0,4 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,1 0,1 0,6 1,0 1,3 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 3,3 0,6 0,7 0,7 1,8 p.p.
Male 2,1 0,3 0,4 0,3 1,0 p.p.
Female 4,9 0,8 1,2 1,1 2,6 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5,7 5,3 5,4 5,8 5,7 -0,1 p.p.
Male 7,3 6,7 7,0 7,3 7,3 0,0 p.p.
Female 3,9 3,5 3,7 4,1 3,9 -0,2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 13,6 13,5 14,2 14,1 14,3 0,3 p.p.
Male 12,1 12,3 13,4 13,4 13,3 -0,1 p.p.
Female 15,3 14,9 15,0 14,9 15,5 0,6 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 16,4 16,6 16,9 17,0 17,1 0,0 p.p.
Male 5,2 5,2 5,5 5,6 5,5 -0,1 p.p.
Female 29,6 29,8 30,1 30,1 30,2 0,0 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9,0 9,3 9,2 9,2 8,3 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,3 19,7 20,2 21,3 18,7 -2,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,6 7,8 7,8 7,6 6,9 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,0 5,6 5,2 5,7 5,1 -0,6 p.p.
Male 8,1 8,4 8,4 8,4 7,8 -0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,7 18,8 19,1 20,1 18,0 -2,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,5 6,8 6,8 6,7 6,3 -0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,9 5,4 5,3 5,9 5,3 -0,6 p.p.
Female 9,9 10,3 10,2 10,1 8,9 -1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,9 20,7 21,5 22,9 19,6 -3,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8,7 8,9 8,9 8,5 7,6 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,0 5,9 5,1 5,6 4,9 -0,7 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 39,2 40,6 41,1 42,0 40,1 -1,9 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 36,4 36,6 36,8 36,8 36,8 0,0 %
Male 39,4 39,7 39,9 39,8 39,8 -0,1 %
Female 32,7 32,9 33,1 33,1 33,3 0,4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -1,9 -0,6 -1,1 -2,3 -2,5 p.p.
Building and construction 0,3 1,5 3,6 4,5 4,9 p.p.
Services 0,7 0,7 0,8 1,3 1,7 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,4 -3,5 -2,0 -1,9 -1,3 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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France
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,8 3,4 3,2 3,2 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3,1 1,6 3,8 4,1 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2,6 3,6 3,5 3,4 3,3 3,8 3,4 3,2 3,1
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1,8 1,1 1,8 2,0 2,1  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,1 -0,5 -0,2 -0,5 -0,4  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 1,5 3,3 2,4 2,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 2,5 1,8 2,5 2,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66,2 66,2 66,2 65,8 65,4  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 33,0 33,0 33,0 32,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 67,0 67,0 67,1 67,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 58,9 59,2 59,7 59,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 49,8 49,9 50,1 50,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 46,0 46,2 46,4 46,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 28,6 28,7 28,7 28,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 4,4 4,4 4,3 4,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1,0 2,4 1,3 1,2 0,8  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,3 0,6 2,0 2,1 1,0  :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,1 2,5 1,9 2,2 2,2 2,1 1,6 2,4 2,5
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 9,3 9,1 8,9 8,7 8,4  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,2 0,3 0,0 0,1 -0,2  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,2 2,3 1,9 1,9 1,6 1,3 1,3 1,4 2,5
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,2 2,4 1,2 1,3 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,8
GDP deflator 1,9 1,6 2,0 2,5 2,5 2,4 2,5 2,7 2,3
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 20,3 -15,0 8,5 4,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -1,9 0,3 -0,4 1,3  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -2,2 0,3 -1,0 1,2 -1,1  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,8 4,5 3,2 4,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 3,0 2,0 1,8 0,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 0,2 1,2 2,3 3,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 3,1 1,6 2,9 2,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 1,4 0,8 1,3 1,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2,8 3,4 3,2 3,2 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 4,0 3,1 3,7 5,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,3 5,0 3,0 4,0  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,1 4,9 3,3 4,1 1,4  :    :    :    :   
Construction 4,6 4,6 2,5 4,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 2,5 3,4 3,3 3,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,4 3,0 3,6 4,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,8 3,0 3,0 1,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -13,6 21,3 -4,5 0,9  :   1,7 0,4 0,0 0,6
Industry excluding construction 4,3 4,6 3,3 2,6  :   2,0 1,4 3,9 4,4
          of which: manufacturing 4,5 4,6 4,3 2,9 2,5 2,5 1,0 4,2 3,6
Construction -1,2 0,1 -0,7 -0,6  :   0,0 -1,2 -1,4 -1,6
Trade, transport and -0,5 1,4 1,5 2,5  :   2,3 0,7 1,0 0,3
Finance and business services 3,3 1,8 1,3 1,2  :   0,0 -0,6 0,7 0,7
Non-market related services -0,3 1,4 0,0 -0,9  :   -0,4 -0,1 0,4 0,6
Market-related sectors 1,4 2,9 1,6 1,9  :   1,3 0,4 1,4 1,3
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Ireland
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 3991 4059 4149 4253 4359 2,5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 2711 2761 2831 2913 2993 2,7 %
as % of total population 67,9 68,0 68,2 68,5 68,7 0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 1866 1919 2004 2092 2168 3,6 %
Male 1079 1108 1149 1198 1231 2,7 %
Female 787 810 854 893 937 4,9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 68,8 69,5 70,8 71,8 72,4 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 52,3 52,4 53,3 54,7 55,0 0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,1 79,9 80,9 81,5 82,0 0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50,2 50,8 53,1 54,4 55,2 0,8 p.p.
Male 79,3 79,9 80,6 81,5 81,4 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 56,0 55,9 56,6 59,0 58,3 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,1 91,8 92,1 92,1 91,6 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 66,3 66,9 67,7 68,7 69,7 1,1 p.p.
Female 58,3 59,0 60,8 61,9 63,3 1,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 48,5 48,8 49,9 50,2 51,5 1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67,2 68,0 69,6 70,7 72,2 1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,8 34,4 38,2 40,0 40,4 0,4 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 65,5 66,3 67,6 68,6 69,1 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47,5 47,7 48,7 50,0 49,9 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 75,9 76,8 77,9 78,4 78,7 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 49,0 49,5 51,6 53,1 53,8 0,7 p.p.
Male 75,2 75,9 76,9 77,7 77,4 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50,5 50,7 51,5 53,6 52,5 -1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,0 87,8 88,4 88,4 87,7 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 64,6 65,0 65,7 67,0 67,9 0,9 p.p.
Female 55,7 56,5 58,3 59,3 60,6 1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,4 44,7 45,9 46,2 47,4 1,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 64,8 65,8 67,3 68,3 69,6 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,1 33,7 37,3 39,1 39,6 0,6 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 1776 1830 1915 1999 2067 68 Th.
Male (as % of total) 57,6 57,5 57,2 57,2 56,6 -0,6 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 42,4 42,5 42,8 42,8 43,4 0,6 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 2,0 3,1 4,7 4,3 3,6 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 2,0 3,1 4,6 4,4 3,4 p.p.
Male 1,5 2,9 4,0 4,3 2,4 p.p.
Female 2,5 3,3 5,5 4,5 4,8 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 10,2 10,3 9,9 9,6 9,9 0,3 p.p.
Male 14,9 15,1 14,6 14,2 14,6 0,4 p.p.
Female 3,9 3,8 3,7 3,4 3,7 0,3 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 5,1 4,1 3,7 3,3 7,3 3,9 p.p.
Male 4,4 3,7 3,1 2,9 6,0 3,1 p.p.
Female 6,0 4,7 4,3 3,9 8,6 4,7 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 16,5 16,5 16,5 : 17,7 : p.p.
Male 6,1 5,6 5,7 : 6,6 : p.p.
Female 30,8 31,2 30,8 : 32,1 : p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4,7 4,5 4,3 4,4 4,6 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,2 8,9 8,6 8,6 9,1 0,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,0 3,8 3,7 3,8 4,0 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,5 2,6 2,8 2,4 2,4 0,0 p.p.
Male 5,0 4,9 4,6 4,6 4,9 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,8 9,3 9,1 9,1 10,0 0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,4 4,3 4,0 4,0 4,3 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,6 2,8 3,0 2,4 2,6 0,2 p.p.
Female 4,3 4,1 4,0 4,1 4,2 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8,4 8,5 7,9 8,0 8,1 0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,5 3,2 3,2 3,4 3,6 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,2 2,1 2,5 2,4 2,0 -0,4 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 32,9 35,0 33,6 32,4 30,1 -2,3 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,5 37,3 37,3 37,1 36,8 -0,9 %
Male 41,6 41,5 41,5 41,1 40,9 -0,5 %
Female 31,6 31,4 31,4 31,3 31,0 -1,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -3,2 -2,6 -0,9 1,2 : p.p.
Building and construction 4,8 10,4 14,2 9,8 : p.p.
Services 3,1 3,6 5,2 4,6 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -1,9 -1,6 -2,4 -0,6 1,3 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Ireland
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 6,4 6,4 5,0 4,5 5,8  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 7,6 6,6 6,0 5,6 5,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 5,5 5,0 4,4 4,4 5,1 5,3 5,9 5,0 4,2
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3,9 5,1 3,7 3,1 4,2  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 1,4 3,0 1,1 0,8 3,2  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 2,8 5,4 4,9  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 5,1 6,0 4,2 3,7 4,8  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 53,3 55,4 56,2 57,3 58,8  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 24,2 25,0 23,5 23,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 19,3 20,1 18,3 17,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2,4 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,6  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 3,3 1,4 1,3 1,7 1,9  :    :    :    :   
GDP 4,5 4,4 6,0 5,7 5,3 8,3 5,4 3,8 3,5
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4,1 3,9 4,0 4,2 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) 1,3 -0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 4,0 2,3 2,2 2,7 2,9 2,8 2,8 2,6 3,2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 4,3 2,1 1,5 2,2 2,6 2,7 2,6 2,5 2,7
GDP deflator 2,5 2,1 2,6 2,3 0,9 4,5 2,3 -0,4 -4,4
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 5,3 3,3 28,9 -3,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,0 -0,4 -0,2 -2,9  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 0,9 -1,0 -0,6 -3,2 0,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction 3,4 6,6 12,1 5,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 4,4 4,8 2,6 4,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -2,2 2,2 1,6 1,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 14,1 9,9 7,1 6,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 1,7 3,5 4,1 1,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 6,4 6,4 5,1 4,5 5,8  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 7,3 6,9 1,7 -3,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 4,5 4,7 5,1 1,9  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 4,3 4,4 5,2 1,9 5,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,0 3,1 4,9 1,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 4,6 4,7 3,6 5,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 5,0 6,1 5,8 7,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 9,6 7,9 4,3 4,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 1,9 3,5 -21,1 0,2  :   0,0 -1,6 -14,2 -23,7
Industry excluding construction 3,4 5,1 5,4 4,9  :   17,9 -0,3 10,0 12,1
          of which: manufacturing 3,4 5,4 5,8 5,2 5,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,5 -3,3 -6,5 -4,0  :   -5,5 -1,0 -3,9 -9,5
Trade, transport and 0,2 -0,1 0,9 0,8  :   4,1 3,7 2,2 -1,7
Finance and business services 7,3 3,7 4,2 5,9  :   2,3 -6,1 -7,6 -7,3
Non-market related services -3,9 -1,9 -2,6 -2,1  :   3,3 2,8 2,2 0,6
Market-related sectors 2,7 2,4 0,9 2,4  :   7,1 -1,2 1,5 -0,1
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Italy
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 57399 57442 58077 58435 58880 0,8 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 38692 38292 38588 38726 38946 0,6 %
as % of total population 67,4 66,7 66,4 66,3 66,1 -0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 23797 24014 24099 24287 24350 0,3 %
Male 14429 14274 14360 14445 14483 0,3 %
Female 9368 9740 9739 9842 9867 0,3 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 61,5 62,7 62,5 62,7 62,5 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,6 36,1 33,8 32,5 30,9 -1,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,3 77,5 77,4 77,8 77,6 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31,5 31,8 32,6 33,4 34,6 1,2 p.p.
Male 74,7 74,9 74,6 74,6 74,4 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,2 40,5 38,7 37,8 36,1 -1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,5 91,4 91,2 91,3 91,0 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,4 44,0 44,3 45,0 46,3 1,4 p.p.
Female 48,3 50,6 50,4 50,8 50,7 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,9 31,7 28,7 26,9 25,5 -1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 60,9 63,6 63,6 64,3 64,1 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 19,3 20,4 21,5 22,5 23,5 0,9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 56,1 57,6 57,6 58,4 58,7 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25,2 27,6 25,7 25,5 24,7 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 70,7 72,2 72,3 73,3 73,5 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,3 30,5 31,4 32,5 33,8 1,3 p.p.
Male 69,6 70,1 69,9 70,5 70,7 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,7 32,1 30,4 30,6 29,6 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86,5 86,7 86,6 87,2 87,3 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,8 42,2 42,7 43,7 45,1 1,4 p.p.
Female 42,7 45,2 45,3 46,3 46,6 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20,6 23,1 20,8 20,1 19,5 -0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 54,9 57,8 57,9 59,3 59,6 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 18,5 19,6 20,8 21,9 23,0 1,1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 21710 22060 22214 22618 22846 228 Th.
Male (as % of total) 61,9 60,5 60,6 60,3 60,2 -0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 38,1 39,5 39,4 39,7 39,8 0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,5 0,4 0,6 2,0 1,1 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1,1 1,6 0,7 1,8 1,0 p.p.
Male 0,8 -0,6 0,8 1,4 0,8 p.p.
Female 1,6 5,2 0,5 2,5 1,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 10,7 17,7 17,1 16,9 16,7 -0,2 p.p.
Male 12,7 19,9 19,4 19,1 19,0 -0,1 p.p.
Female 7,4 14,2 13,6 13,5 13,2 -0,3 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 9,9 11,8 12,3 13,1 13,2 0,1 p.p.
Male 8,2 9,9 10,5 11,2 11,2 0,0 p.p.
Female 12,2 14,5 14,7 15,8 16,0 0,2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8,4 12,5 12,7 13,1 13,4 0,4 p.p.
Male 3,0 4,4 4,3 4,3 4,6 0,2 p.p.
Female 17,3 24,9 25,6 26,4 26,8 0,5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8,4 8,0 7,7 6,8 6,1 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27,1 23,5 24,0 21,6 20,3 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,2 6,9 6,7 5,9 5,3 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,8 4,1 3,5 2,9 2,4 -0,4 p.p.
Male 6,5 6,4 6,2 5,4 4,9 -0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24,2 20,6 21,5 19,1 18,2 -0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,4 5,2 5,1 4,5 4,0 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,6 4,1 3,6 2,8 2,6 -0,2 p.p.
Female 11,3 10,5 10,1 8,8 7,9 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,9 27,2 27,4 25,3 23,3 -1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10,0 9,2 8,9 7,8 7,1 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,3 4,0 3,2 2,9 2,1 -0,8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 58,1 49,2 49,9 49,7 47,4 -2,3 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38,3 38,1 38,1 38,0 38,0 -0,1 %
Male 40,5 41,0 41,0 40,8 40,9 0,2 %
Female 34,5 33,5 33,5 33,5 33,3 -0,4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -6,5 1,3 -0,4 2,0 -2,2 p.p.
Building and construction 3,0 2,1 4,5 1,0 2,4 p.p.
Services 2,2 0,7 0,6 2,5 1,3 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 0,7 -0,9 -0,7 0,9 0,9 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Italy
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,4 3,3 2,9 2,2 1,9  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2,7 3,1 4,6 2,9 1,8  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,8 2,4 4,5 1,9 2,1 1,2  :    :    :   
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 4,0 2,2 2,9 2,3 1,6  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0,9 -0,5 0,8 0,6 -0,6  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 0,9 3,1 4,0 2,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3,5 2,6 3,1 2,1 1,7  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 61,9 61,7 62,4 63,2 62,7  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL : : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) : : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45,0 45,4 43,4 43,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,8 43,2 43,1 43,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) : : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) : : : : :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) -1,5 1,1 0,0 -0,1 0,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity -1,2 1,1 0,4 0,1 -0,2  :    :    :    :   
GDP 0,0 1,5 0,6 1,8 1,5 2,4 2,0 1,9  :   
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8,5 8,0 7,6 7,0 6,5  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,2 0,0 -0,6 -0,3 -0,3  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,8 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,0 2,0 1,9 1,7 2,6
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,7 2,3 2,0 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,8 2,2
GDP deflator 3,1 2,6 2,1 1,7 2,3 2,8 2,4 2,6  :   
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 3,5 -10,0 8,7 4,7 0,4  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 5,5 2,0 2,0 2,5 2,6  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 5,7 2,5 2,1 2,6 2,6  :    :    :    :   
Construction 4,2 4,2 3,4 1,4 5,2  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 5,0 1,8 1,2 1,5 0,6  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 2,1 3,2 3,8 3,7 1,9  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 4,5 1,5 3,7 2,9 0,8  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 4,2 2,0 2,0 1,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2,4 3,3 2,9 2,2 1,9  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 5,3 0,3 4,3 1,3 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,1 4,0 2,3 2,8 2,7  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,1 4,1 2,3 2,9 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction 3,5 3,6 1,3 1,9 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 2,4 3,4 2,4 0,7 1,6  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 0,8 2,1 3,1 3,3 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,6 3,4 4,1 2,2 1,3  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 1,8 11,5 -4,1 -3,3 2,3 3,6 4,9 3,1  :   
Industry excluding construction -3,3 1,9 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,0 -0,7 0,8  :   
          of which: manufacturing -3,4 1,6 0,3 0,3 0,1  :    :    :    :   
Construction -0,7 -0,6 -2,0 0,5 -0,8 4,6 -1,5 -1,6  :   
Trade, transport and -2,5 1,6 1,2 -0,9 1,0 2,2 3,3 -1,3  :   
Finance and business services -1,3 -1,1 -0,7 -0,3 -0,9 1,9 0,8 0,0  :   
Non-market related services -1,8 1,9 0,4 -0,7 0,4 0,1 2,0 -0,5  :   
Market-related sectors -1,7 1,1 0,0 -0,1 0,3 1,8 1,3 0,0  :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Cyprus
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 688 711 727 737 752 2,1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 458 476 494 500 518 3,6 %
as % of total population 66,6 66,9 67,9 67,9 68,9 1,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 331 345 357 365 383 4,9 %
Male 181 191 199 202 209 3,7 %
Female 150 155 159 164 174 6,4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 72,2 72,6 72,4 73,0 73,9 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41,2 41,7 42,6 41,5 41,7 0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,6 86,1 85,7 86,2 86,7 0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52,6 52,7 52,4 55,5 57,7 2,2 p.p.
Male 82,1 83,0 82,9 82,7 82,9 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 42,5 45,7 46,6 44,9 43,9 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 95,3 95,4 95,3 95,3 95,0 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 72,6 74,4 73,2 74,1 74,9 0,7 p.p.
Female 63,1 62,9 62,5 63,8 65,4 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,0 38,3 39,0 38,3 39,7 1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,7 77,4 76,5 77,4 78,7 1,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,2 32,0 32,7 37,8 41,5 3,7 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 69,2 69,1 68,5 69,6 71,0 1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37,5 37,3 36,7 37,4 37,4 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82,5 82,7 81,8 82,6 83,8 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50,3 50,1 50,6 53,6 55,9 2,3 p.p.
Male 78,8 80,0 79,2 79,5 80,0 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38,5 41,4 40,5 41,0 39,1 -1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92,4 92,8 91,8 92,0 92,4 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 68,8 71,0 70,8 71,7 72,5 0,8 p.p.
Female 60,2 59,0 58,4 60,3 62,4 2,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,5 33,6 33,3 34,0 36,0 2,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,5 73,1 72,2 73,6 75,5 1,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32,7 30,4 31,4 36,6 40,2 3,6 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 317 329 338 348 368 20 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,8 55,9 56,1 55,6 54,8 -0,8 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,3 44,1 43,9 44,4 45,2 0,7 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 3,8 3,8 3,6 1,7 3,2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 3,4 3,7 2,9 3,0 5,6 p.p.
Male 2,2 5,9 3,1 2,1 4,2 p.p.
Female 4,8 0,9 2,5 4,3 7,4 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 13,4 12,8 12,4 12,1 11,6 -0,5 p.p.
Male 18,1 16,6 15,1 14,5 14,4 -0,2 p.p.
Female 7,8 8,1 8,9 9,1 8,2 -0,9 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 12,6 13,0 14,0 13,2 13,3 0,1 p.p.
Male 8,1 8,6 9,0 7,9 7,6 -0,4 p.p.
Female 17,1 17,6 19,5 19,0 19,2 0,2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 7,6 7,4 7,6 6,6 6,4 -0,2 p.p.
Male 3,6 3,2 3,2 2,8 3,0 0,2 p.p.
Female 12,5 12,7 13,2 11,3 10,4 -0,9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4,1 4,6 5,2 4,6 3,9 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,0 10,6 13,9 10,0 10,2 0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,6 4,0 4,5 4,1 3,4 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,4 4,8 3,6 3,3 3,1 -0,2 p.p.
Male 3,6 3,6 4,3 4,0 3,4 -0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,3 9,3 13,0 8,8 11,0 2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,0 2,7 3,6 3,5 2,7 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,3 4,7 3,3 3,2 3,2 -0,1 p.p.
Female 4,8 6,0 6,5 5,4 4,6 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 8,7 12,3 14,5 11,2 9,2 -2,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,2 5,5 5,6 4,9 4,1 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1,7 5,0 4,1 3,2 3,1 -0,1 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 24,0 27,4 23,4 19,6 18,9 -0,7 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38,0 39,7 39,2 39,2 39,0 -0,4 %
Male 40,0 41,9 41,3 41,1 40,8 -0,6 %
Female 35,6 36,9 36,3 36,7 36,7 0,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -6,5 3,2 -5,2 -14,1 10,8 p.p.
Building and construction 9,8 6,1 5,7 4,0 4,9 p.p.
Services 4,1 3,7 4,3 2,7 2,9 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 3,2 2,5 0,5 1,1 0,8 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Cyprus
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 7,7 1,9 1,8 2,7 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 7,3 4,2 4,0 3,9 6,0  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 6,3 5,1 3,9 4,7 6,8 7,1 7,5 6,7 6,8
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 9,7 1,5 1,4 0,5 2,4  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 4,3 -1,7 -0,9 -2,2 -0,7  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 6,1 1,6 0,3 3,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 68,8 68,5 68,4 67,4 69,1  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 15,4 15,5 15,6 15,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 84,6 84,5 84,4 84,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 84,6 84,5 84,4 84,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 18,5 18,6 13,6 14,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 16,6 16,8 12,0 12,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 15,4 15,5 15,6 15,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) -1,8 0,4 0,3 2,3 1,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity -1,4 2,4 2,0 1,4 2,4  :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,9 4,2 3,9 4,0 4,4 4,5 4,1 4,6 4,3
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4,4 4,0 3,9 3,8 3,8  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,2 -0,8 -1,3 -1,3 -0,6  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 4,0 1,9 2,0 2,2 2,2 1,4 1,8 2,3 3,2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 3,1 0,8 0,8 0,8 1,7 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,2
GDP deflator 5,1 3,3 2,3 2,8 3,1 2,3 2,7 3,5 3,7
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 84,1 -16,9 25,7 18,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -0,2 6,3 1,9 8,3  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 2,0 4,3 3,7 3,1 2,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction -1,2 2,3 -1,0 6,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 3,7 1,9 -1,4 -0,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 6,6 9,5 7,3 -1,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 11,1 0,6 2,8 3,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 6,0 3,1 0,7 -0,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 6,3 2,2 2,9 2,8 2,2  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 80,0 -19,1 28,7 28,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 0,4 5,5 1,6 6,7  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 1,1 2,9 2,2 2,7 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction -1,2 1,3 -2,6 6,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 0,6 5,4 -0,1 0,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,2 7,3 8,0 3,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 11,3 -0,4 0,6 4,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -2,2 -2,7 2,4 8,5 -13,1 4,6 -7,9 -18,9 -21,9
Industry excluding construction 0,6 -0,7 -0,3 -1,4 2,4 -0,6 0,2 1,9 3,6
          of which: manufacturing -0,9 -1,4 -1,4 -0,4 1,3 0,5 -0,1 1,0 2,9
Construction 0,0 -1,0 -1,6 0,2 2,2 -0,6 -1,0 0,2 1,6
Trade, transport and -3,0 3,4 1,3 1,2 1,8 1,0 1,1 2,2 3,2
Finance and business services -3,2 -2,1 0,7 4,5 0,5 1,2 0,9 2,3 3,6
Non-market related services 0,2 -1,0 -2,2 1,3 -0,6 -0,3 -1,1 -0,3 -0,1
Market-related sectors -2,1 0,7 1,1 2,3 1,6 1,6 0,8 1,4 2,0
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Latvia
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 2330 2319 2305 2294 2281 -0,6 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 1588 1587 1583 1580 1573 -0,4 %
as % of total population 68,1 68,4 68,7 68,9 69,0 0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 1099 1105 1101 1126 1145 1,7 %
Male 564 568 567 581 591 1,6 %
Female 535 538 534 545 555 1,9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69,2 69,6 69,6 71,3 72,8 1,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38,4 37,3 37,7 40,8 43,0 2,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86,2 86,3 85,6 86,4 87,2 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47,9 52,3 53,8 57,1 60,3 3,2 p.p.
Male 74,1 74,3 74,4 76,2 77,6 1,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,5 43,3 43,8 47,8 48,9 1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89,7 89,7 89,4 90,0 91,0 1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56,1 60,4 61,0 64,4 67,9 3,5 p.p.
Female 64,7 65,3 65,1 66,7 68,3 1,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32,1 31,0 31,3 33,6 36,8 3,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,0 83,1 82,0 82,9 83,6 0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41,9 46,1 48,5 51,6 54,6 3,0 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 61,8 62,3 63,3 66,3 68,3 2,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,5 30,5 32,6 35,9 38,4 2,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77,7 77,9 78,4 81,1 82,3 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,1 47,9 49,5 53,3 57,7 4,3 p.p.
Male 66,1 66,4 67,6 70,4 72,5 2,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37,1 36,4 38,7 42,8 43,4 0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,7 80,5 81,7 83,7 85,6 1,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 51,3 55,8 55,2 59,5 64,6 5,2 p.p.
Female 57,9 58,5 59,3 62,4 64,4 2,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25,7 24,4 26,3 28,7 33,1 4,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74,9 75,5 75,3 78,6 79,1 0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38,8 41,9 45,3 48,7 52,4 3,7 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 982 988 1002 1047 1075 28 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51,3 51,3 51,4 51,3 51,3 0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 48,7 48,7 48,6 48,7 48,7 -0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,7 1,1 1,7 4,7 3,5 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 2,2 0,7 1,4 4,5 2,7 p.p.
Male 2,8 0,7 1,7 4,2 2,8 p.p.
Female 1,6 0,7 1,0 4,9 2,5 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5,7 6,0 5,6 6,3 5,5 -0,8 p.p.
Male 6,7 6,9 6,4 7,3 6,7 -0,7 p.p.
Female 4,8 5,1 4,8 5,2 4,3 -0,9 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 11,2 9,5 8,4 7,2 4,3 -2,9 p.p.
Male 13,2 11,6 10,6 8,9 5,7 -3,3 p.p.
Female 9,1 7,3 6,2 5,4 2,9 -2,6 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 9,6 9,7 7,6 5,8 5,6 -0,1 p.p.
Male 7,3 7,1 5,6 4,3 4,4 0,1 p.p.
Female 12,0 12,4 9,7 7,4 6,9 -0,4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 10,5 10,4 8,9 6,8 6,0 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,0 18,1 13,6 12,2 10,7 -1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,9 9,7 8,4 6,1 5,6 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,9 8,4 8,0 6,6 4,4 -2,3 p.p.
Male 10,6 10,6 9,1 7,4 6,4 -1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16,6 16,0 11,8 10,5 11,2 0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10,0 10,3 8,6 7,0 5,9 -1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 8,6 7,6 9,4 7,6 4,8 -2,8 p.p.
Female 10,4 10,2 8,7 6,2 5,6 -0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20,0 21,3 16,1 14,7 10,1 -4,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,8 9,2 8,2 5,2 5,3 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,2 9,1 6,7 5,7 4,0 -1,7 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 41,6 43,7 45,8 35,9 26,1 -9,8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 41,7 41,0 41,4 41,3 40,5 -1,9 %
Male 43,1 42,6 43,0 42,8 41,7 -2,6 %
Female 40,1 39,3 39,6 39,7 39,2 -1,1 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -8,9 -10,0 0,5 -3,1 -7,4 p.p.
Building and construction 23,5 16,9 4,6 17,5 22,4 p.p.
Services 1,7 2,5 3,3 4,1 3,4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 4,7 -2,5 -3,6 5,7 -0,6 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Latvia
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 11,3 14,3 25,3 23,6 33,2  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 11,2 17,6 27,4 23,3 34,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 10,0 10,8 15,0 23,4 30,2 31,5 28,8 30,8 30,2
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 5,6 6,4 15,2 15,3 24,9  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 2,0 -0,6 4,6 4,9 10,3  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 18,6 17,5 26,0 31,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 51,4 51,0 53,5 56,4 62,2  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 21,4 21,4 21,5 21,3 21,1  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 78,6 78,6 78,5 78,7 78,9  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 72,4 73,4 73,4 73,7 73,9  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,2 42,5 42,2 42,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37,3 38,1 37,5 39,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 20,8 20,5 20,7 20,6 20,4  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 5,4 7,5 8,7 7,2 6,6  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 4,4 10,5 9,0 7,0 6,4  :    :    :    :   
GDP 7,2 8,7 10,6 12,2 10,3 11,3 11,0 10,9 8,1
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 11,5 10,5 9,4 8,2 7,1  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,2 -0,8 0,5 3,2 4,8  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,9 6,2 6,9 6,6 10,1 7,6 8,5 10,4 13,7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,9 5,8 5,5 5,1 9,7 7,2 8,4 10,5 12,6
GDP deflator 3,6 7,0 10,2 9,9 13,3 13,0 13,5 13,9 13,0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -7,1 1,7 11,0 24,5 9,7  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -5,3 -0,3 8,1 15,5 26,9  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 5,7 3,2 13,1 16,4 29,6  :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,2 11,9 63,4 28,7 41,3  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -1,9 -2,5 6,8 15,0 19,8  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -5,7 10,2 12,7 15,4 27,6  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 0,1 8,4 9,4 14,5 29,8  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 5,2 4,5 15,9 14,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 1,0 10,2 19,6 23,5 32,6  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery -0,6 17,3 20,4 22,0 27,3  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -2,8 7,8 18,6 15,5 28,0  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 7,1 12,9 24,3 17,0 30,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction -7,0 8,9 80,2 33,8 31,3  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 2,4 4,6 18,2 26,1 24,7  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -4,2 19,2 35,5 -5,3 45,8  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 6,6 12,3 9,0 28,5 37,9  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 7,0 15,3 8,5 -2,0 16,0 22,3 20,9 23,6 14,0
Industry excluding construction 2,6 8,2 9,7 0,0 0,9 6,4 -1,5 -5,1 -5,0
          of which: manufacturing 1,3 9,4 9,9 0,5 0,3 6,8 -3,6 -5,8 -9,8
Construction -8,1 -2,7 10,3 4,0 -7,1 -13,7 -14,9 6,2 3,3
Trade, transport and 4,3 7,2 10,6 9,6 4,1 9,0 7,7 7,6 -2,0
Finance and business services 1,6 8,2 20,2 -18,0 14,3 -0,7 10,0 8,1 11,7
Non-market related services 6,4 3,5 -0,4 12,3 6,2 7,6 2,4 9,7 3,2
Market-related sectors 4,2 8,7 11,3 4,3 5,3 6,6 5,5 7,5 2,6
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Lithuania
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 3445 3434 3424 3403 3385 -0,5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 2305 2310 2322 2321 2319 -0,1 %
as % of total population 66,9 67,3 67,8 68,2 68,5 0,3 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 1610 1596 1587 1565 1575 0,6 %
Male 814 811 807 790 796 0,7 %
Female 797 786 780 775 779 0,5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69,9 69,1 68,4 67,4 67,9 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,0 26,2 25,1 26,3 27,4 1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 88,8 88,7 87,9 86,2 86,0 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50,5 52,6 52,8 52,9 55,6 2,7 p.p.
Male 73,5 72,8 72,1 70,5 71,0 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,1 30,9 29,5 29,3 31,8 2,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90,5 90,7 90,1 88,7 87,9 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 62,0 63,7 63,8 59,9 63,4 3,5 p.p.
Female 66,5 65,6 64,9 64,6 65,0 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25,8 21,4 20,5 23,1 22,8 -0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,2 86,8 85,8 83,8 84,2 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41,8 44,3 44,4 47,6 49,7 2,1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 61,1 61,2 62,6 63,6 64,9 1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22,5 20,3 21,2 23,7 25,2 1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78,9 79,4 81,0 81,7 82,5 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,7 47,1 49,2 49,6 53,4 3,8 p.p.
Male 64,0 64,7 66,1 66,3 67,9 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26,3 24,0 24,8 26,4 29,6 3,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,8 81,7 83,3 84,1 84,3 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55,2 57,6 59,1 55,6 60,8 5,1 p.p.
Female 58,4 57,8 59,4 61,0 62,2 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,5 16,5 17,4 20,8 20,5 -0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78,0 77,3 78,8 79,5 80,8 1,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 36,7 39,3 41,7 45,1 47,9 2,8 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 1408 1413 1454 1476 1506 30 Th.
Male (as % of total) 50,3 51,0 50,9 50,4 50,5 0,2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 49,7 49,0 49,1 49,6 49,5 -0,2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 2,2 0,0 2,5 1,7 1,9 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 2,1 0,3 2,9 1,5 2,0 p.p.
Male 2,4 1,6 2,7 0,5 2,4 p.p.
Female 1,9 -1,0 3,1 2,6 1,7 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 14,4 12,9 11,9 11,0 9,6 -1,4 p.p.
Male 17,3 15,2 14,2 13,1 11,8 -1,3 p.p.
Female 11,5 10,4 9,5 8,9 7,4 -1,6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 7,2 6,3 5,6 4,5 3,5 -1,0 p.p.
Male 9,7 8,8 7,6 6,5 4,9 -1,6 p.p.
Female 4,8 3,9 3,6 2,7 2,3 -0,4 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 9,2 8,3 6,8 9,5 8,1 -1,4 p.p.
Male 7,1 6,4 4,9 7,5 6,5 -1,0 p.p.
Female 11,4 10,3 8,8 11,5 9,7 -1,8 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 12,4 11,4 8,3 5,6 4,3 -1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25,1 22,7 15,7 9,8 8,2 -1,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 11,2 10,4 7,8 5,2 4,0 -1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11,5 10,4 6,8 6,1 3,8 -2,3 p.p.
Male 12,7 11,0 8,2 5,8 4,3 -1,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22,9 22,6 15,9 9,9 6,9 -3,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 11,8 9,9 7,5 5,2 4,0 -1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11,0 9,7 7,4 7,2 4,1 -3,0 p.p.
Female 12,2 11,8 8,3 5,4 4,3 -1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28,2 22,9 15,2 9,6 10,1 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 10,6 11,0 8,2 5,1 4,0 -1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12,0 11,2 6,1 5,2 3,6 -1,7 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 48,2 51,4 52,2 44,0 31,9 -12,1 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,4 37,9 38,1 38,1 38,6 1,2 %
Male 38,5 38,9 39,4 39,2 39,5 0,8 %
Female 36,2 36,7 36,7 37,1 37,6 1,4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 2,5 -11,5 -9,3 -10,0 -10,9 p.p.
Building and construction 15,2 8,9 14,1 12,5 13,5 p.p.
Services 0,9 3,6 4,1 3,5 3,4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 1,5 -3,6 4,4 -0,7 0,1 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Lithuania
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 8,9 10,9 11,5 15,1 14,1  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 9,5 12,0 10,0 17,8 15,4  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,9 4,5 11,5 18,4 20,9 21,6 21,1 20,5 20,5
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0,9 3,3 5,9 8,8 7,0  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 1,9 0,7 0,2 2,0 -1,5  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 12,5 10,7 8,0 22,0  :   14,1  :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 55,4 55,1 55,0 56,3 55,9  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 28,2 28,5 28,5 28,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 71,8 71,5 71,5 71,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 66,5 66,3 66,5 66,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43,4 43,7 40,1 46,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,6 42,9 40,1 43,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 27,8 28,2 28,1 28,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 7,9 7,3 5,3 5,9 6,7  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 8,9 6,0 1,9 6,7 5,6  :    :    :    :   
GDP 10,3 7,3 7,9 7,7 8,8 8,1 8,0 10,8 8,0
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 13,6 12,2 10,3 8,2 6,2  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) 2,2 2,1 2,2 1,9 2,6  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) -1,1 1,2 2,7 3,8 5,8 4,4 5,0 5,9 7,9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0,7 0,7 1,3 2,4 5,2 3,9 4,4 5,5 7,0
GDP deflator -0,9 2,7 5,7 6,6 8,6 8,1 9,2 6,3 10,6
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 6,6 7,3 -8,1 7,1 -2,5 -10,1  :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 0,0 2,5 7,7 6,3 6,1 10,2  :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 4,1 3,1 6,6 5,4 4,9  :    :    :    :   
Construction -2,1 14,7 18,9 17,2 11,2 14,2  :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 1,0 5,8 7,0 9,7 10,3 6,2  :    :    :   
Finance and business services 4,3 2,7 16,1 13,7 12,9 9,7  :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,8 7,1 6,8 10,1 10,0  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 1,5 3,1 2,8 6,9  :   6,6  :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 9,1 10,9 11,5 15,2 14,1 0,0  :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 12,1 20,7 4,1 6,3 23,9 14,0  :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 14,5 16,8 12,2 14,9 10,9 13,1  :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 17,1 19,7 10,6 16,5 10,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction 4,1 12,3 17,1 25,4 14,6 23,7  :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 7,3 8,3 16,2 9,0 19,7 12,7  :    :    :   
Finance and business services 12,0 9,7 16,1 2,8 20,9 11,3  :    :    :   
Non-market related services 6,4 8,0 5,0 21,2 9,3  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 5,2 12,5 13,2 -0,7 27,1 26,8 21,8 33,9 8,7
Industry excluding construction 14,5 14,0 4,2 8,1 4,5 2,6 2,4 8,9 4,4
          of which: manufacturing 12,5 16,0 3,8 10,6 5,0 3,5 3,6 11,7 1,2
Construction 6,4 -2,1 -1,5 7,0 3,1 8,3 5,5 -0,2 1,4
Trade, transport and 6,2 2,3 8,6 -0,6 8,5 6,1 5,1 7,9 15,9
Finance and business services 7,4 6,8 0,0 -9,6 7,1 1,5 9,8 11,1 4,6
Non-market related services 3,5 0,8 -1,7 10,1 -0,6 3,6 -5,4 -5,8 6,4
Market-related sectors 8,6 9,0 7,3 3,6 8,4 6,8 7,8 9,5 9,2
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Luxembourg
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 443 446 450 456 465 1,8 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 300 301 304 307 316 2,9 %
as % of total population 67,7 67,5 67,6 67,2 68,0 0,8 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 193 198 202 205 211 3,2 %
Male 114 115 116 115 118 2,5 %
Female 79 83 86 90 94 4,1 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 64,6 65,8 66,6 66,7 66,9 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,3 28,1 28,8 27,8 26,5 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,4 83,0 83,9 84,5 84,8 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,7 30,8 32,4 33,7 32,7 -1,0 p.p.
Male 75,5 75,6 76,0 75,3 75,0 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,0 29,3 32,2 30,5 30,7 0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94,1 95,3 95,5 95,3 94,9 -0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40,3 38,8 39,7 38,8 36,5 -2,3 p.p.
Female 53,4 55,9 57,0 58,2 58,9 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,6 26,2 25,4 24,8 22,5 -2,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 66,5 70,4 72,2 73,8 74,7 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 21,1 22,6 25,1 28,7 29,1 0,3 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62,2 62,5 63,6 63,5 64,2 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27,1 23,2 25,0 23,2 22,5 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77,9 79,3 80,6 81,0 81,9 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,3 30,3 31,8 33,1 32,0 -1,0 p.p.
Male 73,2 72,8 73,3 72,7 72,3 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28,2 26,2 28,4 25,6 26,5 1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,7 92,2 92,8 92,7 92,2 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39,8 38,4 38,1 38,8 35,5 -3,2 p.p.
Female 50,9 51,8 53,7 54,6 56,1 1,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26,0 20,6 21,5 21,4 18,5 -2,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 63,8 66,2 68,4 69,4 71,7 2,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 20,6 22,1 24,7 27,9 28,5 0,6 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 186 188 193 195 203 8 Th.
Male (as % of total) 59,4 58,9 58,1 56,8 56,0 -0,8 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 40,6 41,1 41,9 43,2 44,0 0,8 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,8 2,2 2,9 3,7 4,2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0,7 1,0 2,8 0,9 3,9 p.p.
Male -1,4 0,2 1,4 -1,3 2,4 p.p.
Female 0,5 2,1 4,8 4,1 5,8 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 6,0 4,9 4,9 4,9 4,1 -0,8 p.p.
Male 6,2 5,4 5,0 5,2 4,2 -1,0 p.p.
Female 5,7 4,3 4,8 4,5 3,9 -0,6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 3,1 4,8 5,3 6,1 6,8 0,7 p.p.
Male 2,4 4,1 4,9 5,7 6,2 0,5 p.p.
Female 4,2 5,8 5,8 6,6 7,6 1,0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 13,4 16,3 17,4 17,1 17,8 0,6 p.p.
Male 1,5 2,3 2,4 2,6 2,6 -0,1 p.p.
Female 30,7 36,4 38,2 36,2 37,1 0,9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 3,7 5,1 4,5 4,7 4,7 0,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 10,5 17,6 13,4 16,4 15,1 -1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,2 4,5 3,9 4,1 3,4 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1,4 1,4 2,0 1,8 1,9 0,1 p.p.
Male 3,0 3,7 3,5 3,5 4,0 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 9,0 10,7 11,9 16,3 13,6 -2,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 2,6 3,3 2,8 2,8 2,9 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1,1 1,1 4,2 0,0 2,6 2,6 p.p.
Female 4,7 7,1 5,8 6,2 5,7 -0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 12,2 21,5 15,4 13,8 17,8 4,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,0 6,0 5,3 5,9 4,0 -1,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,1 2,0 1,7 2,8 1,8 -1,1 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 24,7 21,0 26,4 29,5 28,5 -1,1 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,9 38,2 37,9 37,6 37,6 -0,1 %
Male 40,7 41,4 41,2 40,8 40,8 -0,1 %
Female 33,6 33,3 33,0 33,0 33,2 0,5 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 4,9 0,0 0,0 7,0 2,2 p.p.
Building and construction 2,8 2,0 3,7 7,7 5,1 p.p.
Services 2,3 2,7 3,2 3,4 4,6 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,4 -0,3 0,3 2,1 0,0 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Luxembourg
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,2 3,9 3,8 4,5 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3,6 6,0 5,0 2,6 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,8 2,5 4,1 2,5 2,0 2,2 1,9 2,2 1,7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1,9 1,3 1,7 2,2 3,2  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -3,0 -0,4 -2,4 -3,8 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 0,3 3,6 2,0 3,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3,9 2,7 2,8 2,7 4,0  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 57,9 58,1 56,7 54,1 54,7  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 15,6 16,2 16,2 16,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 84,4 83,8 83,8 83,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 71,6 71,0 71,0 71,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 33,0 33,4 34,2 34,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 25,0 25,5 26,5 27,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 14,1 15,4 15,4 15,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) : 0,9 0,9 0,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0,3 2,6 2,1 2,3 0,2  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,5 4,5 3,1 0,2 -0,5  :    :    :    :   
GDP 2,1 4,9 5,0 6,1 4,5 5,9 4,4 4,2 3,4
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 3,4 3,8 3,9 4,2 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,4 -0,7 -0,9 -0,3 0,3  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,5 3,2 3,8 3,0 2,7 2,2 2,3 2,1 4,0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,8 2,5 2,5 2,3 2,6 2,4 2,6 2,5 2,9
GDP deflator 5,0 1,7 4,2 6,2 2,2 2,2 2,9 -0,2 3,8
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 21,6 -8,1 10,8 73,8 10,3  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,2 -3,0 4,7 3,6 1,5  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 2,9 -3,0 5,0 3,3 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Construction 6,5 -0,4 -1,5 17,8 5,4  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 4,5 -0,5 0,6 2,1 2,0  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -1,1 3,1 0,4 -0,2 5,1  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,7 5,9 6,1 3,1 2,1  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 0,7 0,9 0,7 -0,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2,3 4,1 3,6 4,7 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 7,2 -13,7 2,2 31,8 10,1  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 5,1 3,5 4,1 3,3 3,5  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 4,1 3,7 3,8 4,1 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,5 2,5 2,5 2,4 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 4,5 4,5 3,7 1,4 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -0,2 3,3 4,3 10,0 3,0  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 4,1 5,7 2,6 2,6 2,6  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -11,9 -6,1 -7,7 -24,2 -0,1 -0,4 2,2 -4,2 -8,4
Industry excluding construction 2,9 6,7 -0,7 -0,4 2,0 4,7 3,2 -0,1 -1,5
          of which: manufacturing 1,1 7,0 -1,2 0,8 0,2 6,1 3,1 -2,1 -6,5
Construction -0,9 2,9 4,0 -13,1 -1,0 1,5 -3,3 -6,2 -4,8
Trade, transport and 0,0 5,1 3,1 -0,6 1,4 -0,1 0,6 1,7 0,3
Finance and business services 0,9 0,2 3,8 10,2 -2,0 1,1 -1,8 -2,1 -2,7
Non-market related services 1,4 -0,2 -3,3 -0,5 0,5 0,8 0,5 -1,0 -0,1
Market-related sectors 0,7 3,1 3,1 3,0 0,6 2,1 0,1 -0,4 -1,2
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Hungary
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 9980 9944 9931 9921 9907 -0,1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 6836 6826 6815 6816 6800 -0,2 %
as % of total population 68,5 68,6 68,6 68,7 68,6 -0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 4142 4127 4180 4222 4209 -0,3 %
Male 2251 2239 2260 2286 2290 0,1 %
Female 1890 1888 1920 1936 1919 -0,9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 60,6 60,5 61,3 62,0 61,9 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,9 27,9 27,1 26,8 25,6 -1,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77,8 77,9 78,7 79,6 80,0 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 29,8 32,0 34,3 34,9 34,5 -0,4 p.p.
Male 67,6 67,2 67,9 68,7 69,0 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,6 31,4 30,3 30,1 29,3 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84,8 85,0 85,5 86,5 86,9 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38,9 39,7 42,4 43,1 43,6 0,5 p.p.
Female 53,9 54,0 55,1 55,5 55,1 -0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27,3 24,3 23,8 23,4 21,8 -1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 71,0 70,9 72,1 72,9 73,2 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 22,4 25,8 27,7 28,2 27,3 -1,0 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 57,0 56,8 56,9 57,3 57,3 0,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26,8 23,6 21,8 21,7 21,0 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,7 73,6 73,7 74,2 74,6 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 28,9 31,1 33,0 33,6 33,1 -0,5 p.p.
Male 63,5 63,1 63,1 63,8 64,0 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,8 26,3 24,4 24,5 24,2 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,1 80,5 80,3 81,0 81,3 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 37,8 38,4 40,6 41,4 41,7 0,2 p.p.
Female 50,9 50,7 51,0 51,1 50,9 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 23,8 20,8 19,2 18,8 17,8 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67,4 67,0 67,2 67,6 67,9 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 21,8 25,0 26,7 27,1 26,2 -0,9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 3897 3875 3879 3906 3897 -9 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,2 54,2 54,2 54,3 54,5 0,2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,8 45,8 45,8 45,7 45,5 -0,2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,3 -0,7 0,0 0,7 -0,1 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1,2 -0,6 0,1 0,7 -0,2 p.p.
Male 0,6 -0,5 0,0 1,0 0,2 p.p.
Female 2,0 -0,7 0,3 0,4 -0,7 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 7,6 7,7 7,3 6,6 6,6 -0,1 p.p.
Male 9,4 9,5 8,8 8,1 7,8 -0,3 p.p.
Female 5,4 5,7 5,5 4,9 5,2 0,3 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 7,5 6,8 7,0 6,7 7,3 0,6 p.p.
Male 8,3 7,5 7,5 7,3 7,7 0,4 p.p.
Female 6,6 6,1 6,4 6,0 6,8 0,8 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 3,7 4,4 3,9 3,8 3,9 0,1 p.p.
Male 2,2 3,0 2,4 2,4 2,5 0,1 p.p.
Female 5,6 6,0 5,6 5,4 5,5 0,1 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 5,9 6,1 7,2 7,5 7,4 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13,3 15,5 19,4 19,1 18,0 -1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,3 5,4 6,4 6,8 6,8 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,8 3,1 3,9 3,9 4,2 0,3 p.p.
Male 6,1 6,1 7,0 7,2 7,1 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13,8 16,3 19,6 18,5 17,6 -0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,5 5,3 6,0 6,4 6,5 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,9 3,3 4,2 4,0 4,5 0,5 p.p.
Female 5,6 6,1 7,4 7,8 7,7 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 12,9 14,4 19,1 19,8 18,6 -1,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,0 5,6 6,8 7,2 7,2 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,7 2,8 3,5 3,9 3,9 0,0 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 41,3 44,0 45,1 45,1 46,9 1,8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40,8 40,6 40,3 40,2 39,9 -0,7 %
Male 42,3 41,9 41,5 41,3 41,0 -0,7 %
Female 39,1 39,0 38,8 38,8 38,6 -0,5 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -10,8 -4,9 -4,9 -1,2 -3,9 p.p.
Building and construction 10,9 3,1 1,7 1,5 2,7 p.p.
Services 3,9 0,5 1,1 1,1 -0,3 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3,6 -3,6 -2,8 -0,6 0,6 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Hungary
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 9,4 11,3 7,4 4,7 8,4  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 11,5 10,3 8,1 6,2 8,9  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 6,1 8,7 7,2 9,0 9,6 10,2 11,9 9,3 7,8
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 6,4 5,5 3,1 1,4 6,8  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0,5 1,1 0,9 -2,3 1,5  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 61,6 62,4 62,6 60,6 61,8  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 30,7 30,6 29,6 30,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 69,3 69,4 70,4 69,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 65,8 65,7 66,2 65,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 50,8 51,8 50,5 51,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45,1 46,4 45,2 45,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 28,1 27,8 27,4 26,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2,6 2,8 2,1 4,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2,8 5,5 4,1 3,3 1,5  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 4,3 5,6 4,2 3,5 1,6  :    :    :    :   
GDP 4,2 4,8 4,1 3,9 1,3 2,7 1,2 0,9 0,8
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 5,4 5,7 6,2 6,8 7,3  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,6 0,4 1,0 1,8 0,2  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 4,7 6,8 3,5 4,0 7,9 8,8 8,5 7,3 7,1
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 4,9 6,4 2,7 2,5 6,7 6,7 7,2 6,7 6,2
GDP deflator 5,8 4,4 2,2 3,9 5,2 7,9 5,0 3,2 6,0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -16,9 -38,7 1,4 6,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -5,2 7,1 4,4 -7,9  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -2,5 6,6 1,2 -2,5 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction 8,5 10,0 9,1 2,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 1,7 17,3 1,3 -5,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 6,4 -1,1 9,1 -7,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 9,2 9,1 5,2 -3,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 4,8 12,2 8,9 -1,7 14,0  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery -6,9 -1,3 5,3 0,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 4,6 15,3 10,7 -2,6  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 8,4 14,9 9,5 4,2 7,9  :    :    :    :   
Construction -5,6 10,3 10,9 1,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 6,8 22,9 1,5 0,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 0,2 -1,8 16,2 -3,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 6,4 9,7 9,9 -3,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 12,0 61,1 3,8 -6,1 -10,7 0,0 -7,9 -14,3 -12,9
Industry excluding construction 10,3 7,7 6,0 5,8 6,2 5,4 4,6 7,8 6,5
          of which: manufacturing 11,2 7,8 8,2 6,9 6,9 6,7 4,4 7,7 6,1
Construction -13,0 0,3 1,6 -1,1 -14,1 -8,9 -8,3 -17,8 -15,5
Trade, transport and 5,1 4,8 0,2 6,0 1,8 2,9 0,7 -0,6 3,8
Finance and business services -5,8 -0,7 6,5 4,0 1,6 2,6 0,7 1,6 0,8
Non-market related services -2,6 0,5 4,4 0,1 0,6 0,9 0,3 1,7 0,0
Market-related sectors 4,4 8,0 3,7 4,0 1,2 2,6 0,8 -0,1 1,9
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Malta
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 399 400 402 405 407 0,4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 271 272 274 276 278 0,6 %
as % of total population 68,0 68,1 68,1 68,2 68,3 0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 159 158 159 163 166 1,3 %
Male 109 110 109 111 110 -0,4 %
Female 50 49 50 53 55 4,8 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 58,6 58,2 58,2 59,2 59,5 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 56,4 55,3 54,4 53,3 53,1 -0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 65,4 65,3 65,7 68,0 69,0 1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,3 32,3 31,9 30,8 29,5 -1,3 p.p.
Male 80,2 80,2 79,1 79,7 78,9 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 58,8 59,9 56,3 57,3 56,5 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 93,5 93,3 93,2 94,1 94,0 -0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55,5 54,8 53,1 51,6 47,7 -4,0 p.p.
Female 36,8 36,0 36,9 38,3 39,9 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 54,0 50,6 52,4 49,1 49,5 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 36,8 36,8 37,6 41,2 43,3 2,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 13,0 12,0 12,5 11,7 12,4 0,7 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 54,2 54,0 53,9 54,8 55,7 0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47,2 46,2 45,4 44,7 46,0 1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 61,8 62,1 62,4 64,4 65,6 1,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32,6 31,5 30,8 30,1 28,3 -1,8 p.p.
Male 74,5 75,0 73,8 74,5 74,2 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 49,1 50,3 46,6 47,4 47,9 0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 88,4 88,8 88,9 89,8 90,1 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53,8 53,5 50,8 50,4 46,3 -4,1 p.p.
Female 33,6 32,7 33,7 34,9 36,9 2,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 45,3 41,7 43,9 42,0 44,0 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 34,7 34,8 35,4 38,4 40,6 2,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 13,0 11,5 12,5 11,3 11,7 0,4 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 147 147 148 152 155 3 Th.
Male (as % of total) 69,2 69,8 68,9 68,4 67,1 -1,3 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 30,8 30,2 31,1 31,6 32,9 1,3 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,0 -0,6 1,3 1,2 2,7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0,2 0,0 0,5 2,7 2,1 p.p.
Male 0,4 0,9 -0,7 1,8 0,3 p.p.
Female -0,1 -2,0 3,3 4,6 6,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9,3 9,3 9,0 9,1 9,0 -0,1 p.p.
Male 11,0 11,5 11,2 11,4 10,8 -0,5 p.p.
Female 5,5 4,1 6,0 4,2 5,3 1,1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 3,6 3,8 4,5 3,8 5,2 1,4 p.p.
Male 3,4 3,4 3,6 2,7 3,8 1,1 p.p.
Female 4,8 5,7 6,2 6,0 8,0 2,0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8,8 8,3 9,4 9,9 10,9 1,0 p.p.
Male 3,4 3,7 4,2 4,4 4,0 -0,4 p.p.
Female 21,1 19,0 20,9 21,8 24,9 3,1 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 7,6 7,4 7,3 7,3 6,4 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16,3 16,5 16,6 16,1 13,3 -2,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,5 5,0 5,0 5,3 4,9 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,2 2,3 3,4 2,4 4,1 1,7 p.p.
Male 6,9 6,6 6,5 6,5 5,8 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16,5 15,9 17,2 17,3 15,2 -2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,4 4,8 4,6 4,6 4,2 -0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,0 2,3 4,3 2,4 2,9 0,5 p.p.
Female 9,1 9,0 9,0 8,9 7,6 -1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16,1 17,6 16,3 14,4 11,1 -3,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,6 5,5 5,9 7,0 6,3 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 0,0 3,9 0,0 4,0 5,6 1,6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 41,6 46,7 46,4 40,2 41,0 0,8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,7 40,0 39,2 38,7 38,9 0,5 %
Male 39,9 41,6 41,2 40,3 41,0 1,7 %
Female 32,8 36,2 34,4 34,8 34,2 -1,7 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture : : : : : p.p.
Building and construction : : : : : p.p.
Services : : : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry : : : : : p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Malta
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 4,6 1,3 2,0 3,3 1,5  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 5,1 -0,7 4,8 3,6 3,4  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2,0 7,4 1,9 2,4 1,5 3,1 4,2 -1,8 0,7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 6,0 0,5 -0,1 1,0 0,5  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 3,0 -1,2 -3,0 -1,8 -1,8  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 59,2 60,0 58,3 57,5 56,3  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 7,7 7,9 8,0 6,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 92,3 92,1 92,0 93,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 23,2 23,6 23,9 24,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 23,2 23,6 23,9 24,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 7,7 7,9 8,0 6,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) -1,3 0,8 2,0 2,2 1,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity -0,5 -0,9 4,9 2,5 2,9  :    :    :    :   
GDP -0,3 0,2 3,4 3,4 3,8 3,9 3,5 4,0 3,7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7,4 7,3 7,2 7,0 6,7  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,4 -3,2 -2,1 -1,0 -0,1  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,9 2,7 2,5 2,6 0,7 0,8 -0,9 0,4 2,5
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,9 2,9 1,9 1,8 0,8 1,2 -0,4 0,2 2,0
GDP deflator 3,0 1,7 3,0 2,9 2,3 2,8 2,1 2,4 1,9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 0,2 0,7 2,1 3,7 0,9  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Netherlands
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 16037 16119 16107 16142 16180 0,2 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 10920 10960 10943 10964 10986 0,2 %
as % of total population 68,1 68,0 67,9 67,9 67,9 0,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 8350 8398 8414 8484 8622 1,6 %
Male 4644 4650 4618 4636 4680 0,9 %
Female 3706 3747 3796 3848 3942 2,4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 76,5 76,6 76,9 77,4 78,5 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 72,9 71,6 71,0 70,8 72,7 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,3 85,9 86,5 87,1 87,6 0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 45,5 46,9 48,1 49,6 52,8 3,2 p.p.
Male 84,0 83,9 83,7 83,9 84,6 0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 73,5 72,0 71,2 71,5 73,0 1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 93,5 93,7 93,8 94,1 94,0 -0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 58,2 59,1 59,5 60,4 64,0 3,6 p.p.
Female 68,7 69,2 70,0 70,7 72,2 1,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 72,3 71,1 70,8 70,1 72,4 2,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77,0 78,0 79,0 80,1 81,2 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32,6 34,4 36,5 38,6 41,4 2,8 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 73,6 73,1 73,2 74,3 76,0 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 68,3 65,9 65,2 66,2 68,4 2,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82,6 82,5 82,9 84,2 85,4 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,3 45,2 46,1 47,7 50,9 3,2 p.p.
Male 81,1 80,2 79,9 80,9 82,2 1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 68,9 66,3 65,5 67,2 68,9 1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90,6 90,2 90,3 91,4 92,1 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 56,7 56,9 56,9 58,0 61,5 3,6 p.p.
Female 66,0 65,8 66,4 67,7 69,6 1,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 67,8 65,4 64,9 65,1 67,9 2,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74,4 74,6 75,5 77,0 78,7 1,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 31,8 33,4 35,2 37,2 40,1 2,8 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 8042 8014 8013 8152 8345 193 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55,7 55,5 55,0 54,8 54,5 -0,4 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 44,3 44,5 45,0 45,2 45,5 0,4 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0,5 -0,9 0,2 1,8 2,4 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0,6 -0,3 0,0 1,7 2,4 p.p.
Male -1,2 -0,7 -0,8 1,4 1,7 p.p.
Female 0,3 0,1 1,0 2,2 3,2 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,8 8,1 0,3 p.p.
Male 8,0 8,1 8,4 8,8 9,2 0,5 p.p.
Female 5,9 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,8 0,2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 14,4 14,6 15,4 16,4 17,9 1,5 p.p.
Male 12,7 13,3 14,1 15,2 16,5 1,3 p.p.
Female 16,3 16,3 16,9 17,9 19,6 1,7 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 44,6 45,1 45,7 45,8 46,3 0,6 p.p.
Male 21,3 21,5 21,8 22,1 22,5 0,4 p.p.
Female 74,0 74,6 75,0 74,5 74,8 0,3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 3,7 4,6 4,7 3,9 3,2 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 6,3 8,0 8,2 6,6 5,9 -0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,3 4,0 4,1 3,3 2,5 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,6 3,5 4,1 3,8 3,6 -0,2 p.p.
Male 3,5 4,3 4,4 3,5 2,8 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 6,3 7,9 8,0 6,1 5,6 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,1 3,7 3,8 2,9 2,0 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,6 3,8 4,4 4,1 3,9 -0,2 p.p.
Female 3,9 4,8 5,1 4,4 3,6 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 6,3 8,1 8,4 7,1 6,2 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,4 4,2 4,5 3,8 3,1 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,4 2,9 3,6 3,4 3,2 -0,2 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 27,6 34,1 40,3 42,9 39,4 -3,5 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 31,5 31,5 31,6 31,9 31,8 -0,4 %
Male 36,8 36,8 37,0 37,2 37,1 -0,3 %
Female 24,6 24,5 24,7 25,1 25,1 0,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -1,6 -2,6 -0,5 -2,0 : p.p.
Building and construction -3,9 -1,8 0,8 3,3 : p.p.
Services 0,3 -0,4 0,6 2,3 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3,2 -3,1 -2,1 -0,8 -0,2 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Netherlands
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3,4 3,4 1,0 2,2 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 4,0 3,2 1,2 2,1 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,8 3,0 2,9 1,1 3,3 1,7 2,3 2,7 5,0
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,5 0,2 -0,3 1,1 1,7  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0,3 -0,5 -2,3 -0,8 0,5  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries -1,2 0,4 0,8 2,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3,0 1,0 -0,1 1,1 1,6  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66,9 66,7 65,4 65,1 65,4  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 22,6 23,5 23,1  :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 77,4 76,5 76,9 : :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 67,1 66,3 66,6 : :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37,1 38,8 38,9 44,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 34,4 35,9 35,9 41,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 20,6 21,4 21,0 : :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2,0 2,1 2,1 : :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0,8 3,1 1,3 1,1 1,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,4 3,3 1,8 1,2 1,1  :    :    :    :   
GDP 0,3 2,2 1,5 3,0 3,5 2,5 2,6 4,2 4,5
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 3,0 3,2 3,3 3,2 3,2  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -2,1 -1,6 -2,0 -1,1 0,3  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,9 1,3 1,7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,1 1,3 0,6 0,8 1,3 1,2 1,6 1,3 1,2
GDP deflator 2,2 0,7 2,1 1,9 1,2 1,7 1,2 1,0 0,8
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -0,7 -8,0 -2,3 1,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,2 -3,0 -0,4 0,7  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 1,9 -2,4 -1,4 -0,3 0,1  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,6 5,5 -0,8 1,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -0,8 -0,9 -2,5 -2,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 2,4 0,6 0,4 3,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 3,8 2,5 1,4 1,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 1,5 -1,6 -1,1 -0,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3,4 3,4 1,0 2,2 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 5,2 -0,1 -1,5 2,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 4,1 3,8 1,1 2,9  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 4,1 4,3 0,8 2,8 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Construction 4,0 4,3 1,3 2,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 2,5 3,7 1,2 2,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 4,6 3,8 0,0 1,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,9 2,8 1,5 2,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 6,0 8,5 0,8 0,3  :   1,6 -1,4 -0,1 1,3
Industry excluding construction 1,9 7,1 1,5 2,2  :   -4,4 -1,1 5,1 9,3
          of which: manufacturing 2,2 6,8 2,2 3,1 2,7 4,9 2,5 2,0 0,7
Construction -1,5 -1,1 2,1 0,9  :   6,1 4,1 4,9 4,0
Trade, transport and 3,3 4,6 3,8 4,6  :   3,0 1,0 2,2 1,3
Finance and business services 2,1 3,2 -0,4 -2,5  :   -0,7 -1,2 0,0 -0,3
Non-market related services -0,8 0,3 0,1 0,4  :   0,6 0,7 1,2 1,5
Market-related sectors 2,1 4,4 1,6 1,2  :   0,0 -0,1 2,1 2,7
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Austria
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 7998 8045 8109 8155 8191 0,4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 5459 5485 5516 5532 5551 0,3 %
as % of total population 68,3 68,2 68,0 67,8 67,8 -0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 3933 3911 3994 4077 4148 1,8 %
Male 2171 2141 2177 2215 2257 1,9 %
Female 1762 1770 1816 1862 1891 1,6 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 72,0 71,3 72,4 73,7 74,7 1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 55,0 57,4 59,2 59,4 60,8 1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,3 86,3 86,4 87,1 87,4 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32,0 29,9 33,0 36,8 39,8 3,0 p.p.
Male 79,9 78,5 79,3 80,5 81,7 1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 60,3 61,7 63,6 63,9 65,0 1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94,6 92,9 92,8 93,2 93,7 0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,9 40,6 43,0 47,3 51,3 4,0 p.p.
Female 64,3 64,2 65,6 67,0 67,8 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 49,8 53,3 54,8 55,1 56,7 1,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,9 79,6 79,9 80,9 81,1 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 21,7 19,9 23,5 26,9 28,9 2,0 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 68,9 67,8 68,6 70,2 71,4 1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 51,1 51,9 53,1 54,0 55,5 1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84,0 82,6 82,6 83,5 84,0 0,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,3 28,8 31,8 35,5 38,6 3,1 p.p.
Male 76,4 74,9 75,4 76,9 78,4 1,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 55,7 56,0 56,8 58,2 59,6 1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,1 89,4 89,1 89,9 90,6 0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40,4 38,9 41,3 45,3 49,8 4,5 p.p.
Female 61,6 60,7 62,0 63,5 64,4 1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 46,5 47,9 49,4 49,9 51,5 1,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,9 75,8 76,0 77,0 77,5 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 20,8 19,3 22,9 26,3 28,0 1,7 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 3763 3716 3786 3881 3963 82 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55,2 55,0 54,7 54,6 54,7 0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 44,8 45,0 45,3 45,4 45,3 -0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,2 0,6 1,3 1,0 1,9 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 2,2 -1,3 1,9 2,5 2,1 p.p.
Male 2,5 -1,6 1,3 2,3 2,3 p.p.
Female 1,9 -0,8 2,6 2,7 1,8 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5,7 7,0 6,9 6,8 6,6 -0,2 p.p.
Male 6,1 7,7 7,3 7,3 6,9 -0,5 p.p.
Female 5,3 6,3 6,4 6,3 6,3 0,0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 6,9 9,7 9,1 9,0 8,9 -0,1 p.p.
Male 7,1 10,2 9,3 9,1 8,9 -0,3 p.p.
Female 6,8 9,0 8,8 9,0 9,0 0,1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 18,4 19,4 20,8 21,3 21,8 0,6 p.p.
Male 4,3 4,5 5,6 5,8 6,2 0,4 p.p.
Female 35,8 37,7 39,1 39,9 40,7 0,9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4,3 4,8 5,2 4,7 4,4 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 7,0 9,7 10,3 9,1 8,7 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,8 4,2 4,4 4,1 3,8 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,3 3,8 3,6 3,6 3,0 -0,6 p.p.
Male 4,0 4,4 4,9 4,4 3,9 -0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 7,5 9,3 10,7 8,9 8,3 -0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,7 3,8 4,0 3,6 3,3 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,9 4,2 4,1 4,3 2,9 -1,4 p.p.
Female 4,7 5,3 5,5 5,2 5,0 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 6,5 10,1 9,9 9,3 9,1 -0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,9 4,8 4,9 4,8 4,5 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,4 3,1 2,7 2,3 3,1 0,8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 26,6 27,5 25,2 27,5 26,8 -0,7 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38,5 39,3 38,7 38,5 38,0 -1,2 %
Male 41,7 43,3 42,7 42,6 42,2 -1,1 %
Female 34,3 34,0 33,5 33,2 32,8 -1,4 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2,1 -3,2 -4,6 -1,7 : p.p.
Building and construction 4,4 -1,6 2,0 0,9 : p.p.
Services 0,2 0,9 0,9 2,4 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -1,5 -0,8 -0,1 0,7 0,6 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Austria
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,1 0,9 2,3 3,0 2,6  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 1,5 1,0 2,6 2,9 3,0  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 1,5 -1,3 3,1 1,7 3,2 3,3 3,0 3,3 3,5
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1,1 -0,7 1,6 0,7 1,2  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,1 -2,7 -0,2 -1,1 -1,1  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1,8 -0,4 1,5 1,5 1,3  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66,3 64,5 64,2 63,2 62,7  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 27,0 27,1 27,0 26,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73,0 72,9 73,0 73,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 63,5 63,4 63,5 63,7 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 47,4 48,1 47,9 48,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,0 43,0 42,9 43,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 24,1 24,2 24,2 24,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2,9 2,8 2,8 2,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1,0 1,7 0,7 2,3 1,4  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 0,7 1,4 1,0 2,0 1,6  :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,2 2,3 2,0 3,3 3,4 3,6 3,5 3,4 3,1
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 4,3 4,5 4,6 4,5 4,5  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,7 -1,4 -1,4 -0,2 0,9  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,3 2,0 2,1 1,7 2,2 1,8 1,9 2,0 3,2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,3 1,6 1,5 1,3 1,9 1,7 1,8 1,9 2,3
GDP deflator 1,2 2,1 1,8 1,8 2,3 2,4 1,9 2,4 2,6
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 1,1 -0,6 -0,1 -4,2 -1,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2,1 0,9 2,3 3,0 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,8 2,5 3,2 3,5 4,7  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing 1,7 3,1 3,3 8,1 6,6  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Poland
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 30952 31123 31258 37446 37277 -0,5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 26031 26142 26211 26325 26299 -0,1 %
as % of total population 84,1 84,0 83,9 70,3 70,5 0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 16644 16727 16873 16679 16610 -0,4 %
Male 9006 9077 9191 9127 9086 -0,5 %
Female 7638 7651 7682 7552 7524 -0,4 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 63,9 64,0 64,4 63,4 63,2 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,4 35,9 35,7 34,2 33,0 -1,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81,4 81,9 82,5 81,7 81,7 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,1 29,6 30,5 30,7 31,8 1,2 p.p.
Male 70,0 70,1 70,8 70,1 70,0 0,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,5 39,7 39,5 37,5 36,5 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,1 87,8 88,7 88,2 87,9 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39,7 39,1 40,9 42,6 44,7 2,2 p.p.
Female 58,0 57,9 58,1 56,8 56,5 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32,2 32,0 31,8 30,7 29,3 -1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 75,8 76,0 76,4 75,4 75,6 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 22,0 21,4 21,5 20,3 20,6 0,3 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 51,2 51,7 52,8 54,5 57,0 2,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21,2 21,7 22,5 24,0 25,8 1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67,5 68,2 69,6 71,8 74,9 3,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 26,9 26,2 27,2 28,1 29,7 1,6 p.p.
Male 56,5 57,2 58,9 60,9 63,6 2,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 23,9 24,8 25,4 26,9 29,2 2,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,0 73,9 76,1 78,3 81,1 2,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 35,2 34,1 35,9 38,4 41,4 3,0 p.p.
Female 46,0 46,2 46,8 48,2 50,6 2,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,4 18,6 19,6 21,0 22,4 1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 62,1 62,6 63,1 65,3 68,8 3,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 19,8 19,4 19,7 19,0 19,4 0,4 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 13324 13504 13834 14338 14996 658 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,6 54,8 55,2 55,3 55,1 -0,2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,4 45,2 44,8 44,7 44,9 0,2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -1,2 1,3 2,3 3,3 4,5 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -1,1 1,3 2,4 3,6 4,6 p.p.
Male -1,1 1,8 3,3 3,7 4,2 p.p.
Female -1,1 0,8 1,4 3,6 5,1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 17,4 16,7 16,0 15,3 14,7 -0,6 p.p.
Male 20,3 19,3 18,6 17,9 17,2 -0,7 p.p.
Female 14,0 13,5 12,8 12,2 11,7 -0,6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 19,3 22,6 25,6 27,2 28,2 0,9 p.p.
Male 20,7 23,6 26,4 28,4 28,4 0,1 p.p.
Female 17,8 21,5 24,6 25,9 27,9 2,0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 9,4 9,8 9,8 8,9 8,5 -0,4 p.p.
Male 7,2 7,2 7,0 6,2 5,8 -0,4 p.p.
Female 12,1 12,9 13,3 12,2 11,7 -0,5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 19,6 19,0 17,7 13,8 9,6 -4,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41,9 39,5 36,9 29,8 21,7 -8,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 17,1 16,7 15,7 12,2 8,4 -3,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 10,7 11,4 10,8 8,5 6,8 -1,7 p.p.
Male 19,0 18,2 16,6 13,0 9,0 -4,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,9 37,7 35,7 28,3 20,0 -8,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 16,2 15,8 14,3 11,2 7,7 -3,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11,3 12,6 12,2 9,8 7,4 -2,4 p.p.
Female 20,4 19,9 19,1 14,9 10,3 -4,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43,1 42,0 38,3 31,6 23,8 -7,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 18,0 17,7 17,4 13,4 9,0 -4,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9,9 9,4 8,4 6,2 5,7 -0,4 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 56,0 54,1 57,7 56,2 51,2 -5,0 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40,4 40,4 40,3 40,3 40,3 0,0 %
Male 42,6 42,7 42,5 42,5 42,4 -0,1 %
Female 37,6 37,5 37,4 37,5 37,6 0,1 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -1,2 1,3 2,3 3,3 : p.p.
Building and construction -1,2 1,3 2,3 3,2 : p.p.
Services -1,2 1,3 2,3 3,3 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -0,8 2,1 3,2 3,3 5,9 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Poland
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 1,7 1,8 1,6 1,9 8,1  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2,7 2,6 2,3 4,1 9,5  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,5 3,5 3,7 5,9 11,3 10,0 11,0 11,8 11,9
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs -3,2 -2,1 0,3 -1,0 6,1  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -3,6 -6,0 -2,3 -2,4 3,0  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 2,4 4,2 4,2  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 60,2 56,0 55,3 54,4 56,1  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  : 19,8 19,8  :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL : 80,2 80,2 : :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) : 74,2 74,2 : :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43,1 43,3 43,6 43,7 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 43,1 43,3 43,6 43,7 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) : 16,6 16,6 : :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) : 3,3 3,3 : :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 5,1 4,0 1,3 2,9 1,9  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 4,9 4,0 0,7 3,4 2,0  :    :    :    :   
GDP 3,9 5,3 3,6 6,2 6,5 6,8 6,7 5,8 7,2
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 18,2 17,7 16,3 14,1 11,5  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,0 0,4 -0,4 0,6 1,2  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 0,7 3,6 2,2 1,3 2,6 2,0 2,3 2,4 3,7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 0,6 2,8 1,2 0,6 2,0 1,2 1,7 2,2 3,0
GDP deflator 0,4 4,1 2,6 1,5 3,0 3,2 3,3 4,2 2,2
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -41,7 -1,4 15,2 -3,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -17,6 -7,6 12,8 -2,5  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -9,6 -6,7 -1,7 -11,4 5,4  :    :    :    :   
Construction -20,8 -0,9 10,9 2,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -9,8 -8,0 12,9 7,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -16,8 -0,3 12,6 10,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services -11,4 0,1 18,2 7,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries -9,5 1,0 16,6 7,9 11,3  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 2,0 5,8 14,1 -6,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -9,7 1,4 15,9 6,0  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 0,7 3,0 -0,8 -0,1 9,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction -16,0 8,2 19,0 6,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and -9,1 -2,7 15,5 10,1  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -15,4 2,0 14,9 12,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services -6,7 1,3 18,3 7,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 74,9 7,3 -1,0 -3,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 9,6 9,7 2,8 8,7  :    :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing 11,4 10,4 0,9 12,8 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 6,1 9,2 7,3 3,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 0,8 5,8 2,3 2,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,7 2,3 2,0 1,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 5,4 1,1 0,2 0,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 22,2 6,6 2,9 4,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Portugal
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 10435 10504 10563 10586 10604 0,2 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 7038 7084 7114 7116 7135 0,3 %
as % of total population 67,4 67,4 67,4 67,2 67,3 0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 5133 5170 5222 5258 5284 0,5 %
Male 2759 2768 2778 2796 2801 0,2 %
Female 2374 2403 2443 2462 2484 0,9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 72,9 73,0 73,4 73,9 74,1 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 45,4 43,8 43,0 42,7 41,9 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,9 86,3 87,1 87,7 87,8 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 54,0 53,2 53,8 53,5 54,4 1,0 p.p.
Male 79,6 79,1 79,0 79,5 79,4 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 49,2 47,9 47,0 46,6 45,3 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92,3 92,2 92,4 92,9 92,8 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 65,2 62,8 62,4 62,7 63,0 0,3 p.p.
Female 66,5 67,0 67,9 68,4 68,8 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41,5 39,5 38,8 38,7 38,4 -0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,7 80,6 81,8 82,7 82,8 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,0 44,8 46,1 45,1 46,7 1,6 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 68,1 67,8 67,5 67,9 67,8 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 38,8 37,1 36,1 35,8 34,9 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,9 81,1 80,8 81,3 81,0 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 51,6 50,3 50,5 50,1 50,9 0,8 p.p.
Male 75,0 74,2 73,4 73,9 73,8 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43,1 41,5 40,5 39,8 39,1 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,8 87,4 86,7 87,4 87,2 -0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 62,1 59,1 58,1 58,2 58,6 0,4 p.p.
Female 61,4 61,7 61,7 62,0 61,9 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,4 32,5 31,4 31,6 30,6 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74,3 74,9 74,9 75,3 74,9 -0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,4 42,5 43,7 42,8 44,0 1,2 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4792 4806 4800 4830 4837 6 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,2 54,0 53,8 53,9 53,9 0,0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,8 46,0 46,2 46,2 46,1 0,0 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0,4 0,1 0,0 0,7 0,2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0,4 0,3 -0,1 0,6 0,1 p.p.
Male -1,3 -0,1 -0,6 0,8 0,1 p.p.
Female 0,6 0,8 0,4 0,4 0,1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 15,1 14,4 14,1 13,6 13,5 -0,1 p.p.
Male 14,6 14,1 13,5 13,2 13,6 0,4 p.p.
Female 15,7 14,7 14,7 14,0 13,4 -0,6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 20,6 19,9 19,6 20,6 22,4 1,8 p.p.
Male 19,0 18,7 18,7 19,6 21,8 2,2 p.p.
Female 22,4 21,2 20,5 21,7 23,1 1,3 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 8,7 8,2 8,2 8,1 8,8 0,7 p.p.
Male 4,2 3,9 3,8 4,1 4,7 0,5 p.p.
Female 14,0 13,2 13,2 12,7 13,6 0,9 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 6,3 6,7 7,6 7,7 8,0 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 14,5 15,3 16,1 16,3 16,6 0,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,8 6,1 7,3 7,3 7,8 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,3 5,6 6,2 6,3 6,5 0,2 p.p.
Male 5,5 5,8 6,7 6,5 6,6 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 12,4 13,5 13,6 14,5 13,5 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,9 5,1 6,2 5,8 6,1 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,7 5,9 6,9 7,3 7,1 -0,1 p.p.
Female 7,2 7,6 8,7 9,0 9,6 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,0 17,6 19,1 18,4 20,3 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,7 7,1 8,4 9,0 9,6 0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,7 5,1 5,3 5,2 5,8 0,6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 34,9 44,2 48,1 50,2 47,1 -3,2 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 38,2 38,4 38,4 38,3 38,0 -0,9 %
Male 40,0 40,2 40,2 40,0 39,6 -0,9 %
Female 36,0 36,1 36,3 36,3 36,0 -1,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 0,8 -3,7 -1,9 -0,4 : p.p.
Building and construction -5,6 -6,1 1,1 -0,2 : p.p.
Services 1,8 3,0 1,4 1,0 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3,2 -1,6 -3,4 1,2 -2,7 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Portugal
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,8 2,6 2,9 2,4 2,1  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 4,5 2,8 4,4 3,5 1,7  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 2,4 3,3 2,0 1,7 3,9 2,9 3,7 4,0 4,7
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3,2 1,2 2,0 1,8 0,4  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 0,1 -1,2 -0,6 -1,0 -2,5  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 4,2 2,0 2,7 2,2 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 74,6 73,3 73,6 73,2 71,3  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 21,9 22,5 22,5 22,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 78,1 77,5 77,5 77,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 71,5 71,6 71,6 71,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 37,0 37,1 36,5 36,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 34,5 34,5 34,0 34,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 20,7 21,2 21,2 21,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1,1 1,3 1,3 1,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) -0,4 1,4 0,9 0,6 1,7  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,2 0,4 1,5 0,3 1,4  :    :    :    :   
GDP -0,8 1,5 0,9 1,3 1,9  :    :    :    :   
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 5,9 6,1 6,5 6,8 7,2  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,3 -1,3 -1,7 -1,6 -1,1  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 3,3 2,5 2,1 3,0 2,4 2,4 2,5 2,1 2,7
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 3,3 2,6 1,7 2,4 2,2 2,0 2,4 2,1 2,4
GDP deflator 3,2 2,4 2,5 2,7 3,0  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 3,1 3,4 0,4 2,3 -1,9  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3,5 2,6 3,5 3,0 2,4  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 5,4 5,3 2,9 2,8 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -3,3 10,1 -4,0 8,2 -3,5  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 3,2 3,3 1,7 1,4 4,0  :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing 2,2 1,9 2,5 0,5 5,9  :    :    :    :   
Construction -4,8 1,3 0,8 -2,9 -1,0  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and -2,7 0,9 0,2 0,7 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,2 -1,0 -0,8 2,3 -2,6  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 0,8 0,1 1,0 -1,3 1,4  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 0,0 2,3 1,1 1,7 1,9  :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Slovenia
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 1996 1997 1999 2006 2015 0,4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 1405 1405 1402 1407 1412 0,4 %
as % of total population 70,4 70,4 70,1 70,1 70,1 -0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 943 981 991 997 1007 0,9 %
Male 512 530 535 537 547 1,9 %
Female 431 450 456 461 460 -0,2 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 67,1 69,8 70,7 70,9 71,3 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 35,2 40,4 40,5 40,6 41,8 1,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,5 88,6 88,8 89,0 89,3 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 24,3 29,9 32,1 33,4 34,6 1,2 p.p.
Male 72,0 74,5 75,1 74,9 75,8 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,9 45,1 44,5 44,4 47,6 3,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90,6 91,0 91,1 91,0 91,3 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 34,5 42,5 45,4 45,8 46,7 0,9 p.p.
Female 62,1 65,0 66,1 66,7 66,6 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 30,3 35,3 36,3 36,4 35,4 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84,3 86,1 86,4 87,0 87,3 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 15,0 18,1 18,9 21,4 23,1 1,6 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62,6 65,3 66,0 66,6 67,8 1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,1 33,8 34,1 35,0 37,6 2,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 82,5 83,8 83,8 84,2 85,4 1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 23,5 29,0 30,7 32,6 33,4 0,9 p.p.
Male 67,4 70,0 70,4 71,1 72,7 1,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33,7 38,8 38,1 39,2 43,2 4,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,7 86,4 86,4 87,1 88,1 1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,2 40,9 43,1 44,5 45,2 0,7 p.p.
Female 57,6 60,5 61,3 61,8 62,6 0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24,3 28,6 29,8 30,3 31,4 1,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,3 81,2 81,1 81,2 82,4 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 14,7 17,8 18,5 20,9 22,2 1,2 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 879 917 925 937 957 20 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,5 54,3 54,3 54,4 54,8 0,4 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,5 45,7 45,7 45,6 45,2 -0,4 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0,4 0,3 0,2 1,2 2,7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -1,1 4,4 0,8 1,3 2,2 p.p.
Male -1,0 4,0 0,7 1,5 2,9 p.p.
Female -1,3 4,9 1,0 1,0 1,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 6,2 5,9 6,1 6,8 6,7 -0,1 p.p.
Male 8,3 7,8 8,2 9,5 8,8 -0,7 p.p.
Female 3,6 3,6 3,5 3,6 4,1 0,5 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 13,6 17,6 17,2 17,1 18,4 1,3 p.p.
Male 12,4 16,4 15,4 15,2 16,3 1,1 p.p.
Female 14,9 18,9 19,2 19,1 20,7 1,6 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 5,5 7,9 7,8 8,0 8,1 0,0 p.p.
Male 4,4 6,5 6,1 6,0 6,5 0,4 p.p.
Female 6,8 9,7 9,8 10,4 10,0 -0,4 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 6,7 6,3 6,5 6,0 4,8 -1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,3 16,2 16,0 13,9 10,1 -3,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,7 5,4 5,6 5,4 4,4 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,3 3,2 4,2 2,6 3,3 0,7 p.p.
Male 6,3 5,8 6,1 4,9 4,0 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15,5 13,9 14,6 11,6 9,3 -2,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,4 5,1 5,2 4,4 3,4 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,8 3,8 5,0 2,7 3,1 0,4 p.p.
Female 7,1 6,8 7,0 7,2 5,8 -1,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19,8 19,1 17,8 16,9 11,2 -5,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,0 5,8 6,2 6,6 5,6 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,0 1,7 2,4 2,3 3,8 1,6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 53,0 51,4 47,5 49,4 45,6 -3,8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40,8 40,2 40,2 39,5 39,6 0,2 %
Male 41,8 41,3 41,4 40,5 40,6 0,2 %
Female 39,6 38,9 38,7 38,2 38,2 0,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -3,5 -2,5 -2,6 -3,0 -2,7 p.p.
Building and construction -0,1 -1,6 4,4 6,7 10,8 p.p.
Services 1,2 1,8 1,2 2,6 3,5 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,2 -0,8 -2,0 -1,7 0,8 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Slovenia
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 7,9 7,8 5,3 5,5 6,2  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 7,9 10,1 5,3 4,7 6,7  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 8,1 7,3 5,0 6,3 5,4 4,8 5,7 7,3 4,2
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 4,5 3,5 1,3 0,9 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1,1 0,2 -0,3 -1,0 -1,0  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 73,4 73,4 73,1 71,8 71,0  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 19,3 17,5 17,8 17,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 80,7 82,5 82,2 82,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 65,3 65,8 65,6 65,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,5 42,6 42,4 44,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 40,1 40,2 39,2 38,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 14,3 13,0 13,2 13,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 5,0 4,5 4,6 4,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 3,2 4,1 4,0 4,5 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 2,8 6,3 3,7 3,5 3,3  :    :    :    :   
GDP 2,8 4,4 4,1 5,7 6,1 7,2 6,0 6,4 4,7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 6,1 5,9 5,7 5,5 5,3  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,8 -1,4 -1,3 0,2 1,4  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 5,7 3,7 2,5 2,5 3,8 2,6 3,2 3,7 5,5
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 6,3 3,7 1,3 1,5 3,4 2,6 2,6 3,7 4,5
GDP deflator 5,6 3,3 1,7 2,0 3,9 4,0 3,5 4,2 3,8
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 12,5 -9,2 2,7 6,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -2,6 1,2 0,0 -4,0  :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 0,6 3,6 0,2 -3,9 -0,7  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,9 8,5 6,2 -2,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -0,6 3,2 0,5 0,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,9 1,2 1,1 6,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,6 2,5 0,9 3,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 4,3 5,4 5,1 5,4 6,1  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery -2,2 7,7 0,4 5,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 4,5 6,2 5,8 5,9  :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 8,3 8,4 5,9 6,0 6,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction 6,1 10,2 6,5 6,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 3,2 7,3 4,7 5,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,8 3,4 6,1 5,5  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 3,4 3,2 2,9 3,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -13,1 18,6 -2,2 -0,5 -1,5 0,2 -0,7 -1,3 -2,5
Industry excluding construction 7,3 4,9 5,8 10,3 6,8 9,3 7,2 6,8 4,9
          of which: manufacturing 7,6 4,6 5,6 10,4 7,5 10,1 7,8 6,9  :   
Construction 3,1 1,6 0,3 8,8 6,9 17,1 13,7 5,4 -3,8
Trade, transport and 3,9 4,0 4,2 4,8 2,0 3,2 2,3 2,2 0,5
Finance and business services -0,1 2,2 5,0 -0,9 0,0 -0,9 -0,6 1,1 -0,1
Non-market related services 0,8 0,7 2,0 0,4 0,1 0,8 0,7 0,5 0,3
Market-related sectors 3,9 4,9 4,5 6,1 3,9 5,8 4,6 4,2 1,8
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Slovak Republic
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 5389 5370 5379 5389 5391 0,0 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 3733 3792 3824 3862 3873 0,3 %
as % of total population 69,3 70,6 71,1 71,7 71,8 0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 2614 2642 2636 2650 2646 -0,2 %
Male 1417 1437 1452 1468 1464 -0,3 %
Female 1198 1205 1184 1182 1182 0,0 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 70,0 69,7 68,9 68,6 68,3 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41,1 39,3 36,7 35,3 34,6 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89,5 88,9 88,0 87,6 86,9 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 28,5 31,7 35,0 36,7 38,8 2,2 p.p.
Male 76,7 76,5 76,5 76,4 75,9 -0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,9 42,9 40,7 39,7 38,9 -0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 94,1 93,8 93,8 94,0 93,1 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 48,1 51,9 55,1 55,2 57,0 1,8 p.p.
Female 63,5 63,0 61,5 60,9 60,8 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37,2 35,7 32,4 30,8 30,2 -0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84,8 84,1 82,1 81,2 80,7 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12,4 14,8 18,1 20,9 23,3 2,4 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 57,7 57,0 57,7 59,4 60,7 1,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 27,4 26,3 25,6 25,9 27,6 1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,0 74,7 75,3 77,2 78,0 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 24,6 26,8 30,3 33,1 35,6 2,6 p.p.
Male 63,3 63,2 64,6 67,0 68,4 1,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,3 28,0 28,1 29,2 30,9 1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,5 80,0 81,4 84,1 85,0 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41,0 43,8 47,8 49,8 52,5 2,8 p.p.
Female 52,2 50,9 50,9 51,9 53,0 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 25,4 24,6 23,1 22,5 24,1 1,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 71,5 69,3 69,2 70,2 71,0 0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11,2 12,6 15,6 18,9 21,2 2,3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2154 2160 2207 2295 2350 55 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,3 54,9 55,6 56,1 56,1 0,0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,7 45,1 44,4 43,9 43,9 0,0 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,1 -0,2 1,4 2,3 2,1 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1,7 0,3 2,2 4,0 2,4 p.p.
Male 1,8 1,4 3,4 4,9 2,4 p.p.
Female 1,6 -1,1 0,6 2,8 2,4 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 6,8 8,5 9,3 9,4 9,7 0,2 p.p.
Male 9,1 11,4 12,8 12,6 13,2 0,6 p.p.
Female 4,1 5,0 5,0 5,4 5,2 -0,2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 4,7 5,4 4,9 5,0 5,0 0,0 p.p.
Male 5,0 5,8 5,0 4,9 4,9 0,0 p.p.
Female 4,4 4,9 4,8 5,0 5,1 0,1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 2,2 2,5 2,4 2,7 2,5 -0,2 p.p.
Male 1,1 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,0 -0,2 p.p.
Female 3,6 4,0 3,9 4,5 4,3 -0,2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 17,6 18,2 16,3 13,4 11,1 -2,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33,4 33,1 30,1 26,6 20,3 -6,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 15,1 16,1 14,5 11,9 10,2 -1,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 13,5 15,4 13,4 9,8 8,2 -1,6 p.p.
Male 17,4 17,4 15,5 12,3 9,9 -2,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,8 34,7 31,0 26,4 20,4 -6,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 14,5 14,7 13,3 10,5 8,6 -1,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 14,7 15,6 13,2 9,9 7,8 -2,1 p.p.
Female 17,7 19,2 17,2 14,7 12,7 -2,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,7 31,1 28,8 27,0 20,2 -6,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 15,7 17,6 15,8 13,5 12,0 -1,5 p.p.
Older (55-64) 9,9 15,0 14,0 9,5 9,0 -0,5 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 65,2 64,8 72,1 76,4 74,3 -2,1 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40,6 40,8 41,0 40,1 40,3 0,4 %
Male 41,4 41,8 42,0 41,3 41,5 0,5 %
Female 39,6 39,5 39,7 38,6 38,7 0,2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -9,7 0,8 -1,9 -8,1 -5,8 p.p.
Building and construction 6,9 3,6 3,2 2,9 8,1 p.p.
Services 1,3 -0,2 2,5 3,7 1,7 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 2,0 -0,9 -0,8 1,0 3,2 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Slovak Republic
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 8,2 8,4 9,7 7,9 8,3  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 10,6 2,8 6,6 8,6 6,4  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 9,8 5,8 8,5 7,4 7,6 6,6 8,2 7,7 8,1
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 4,4 2,8 4,3 1,7 0,2  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,9 -2,9 1,9 -1,2 -0,9  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 11,0 9,4 8,8 10,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 48,2 46,7 48,0 46,8 46,5  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 26,4 26,3 24,7 25,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73,6 73,7 75,3 75,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 61,9 62,8 65,1 64,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,9 42,5 38,3 38,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 40,3 38,1 33,8 34,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 25,5 25,1 23,7 24,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 0,9 1,2 0,9 0,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 3,6 5,5 5,1 6,1 8,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 7,3 2,4 3,0 6,8 6,4  :    :    :    :   
GDP 4,8 5,2 6,6 8,5 10,4 8,3 9,3 9,4 14,3
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 16,5 15,5 14,3 12,9 12,0  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -3,2 -3,4 -3,2 -1,6 1,9  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 8,4 7,5 2,8 4,3 1,9 2,1 1,7 1,4 2,4
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 7,4 6,5 1,7 2,1 1,9 1,9 1,7 1,6 2,5
GDP deflator 5,3 5,9 2,4 2,9 1,1 3,4 1,3 2,4 -2,4
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 1,9 0,0 7,8 4,7 27,6  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -2,5 -3,9 2,3 2,6 5,1  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -4,8 -4,3 -5,0 0,1 -8,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction 41,2 14,3 -4,5 -0,1 16,3  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 8,9 1,8 11,8 2,7 9,8  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 14,7 20,3 18,0 3,9 23,6  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 8,5 28,9 15,2 10,0 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 5,5 -0,4 1,0 -1,4  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 11,3 12,4 13,7 11,9 19,4  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 19,0 2,0 22,0 29,2 8,2  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 11,9 12,2 10,5 12,5 22,5  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 8,8 7,9 6,9 7,9 10,9  :    :    :    :   
Construction 15,0 12,9 12,1 11,5 12,4  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 10,3 10,9 13,7 7,6 17,3  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,8 14,5 11,1 17,7 20,3  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 12,2 13,4 17,3 10,4 20,5  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 16,8 2,0 13,2 23,3 -15,2 -13,0 -12,0 -14,6 -21,7
Industry excluding construction 14,8 16,7 7,9 9,7 16,6 14,3 17,7 15,5 18,7
          of which: manufacturing 14,4 12,7 12,5 7,8 20,5 22,8 20,6 19,2 19,9
Construction -18,6 -1,3 17,4 11,5 -3,4 5,7 -2,0 -6,5 -9,0
Trade, transport and 1,2 9,0 1,7 4,7 6,8 16,6 9,8 1,2 1,4
Finance and business services -9,4 -4,9 -5,9 13,2 -2,7 -16,2 -8,9 14,8 3,2
Non-market related services 3,5 -12,0 1,8 0,4 15,6 17,5 15,7 17,3 13,0
Market-related sectors 3,0 8,8 4,5 8,9 7,0 6,9 7,8 6,6 6,4
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Finland
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 5192 5205 5224 5242 5266 0,5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 3464 3467 3476 3484 3497 0,4 %
as % of total population 66,7 66,6 66,5 66,5 66,4 -0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 2580 2574 2597 2620 2642 0,8 %
Male 1337 1332 1338 1350 1358 0,6 %
Female 1243 1242 1259 1270 1284 1,1 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 74,5 74,2 74,7 75,2 75,6 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50,7 49,7 50,7 51,8 53,4 1,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,5 87,4 87,7 87,8 88,0 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53,7 54,9 56,6 58,5 58,8 0,3 p.p.
Male 76,8 76,4 76,6 77,1 77,2 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 51,4 50,5 50,9 52,6 53,3 0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 90,1 90,1 90,3 90,3 90,4 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55,3 55,6 56,9 58,8 59,1 0,3 p.p.
Female 72,2 72,0 72,8 73,3 73,8 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50,0 48,9 50,4 51,0 53,6 2,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84,8 84,5 85,1 85,3 85,6 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 52,2 54,3 56,4 58,2 58,4 0,2 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 67,7 67,6 68,4 69,3 70,3 1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,7 39,4 40,5 42,1 44,6 2,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81,1 81,0 81,7 82,4 83,4 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 49,6 50,9 52,7 54,5 55,0 0,5 p.p.
Male 69,7 69,7 70,3 71,4 72,1 0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,1 39,4 40,4 42,6 44,5 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,3 83,8 84,4 85,2 86,0 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 51,0 51,4 52,8 54,8 55,1 0,3 p.p.
Female 65,7 65,6 66,5 67,3 68,5 1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,2 39,4 40,6 41,6 44,7 3,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78,9 78,2 78,9 79,6 80,6 1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 48,3 50,4 52,7 54,3 55,0 0,7 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2345 2345 2378 2416 2459 42 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51,7 51,8 51,6 51,7 51,6 -0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 48,3 48,2 48,4 48,3 48,4 0,2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,1 0,4 1,4 1,8 2,2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0,4 0,0 1,4 1,6 1,8 p.p.
Male -0,3 0,1 1,1 1,7 1,5 p.p.
Female -0,5 -0,1 1,7 1,5 2,1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 7,9 7,9 8,0 8,0 7,6 -0,3 p.p.
Male 9,7 9,8 9,9 10,2 9,7 -0,5 p.p.
Female 5,9 5,9 5,9 5,6 5,5 -0,2 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 16,3 16,1 16,4 16,3 15,8 -0,5 p.p.
Male 12,6 12,6 12,8 12,5 12,2 -0,3 p.p.
Female 20,0 19,5 20,0 20,0 19,4 -0,6 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 12,6 13,2 13,2 13,5 13,4 -0,1 p.p.
Male 8,0 8,4 8,6 8,6 8,3 -0,3 p.p.
Female 17,4 18,3 18,2 18,7 18,8 0,0 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9,0 8,8 8,4 7,7 6,9 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21,8 20,7 20,1 18,7 16,5 -2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,2 7,3 6,8 6,1 5,3 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,6 7,3 6,9 6,8 6,3 -0,4 p.p.
Male 9,2 8,7 8,2 7,4 6,5 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21,9 22,0 20,6 19,0 16,4 -2,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,5 7,0 6,5 5,6 4,9 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,7 7,4 7,2 6,9 6,8 -0,1 p.p.
Female 8,9 8,9 8,6 8,1 7,2 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21,6 19,3 19,5 18,4 16,6 -1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,0 7,6 7,2 6,6 5,8 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,6 7,1 6,6 6,7 5,9 -0,8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 25,5 24,3 26,1 25,6 23,0 -2,6 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,1 37,0 37,1 36,9 36,8 -0,3 %
Male 39,5 39,2 39,2 39,2 39,0 -0,5 %
Female 34,5 34,5 34,6 34,3 34,2 -0,3 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -1,8 -2,0 -0,4 0,3 -1,2 p.p.
Building and construction 0,5 2,3 4,6 4,1 8,0 p.p.
Services 1,0 1,3 1,5 1,9 2,4 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,4 -2,5 0,2 0,8 0,3 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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Finland
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,8 3,6 3,8 2,9 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3,3 3,4 4,2 3,0 4,6  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,9 2,3 5,3 1,9 3,1 3,0 2,3 2,3 4,6
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 1,1 0,2 2,3 -0,2 1,1  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 1,5 -0,4 1,9 -1,4 -1,3  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 2,2 2,8 4,1 3,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1,6 0,7 2,4 -0,1 1,2  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 62,4 62,0 63,3 62,3 61,2  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 22,2 22,2 22,1 22,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 77,9 77,8 77,9 78,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 67,0 65,8 66,0 66,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45,0 44,5 44,6 44,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 41,9 41,2 41,5 41,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 20,6 21,0 20,9 20,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1,5 1,2 1,2 1,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1,7 3,3 1,4 3,0 2,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 2,1 3,1 1,8 3,3 3,1  :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,8 3,7 2,8 4,9 4,4 5,4 5,1 3,6 3,7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8,3 7,7 7,2 6,8 6,4  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,5 -1,1 -1,6 -0,2 0,8  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,3 0,1 0,8 1,3 1,6 1,4 1,4 1,6 2,0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,3 -0,1 0,3 0,8 1,4 1,3 1,4 1,6 1,3
GDP deflator -0,4 0,6 0,4 1,3 2,5 2,1 2,0 2,8 3,0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 4,7 -0,9 -2,7 2,5 -11,5  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -2,5 -2,8 0,4 -5,2 -1,4  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -2,7 -2,9 0,0 -6,0 -2,3  :    :    :    :   
Construction 0,8 1,8 6,0 2,4 0,5  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 0,1 -1,3 0,2 -2,2 1,1  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 5,7 0,9 5,5 4,4 4,6  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 5,2 4,5 4,2 3,4 1,8  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 0,6 -1,0 1,8 -3,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2,8 3,6 3,7 2,9 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery -0,2 2,3 1,8 1,4 5,1  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,6 4,6 3,8 3,7 3,7  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,5 4,7 3,8 3,9 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,8 2,9 2,7 3,0 -0,1  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 2,4 2,8 3,3 2,0 2,3  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 3,5 3,9 3,7 2,7 3,2  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 3,4 3,5 4,1 2,7 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -4,7 3,1 4,6 -1,1 18,8 28,1 24,2 12,6 12,5
Industry excluding construction 5,2 7,7 3,4 9,3 5,2 7,4 3,9 5,6 3,7
          of which: manufacturing 5,3 7,8 3,8 10,4 5,8 8,8 5,0 6,6 2,9
Construction 1,9 1,1 -3,0 0,6 -0,6 1,2 2,7 -5,3 0,2
Trade, transport and 2,4 4,1 3,1 4,3 1,1 3,0 -0,7 1,3 1,5
Finance and business services -2,1 3,0 -1,8 -1,6 -1,4 -1,3 -1,8 -1,2 -2,1
Non-market related services -1,7 -1,0 0,0 -0,7 1,2 1,6 1,4 1,8 -0,2
Market-related sectors 2,0 4,7 1,7 4,4 2,4 4,4 1,7 1,8 1,6
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Sweden
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 8969 9006 9041 9084 9147 0,7 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 5821 5855 5898 5951 6002 0,9 %
as % of total population 64,9 65,0 65,2 65,5 65,6 0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 4501 4519 4614 4687 4750 1,3 %
Male 2341 2353 2411 2452 2482 1,2 %
Female 2160 2165 2203 2235 2268 1,5 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 77,3 77,2 78,2 78,8 79,1 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47,7 47,2 49,9 51,3 52,2 0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,7 87,7 88,8 89,4 90,0 0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 71,9 72,7 72,7 72,8 72,8 0,0 p.p.
Male 79,2 79,1 80,5 81,2 81,4 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47,3 47,1 49,0 50,8 51,8 0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 89,9 90,0 91,7 92,5 92,9 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 74,9 75,6 76,4 76,0 76,2 0,2 p.p.
Female 75,4 75,2 75,9 76,3 76,8 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 48,3 47,3 50,8 51,9 52,7 0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,4 85,3 85,9 86,3 87,1 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 68,9 69,7 69,0 69,6 69,4 -0,2 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 72,9 72,1 72,3 73,1 74,2 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41,2 39,2 39,0 40,3 42,2 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,5 82,9 83,5 84,7 86,1 1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 68,5 69,1 69,5 69,6 70,0 0,3 p.p.
Male 74,2 73,6 74,3 75,5 76,5 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,4 38,6 38,2 40,2 42,0 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,3 85,0 86,1 87,8 89,1 1,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 70,8 71,2 72,4 72,3 72,9 0,6 p.p.
Female 71,5 70,5 70,2 70,7 71,8 1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 42,1 39,7 39,7 40,4 42,3 1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81,7 80,9 80,8 81,5 83,0 1,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 66,3 67,0 66,7 66,9 67,0 0,0 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 4242 4220 4263 4352 4453 101 Th.
Male (as % of total) 51,7 51,9 52,2 52,4 52,4 0,0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 48,3 48,1 47,8 47,6 47,6 0,0 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) -0,6 -0,7 0,3 1,7 2,2 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -0,2 -0,5 1,0 2,1 2,3 p.p.
Male -0,2 -0,2 1,6 2,5 2,3 p.p.
Female -0,3 -0,8 0,4 1,6 2,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 5,7 6,0 6,0 6,0 5,8 -0,2 p.p.
Male 7,9 8,4 8,2 8,1 7,7 -0,4 p.p.
Female 3,4 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,7 0,0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 14,9 15,3 15,7 17,0 17,2 0,2 p.p.
Male 12,5 13,3 13,6 15,0 14,7 -0,3 p.p.
Female 17,2 17,3 17,6 18,9 19,7 0,8 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 22,0 22,8 23,5 23,6 23,5 -0,1 p.p.
Male 10,0 10,8 10,4 10,3 10,3 0,0 p.p.
Female 34,9 35,7 37,7 38,3 38,0 -0,2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 5,6 6,3 7,4 7,0 6,1 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13,7 17,0 21,9 21,5 19,3 -2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,8 5,4 6,0 5,3 4,4 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,7 4,9 4,4 4,4 4,0 -0,4 p.p.
Male 6,0 6,5 7,5 6,9 5,8 -1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 14,5 18,0 22,0 21,0 18,8 -2,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,1 5,6 6,0 5,2 4,1 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 5,5 5,8 5,2 4,9 4,3 -0,5 p.p.
Female 5,2 6,1 7,4 7,2 6,4 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 12,8 16,0 21,8 22,0 19,8 -2,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,4 5,2 5,9 5,5 4,7 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,8 4,0 3,4 3,8 3,5 -0,3 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 17,7 19,3 17,0 15,3 14,0 -1,4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 35,4 35,4 35,6 35,5 35,5 0,1 %
Male 37,9 37,9 38,3 38,1 38,1 0,1 %
Female 32,4 32,4 32,4 32,4 32,4 0,2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -6,4 -3,7 -4,6 -2,8 3,1 p.p.
Building and construction -1,7 0,6 3,2 6,6 5,7 p.p.
Services 0,2 0,2 0,5 2,0 2,3 p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,9 -4,6 -1,1 -0,7 0,5 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures	
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Sweden
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3,2 4,0 3,1 2,2 4,2  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 4,5 2,2 3,2 2,4 3,4  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4,9 3,2 3,2 1,6 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 0,6 -0,8 0,1 -0,2 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1,3 -1,1 -0,8 -2,0 0,5  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries 1,2 2,3 3,9 4,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 1,3 -0,1 0,6 0,0 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 69,9 68,9 68,3 67,0 67,4  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 33,5 33,8 33,8 33,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 66,5 66,2 66,2 66,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 57,5 57,2 57,2 57,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 48,2 48,4 47,9 47,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45,3 45,5 45,2 44,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 29,6 30,6 30,6 30,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 3,9 3,3 3,3 3,3 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2,5 4,9 3,0 2,3 0,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 3,4 3,3 3,1 2,6 -0,6  :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,9 4,1 3,3 4,1 2,6 2,8 2,9 2,5 2,1
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 5,9 5,9 6,1 5,9 5,7  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -1,2 0,1 0,6 1,5 0,6  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,3 1,0 0,8 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,4 1,4 2,3
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,3 0,8 0,2 0,5 1,8 1,4 1,7 2,0 2,2
GDP deflator 1,9 0,2 0,9 1,8 3,3 3,1 3,4 3,1 3,7
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery -4,6 -5,4 4,0 -10,4 8,7  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -1,5 -7,0 -3,6 -1,8 3,4  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -3,7 -7,2 -2,4 -3,5 3,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,4 -0,5 0,6 1,6 4,6  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -0,4 -1,5 -3,4 -2,3 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -1,7 1,8 -0,8 0,5 7,4  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 5,7 2,3 0,5 3,5 3,4  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors -1,5 -2,6 -0,4 -1,7  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 3,6 4,0 1,3 2,5 4,8  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 2,5 5,9 3,8 3,2 4,2  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 4,7 6,1 1,5 2,9 5,4  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 4,0 6,1 3,2 2,2 4,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction 0,7 3,9 1,9 2,5 4,5  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 3,7 3,3 1,0 1,6 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,1 5,1 1,1 2,2 6,0  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 4,8 2,9 1,3 2,7 4,0  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery 7,4 11,9 -0,2 15,1 -4,2 2,7 -6,9 -8,6 -3,7
Industry excluding construction 6,2 14,1 5,3 4,7 2,0 0,3 2,5 2,2 1,5
          of which: manufacturing 8,0 14,4 5,8 5,9 1,5 0,8 2,6 1,3 1,3
Construction -1,6 4,4 1,3 0,9 -0,1 -0,7 -1,3 0,1 1,8
Trade, transport and 4,2 4,8 4,5 4,0 0,4 2,0 1,4 1,4 -0,4
Finance and business services 2,9 3,3 1,9 1,7 -1,3 -1,1 0,3 -1,3 -1,5
Non-market related services -0,8 0,6 0,8 -0,8 0,7 -0,4 0,1 1,3 0,1
Market-related sectors 4,2 7,3 3,6 3,6 0,1 0,2 0,7 0,3 -0,2
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: United Kingdom
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 58135 58285 58421 58588 58776 0,3 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 38177 38364 38529 38777 38994 0,6 %
as % of total population 65,7 65,8 66,0 66,2 66,3 0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 28715 28846 28997 29293 29362 0,2 %
Male 15503 15514 15545 15667 15704 0,2 %
Female 13212 13332 13452 13626 13659 0,2 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 75,2 75,2 75,3 75,5 75,3 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 63,0 62,9 61,9 61,9 60,9 -0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,7 83,7 84,1 84,5 84,4 -0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 57,2 57,9 58,5 59,1 59,4 0,2 p.p.
Male 82,3 82,0 81,9 82,1 81,9 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 66,0 65,4 64,7 64,3 63,6 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,3 91,0 91,1 91,6 91,5 -0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 67,4 68,1 68,3 68,4 69,0 0,6 p.p.
Female 68,3 68,6 68,8 69,2 68,9 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 60,0 60,5 59,1 59,4 58,3 -1,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,4 76,7 77,4 77,6 77,6 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47,3 47,9 49,0 50,2 50,1 -0,2 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 71,5 71,6 71,7 71,5 71,3 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 55,3 55,4 54,0 53,2 52,1 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,6 80,8 81,2 81,1 81,3 0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 55,4 56,2 56,9 57,4 57,4 0,1 p.p.
Male 77,7 77,8 77,6 77,3 77,3 0,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 56,9 56,6 55,3 54,1 53,4 -0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 87,6 87,7 87,8 87,9 88,1 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 64,8 65,7 66,0 66,0 66,3 0,3 p.p.
Female 65,3 65,6 65,9 65,8 65,5 -0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 53,7 54,1 52,5 52,2 50,9 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,8 74,2 74,8 74,6 74,7 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 46,3 47,0 48,1 49,1 49,0 -0,1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 27277 27485 27610 27711 27798 87 Th.
Male (as % of total) 53,7 53,6 53,4 53,3 53,3 0,0 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 46,3 46,4 46,6 46,7 46,7 0,0 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,7 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0,7 0,8 0,5 0,4 0,3 p.p.
Male 0,7 0,5 0,1 0,2 0,4 p.p.
Female 0,7 1,0 0,9 0,6 0,2 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9,2 9,3 9,4 9,6 9,8 0,2 p.p.
Male 12,3 12,6 12,6 12,8 13,1 0,2 p.p.
Female 5,6 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 0,1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 6,0 5,9 5,6 5,6 5,7 0,0 p.p.
Male 5,2 5,3 5,1 5,0 5,1 0,1 p.p.
Female 6,7 6,4 6,2 6,3 6,3 0,0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 24,8 24,9 24,4 24,4 24,4 -0,1 p.p.
Male 8,9 9,1 9,1 9,2 9,4 0,2 p.p.
Female 43,3 43,2 41,9 41,8 41,5 -0,3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 4,9 4,7 4,8 5,4 5,3 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 12,3 12,0 12,8 14,1 14,4 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,8 3,5 3,4 4,0 3,8 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 3,2 2,8 2,7 3,0 3,2 0,2 p.p.
Male 5,5 5,0 5,2 5,7 5,6 -0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 13,9 13,3 14,5 15,9 16,0 0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 4,1 3,7 3,6 4,1 3,7 -0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 4,0 3,5 3,4 3,5 4,0 0,4 p.p.
Female 4,3 4,2 4,3 4,9 4,9 0,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 10,5 10,6 11,0 12,1 12,7 0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 3,4 3,2 3,2 3,9 3,8 -0,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,0 1,9 1,9 2,3 2,2 -0,1 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 21,4 20,4 21,0 22,3 23,8 1,5 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 35,7 35,7 35,7 35,7 35,7 0,1 %
Male 40,7 40,5 40,4 40,3 40,2 -0,1 %
Female 29,8 29,9 30,2 30,2 30,3 0,2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -4,9 2,6 : : : p.p.
Building and construction 4,6 4,7 : : : p.p.
Services 1,8 1,5 : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -4,7 -4,3 -5,1 -3,1 -1,9 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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United Kingdom
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 4,9 4,3 4,3 5,0 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 5,2 4,4 4,7 4,7 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 4,5 6,8 3,5 3,6 5,3 5,7 4,6 6,0 4,3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3,0 2,0 3,5 2,9 1,5  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,1 -0,5 1,1 0,2 -1,5  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 3,6 2,6 4,1 3,7 2,4  :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 72,9 72,5 73,0 73,1 72,1  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 19,7 20,0 20,8  :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 80,3 80,0 79,2 : :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 69,0 69,0 70,2 : :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 33,3 33,4 33,5 33,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 30,9 31,0 31,2 31,6 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 17,6 18,1 18,4 : :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2,1 2,0 2,5 : :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1,8 2,2 0,8 2,0 2,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 2,9 2,5 0,7 2,3 3,0  :    :    :    :   
GDP 2,8 3,3 1,8 2,9 3,0 4,3 3,1 2,6 2,2
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 5,0 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,1  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) 0,1 0,7 -0,1 0,0 0,4  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,4 1,3 2,0 2,3 2,3 2,8 2,6 1,8 2,1
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,3 1,1 1,4 1,4 1,9 1,9 2,1 1,7 1,8
GDP deflator 3,1 2,6 2,3 2,7 3,1 2,4 3,0 3,5 3,5
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 0,3 -0,4 0,0 2,2 2,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries -4,7 6,3 3,9 4,9 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 5,5 6,1 4,2 6,8 4,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing 5,1 6,6 4,2 4,6 2,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: European Union (25 countries)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 443204 445154 447945 456090 458016 0,4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 302114 303184 305384 306805 308062 0,4 %
as % of total population 68,2 68,1 68,2 67,3 67,3 0,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 209508 210921 214751 216870 218437 0,7 %
Male 116540 116939 118558 119441 120032 0,5 %
Female 92969 93983 96193 97429 98405 1,0 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 69,3 69,6 70,3 70,7 70,9 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,9 44,6 45,2 45,1 45,1 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,3 83,6 84,1 84,5 84,7 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,9 43,8 45,6 46,6 47,5 0,9 p.p.
Male 77,4 77,4 77,9 78,0 78,1 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 48,4 47,9 48,6 48,4 48,3 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,9 91,9 92,1 92,3 92,3 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53,6 54,3 55,6 56,4 57,3 0,9 p.p.
Female 61,3 61,8 62,8 63,4 63,7 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 41,4 41,1 41,8 41,7 41,7 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74,7 75,3 76,1 76,7 77,0 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32,7 33,8 36,1 37,4 38,3 0,9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 63,0 63,1 64,0 64,8 65,8 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,9 36,4 36,9 37,4 38,2 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,6 76,7 77,4 78,4 79,3 1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40,0 40,7 42,6 43,7 44,9 1,2 p.p.
Male 70,9 70,7 71,3 72,1 73,0 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,7 39,2 39,8 40,3 41,1 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,2 85,1 85,6 86,4 87,2 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 50,0 50,5 51,9 52,8 54,1 1,3 p.p.
Female 55,2 55,5 56,6 57,6 58,6 1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 34,0 33,5 33,9 34,4 35,2 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67,9 68,4 69,3 70,4 71,5 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,6 31,4 33,8 35,0 36,1 1,1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 190403 191295 195316 198906 202622 3716 Th.
Male (as % of total) 56,0 55,8 55,6 55,5 55,3 -0,2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 44,0 44,2 44,4 44,5 44,7 0,2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,4 0,7 1,0 1,6 1,8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0,8 0,5 2,1 1,8 1,9 p.p.
Male 0,3 0,2 1,7 1,6 1,6 p.p.
Female 1,4 0,9 2,6 2,1 2,2 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9,1 9,9 9,8 9,8 9,7 -0,1 p.p.
Male 11,1 12,0 11,9 11,8 11,8 -0,1 p.p.
Female 6,5 7,2 7,2 7,2 7,2 -0,1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 13,1 13,6 14,5 15,0 15,1 0,1 p.p.
Male 12,3 13,0 14,1 14,4 14,4 0,0 p.p.
Female 13,9 14,4 15,1 15,6 15,8 0,3 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 16,5 17,2 17,7 18,0 18,2 0,2 p.p.
Male 6,0 6,3 6,6 6,9 7,0 0,1 p.p.
Female 29,9 31,0 31,6 31,8 32,1 0,2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 9,0 9,0 8,9 8,2 7,2 -1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,9 18,3 18,5 17,1 15,3 -1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8,1 8,2 8,0 7,2 6,3 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,6 7,0 6,5 6,3 5,6 -0,7 p.p.
Male 8,3 8,3 8,3 7,5 6,5 -1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,9 18,2 18,3 16,7 14,9 -1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,3 7,4 7,1 6,4 5,5 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,7 7,0 6,7 6,3 5,5 -0,7 p.p.
Female 9,8 9,9 9,7 9,0 7,9 -1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,9 18,5 18,7 17,6 15,7 -1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,1 9,2 9,0 8,2 7,2 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,5 6,9 6,4 6,3 5,7 -0,6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 44,6 44,1 45,5 44,9 42,2 -2,7 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,4 37,4 37,5 37,3 37,3 0,0 %
Male 40,6 40,8 40,9 40,7 40,7 -0,1 %
Female 33,1 33,0 33,1 32,9 32,9 0,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture : : : : : p.p.
Building and construction : : : : : p.p.
Services : : : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry : : : : : p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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European Union (25 countries)
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3,1 2,9 2,5 2,8 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3,5 2,7 2,9 3,1 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,6 3,4 3,0 2,9 3,6 3,3 3,3 3,6 3,8
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,0 1,0 1,5 1,3 1,9  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,3 -1,2 -0,6 -0,8 -0,7  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66,5 65,9 65,7 65,3 64,9  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45,4 45,2 44,7 44,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,1 42,0 41,7 42,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1,1 1,9 1,0 1,5 1,2  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,6 1,7 1,1 1,7 1,2  :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,4 2,6 2,0 3,2 3,0 3,5 2,7 2,8 2,4
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8,7 8,5 8,2 7,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,7 -0,4 -0,7 -0,1 0,3  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 1,9 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,3 2,2 2,1 2,0 2,9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,9 2,0 1,5 1,5 2,1 1,9 2,0 2,0 2,3
GDP deflator 2,3 2,3 2,1 2,1 2,5 2,8 2,9 2,7 1,9
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 4,2 -8,5 6,8 1,8 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -1,4 -1,0 0,0 -0,1 0,4  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,6 3,7 3,7 1,9 4,2  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -0,5 1,0 1,2 0,4 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -0,3 2,2 2,1 2,4 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,8 3,1 2,8 3,2 2,4  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors -0,6 0,3  :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 0,9 3,0 2,4 2,7 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 2,4 3,1 2,8 3,2 3,7  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 0,9 3,4 2,0 3,3 2,8  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,8 3,8 2,9 3,2 3,5  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 0,2 2,7 2,3 2,1 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 0,7 2,5 2,8 2,9 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,4 3,2 2,5 2,4 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -1,8 12,6 -3,8 1,4 1,0 2,0 -0,2 0,0 1,6
Industry excluding construction 2,4 4,4 2,0 3,4 2,4 2,3 2,4 3,1 2,7
          of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction 0,2 0,1 -0,8 1,3 -0,6 2,7 -1,7 -2,0 -1,0
Trade, transport and 0,7 1,7 1,1 1,7 1,6 3,2 2,0 1,3 1,1
Finance and business services 1,0 0,3 0,7 0,4 -0,1 0,7 0,1 0,3 0,0
Non-market related services -0,4 0,1 -0,2 -0,8 0,3 0,5 0,8 0,6 0,1
Market-related sectors 1,4 2,4 1,2 2,0 1,3 2,2 1,4 1,4 1,3
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: European Union (15 countries)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 376462 378356 380946 382884 384942 0,5 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 251406 252279 254281 255498 256734 0,5 %
as % of total population 66,8 66,7 66,7 66,7 66,7 0,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 176249 177672 181110 183301 184902 0,9 %
Male 98581 98897 100262 101135 101715 0,6 %
Female 77668 78775 80848 82166 83187 1,2 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 70,1 70,4 71,2 71,7 72,0 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47,2 47,0 47,8 47,9 47,9 0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,3 83,7 84,2 84,7 84,9 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,3 45,3 47,2 48,4 49,3 1,0 p.p.
Male 78,5 78,5 79,0 79,2 79,3 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 50,5 50,3 51,1 51,1 51,0 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92,5 92,4 92,6 92,8 92,8 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 54,9 55,7 56,9 57,7 58,5 0,9 p.p.
Female 61,7 62,4 63,5 64,3 64,8 0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 43,8 43,7 44,5 44,6 44,8 0,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74,1 74,9 75,8 76,5 77,0 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 34,1 35,3 37,9 39,4 40,5 1,1 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 64,4 64,6 65,4 66,2 66,9 0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,0 39,5 39,9 40,3 40,8 0,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 77,3 77,5 78,1 79,0 79,7 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 41,5 42,3 44,2 45,3 46,6 1,2 p.p.
Male 72,7 72,5 73,0 73,6 74,2 0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 42,7 42,3 42,7 43,1 43,5 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86,6 86,3 86,7 87,3 87,8 0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 51,3 52,0 53,3 54,1 55,3 1,2 p.p.
Female 56,2 56,7 57,8 58,7 59,7 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37,2 36,7 37,0 37,4 38,0 0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 68,0 68,7 69,6 70,6 71,6 1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32,0 32,9 35,5 36,9 38,1 1,3 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 161982 162863 166234 169016 171831 2815 Th.
Male (as % of total) 56,3 56,1 55,7 55,6 55,4 -0,2 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 43,7 43,9 44,3 44,4 44,6 0,2 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,5 0,7 1,0 1,5 1,6 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0,9 0,5 2,1 1,7 1,7 p.p.
Male 0,3 0,1 1,5 1,4 1,3 p.p.
Female 1,7 1,1 2,8 2,0 2,1 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 8,3 9,3 9,4 9,4 9,3 -0,1 p.p.
Male 10,2 11,4 11,4 11,4 11,3 -0,1 p.p.
Female 5,9 6,7 6,9 6,9 6,9 0,0 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 13,1 13,5 14,4 14,7 14,8 0,1 p.p.
Male 12,2 12,7 13,7 14,1 14,0 0,0 p.p.
Female 14,2 14,5 15,1 15,6 15,7 0,1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 18,2 19,0 19,5 20,0 20,2 0,3 p.p.
Male 6,2 6,6 6,9 7,3 7,4 0,1 p.p.
Female 33,6 34,8 35,4 35,8 36,1 0,3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 7,9 8,0 8,1 7,7 7,0 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15,3 16,0 16,6 15,9 14,9 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,2 7,4 7,2 6,8 6,1 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,4 6,8 6,3 6,2 5,6 -0,6 p.p.
Male 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,1 6,4 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15,4 15,8 16,4 15,6 14,6 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,4 6,6 6,4 6,0 5,3 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,5 6,7 6,4 6,1 5,5 -0,6 p.p.
Female 8,7 8,9 8,9 8,5 7,7 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 15,2 16,2 16,8 16,3 15,2 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8,2 8,3 8,1 7,7 7,0 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,3 6,9 6,3 6,4 5,8 -0,6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 41,4 41,0 41,8 42,1 40,2 -1,8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 36,8 36,8 36,9 36,7 36,7 -0,1 %
Male 40,3 40,5 40,7 40,4 40,4 0,0 %
Female 32,1 32,0 32,1 31,9 31,9 0,1 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2,3 -2,7 : : : p.p.
Building and construction 0,7 1,4 : : : p.p.
Services 1,2 1,4 : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -2,0 -1,9 -1,7 -0,7 0,0 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
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European Union (15 countries)
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,9 2,7 2,4 2,8 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3,2 2,5 2,9 3,0 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index)  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,2 1,0 1,6 1,4 1,6  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,2 -1,0 -0,5 -0,7 -0,8  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity 2,6 1,4 1,9 1,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66,7 66,2 66,0 65,7 65,2  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45,5 45,2 44,8 44,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,1 42,0 41,7 42,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0,7 1,6 0,8 1,4 1,1  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,2 1,4 1,2 1,5 1,2  :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,2 2,3 1,7 2,9 2,7 3,3 2,5 2,6 2,2
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 7,7 7,6 7,4 7,3  :    :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,6 -0,4 -0,7 -0,1 0,2  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,0 2,0 2,1 2,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,8 1,8 1,5 1,5  :    :    :    :    :   
GDP deflator 2,4 2,1 2,0 2,1 2,4 2,8 2,6 2,4 1,4
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 5,8 -9,7 7,2 1,6 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -1,0 -0,8 -0,3 0,2 0,3  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 0,4 -0,8 -0,7 -0,4 -0,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,8 3,6 3,6 1,8 3,6  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -0,3 1,0 1,1 0,4 0,8  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -0,2 2,2 2,0 2,4 2,5  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,9 3,0 2,5 3,1 2,1  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors -0,3 0,4  :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 1,0 3,0 2,2 2,8 2,6  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 2,0 1,8 2,1 2,9 2,7  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,2 3,7 1,9 3,7 2,9  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,8 3,4 2,0 3,8 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Construction 2,1 3,6 2,5 3,4 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 0,3 2,6 2,3 2,2 2,3  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,0 2,6 2,7 2,9 2,4  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,3 3,1 2,3 2,3 2,5  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -3,6 12,6 -4,8 1,3 1,7 3,4 1,3 1,4 2,0
Industry excluding construction 2,2 4,5 2,2 3,5 2,6 2,4 2,3 3,0 2,3
          of which: manufacturing 2,4 4,3 2,7 4,2 3,4  :    :    :    :   
Construction 0,3 -0,1 -1,1 1,5 -0,5 2,5 -2,0 -2,0 -0,8
Trade, transport and 0,5 1,5 1,2 1,8 1,5 3,1 1,9 1,1 0,6
Finance and business services 1,2 0,4 0,7 0,6 -0,2 0,7 -0,1 0,1 -0,1
Non-market related services -0,6 0,1 -0,2 -0,8 0,5 0,4 0,9 0,4 0,1
Market-related sectors 1,1 2,3 1,1 2,0 1,3 2,2 1,2 1,2 0,9
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Euro Area
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 304030 305733 308088 309797 313603 1,2 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 203890 204548 206288 207201 209577 1,1 %
as % of total population 67,1 66,9 67,0 66,9 66,8 -0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 140291 141551 144654 146446 148931 1,7 %
Male 79269 79586 80801 81500 82564 1,3 %
Female 61022 61965 63852 64946 66367 2,2 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 68,8 69,2 70,1 70,7 71,1 0,4 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,1 43,9 44,7 44,6 44,7 0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,0 83,5 84,0 84,5 84,8 0,3 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40,6 41,6 43,8 45,1 46,3 1,2 p.p.
Male 77,7 77,8 78,3 78,5 78,6 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47,6 47,4 48,2 48,1 48,0 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 92,8 92,7 92,9 93,1 93,0 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 51,5 52,3 53,8 54,7 55,6 1,0 p.p.
Female 59,9 60,6 61,9 62,8 63,5 0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,5 40,2 41,0 40,9 41,3 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,2 74,1 75,1 75,9 76,5 0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,1 31,3 34,3 35,9 37,3 1,3 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62,7 62,8 63,8 64,8 65,7 1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,8 36,2 36,8 37,3 38,0 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,4 76,6 77,3 78,3 79,2 0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 37,5 38,3 40,6 41,8 43,3 1,5 p.p.
Male 71,6 71,3 71,9 72,7 73,4 0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,9 39,4 40,0 40,6 41,2 0,6 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 86,4 86,1 86,4 87,1 87,7 0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 47,7 48,4 49,9 50,9 52,3 1,4 p.p.
Female 53,8 54,3 55,7 56,8 58,0 1,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33,6 32,9 33,5 33,8 34,7 0,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 66,3 67,1 68,2 69,4 70,6 1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 27,7 28,6 31,7 33,1 34,7 1,6 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 127819 128528 131654 134192 137780 3589 Th.
Male (as % of total) 57,1 56,8 56,4 56,2 55,9 -0,3 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 42,9 43,2 43,6 43,8 44,1 0,3 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,5 0,7 1,0 1,6 1,8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 1,0 0,6 2,4 1,9 2,7 p.p.
Male 0,2 0,0 1,7 1,6 2,2 p.p.
Female 2,1 1,3 3,4 2,4 3,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 8,4 9,6 9,6 9,6 9,4 -0,1 p.p.
Male 10,0 11,3 11,4 11,3 11,2 -0,1 p.p.
Female 6,2 7,2 7,4 7,3 7,2 -0,1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 14,8 15,3 16,3 16,8 16,8 0,0 p.p.
Male 13,7 14,3 15,6 16,0 15,9 0,0 p.p.
Female 16,0 16,5 17,2 17,7 17,8 0,0 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 16,5 17,5 18,4 18,9 19,1 0,3 p.p.
Male 5,4 5,8 6,3 6,7 6,9 0,1 p.p.
Female 31,3 32,8 33,9 34,4 34,7 0,3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8,7 8,8 8,9 8,3 7,4 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16,5 17,5 17,6 16,4 15,0 -1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8,0 8,2 8,0 7,4 6,6 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,4 7,9 7,4 7,2 6,3 -0,9 p.p.
Male 7,7 7,9 8,0 7,4 6,6 -0,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 16,1 16,9 16,9 15,6 14,2 -1,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,9 7,2 7,0 6,4 5,7 -0,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,2 7,5 7,2 6,9 5,9 -0,9 p.p.
Female 9,8 10,0 9,9 9,3 8,4 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 17,1 18,2 18,5 17,5 16,0 -1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,4 9,5 9,2 8,6 7,7 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 7,8 8,5 7,7 7,8 6,9 -0,8 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 44,3 43,8 44,5 45,4 43,5 -1,9 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,2 37,2 37,3 37,0 37,0 0,0 %
Male 40,5 40,7 40,9 40,6 40,5 -0,1 %
Female 32,8 32,6 32,5 32,3 32,3 0,2 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -2,2 -2,9 -1,2 -1,5 : p.p.
Building and construction 0,3 1,0 2,9 2,6 : p.p.
Services 1,2 1,5 1,4 2,2 : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -1,5 -1,4 -1,2 -0,4 0,3 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figuresre
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Euro Area
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 2,5 2,2 1,9 2,3 2,4  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 2,8 2,0 2,5 2,6 2,6  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,1 2,5 2,7 2,5 2,7 2,4 2,7 2,8 3,1
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only)  :  :    :    :    :   2,05 2,32 2,15 2,12
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,0 0,9 1,2 1,1 1,5  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,2 -1,1 -0,8 -0,9 -0,7  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 65,0 64,5 64,1 63,7 63,3  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 0,4 1,4 0,7 1,2 0,9  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 0,8 1,2 1,2 1,3 0,8  :    :    :    :   
GDP 0,9 2,1 1,7 2,8 2,7  :    :    :    :   
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8,4 8,2 8,0 7,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,8 -0,6 -0,9 -0,2 0,2  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,1 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,9
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,0 2,1 1,5 1,5 2,0 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,3
GDP deflator 2,3 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,2  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 7,0 -11,4 7,4 2,1 2,2  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 0,6 -1,2 -0,5 -0,3 -0,3  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 0,6 -0,5 -0,8 -0,6 -1,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction 3,3 3,3 3,0 1,3 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 2,0 0,3 0,8 0,3 0,6  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,8 2,2 1,6 2,3 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 3,1 2,1 2,0 2,5 2,0  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 2,3 2,1 1,8 2,2 2,1  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 2,5 1,2 1,7 2,6 3,1  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,3 2,9 1,8 3,4 2,2  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 2,4 3,0 1,7 3,5 2,5  :    :    :    :   
Construction 3,1 2,9 2,0 3,4 3,0  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 1,9 1,4 1,7 1,6 1,7  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 2,5 1,7 2,3 2,2 1,7  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 2,5 2,4 1,8 1,6 2,3  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -4,3 14,2 -5,3 0,5 0,9  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,7 4,1 2,2 3,7 2,5  :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing 1,8 3,6 2,5 4,1 3,6  :    :    :    :   
Construction -0,2 -0,3 -1,0 2,1 -0,9  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and -0,1 1,1 0,9 1,3 1,0  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 0,7 -0,5 0,6 -0,1 -1,4  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services -0,6 0,3 -0,2 -0,9 0,2  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 0,6 1,9 1,0 1,8 0,7  :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Bulgaria
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 7821 7786 7747 7706 7673 -0,4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 5308 5306 5283 5238 5198 -0,8 %
as % of total population 67,9 68,1 68,2 68,0 67,7 -0,2 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 3233 3277 3281 3376 3448 2,1 %
Male 1711 1741 1751 1782 1820 2,2 %
Female 1522 1535 1530 1595 1628 2,1 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 60,9 61,8 62,1 64,5 66,3 1,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28,8 28,9 27,9 28,9 28,9 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 79,1 79,9 80,2 82,3 84,5 2,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,9 36,2 38,0 43,0 45,7 2,7 p.p.
Male 65,4 66,4 67,0 68,8 70,6 1,8 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,5 31,8 31,1 31,3 31,7 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 81,8 82,9 83,3 85,1 87,5 2,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 45,6 47,2 49,9 53,6 55,3 1,7 p.p.
Female 56,5 57,2 57,3 60,2 62,1 1,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26,1 25,9 24,5 26,4 26,0 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,4 76,8 77,2 79,4 81,4 2,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 23,8 26,8 27,8 33,9 37,2 3,4 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 52,5 54,2 55,8 58,6 61,7 3,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20,7 21,5 21,6 23,2 24,5 1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 69,2 71,2 73,0 75,7 79,4 3,7 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,0 32,5 34,7 39,6 42,6 3,0 p.p.
Male 56,0 57,9 60,0 62,8 66,0 3,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 21,7 23,2 23,9 25,4 27,1 1,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 71,4 73,5 75,7 78,6 82,5 4,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 40,5 42,1 45,5 49,5 51,8 2,3 p.p.
Female 49,0 50,6 51,7 54,6 57,6 2,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19,6 19,6 19,4 21,0 21,8 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67,1 68,8 70,3 72,8 76,2 3,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 21,0 24,2 25,5 31,1 34,5 3,4 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 2785 2877 2947 3072 3209 137 Th.
Male (as % of total) 52,6 52,8 53,2 52,9 53,0 0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 47,4 47,2 46,8 47,1 47,0 -0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 3,0 2,6 2,7 3,3 2,8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 2,8 3,3 2,4 4,2 4,5 p.p.
Male 3,4 3,6 3,2 3,7 4,6 p.p.
Female 2,2 2,9 1,5 4,9 4,3 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 8,6 8,5 8,2 7,6 6,9 -0,6 p.p.
Male 10,5 10,5 9,9 9,1 8,3 -0,7 p.p.
Female 6,4 6,3 6,3 5,9 5,3 -0,6 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 6,4 7,3 6,3 6,1 5,1 -1,0 p.p.
Male 6,9 7,7 6,6 6,2 4,8 -1,4 p.p.
Female 6,0 6,9 6,1 6,0 5,4 -0,6 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 1,9 2,0 1,8 1,7 1,4 -0,3 p.p.
Male 1,5 1,7 1,5 1,2 1,1 -0,2 p.p.
Female 2,3 2,4 2,2 2,2 1,9 -0,3 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 13,7 12,0 10,1 9,0 6,9 -2,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28,2 25,8 22,3 19,5 15,1 -4,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 12,5 10,9 9,0 8,0 6,1 -2,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11,5 10,3 8,6 7,9 6,8 -1,0 p.p.
Male 14,1 12,5 10,3 8,6 6,5 -2,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 31,0 27,0 23,4 18,9 14,5 -4,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 12,7 11,3 9,1 7,7 5,7 -2,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 11,1 10,7 8,8 7,6 6,4 -1,2 p.p.
Female 13,2 11,5 9,8 9,3 7,3 -2,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 24,8 24,3 21,0 20,3 15,9 -4,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 12,2 10,4 9,0 8,3 6,5 -1,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 12,1 9,6 8,3 8,3 7,4 -0,9 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 65,5 59,5 59,9 55,8 59,2 3,4 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 40,5 40,6 40,6 41,1 41,1 0,1 %
Male 41,0 41,1 41,1 41,6 41,7 0,1 %
Female 40,1 40,1 40,2 40,4 40,5 0,3 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture -0,8 -0,8 -1,5 -1,3 -0,9 p.p.
Building and construction 2,1 7,3 17,0 25,1 9,7 p.p.
Services 6,4 4,2 3,7 3,4 3,6 p.p.
Manufacturing industry 0,1 2,2 2,2 3,3 2,8 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figurese	
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Bulgaria
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 5,1 4,9 5,9 7,4 17,9  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 6,5 3,7 7,3 9,1 19,0  :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 7,4 5,4 5,3 5,4 17,0 14,7 15,8 17,5 18,4
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 3,0 1,0 2,4 4,4 14,2  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. 1,2 -4,0 -1,3 -3,8 5,9  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries -1,0 7,6 13,9 10,2  :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 57,0 56,0 56,0 54,5 56,8  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 27,0 27,5 24,9 21,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 73,0 72,5 75,1 78,5 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) 62,3 61,9 65,3 69,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 39,0 38,9 38,9 35,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 34,4 38,9 32,4 29,4 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 25,8 25,2 24,0 20,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 1,1 2,3 0,9 0,7 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 2,0 3,9 3,5 2,9 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 2,7 2,5 3,8 3,5 3,3  :    :    :    :   
GDP 5,0 6,6 6,2 6,3 6,2 6,2 8,1 5,6 7,7
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 14,4 12,8 11,0 9,3 7,7  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) 0,0 1,1 1,4 1,6 1,4  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,3 6,1 6,0 7,4 7,6 5,3 4,7 9,0 11,2
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 1,8 5,9 3,6 8,1 8,2 6,6 5,9 9,1 11,3
GDP deflator 1,8 5,1 3,8 8,5 7,9 7,6 4,2 8,0 8,3
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 7,4 2,1 21,1 8,5 56,0  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -5,1 0,4 4,9 5,7 8,7  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing -4,4 2,1 3,4 2,6 13,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,9 -5,1 3,0 15,0  :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication 8,2 0,4 0,6 1,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 4,0 12,1 12,7 11,9  :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 13,1 7,4 2,6 8,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 1,4 0,7 4,7 3,6  :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 5,1 4,7 5,8 7,4 17,9  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 5,7 5,4 11,2 8,8 10,6  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,1 1,5 6,6 9,0 19,9  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 5,4 1,7 8,0 10,5 21,2  :    :    :    :   
Construction 5,9 -1,0 -3,3 1,2 25,3  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 8,3 1,6 5,0 5,2 17,1  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 5,2 6,7 18,7 14,3 15,9  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 5,6 9,8 3,6 6,3 16,4  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -1,6 3,2 -8,1 0,2 -29,1 0,5 -6,2 -43,4 -35,5
Industry excluding construction 6,5 1,1 1,6 3,1 10,3 4,9 10,7 11,6 13,6
          of which: manufacturing 10,3 -0,4 4,5 7,7 7,0 8,9 12,4 13,0 14,7
Construction 0,0 4,2 -6,1 -11,9  :   -2,2 -1,2 7,8 21,5
Trade, transport and 0,1 1,1 4,4 3,3  :   -1,1 4,7 -1,1 3,1
Finance and business services 1,2 -4,8 5,3 2,1  :   -3,2 1,0 3,0 1,5
Non-market related services -6,6 2,3 0,9 -2,3  :   2,0 2,5 5,8 3,6
Market-related sectors 3,1 2,0 2,4 2,9 -60,8 1,8 5,9 -1,7 5,0
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: Romania
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 21686 21638 21609 21575 21551 -0,1 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 14933 14964 15021 15035 15046 0,1 %
as % of total population 68,9 69,2 69,5 69,7 69,8 0,1 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 9293 9434 9355 9566 9483 -0,9 %
Male 5125 5195 5180 5287 5261 -0,5 %
Female 4168 4239 4176 4278 4222 -1,3 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 62,2 63,0 62,3 63,6 63,0 -0,6 p.p.
Young (15-24) 32,9 35,8 31,2 30,6 30,5 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 78,0 78,3 78,2 79,9 79,0 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38,8 37,9 40,4 42,8 42,4 -0,4 p.p.
Male 69,3 70,0 69,4 70,7 70,1 -0,5 p.p.
Young (15-24) 37,5 40,5 35,9 35,1 35,9 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 85,8 85,7 85,8 87,1 85,9 -1,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 44,6 44,9 48,4 52,0 52,1 0,1 p.p.
Female 55,3 56,2 55,3 56,6 56,0 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 28,2 31,0 26,5 25,9 24,9 -1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 70,1 70,9 70,7 72,6 72,0 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,6 31,9 33,5 34,8 33,9 -0,9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 57,6 57,7 57,6 58,8 58,8 0,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 26,4 27,9 24,9 24,0 24,4 0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 73,1 72,9 73,3 74,7 74,6 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 38,1 36,9 39,4 41,7 41,4 -0,3 p.p.
Male 63,8 63,4 63,7 64,6 64,8 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 29,9 30,7 28,2 27,3 28,3 1,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 80,1 79,2 80,0 80,8 80,6 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 43,5 43,1 46,7 50,0 50,3 0,3 p.p.
Female 51,5 52,1 51,5 53,0 52,8 -0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 22,9 25,1 21,6 20,6 20,2 -0,4 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 66,0 66,6 66,5 68,6 68,5 -0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 33,3 31,4 33,1 34,5 33,6 -0,9 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 8602 8635 8651 8838 8842 5 Th.
Male (as % of total) 54,8 54,5 55,0 54,7 55,0 0,3 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 45,2 45,5 45,0 45,3 45,0 -0,3 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,0 -1,7 -1,5 2,8 1,3 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) -2,6 0,4 0,2 2,2 0,1 p.p.
Male -2,1 -0,3 1,2 1,6 0,6 p.p.
Female -3,3 1,2 -1,0 2,9 -0,6 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 18,2 16,0 17,2 16,6 17,0 0,4 p.p.
Male 23,6 21,4 22,7 22,0 22,2 0,2 p.p.
Female 11,7 9,6 10,5 10,1 10,6 0,5 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 2,0 2,5 2,4 1,8 1,6 -0,2 p.p.
Male 2,2 2,9 2,8 2,0 1,7 -0,3 p.p.
Female 1,7 2,1 1,9 1,6 1,5 -0,1 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 10,2 9,5 9,2 8,6 8,6 0,0 p.p.
Male 9,8 9,3 9,1 8,7 8,3 -0,3 p.p.
Female 10,7 9,8 9,2 8,5 8,9 0,5 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 7,0 8,1 7,2 7,3 6,4 -0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 19,6 21,9 20,2 21,4 20,1 -1,3 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,3 6,9 6,4 6,4 5,6 -0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 1,7 2,8 2,5 2,6 2,3 -0,3 p.p.
Male 7,6 9,1 7,8 8,2 7,2 -1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 20,3 24,2 21,5 22,3 21,1 -1,2 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 6,7 7,6 6,7 7,2 6,2 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 2,5 4,0 3,4 3,8 3,5 -0,4 p.p.
Female 6,4 6,9 6,4 6,1 5,4 -0,7 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,7 18,9 18,4 20,2 18,7 -1,5 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 5,8 6,2 6,0 5,5 4,9 -0,6 p.p.
Older (55-64) 0,9 1,3 1,2 0,9 0,7 -0,2 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 62,1 58,9 56,7 57,7 49,9 -7,9 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 39,8 40,0 40,1 39,8 39,7 -0,2 %
Male 41,0 41,0 41,0 40,7 40,7 0,0 %
Female 38,5 38,7 39,0 38,8 38,6 -0,5 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture 6,3 -13,1 -1,5 : : p.p.
Building and construction -0,4 11,2 5,8 : : p.p.
Services -3,1 6,6 0,0 : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry -3,7 2,7 -5,2 -0,2 -0,3 p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figuresre
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Romania
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 28,3 13,9 22,1 17,8 20,2  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 25,4 25,2 18,8  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 16,4 16,3 14,6 19,1 23,4 24,1 24,1 23,8 22,3
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 21,9 3,3 15,4 12,3 14,8  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -1,7 -10,2 2,8 1,3 3,6  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 68,1 60,6 63,2 63,6 66,2  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs 27,4 26,0 26,5 28,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL 72,6 74,0 73,5 72,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs) : 66,8 66,4 65,2 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 46,2 45,8 44,0 43,7 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 41,5 41,7 40,9 0,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs) 24,8 23,1 25,0 26,1 :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs) 2,6 2,9 1,5 1,8 :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 5,3 10,3 5,8 4,9 4,7  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 7,0 9,8 5,4  :    :    :    :    :    :   
GDP 5,2 8,5 4,2 7,9 6,0 6,1 5,7 5,7 6,6
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 6,5 6,8 6,9 6,9 6,6  :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -2,0 1,7 1,1 3,4 3,0  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 15,3 11,9 9,1 6,6 4,9 3,9 3,9 5,1 6,8
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 15,1 12,2 6,3 5,8 5,5 5,6 5,1 4,9 6,5
GDP deflator 24,0 15,0 12,2 10,8 10,8 6,2 8,0 11,5 14,4
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 21,5 -52,1 111,4  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -6,5 4,2 35,6  :    :    :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing 15,3 11,7 20,0 -22,1 16,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction -7,1 8,8 30,9  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -8,6 -3,8 25,8  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 1,6 7,5 28,5  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 12,4 25,4 31,4  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 6,8 5,6 43,8 21,0 27,2  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 20,3 -34,6 77,4  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 2,3 8,4 46,7  :    :    :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing 25,9 17,4 31,4 -18,9 21,0  :    :    :    :   
Construction -0,1 6,7 36,1  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 3,5 0,9 40,3  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -9,2 -4,1 39,7  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 22,6 18,4 38,9  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -1,0 36,6 -16,1  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 9,4 4,0 8,2  :    :    :    :    :    :   
          of which: manufacturing 9,1 5,1 9,5 4,1 4,3  :    :    :    :   
Construction 7,5 -1,9 4,0  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 13,3 4,9 11,5  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -10,6 -10,8 8,7  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 9,1 -5,5 5,7  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors 4,5 13,3 5,3  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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Work Status of persons: European Union (27 countries)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 * Changes2006-2007 * in
1 Population (total) 1000 pers. 472734 474595 477301 485371 487241 0,4 %
2 Population   (working age:15-64) 322355 323443 325688 327078 328307 0,4 %
as % of total population 68,2 68,2 68,2 67,4 67,4 0,0 p.p.
3 Labour force (15-64) 1000 pers. 222248 223813 227388 229812 231368 0,7 %
Male 123470 123954 125489 126510 127113 0,5 %
Female 98779 99858 101899 103302 104254 0,9 %
4 Activity rate (as % of population 15-64) 68,9 69,2 69,8 70,3 70,5 0,2 p.p.
Young (15-24) 44,1 43,8 44,2 44,1 44,0 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 83,1 83,4 83,8 84,2 84,4 0,2 p.p.
Older (55-64) 42,6 43,4 45,3 46,4 47,3 0,9 p.p.
Male 76,9 76,9 77,3 77,6 77,6 0,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 47,6 47,3 47,6 47,4 47,3 -0,1 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 91,5 91,5 91,7 92,0 91,9 0,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 53,2 53,9 55,3 56,2 57,1 0,9 p.p.
Female 61,1 61,5 62,4 63,0 63,3 0,3 p.p.
Young (15-24) 40,5 40,3 40,6 40,6 40,6 0,0 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 74,6 75,2 75,9 76,5 76,9 0,4 p.p.
Older (55-64) 32,7 33,6 35,9 37,2 38,1 0,9 p.p.
5  Employment rate (as % of pop. 15-64) 62,7 62,8 63,5 64,5 65,4 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 36,1 35,7 36,0 36,4 37,2 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 76,4 76,5 77,2 78,2 79,1 1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 39,9 40,5 42,4 43,5 44,7 1,2 p.p.
Male 70,3 70,2 70,8 71,6 72,5 0,9 p.p.
Young (15-24) 39,0 38,5 38,8 39,4 40,2 0,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 84,8 84,7 85,2 86,0 86,8 0,8 p.p.
Older (55-64) 49,7 50,1 51,6 52,7 53,9 1,3 p.p.
Female 55,0 55,4 56,3 57,3 58,3 1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 33,2 32,8 33,0 33,4 34,2 0,7 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 67,9 68,4 69,2 70,3 71,5 1,1 p.p.
Older (55-64) 30,6 31,4 33,6 34,9 36,0 1,1 p.p.
6 Employed persons (age15-64 -Th. pers.) 201986 203005 206914 210815 214673 3858 Th.
Male (as % of total) 55,9 55,7 55,6 55,4 55,3 -0,1 p.p.
Female (as % of total) 44,1 44,3 44,4 44,6 44,7 0,1 p.p.
7 Employment growth ( %) (National accounts) 0,4 0,6 1,0 1,7 1,8 p.p.
Employment growth ( %) (LFS - age 15-64) 0,6 0,5 1,9 1,9 1,8 p.p.
Male 0,2 0,2 1,6 1,6 1,6 p.p.
Female 1,2 0,9 2,3 2,2 2,2 p.p.
8 Self employed (% of total employment ) 9,5 10,1 10,1 10,0 10,0 -0,1 p.p.
Male 11,6 12,4 12,3 12,2 12,1 -0,1 p.p.
Female 6,8 7,3 7,4 7,3 7,3 -0,1 p.p.
9 Temporary employment (as % total) 12,6 13,2 14,0 14,4 14,5 0,1 p.p.
Male 11,9 12,6 13,6 13,9 13,9 0,0 p.p.
Female 13,4 13,9 14,5 15,0 15,2 0,2 p.p.
10 Part-time (as % of total employment ) 16,0 16,7 17,1 17,4 17,5 0,2 p.p.
Male 6,1 6,4 6,6 6,9 6,9 0,0 p.p.
Female 28,7 29,6 30,2 30,4 30,6 0,2 p.p.
11 Unemployment rate (Harmonised:15-74) 8,9 9,0 8,9 8,1 7,1 -1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,1 18,6 18,6 17,3 15,5 -1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 8,1 8,2 7,9 7,2 6,2 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,5 6,9 6,4 6,2 5,5 -0,7 p.p.
Male 8,4 8,4 8,3 7,6 6,6 -1,0 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,1 18,6 18,5 17,0 15,2 -1,8 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 7,3 7,5 7,1 6,5 5,6 -0,9 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,6 7,0 6,6 6,2 5,5 -0,7 p.p.
Female 9,7 9,8 9,6 8,9 7,8 -1,1 p.p.
Young (15-24) 18,1 18,6 18,7 17,7 15,8 -1,9 p.p.
Prime age (25-54) 9,0 9,1 8,8 8,1 7,1 -1,0 p.p.
Older (55-64) 6,3 6,8 6,2 6,1 5,5 -0,6 p.p.
12 Long-term unemployment rate 
 (as % of total unemployment) 45,7 45,0 46,1 45,6 42,8 -2,8 p.p.
13 Worked hours (average actual weekly hours) 37,6 37,6 37,7 37,5 37,4 -0,1 %
Male 40,7 40,9 40,9 40,7 40,6 -0,2 %
Female 33,5 33,4 33,5 33,3 33,3 0,0 %
14 Sectoral employment growth
Agriculture : : : : : p.p.
Building and construction : : : : : p.p.
Services : : : : : p.p.
Manufacturing industry : : : : : p.p.
Source: Eurostat, labour force survey.
2007 *: preliminary	figures
235
stAtIstICAl ANNEX — Country tables
European Union (27 countries)
Indicator board on wage developments
annual percentage change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3 07-Q4
Different measures of wage/labour costs:
Compensation per employee 3,5 2,8 2,8 2,9 3,3  :    :    :    :   
Compensation of employees per Hour Worked 3,8 3,0 3,2  :    :    :    :    :    :   
Hourly labour costs (Eurostat labour cost index) 3,6 3,5 3,0 3,0 3,7 3,4 3,6 3,7 4,0
Negotiated wages (Euro-area only) : : : : : : : : :
Nominal Unit labour costs 2,3 0,8 1,7 1,4 2,0  :    :    :    :   
Real unit labour costs deflated by GDP deflator. -0,3 -1,7 -0,5 -0,9 -0,6  :    :    :    :   
Wage and salaries  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Compensation per employee adjusted by Total Factor Productivity  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Adjusted wage share (% of GDP at current market prices) 66,5 65,9 65,6 65,3 64,9  :    :    :    :   
Structure of labour costs
Share of indirect costs in total labour costs  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total wage (as a percentage of total labour costs) ANNUAL  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Direct remuneration and bonuses (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with no 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 45,4 45,2 44,7 44,9 :  :    :    :    :   
Total tax wedge (including employers SSC) - Married couple with 2 
children, 100% and 100% of AW 42,1 42,0 41,7 42,0 :  :    :    :    :   
Employers' social security contributions (as a percentage of total labour 
costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Other indirect costs (as a percentage of total labour costs)  :  :    :    :   :  :    :    :    :   
Memo items: determinants or benchmarks according to which wage developments can be assessed
Labour productivity (GDP/Person Employed) 1,1 2,0 1,1 1,5 1,3  :    :    :    :   
Hourly Labour Productivity 1,7 1,9 1,3  :    :    :    :    :    :   
GDP 1,5 2,7 2,1 3,3 3,1 3,5 2,8 2,8 2,4
ECFIN NAIRU estimate 8,7 8,5 8,2 7,8  :    :    :    :    :   
Output gap (%) -0,7 -0,3 -0,7 -0,1 0,3  :    :    :    :   
Headline inflation (harmonised consumer price index 1996=100) 2,1 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,2 2,2 2,1 3,0
Underlying inflation (exc. energy and unprocessed food) 2,0 2,1 1,5 1,6 2,2 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,4
GDP deflator 2,6 2,5 2,2 2,3 2,7 3,0 3,0 2,9 2,0
Sectoral breakdown of unit labour costs
Agriculture and fishery 7,0 -15,3 11,2 2,6 1,4  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction -1,4 -1,0 0,2 0,1 0,6  :    :    :    :   
         of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,5 3,8 3,9 2,0 4,2  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and communication -0,5 0,9 1,3 0,5 1,2  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services -0,3 2,1 2,2 2,5 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,9 3,1 2,9 3,3 2,6  :    :    :    :   
Market-related sectors  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of compensation per employee
Total industries 1,0 2,8 2,7 2,9 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Agriculture and fishery 3,0 -1,8 6,6 3,7 0,6  :    :    :    :   
Industry excluding construction 1,1 3,1 2,5 3,5 2,9  :    :    :    :   
of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction 1,8 3,6 2,9 3,3 3,9  :    :    :    :   
Trade, transport and 0,3 2,4 2,5 2,3 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Finance and business services 0,5 2,2 2,9 3,1 2,8  :    :    :    :   
Non-market related services 1,5 3,2 2,7 2,4 2,9  :    :    :    :   
Sectoral breakdown of labour productivity
Agriculture and fishery -3,7 15,9 -4,1 1,1 -0,7 1,1 -1,2 -1,7 0,3
Industry excluding construction 2,5 4,1 2,2 3,4 2,3 2,3 2,4 3,1 2,6
          of which: manufacturing  :  :    :    :    :    :    :    :    :   
Construction 0,2 -0,2 -0,9 1,3 -0,3 3,3 -1,3 -1,6 -0,8
Trade, transport and 0,8 1,5 1,2 1,7 1,7 3,4 2,1 1,4 1,1
Finance and business services 0,9 0,1 0,7 0,6 -0,1 0,8 0,2 0,3 -0,1
Non-market related services -0,3 0,1 -0,2 -0,9 0,3 0,5 0,9 0,6 0,1
Market-related sectors 1,3 2,6 1,3 2,1 1,3 2,3 1,5 1,4 1,2
Source: AMECO, Eurostat-National Account, ECB.
* Note: available on an annual basis only. 
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